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Ten years after the Guatemalan Peace Accords heralded the construction of a 
multi-ethnic democracy, corrupt neo-authoritarian regimes have derailed the Accords, 
continued state violence and impunity, and implemented neoliberal economic policies 
that have worsened poverty in Mayan highlands.  Strangely, war tattered and 
impoverished rural Mayans, including many who supported the revolutionary left in the 
1970s, provide these parties’ main base of support.  Stranger still is widespread support 
for ex-dictator general Ríos Montt, who stands indicted for genocide of Mayans in the 
1980s.  Mayan support for neo-authoritarians is usually viewed as either an expression of 
pure democratic free will or as the repression of revolutionary consciousness through fear 
and/or deception.  While the former ignores massive Mayan support for the left and 
trivializes decades of repression, the latter ignores important changes in Guatemalan 
political culture and erases Mayan agency.  My dissertation reframes this phenomenon by 
providing a critical genealogy of Mayan political imaginaries in relation to overlapping 
and competing regimes of power for the last sixty years.  During 14 months of 
ethnographic fieldwork in the right-dominated Mayan-Mam town of San Pedro Necta, I 
investigated Mayan responses to reformist and revolutionary organizing, state repression, 
 ix 
state-led agrarian modernization, and neo-authoritarian development populism.  I focus 
on the effects of these mechanisms on evolving conceptions and practices of politics, 
development, and community among township inhabitants.  Bitter Earth locates the 
appeal of neo-authoritarian politics in the ways that state strategies have rearranged the 
conceptual and affective terrain upon which Mayans collectively struggle for economic 
security, dignity, and racial equality. This research shows the limits of neoliberal 
multiculturalism, particularly its complicity with colonial governance and 
counterinsurgency strategy, and orients our thinking towards political alternatives 
consistent with Mayans’ long-term struggles for racial justice and community autonomy.  
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Theorizing Neo-authoritarian Populism in Guatemala 
ELECTORAL MAYHEM IN HUEHUETENANGO, 2003 
When General Ríos Montt, Guatemala’s ex-dictator-turned-presidential candidate, 
arrived in the highland town of San Pedro Necta in September 2003 at the peak of 
electoral season to speak at a campaign rally, he was not ready for the hostility that 
awaited him.  In addition to the hundreds of supporters congregated in the municipal 
fútbol field that day, carrying blue and white banners for Ríos Montt’s party, the Frente 
Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), were hundreds of angry men, armed with machetes 
and farming tools, who wanted a piece of him.  Ríos was forced to cancel the rally and 
make an emergency landing in a nearby town.  The angry men were former members of 
the patrulleros de autodefensa civil (civil self-defense patrols, known as the ‘PAC’ or ex-
PAC) a state mandated paramilitary organization formed by Ríos Montt in 1982 and 
disbanded in 1996 by the Peace Accords. Although all ex-PAC were promised payment 
for service by the FRG leadership months before, the payment was now being politicized, 
only going to FRG affiliates, including many too young to have ever patrolled.1 Events in 
San Pedro were small slices of a violent and contested electoral season, Guatemala’s 
sixth since the democratic transition began in 1986, and the second since the Peace 
Accords. 
The civil patrols were a crucial element in the army’s approach to 
counterinsurgency, the centerpiece of which was an incomprehensibly brutal wave of 
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massacres in hundreds of highland villages known as the tierra arrasada (scorched earth) 
campaign, launched after Ríos Montt took power by coup in 1981.  In the wake of the 
massacres, rural men between the ages of 16 and 60 were forced by threat of 
imprisonment, torture, or death to patrol in search of guerrilla combatants in their midst 
for one 24-hour shift a week. The decision to pay each civil patroller Q5,2412 was, 
second only to his inscription as a candidate, the most hotly contested element of Ríos 
Montt’s presidential campaign, which was riddled with illegality and chicanery. The FRG 
was regularly derided by the national press, civil society organizations, and by 
international donor countries (including the US State Department) for a laundry list of 
electoral ‘fouls.’  In June of that year, FRG supporters, masked and armed, shut down the 
capital to pressure the government to accept the legality of Ríos Montt’s candidacy, 
despite the fact that the constitution, ratified in 1985, specifically prohibits anyone who 
has taken power by coup from running for the presidency.3 The law was made 
specifically to block Ríos. These protests, known as Jueves Negro (Black Thursday), 
were organized by FRG leadership, among them Ríos’s daughter, Zury, a diputada 
(legislator) and wife of US senator Jerry Weller from Illinois. Afterwards, a supreme 
court, stacked by the FRG in the previous regime, overruled a lower court decision 
prohibiting Ríos Montt’s candidacy.4 Exasperated political opponents on the left 
complained that members of the PAC had committed numerous human rights abuses 
while those on the right warned that the payment would break the national budget.  Other 
charges included buying votes with public funds;5 bypassing legal channels to 
concentrate distribution of development projects to rural areas; and, the worst sin of all, 
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polarizing the population with a ‘populist’ discourse that sides with the poor masses 
against the rich.  For many Guatemalans, the primary scandal of Ríos Montt’s campaign 
concerned and his role during la violencia, the common name Guatemalans give to the 
period of intense repression from the late 1970s to 1983.  In fact, the same election year, 
a Spanish prosecutor had indicted Ríos for war crimes and genocide along with several 
retired generals, including two ex-presidents—Oscar Humberto Mejia Víctores and 
Romeo Lucas García (now dead). 
Despite vehement opposition to Ríos Montt in San Pedro over the politicization of 
the PAC payment and his violent past, the FRG’s local candidate for alcalde (mayor) 
handily won the election, gaining 2,230 votes out of over 7,000 cast—and over a 
thousand more than the second place candidate from the Partido de Accion Nacional 
(PAN).  With similar numbers, Ríos Montt likewise dominated in local votes for 
president, making San Pedro Necta part of a near FRG sweep of the predominantly 
Mayan rural highlands. The victory of Rios Montt’s party, the Frente Republicano 
Guatemalteco, FRG in local elections in 2003 effectively ended the reign of local Mayan 
activists who, since the late 1980s had supported center-Right parties, and had edged 
towards Mayan-centered and Leftist parties in 2003 elections. 
While the FRG was defeated in the 2003 national elections, their influence in the 
highlands increased. Ríos came in a distant 3rd place in the first round of votes for 
president, leaving him out of the national runoff, in which the right wing Oscar Berger, a 
sugar magnate from the right wing Grand National Alliance, (GANA) party, defeated 
Alvaro Colom, representing the center left National Unity of Hope, (UNE). 6  Although 
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many celebrated the defeat of the FRG, including Rigoberta Menchú, who subsequently 
joined the GANA government, the feeling of relief was premature: FRG victories in the 
highlands left them in control of Congress with forty-five diputados (legislators), 
compared to the GANA, which had 43.7  The FRG also won far more mayoralships than 
any other party (110 out of 237).8  Their influence on national politics remained intact. 
INTERROGATING MAYAN AUTHORITARIANISM 
This dissertation investigates why a so many rural Mayans—including many who 
once supported the revolutionary left in the 1970s—now, after democratization, align 
with corrupt neo-authoritarian regimes that implement neoliberal economic policies.   
Mayan support for the far right is typically viewed either as pure free choice or pure 
repression.  None of the existing explanations captures the specificity of Mayan support 
for the far right.  And few studies examine the agency of rural Mayans who have shifted 
political affiliations from the left to the right.9 
Guatemalan conservatives celebrate Mayan participation in neo-authoritarian 
parties.  They frame this participation as “support,” an expression of the democratic free 
will of a group that, in this narrative, never willingly supported the left.  Neoliberals in 
Guatemala and the US decry populist politics, especially the anti-rich, Mayan-centric 
discourse of Ríos Montt, but affirm them as democratic.  Reading Mayan participation in 
right-wing parties as “support” reinforces the powerful narrative, hegemonic in 
Guatemala and the US, that constructs Guatemala as a democratic nation, as good and 
legitimate as any other, deserving of sovereignty.  But this perspective contradicts 
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emerging accounts of widespread and enthusiastic Mayan investment in the revolution 
(McAllister 2003, Grandin 2004).  It also denies any impact of decades of extreme 
violence and intense militarization on Mayan politics (CEH 1999, REHMI 1998).10  
Likewise, the provocative assertion that Mayans only participated in the left due to 
coercion, and now blame the left for provoking the genocide (Stoll 1993) assigns no 
influence to Orwellian repression on shaping this public memory (Hale 1997).  
Leftists and politically engaged scholars contend that participation in the far-right 
stems from extreme violence and surveillance that have created a “culture of fear” which 
represses latent political dissent among Mayans (Green 1999; Manz 1994, 1991, 2001, 
2002; Sanford 2003).11 A good deal of work concerns the immediate psychological 
effects of violence on individuals and does not address the long-term effects on 
individuals and community political behavior (cfa Manz 1988, Carmack et al 1988). This 
analysis focuses our attention to the pervasive and continued effects of violence, but does 
not seem to fit the post-Accords era, which is characterized by more selective state 
violence, Truth Commissions, de-militarization, the Pan-Mayan movement, legalization 
of the left, state multiculturalism, and limited democratization. These constructions tend 
to assign an omnipotent functionality to state power and negate Mayan agency.12 This 
line of thought also downplays elements of Mayan politics that do not fit within the 
romanticized image of the ‘revolutionary Indian’ (cfa Carmack 1995). 
Other scholars emphasize ideological resonance.  For example, Annis (1987) 
argues that many Mayans see Ríos Montt as a vanguard for a rising Protestant moral 
order.  But it is unclear the role assigned to violence in this explanation, which is also 
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quite dated and based on questionable premises.13  Furthermore, it does not explain 
substantial support for the FRG among non-Protestant Mayans’ or the fact that Ríos 
Montt is widely hated in the highlands.   
Hale (2002, 2006) makes a stronger version of this argument.  He locates Mayan 
support for the FRG in a move by right wing parties to open a sanctioned space for 
indigenous politics, part of what he calls “neoliberal multiculturalism.” By using a 
Mayan-centric, anti-rich populist discourse, seeking Mayans to occupy key leadership 
positions in local politics, and providing development, Mayans have come to view the 
FRG as the “Mayan” party, most in tune with and responsive to their desires and 
sensibilities.  A critical take on the cultural politics in leftist organizations complements 
this argument.  Hale (1996, 2002) and Smith (1990b) argue that racism and 
authoritarianism in leftist groups, and their seeming inability to appreciate cultural 
difference, undermines the appeal of leftist organizations to rural Mayans.  
These arguments point to very important shifts in the Mayan-state relationship, 
but do not resolve the puzzle of neo-authoritarian political alignment.  If Mayans are 
persuaded by populism multiculturalism, why do so many rural Mayans still hate Ríos 
Montt, and think of him as a corrupt assassin?  Why do some Mayan communities 
consistently support the left?  Leftist groups have engaged in a substantial rethinking on 
the politics of cultural difference, and are also usually indigenous-run at the local level in 
highland towns.  Why do cultural criticisms seem to have less of an impact on right wing 
parties, which, in addition to being Ladino-run at the higher levels, are implicated in 
military atrocities against Mayans?14 Moreover, it is unclear how persistent state violence 
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and spatial control through violence and development works alongside multi-culturalist 
populist appeals in the formation of Mayan political subjectivities. The emphasis on 
‘consent’ tends to downplay the effects of ‘coercion’ still at work in Mayan towns.   
Bitter Earth reframes Mayan neo-authoritarianism by providing a critical 
genealogy of Mayan political imaginaries in relation to overlapping and competing 
regimes of power for the last sixty years.15 During 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork 
in the right-dominated Mayan-Mam town of San Pedro Necta, I examined Mayan 
responses to revolutionary organizing, state repression, state-led agrarian modernization, 
and neo-authoritarian development populism.  I focus on the effects of these mechanisms 
on evolving conceptions and practices of politics, development, and community among 
township inhabitants.  In particular, I focused my investigation in the following areas: 1) 
the narratives and strategies of the revolutionary left and contemporary leftist 
organizations in rural villages; 2) the application, symbolism and narration of state 
violence, both past and present forms; 3) how the state conceptualizes and implements 
infrastructural development, individual assistance, and individual capacity building 
programs; 4) the effects of these mechanisms on evolving conceptions and practices of 
politics, development, and community among township inhabitants; and 5) responses of 
rural Mayans, such as: endorsements, reconfigurations and resistance.  I locate the appeal 
of neo-authoritarian politics in the ways that state strategies have rearranged the 
conceptual and affective terrain upon which Mayans collectively struggle for economic 
security, personal dignity, racial justice and autonomy. I describe how neo-conservative 
politics gain traction from the ways that state violence and state development programs 
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resonate with and reshape Mayan conceptions and practices of politics, development, and 
community.  
This is not a primarily ideological transition akin to the ideal enshrined in the 
North American imaginary of democracy.  Highland politics is a series of visceral 
appeals in a game where life itself is what is constantly at stake, and in which life itself is 
understood by Mayans as threatened, fragile and in very short supply.  Mayan 
authoritarianism is a contingent outcome of Mayan struggles for a better life in a constant 
state of risk. State strategies seem to have succeeded, at least in part, in pitting Mayan 
pursuit of well-being against their collective political agency.  Instead of united in 
struggle against the state, Mayans compete for state resources.  Many simply look out for 
themselves. Neo-authoritarian politics thrive upon the most odious effects of racialized 
counter-insurgency mechanisms. Rather than ideological support for Ríos Montt, 
pervasive cynicism, fear, vulnerability, divisionism, and disrespect have led some to seek 
recourse in his party, which specializes in providing first aid for victims, many of whom 
are of its own making. I read Mayan authoritarianism as a symptom of social upheaval 
wrought by an ongoing counterinsurgency apparatus.  
In this dissertation, I locate contemporary Mayan conservatism in relationship to 
the broader dynamics in the opening and closing of spaces for Mayan political agency in 
the following interrelated spheres.  The first is the field of political narratives.  In the late 
1970s, many Mayans were hopeful about possibilities for social reform represented by 
the revolutionary movement and its promises of economic and racial justice. The 
revolutionary narrative embodied many Mayan understandings of how politics should 
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and could be made to work. I also examine how memorial practices and conditions 
shaping the contemporary circulation of discourses about the political past frame this 
revolutionary past and shape contemporary politics.  These rewritings are intimately 
connected with political affect, by which I mean Mayans’ sense of the efficacy of their 
own collective political agency.  I emphasize both active and reactive forms.  Next, I am 
concerned with local desires for development.  This includes both sense of self and 
definitions of well-being.  In speaking about sense of self, I am concerned with how one 
identifies socially, ways of distinguishing between persons, how one conceives of who 
one really is, their personal habits and beliefs, including notions of intelligent, moral or 
normal behavior and the forms of ethical and managerial relationships that one cultivates 
with ones’ self and with others.  In using the term well-being, I refer to the types of 
political and consumption practices one needs to engage in to survive, to be secure, to be 
comfortable and to be distinguished. The fourth area is community.  Here I mean not a 
seamless egalitarian unity, essential ethnic identity or bounded cosmovision—these never 
existed, and to the extent and in the manner that they did, form part of an irrecuperable 
past—but a shared sense of belonging and acting together based in reciprocity, language 
and kinship and shared experiences of discrimination, poverty and political struggle 
(Handy 1984a, 1994; Stepputat 2001; Watanabe 1992).16  A convergence of these 
configurations formed the ground for reformist politics in late 1970s (Grandin 2004, 
McAllister 2003), and therefore these constitute privileged frames through which to 
evaluate transformations in rural Mayan political culture.  
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FACING THE FUTURE WITH A BROKEN HEART 
Guatemalan history in the twentieth century reads like a tragedy without an 
ending.  In 1954, the Eisenhower administration, through the CIA, sponsored a coup 
against the democratically elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, who had 
begun to nationalize the fallow holdings of the United Fruit Company (UFCo) and 
distribute them to the peasantry.  Whether to protect UFCo investors, or to fight 
international communism, or both, is unclear.  What is clear is that the coup reversed the 
agrarian reform and criminalized and radicalized political dissent, initiating nearly four 
decades of the dirtiest and bloodiest internal war in Latin American history.  In the mid 
1970s, Marxist guerrilla organizations, inspired by the Cuban Revolution and the life and 
writings of Che Guevara and undaunted by the recent military defeat of leftist campesino 
organizations in eastern Guatemala, smuggled themselves across the border from Mexico 
with the dream of stirring up Mayan support for an armed confrontation with the state 
(Payeras 1983).17  Their promise was land and liberty for los pobres (the poor).  They saw 
land poor, starving, and socially marginalized indigenous as natural revolutionary 
subjects, prime material in need of ideological education and combat training.18  Indeed, 
many Mayans, some already politically seasoned by their participation in the Democratic 
Revolution, participated enthusiastically (Grandin 2004, McAllister 2003).  
The Guatemalan internal war, especially the period of la violencia, is a limit case 
in the intensive use of violence and surveillance to crush an internal enemy.  State 
counterinsurgency programs had two overarching objectives: to crush the revolutionary 
movement in Mayan villages and build a new, non-threatening rural Mayan political 
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culture, non-revolutionary, apolitical and identified with the state (Schirmer 1998).  In the 
same motion, counterinsurgent strategies aimed to separate Mayans from the guerrilla 
movement by conditioning life itself on political obedience (Schirmer 1998). Enraged, 
the army resorted to a campaign of massacres to instill widespread fear in the population.  
On March 23, 1982 Ríos Montt took power by military coup.  In a strategy known as 
Víctoria ’82, adopted in June of that year, ‘good’ Mayans were spared from violence and 
became eligible for benefits and protection in the same move. Ríos gave an infamous 
speech in which he offered rural Guatemalans a choice between “frijoles o fusiles” 
(beans or rifles). After he offered amnesty to those willing to renounce the guerrilla, the 
army unleashed its full fury in the Mayan highlands.  
After a first wave of violence, many more Mayan sought protection from the 
Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP) and later the 
Organización de la Población en Armas, (The Organization of the People in Arms, 
ORPA) who claimed to be able to defend them from the army (Stoll 1993, Falla 1992).  
Seeing their plan backfire, the military decided to pull out all of the stops to achieve their 
objective of spreading shockwaves of terror throughout the entire populace.   With 
extreme cruelty and a callous disregard for human dignity or for differences between 
civilians and combatants, the Guatemalan army set out to raze rural villages, massacring, 
torturing, and raping Mayans suspected to support the guerilla (REHMI 1998, CEH 1998, 
Falla 1992). Military planners, using information garnered from local spies and captured 
prisoners, marked communities with red pins on a war map indicating their “infection” 
with communism, and marking them for extermination (Schirmer 1998).  Some 1.5 
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million refugees fled, some into the mountains, some to neighboring Chiapas, Mexico, 
taking only what they could carry in their hands, often leaving people behind to die 
(Manz 1988) where most remained for the better part of a decade.   
Communities in the mountain, known as the comunidades de poblacion en 
resisténcia (communities of populations of resistance) the CPR’s were hunted.  The 
military strictly controlled the trade of salt, attempting to drive them out.  Anyone found 
transporting salt would be tortured, interrogated and them killed. A friend of mine from 
the CPR described to me how only newborn and sick infants would receive a dab salt on 
their tongue.  In the space of two years, over 75,000 people were slaughtered; including 
626 communities destroyed entirely, the houses burnt to the ground and all of their 
valuable belongings stolen  (REHMI 1998, CEH 1998).  In the entire war, 75,000 
Guatemalans were disappeared, taken away and never seen or heard from again, and the 
truth commission estimates that 200,000 were killed, 80% of them Mayans.  The military 
denied any knowledge and operated with complete authority and impunity for decades.  
Civilians comprised the vast majority of those killed in the tierra arrasada campaign. 
Military age, or at least sized, Mayan boys were grabbed in military raids, and shuttled 
into the military. There they were “remade” into soldiers, often by way of torture and 
humiliation, and regularly forced to commit atrocities.   
Shortly after the massacres, in the summer of 1982, the army ordered villagers to 
form civil patrols.  Officially these were ‘voluntary’ organizations; but whoever did not 
participate in the patrols was labeled as an enemy.  This warped reality—at once a 
massive human rights violation and a recipe for driving the violence into the recesses of 
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village life—ordered Mayans, on threat of death, to hunt down their own neighbors, a 
strategy which not only broke the back of the insurgency, but led to a huge number of 
civilian casualties and (Krueger and Enge 1985, Smith 1990a, Kobrak 1997). Making 
villagers responsible for policing their own neighbors amplified the threat of certain 
violence exponentially.  The patrollers also drew civilians deeper into the violence. In 
some towns, guerrillas and civil patrollers battled it out, creating many martyrs and bitter 
enmities on both sides.  The bitter legacy of social polarization still smolders. The civil 
patrollers shut down open political discourse almost immediately; no one could be certain 
who was and who was not a spy, who was or who was not a guerrilla, and who or who 
was not trying to accuse who or kill who for being one or the other. Anyone could 
denounce anyone to the military.  Many sent their neighbors to the military zone for 
personal revenge, like a simple land conflict. In addition to the civil patrols, displaced 
populations were rounded up and organized into “model communities” where their 
houses were arranged in a grid-like formation to facilitate surveillance (Schirmer 1998, 
Nelson 1999).  While under military control, thousands of monitored residents were 
subjected to ideological re-education and introduced into dependency relationships with 
the military. 
Guatemala began a transition to democracy in 1986, ratifying a new constitution 
and democratically electing Vinicio Cerezo their first president since Jacobo Arbenz, 
albeit to a state still run by the army.   Reform was on its way.  Reformist factions in the 
Guatemalan Government, mostly members of the landed elite, wanted to shed pariah 
status and rebuild their economy opted for a slow democratization and devolution of 
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military authority (Smith 1990a). In the early 1990s negotiations began between the 
URNG The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity and army generals.  These led to 
the Peace Accords, which, while limited, promised unheralded reforms of the military, 
society and the economy and a new era of political openness.19  The Patrols were 
disbanded, troops were redeployed from military garrisons to the zona militar; and the 
army itself was to be civilian controlled.  Human rights were now to be protected, 
including rights to education and economic welfare. The Accords located the causes of 
the war squarely in historic social and ethnic inequalities, and included an accord that 
called for the recognition that indigenous groups have the right to practice their identity. 
Guatemala was officially a multiethnic, multilingual and democratic nation. 
When negotiations were barely underway, refugees from the mountains and from 
Mexico returned by the thousands, staging a dramatic march through Guatemala City in 
1993 (North and Simmons 1999).  Since the Accords, many new groups have taken a 
visible leadership role in civil society, espousing ideas that before would have led to 
certain death, such as human rights, strong criticisms of the government; and even open 
revolutionary organizations were invited to participate in the apertura (democratic 
opening).  This has included a much different look at the past. Also notable were the 
Guatemalan Truth Commissions, the Comisión de Escaramiento Historico, (CEH) which 
provided the nation with a horrifying look at the scope of the violence and wrote a 
condemnation of the counterinsurgency into official national history (CEH 1998).  The 
CEH shocked the nation with the conclusion that genocide had been committed.   
Another report, REHMI, published soon afterwards by the Catholic Diocese, gave further 
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contextualization on the human cost, and went further to assess blame: 97% of the 
massacres, it found, were committed by the army, a stark contrast to the army’s official 
line that “both groups” were responsible.20  In 2000, the first national election after the 
Peace Accords, the National Guerrilla Unity party (URNG) won numerous mayoral races 
in the highlands and elected several representatives to congress.   
Also stepping into the national spotlight was the Pan Mayan movement (Smith 
1991; Bastos and Camus 199, 2003; Cojtí 1997; Fischer and Brown et al 1996; Warren 
1998a). Pan-Mayanism revalorizes all things Mayan in their diversity, including 
languages, architecture, agriculture, philosophy, poetry, notion of community—each 
viewed as elements of what Pan Mayanists refer to as their cosmovision.  A key symbolic 
victory for this movement came in 1992, Rigoberta Menchú won a Nobel Peace Prize for 
her activism, including her book I, Rigoberta Menchú,21 which describes her coming into 
revolutionary consciousness as a young indigenous girl and documents state violence 
against her family.   
Several Mayan organizations have emerged, many with wide following and their 
own publications.  Many rural Mayans are becoming literate in their own languages.  
Mayan activists also had an important, if unofficial, role in the political coalition to 
support the Peace Accords, and shaped their final language of the Accords, which calls 
for sovereignty for Mayan communities, whose distinct customs and practices, such as 
legal practices deserve recognition from the state. The Accords initiated a sustained 
national dialog about how to include the highland Mayan population in a democratic 
polity.  Young Mayan children now learn in bilingual schools that now teach in Mayan to 
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help them learn Spanish.  They also stipulate Mayans access to communication 
technology, such as radio and TV stations. There are several signs that the Pan Mayan 
movement continues to grow as more young Mayan professionals emerge and encounter 
and feel harmony with these ideas, disseminated by literally dozens of state, non-state, 
and international institutions and organizations, including many local organizations, each 
with their own particular visions of Mayan identity and culture.  In a process dubbed 
Mayanización rural Mayans have come to identify themselves as Mayan, as opposed to 
indígena, indicating a collective consciousness.  One small sign of this change is the 
common practices among young Mayan couples to give their children ‘Mayan’ names.  
Mayan power is unmistakably on display in highland Mayan communities, most of which 
are now run by Mayan mayors.  In the early 1990s, conservative political parties sought 
Mayan candidates for their parties, promising them power and development. 
There is also a growing feminist movement in Mayan communities (Blacklock 
1999, Torres 1999).  Women’s organizations have sprouted up in almost every town 
since the signing of the Accords, which included substantial language about women’s 
rights, although, many have noted, not an accord specifically addressing the dilemma of 
Guatemalan rural women.22 Women’s collectives call for women’s rights to speak their 
minds, to participate in community governance, to receive an education, to live free of 
violence, and to decide their reproduction, along with the rest of rights usually assumed 
only to pertain to men.  Many women have started economic cooperatives and participate 
in a growing number of development projects directed specifically towards women.  
Instead of a ‘foreign’ transplant, Mayan feminism is homemade, an outgrowth between 
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local notions of gender complementarity and political experiences during and after the 
war (Copeland 2005).23  Basic ideas about women’s equality are espoused by a majority 
of all women, regardless of political alignment. 
In the meantime, fledgling democratic reform efforts have hit a wall. 
Authoritarian populist parties—especially the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), 
led by the ex-dictator, general Ríos Montt—have derailed the Peace Accords while 
implementing the standard package of neoliberal reforms that have deepened poverty in 
the highlands (Jonas et al 2001, Jonas 2002, Robinson 2000, 2004).  Not everyone in 
Guatemala supported a democratic transition.  FRG leaders include many generals and 
colonels who did not want to negotiate the Peace Accords with a “defeated enemy.”24 
Members of these groups still voice vehement opposition to the Peace Accords, UN 
‘interference,’ and human rights. In addition to blocking the Peace Accords, including 
constitutional amendments legalizing many of the substantive measures just described,25 
these parties use political power for myriad anti-democratic purposes, including: 
impeding the prosecution of many military officials—including Ríos—of charges of 
genocide and war crimes; exorbitant military spending and military secrecy; continued 
operation of illegal death squads; targeted repression of social movements; outrageous 
acts of corruption and negligence; and even drug trafficking. The FRG ‘administration’ 
was a military-narco-kleptococracy of the most fantastic extremes; and even out of power 
they still do much as they please with impunity.  Octogenarian Ríos Montt is seeking 
protection from his Spanish arrest order by running for the president of congress, where 
he will enjoy legal immunity.   
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Strangely, this nefarious party’s main base of support comes from war-tattered 
and impoverished rural Mayans, including many who had previously fervently supported 
the revolutionary left.  The Guatemalan left, despite its new legality and persistent 
following in several rural Mayan towns, is fragmented, with their leftist parties, social 
movements and NGOs generating little following in the highlands.26  This diverges 
sharply from the trend sweeping across all Latin American, where rejection of neoliberal 
economic policies, especially in countries with strong indigenous movements, 27 has 
shifted power to a new left. What makes Guatemala different? 
 
GUATEMALAN APARTHEID  
Centuries of colonial governance in Guatemala have produced a racialized 
topography of power, the most unequal in the western hemisphere.28 Comprising 
somewhere between 50 and 70 percent of the total population, indigenous have existed 
simultaneously inside and outside of the nation-state. At the end of the 19th century the 
mantle of colonial control passed from the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church to 
internal elites. Creole nationalists, dedicated to replicating the dreams of modernity in the 
new world, did not end colonial relations with the country’s indigenous majority; they 
intensified it. Racialized dispossession enabled racialized exploitation.  In the 1870’s, 
Liberal president Justo Rufino Barríos drove Mayans off productive coffee land and 
instituted a system of forced labor (Handy 1984b).29 At the same time, the state 
empowered rural Ladinos as an intermediary class in rural towns, giving them the 
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responsibility of contracting indigenous labor and town governance, thereby creating a 
bulwark between the state and Mayans (Smith 1990c).  Guatemala’s indigenous 
population, along with others throughout the New World, have been periodically 
exterminated, systematically enslaved and exploited, frequently raped and reviled, and 
occasionally assimilated ever since the arrival of the Spanish (Smith 1991, 31).30  
Instead of trying to make Mayans into modern citizens—the purported goal of 
colonialism elsewhere—Guatemala’s Liberal governments in the 19th and 20th century 
followed a line of separatism and inequality more than mestizaje.  Rather than 
assimilaion, their goal was to freeze Mayans in their communities, maintaining their 
‘backwardness’ and hyperexploitation (Taracena 2005).31 Mestizaje describes the national 
project of the democratic regimes (1944-1954), which had a fundamentally Liberal view 
of race and assimilation, and therefore did not address founding inequalities, and whose 
reforms were largely swept away by the counterrevolution (Hale 2002).  These 
contradictions have led to generations of political mobilization from Guatemala’s 
indigenous population.   A high point in this mobilization was during the late seventies, 
when decades of Mayan local activism encountered the guerrilla movement.  Out of the 
ashes of counterinsurgency violence, new Mayan political organizations emerged, 
demanding both cultural and material rights.   Today, Mayan politicians dominate 
highland politics as representatives of right wing parties.   
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SAN PEDRO NECTA 
San Pedro is in many ways a typical Mayan town in Huehuetenango.  It is located 
in the foothills of the Cuchumatanes mountain chain, not too far from the Inter-American 
highway.  San Pedro is only an hour and a half from the southern border of Mexico.  
Sampedrano Mayans are Mames, Mam being the Mayan language, one of 21 in 
Guatemala, spoken in this region of Huehuetenango.  Most Mam speakers are bilingual, 
an important condition of possibility for my research.  The majority of Mayan 
Sampedranos live in poverty or extreme poverty.  The population of about 35,000 is bi-
ethnic.  Ladinos (Guatemalan mestizos) comprise about 8% of the population and live 
concentrated in the town center.  Indigenous tend to live in villages, where most live off a 
combination of subsistence farming, cash cropping, and day labor.  Economic and 
cultural differences between the two groups are vast.  Ladinos have both economic and 
cultural dominance of indigenous, although this pattern has been altered as more 
indigenous people enter the middle class and political authority.  Living for almost a year 
and half in San Pedro, an entire year in 2004 and two subsequent trips, allowed me to 
examine the micro-practices that comprise the interplay between governance and rural 
Mayan political organizations.   I was able to map two generations of Mayan politics in 
San Pedro with some detail: organizations that emerged in the immediate wake of 
genocidal violence; and a new generation of Mayan leaders, who has begun to challenge 




In order to reframe Mayan support for neo-authoritarianism in San Pedro, I draw 
on a combination of the writings of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci. Although 
there is a fundamental tension in the types of analytical questions posed by each 
approach, they have many similarities, and holding their perspectives in tension can 
enhance our understandings of how political power operates in diverse contexts (cfa 
Moore 2005, Hale 2006, Hansen and Stepputat et al 2001).  I will ride both of these 
horses to get an analytical grip on Mayan neo-authoritarianism. 
Governing Populations 
Foucault’s writings focus on how power operates in the constitution of political 
fields and political subjects.  Foucault defines governance as the “conduct of conduct,” 
all attempts to regulate human conduct for political ends.  He locates the emergence of 
the problem of governance in the 16th century. Central to the art of government is the 
notion of economy, first defined as “the correct way of managing individuals, goods and 
wealth within the family” (1997, 207).  Foucault argued that the aim of power is not 
primarily to repress, but to produce; governance operates through the formation of 
subjects, the directed deployment of their agency.32 Agency is not opposed to power: it 
completes it.  Foucault identifies two poles of power.  The first was disciplinary power or 
anatamo-power.  This form of power works directly on the body, shaping it, training it, 
and directing its movement (1979).  Microphysical control of the body is achieved though 
careful deployment of punishment and rewards and detailed forms of training. The 
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second pole of power identified by Foucault was ‘bio-technical” power, which refers to 
the means through which “life, and its object, come into the realm of technical 
manipulation’ (1980, 101).  Power is multiple, discontinuous, and distributed throughout 
society; it is exercised as much through organizations in what we think of as the non-state 
space of civil society as much as through the state itself.33   
Foucault identified an important transformation in the ways that states were 
administered in the 18th century with the emergence of the population, a “datum” made 
visible through the compilation of statistics.  The art of government was no longer 
tethered to the will of the sovereign, or focused on the family; it was now directed to the 
higher cause of defending and multiplying the life forces of the population (1997, 217).  
The population becomes both target and object of governmental intervention: 
In contrast to sovereignty, government has its purpose not in the act of 
government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.; and the means that the 
government uses to attain these ends are themselves all in some sense immanent 
to the population; it is the population itself onto which the government will act 
either directly through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly through the techniques 
that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation 
of birth rates, the directing of the flow of population into certain regions or 
activities, etc. (217) (italics mine) 
 
No longer limited to giving or taking life, power in modern societies operates through 
shaping and regulating bodies and populations, investing and arranging them, 
normalizing them according to idealized visions of “life” (1980, 144).  It entails attention 
towards the imbrication of “men and things” in their minute relations (1997, 211).  
Governing a state requires the pastoral caretaking over “each and all” of its citizens.  In 
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addition, these same processes brought to light “new networks of continuous and multiple 
relations between population, territory and wealth,” resulting the emergence of the 
“economy” as in independent field of intervention (217).  This re-centering of 
governance around the population did not displace sovereignty or discipline; instead it 
intensified them by giving them a more rational ethical basis and a more compelling 
justification: “in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has 
its primary target the population and its essential mechanism the apparatus of 
security”(219).  
Throughout modern history, there has been a sustained multiplication of 
mechanisms—techniques, maps, calculations, institutions—designed to expand the 
ability to manipulate and regulate individual and group behavior from increasing 
distances and in increasingly minute detail.  The ends of government have also 
multiplied. Governance, then, entails the calculated deployment of discipline and 
regulation order to render subjects visible and to make their activities function smoothly 
within larger regulated systems for the welfare of the population. The achievement of 
modern society, in Foucault’s opinion, is its ability to align the desires and interests of 
individuals with the interests of the population (1979).34 Instead of a narrative of 
progress, Foucault critiques the spread of a society based on normalization.35  Foucault 
sees a real danger in that the “underside” of this power to promote life, is the power to 
deny it.36   The needs of the population are held in higher esteem than the needs—even 
the need to live—of some of its smaller or inessential segments. Killing, or taking life, 
becomes seen as an integral part of “protecting life” at the level of the population.37 In 
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Guatemala, the massacre of Mayan revolutionaries was seen as “vital” to protect the 
dominant race, whose way of life is coterminous with the Guatemalan social order.38  
Foucault’s observations have opened a new field of studies of the history and 
transformation of different regimes of governance (Burchell et al 1991, Miller and Rose 
1993, Barry et al 1996, Rose 1999, Dean 1999).39  My work combines these perspectives 
with the work of post-Foucaultian scholars who examine new regimes of control, 
including: various models of ‘community’ governance (Rose 1996); state-
multiculturalism (Goldberg 1994, Brown 1995, Povinelli 2002, Hale 2002); control of 
memory (Hacking 1995, Trouillot 1995);40 and the formation of ‘enterprising’ selves (Ali 
2002, Barry et al 1996, Burchell 1996, O’Malley 1998, Rose 1996, Rose and Miller 1993, 
Gupta and Ferguson 2002).  Often these approaches are called “neoliberal.”41  I examine 
how all of these forms of control operate and produce effects in synergy with less 
sophisticated, but equally or more effective, forms of social control such as violence and 
surveillance.  I examine how ‘neoliberal’ forms of control open and close spaces for 
grassroots and Mayan political action alongside authoritarian mechanisms of rule.  
In spite of the Eurocentrism of Foucault’s analysis,42many theorists have shown 
the operation of modern regimes of power in colonial and in postcolonial contexts (Ali 
2002; Chatterjee 1993; Mitchell 1991, 2002; 2005; Scott 1995; Stoler 1995).  Rather than 
positing a universal experience of colonization, Scott (1995) focuses on the “historically 
constituted complexes of power/knowledge that give shape to colonial projects of 
political sovereignty.” Scott wants to examine on the “specific power effects of race” 
within particular regimes of colonial rule.  He also suggests that: 
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The political problem of modern power was […] not merely to contain resistance 
and encourage accommodation but to seek to ensure that both could only be 
defined in relation to the categories and structures of modern political 
rationalities. (196) 
 
In this view, modern power operates through “concerted attempt[s] to alter the political 
and social worlds of the colonized”(214).  This involved the “disabling [of] old forms of 
life by systematically breaking down their conditions, and with constructing in their place 
new conditions so as to enable—indeed, so as to oblige—new forms of life to come into 
being” (193).43 Chakrabarty (2000, 2002) amplifies this point, arguing that normalizing 
and secularizing visions of the political, rooted in Eurocentric visions of history, close 
spaces for other ways of being human.  These authors focus our attention towards the 
ways that the civilizing mission continues to operate after official de-colonization. 
From this perspective, many authors see development as the primary means 
through which postcolonial subjects are governed and through which colonial relations 
are maintained and reproduced (Ferguson 1990, Escobar 1995, Crush et al 1995, Gupta 
1998, Mitchell 2002).  Escobar argues that the very notion of the “third world” is a 
product of this teleological discourse that normalizes global economic asymmetries as the 
temporal lag between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’.44 Development labels existing 
forms of life as backward and attempts to replace them with western ‘modern’ norms for 
economic and social life, bodily discipline, medicine, and worldviews (Escobar 1995).  
These political and civilizing effects may have little to do with the stated aims and 
objectives, but are built into the deep structure of the political technology itself.   
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Analysis from the perspective of governmentality is a nuanced view of coercion 
as a set of techniques that work on the body (violence, surveillance) and the political field 
(governance) to open and close spaces for subjectivity. Power operates in the very 
demarcation of political subjects and through defining what is and is not to be contested 
by politics.  And, by refusing to focus solely on the ‘state’ Foucault makes visible the 
exercise of power for multiple aims, overlapping forms of control that traverse the left 
and right, good or bad distinction.  
However insightful, this approach has some clear disadvantages that make it 
insufficient to the task of understanding what is at stake in social movements.  Work from 
this perspective examines the structuring of the political field, but has little to say about 
the consciousness of agents on that field.  It assumes that governance is always one step 
ahead, defining the terms of resistance. 45 Agency is always an effect of governance; 
movements are always already absorbed and neutralized. Thig ignores huge gaps between 
planning, implementation and outcomes.  Smooth operation of government, especially in 
the postcolony, is the exception, not the rule.  Furthermore, the focus on multiple 
overlapping regimes of power can obscure struggles over the major axes of social 
domination, and can in some cases reinforce domination along these lines.46  In a 
neocolonial context like Guatemala, the state and political economy are key terrains of 
social struggle, and civil society is a crucial space for the formation of organized 
resistance to neo-colonizing and militaristic nationalist projects.  
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Hegemony and Cultural Politics 
In order to focus on the dynamic inter-relationship between movements for 
cultural rights and counterinsurgency strategies, Foucaultian perspectives on power must 
take a backseat to a theory of hegemony as proposed by Antonio Gramsci.47 Gramsci 
(1971) wanted to understand how political economic inequality is maintained.  He saw 
that states, by which he meant the sum totality of the dominant class, dominated 
marginalized classes not only through brute force, but also through universalizing ruling 
class values.  Power operates through both ‘domination’ and ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’ (58). Coercion shuts down demands that are impossible for a ruling block to 
fulfill without collapsing.  Moral leadership is essential to maintaining power once 
opposition movements are liquidated.  Here, the state plays the role of “educator,” a role 
that consists of numerous attempts to persuade the masses that the dominant vision of 
reality is correct, normal or inevitable. Dominant ideologies depict oppositional 
worldviews as ‘not-in-conflict’ with the dominant social order. Hence ideology cannot be 
simply derived from class position. This reframing is symbolic violence. Education 
occurs both at the level of abstract and formal ideology and of practical consciousness, or 
commonsense (Hall 1986, 26-27).48 A perspective is considered ‘hegemonic’ if its basic 
premises are so taken for granted that they go without saying.  
For Gramsci, hegemony is never achieved once and for all, but is a constant and 
always incomplete negotiation between rulers and ruled who are engaged in a struggle in 
civil society (Gramsci 1971, Dagnino 1998).49  Social inequalities always come back to 
haunt dominant power structures by generating oppositional consciousness if not 
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organized resistance. Thus, cultural struggle is a contest of values.  Because collective 
interests cannot be derived from objective location in the regime of production, conscious 
reflection is necessary.  Gramsci views ‘organic intellectuals’ – intellectuals from 
oppressed classes—as necessary leaders to educate a counter-hegemonic bloc, united 
around political struggle against the dominant class. In cultural political struggles, 
Gramsci places agency with the subaltern, who always resists, counter-strategizes and 
maneuvers, even while absorbing many aspects of hegemonic ideology.  
Populism is a specific form of hegemonic strategy, in which a political discourse 
that constitutes the social as antagonistically divided between the ‘people’ and the ‘power 
bloc’ and claims to defend the former against the latter (Laclau 1979, 2005).50 The key 
moment in populism is the discursive constitution of the ‘people’.  The ‘people’ is an 
“empty signifier,” effective precisely because of its openness, which gives it the ability to 
articulate to a wide range of subjects.51   If a decisive number of political subjects see 
themselves and their interests in the constitution of ‘the people’ a populist interpellation 
is successful.  Populist interpellations are not limited to rhetoric, but actual political 
demands.  Populism has no proper class character; it can be used to articulate political 
subjects to either the dominant mode of production or to oppositional movements. 
Populism is not risk free for dominant groups however.  There may come a point when 
too much ground is given to populist demands, and the social order itself comes into a 
more direct challenge.  Therefore, populist regimes on the right are unable to be fully 
populist and must constantly backtrack.52  
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A Gramscian approach limited in that they tend to focus exclusively on political 
economic struggles instead of the structure of the political field on which those struggles 
occur.  It also tends to downplay how power operates on the body (ie, in non-ideological 
ways) and often ignores the role of agency in completing regimes of power.  
Furthermore, Gramscian analysis offers little insight into how power operates through 
spatial control, or through the categories and practices that comprise “civil society.”  
A Hybrid Approach   
There are broad similarities between Foucaultian and Gramscian approaches to 
understanding Mayan conservatism.  Where Foucaultian perspectives would see neo-
authoritarian consolidation as effective governance, Gramsci sees effective hegemony.  
Both orient our attention directly to the question of how power operates to produce 
subjects.  Although their notions of how these processes work differ markedly, they are 
complementary. I propose a hybrid approach that combines a Foucaultian focus on how 
overlapping, decentered regimes of power/knowledge produce normalized bodies and 
spaces for agency with a Gramscian emphasis on political economic struggle, the 
education of consent by the state, consciousness, and the possibility for resistance and 
empowerment.  
Where Gramscian analysis would focus on the question of how right wing 
governments gain a political following, a Foucaultian approach shows continuities in 
forms of governance between right and left, bringing to light multiple and overlapping 
regimes of truth and knowledge, each pursuing their own type of normalization. A 
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combined approach would maintain a focus on what is explicitly contested in political 
struggles, as well as what is taken for granted in them. Where Foucault orients our 
thinking towards forms of spatial control and broader strategies, a focus on consciousness 
might provide more insight into how people experience it and how and why these 
techniques succeed or fail.  Furthermore, combining both Foucault and Gramsci would, 
ideally, neither ignore or romanticize agency; rather it would promote an examination of 
the spaces for possible thought and action made possible through different types of 
action, never assuming that either power or agency is completely guaranteed once and for 
all.  A combined approach focuses on governance and agency as dynamic, relational and 
discontinuous processes. This research proposes genealogical examinations of the 
conditions under which governance operates in particular cultural and political contexts, 
and by tracing the way that its meaning and function changes in relationship to its 
linkages with evolving forms of desire, power and subjectivity.  It calls for the location of 
development discourses within specific political contests over colonial rule—forms of 
power and forms of anti-colonial resistance.  
My research compares state multiculturalist strategies to responses by Mayan 
political actors engaged in grassroots identity politics in order to clarify differences in 
ideology, practice and aims. By riding these two horses at once, I reveal the 
interconnectedness and non-commensurability of race, class and gender oppression as 
well as various dimensions of disjuncture between Mayan, state and neoliberal visions of 
citizenship, self and community. I argue that genealogical and ethnographic research 
from both perspectives is needed to make sense of a phenomenon like Mayan neo-
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authoritarianism. I show how new, divided identities and administrative categories 
formed during the counterinsurgency and by development programs and projects coalesce 
into governable social divisions; the ex-PAC is only the most visible example. 
The benefits of a combined approach become clear in discussions of development 
in the rural highlands.53  With Gramsci, state development would be seen as a material 
concession to social movement demands and vital to the survival of Mayan communities, 
albeit certainly a vehicle for official nationalisms (Brow 1997; Woost 1993), and 
depoliticizing ideologies (Ferguson 1990).  Foucaultian analysis would question how 
development structures the political field of action, reshapes prior political demands, 
transforms existing subsistence practices, creates differently configured subjects with 
new investments, forges productive linkages between state and community, and even 
restructuring intra-community relationships.  It would show there is much more than 
ideological and respresentational politics at stake. They are also not external to national 
level politics: in fact these other forms of politics form the basis of unlikely and 
unpredictable political strategies. Yet a hybrid approach would encourage us to see the 
state as responding to and acommodating Mayan desires, in addition to trying to shape 
and direct them.  My research examines how different forms of development produce 
governing effects within hybridized neoliberal-colonial regimes of governmentality and 
how these are accommodated, resisted redeployed and desired by subaltern groups 
(Cooper and Packard 1997, Crush et al 1995, Edelman 1999, Gupta 1998, Pigg 1993, 
Watts 2003). The question for a combined perspective then would be how to decolonize 
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the forms of development necessary for Mayan social reproduction and in line with their 
collective political struggles. 54  
This approach produces several insights of that form recurrent themes in the 
dissertation.  First, the cultural politics of representation and the efforts to structure the 
field of representational politics are dialectical and mutually conditioning processes.  The 
distinction between these remains important analytically, but does not exist in practice.  
Second, I see resistance as prior to power.  It is thus important to affirm subaltern 
resistance as the motor that drives governance.  But it is just as important to examine how 
regimes of governance mine the array of resistance strategies to formulate new regimes 
of control.  At the same time as affirming state responses as affirmations of subaltern 
agency, we must pay close attention to the subtle, but important differences between the 
two approaches and the way official alternatives are linked to power.  Next, analysis 
should also pay attention to shifts in the political field over time. As contexts change, and 
forms of resistance calcify, they can produce unintended effects on subaltern political 
strategies, which are often difficult or impossible to keep unified across generations.55  
 
POLITICAL IMAGINARIES AND POLITICAL AFFECT 
The Gramscian conception of ‘consciousness’ needs further unpacking if it is to 
be useful ethnographically.  To complicate this somewhat reductive understanding of 
human consciousness I add a focus on the political imaginary. At the same time, I want to 
flesh out Foucault’s notion of the body with a theory of affect.  Recent research define 
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the social imaginary not as a rational, internally consistent or fixed system, but also the 
vast and shifting repository of concepts, narratives and common-sense understandings of 
social and political reality, woven into everyday life, through which fields of objects, 
forms of subjectivity and patterns of social relations become intelligible, desirable and 
practicable (Castoriadis 1987, Gaonkar 2002).  These imaginary frameworks mediate all 
of social life and political life. It is not enough, however, to recognize the frames through 
which, as Mitchell (1991) puts it, subjects “manufacture the real,” the real not being 
available ‘outside’ of or apart from discourse; we also need to examine how they are 
affective, that is, how they articulate to subjective desire.  As Begoña Aretxaga (2000) 
contends: “our political imaginaries and the violence that accompany them are 
characterized by and entanglement of discourse and desire that needs to be examined 
rather than taken for granted, because it is this entanglement that constitutes political 
realities” (63).  In this conception, desire is drives the exercise of power and resistance, 
fueling the narratives that define the specific objects and agents in each process.   
My research focuses on the ways that governance and hegemony operate through 
the refashioning of political imaginaries and affective states (Anderson 1983, Suarez-
Orozco 1985, Brown 1995, Rose 1996, Berlant 1997, Ivy 1997, Taussig 1997, Taylor 
1997, Sigel 1998).  Governance works to generate, resonante with and reshape the forms 
of affect that generate political action at the same time as it rewrites the central narratives 
through which people experience their lives and constitute social and political identities. 
It inserts itself into everyday life and generates new frames of reference.  By remaking 
the political field, it attempts to make active forces become reactive.  Power is 
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experienced as a lived intensity, and emotion, or an investment. A theory of drives and 
fantasies focuses analysis towards the ways governance is guided by non-rational as well 
as rational ends, and how it works on the body to produce intensities, investments, 
excitement or fear.   States are nervous bodies politic incited by imagined crises to make 
the risks of disobedience known and felt among potentially unruly subjects.  These 
produce lasting effects on the bodies, identities, and affective states and investments 
among governed populations, effects that can be made visible through ethnographic 
attentiveness.   
My research inquires into the relationship between the manner in which rural 
Mayans imagine the state as an object of fear and desire their collective sense of 
empowerment and their shared narratives of political agency. From this perspective, I 
revise ideology-centered theories of populism, arguing that the resonance of neo-
authoritarian populism among rural Mayans derives from the effects of 
counterinsurgency mechanisms on the spatial, conceptual and affective landscape upon 
which Mayans constitute their social and political identities.  Of all the major political 
parties, the FRG is the most adept at generating, identifying and placating aggrieved 
groups; their political strategies are a cross between voodoo and brain surgery.  The FRG 
transforms itself into a source of redress for the poverty that it creates, for feelings of 
backwardness, and, in some cases, for its own crimes against humanity.  But the state 
remains a benefactor to be feared as much as desired.  
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METHODOLOGY AND POSITIONING 
I lived for 14 months in San Pedro Necta, and a particular amount of time in a 
village I will call Los Altenses.  I gathered data about how state violence is targeted, 
symbolized and narrated from mass media depictions, oral history interviews, eyewitness 
testimony, human rights reports and through discussions with government officials. I 
refined my understanding of the long-term effects of violence on popular conceptions and 
practices of politics through observations of local political processes, interviews and 
conversations with rural Mayans and Mayan leaders and with surviving family members 
and friends of Mayan war victims.  Witnessing the mourning and memorial practices of 
family and friends and carefully observing how the state and local agency is figured in 
public discourse provided additional insights. Interviews with development agents, 
research into policy documents and observations showed how conceptions of the state, 
Mayan agency, community, and progress are built into program administration, pedagogy 
and organizing narratives. They also revealed the channels, actors and conditions through 
which programs were implemented. 
Participation in and observation of everyday life and local political processes 
along with oral histories and interviews with politically active Mayans and non-Mayan 
mestizos revealed how conceptions, practices and narratives embedded within 
development programs filtered into local consciousness and meshed with local common 
sense, expectations and forms of knowledge and practice.  I learned how subtle but 
nonetheless significant changes in local discourses, practices and emotions related to 
politics, self, and community and how shape different forms of political participation. 
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These methods allowed me to discover what development and advancement have come to 
mean to rural Mayans and how they respond favorably, unfavorably and creatively to 
different aspects of the programs and to their different effects. Close observation and 
interviews also clarified the relationship between the manner of the delivery and 
administration of infrastructure and assistance programs and inter and intra-ethnic 
political divisions. I tracked the political careers of the two most important Mayan 
politicians in San Pedro since the 1990s, and examined the political currents that each 
had ridden to power.  I investigated the milieu in which they operated, moving between 
the villages, town politics, and state institutions and practices. Slowly and unevenly, I 
was able to piece together fragments into a backstory to these politics, reconstructing 
their conditions for possibility and assembling a history of the present. 
When I first arrived in San Pedro, I didn’t know anyone.  No one I could talk to 
openly at least.  I had worked for two years as an investigator for the left-aligned NGO 
Asociación CEIBA.  I collaborated with CEIBA and leaders of a rural Mayan women’s 
organization from the town of Colotenango.  Colotenango is a ‘revolutionary’ town 
where the URNG has won local elections since 2000.  When I went to San Pedro to study 
state development strategies, I was worried that my previous work with CEIBA would 
make some of the people in this right-wing town think that I worked for the revolutionary 
organization, and that they would therefore be unwilling or afraid to work for me.   I was 
even worried that something bad could happen to me, especially if I were seen as a spy. 
Many people had warned me to be careful given the political nature of my 
research. Some agronomists from CEIBA already lived in the town.  A couple from 
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Belgium, working as agronomists, had worked there for several years.  There was a 
replacement group of agronomists now, another Belgian named Tom and a young 
Q’anjobal woman from Barillas, a town in the north of the department.  There was also a 
local Mayan woman involved in CEIBA’s women’s programs, Guadalupe Mendoza.  I 
knew they were in town, and they knew I was going to be there; but we had agreed not to 
meet openly for fear that I would be ‘exposed’.  Guadalupe was the person that I talked to 
before I arrived in San Pedro to find out names of people who I should talk to.  
Guadalupe had a solid grasp of the political landscape.  Once in town, I kept my public 
contact with her to a minimum.  We had agreed only to meet outside of the town, most 
often at the home of a mutual friend of ours in Huehuetenango.   
When I first got to San Pedro, I rented a small room at a hotel in the town center.  
San Pedro has a hospital, founded by the Catholic Church and later taken over by the 
state but still on Church owned property.  This hospital meant that people from all over 
the region would come to San Pedro from treatment, hence the need for several modest 
hotels. The young Ladino family who ran the hotel I stayed was fun, and the father was 
active in one of the large political parties.  I decided this would be a good place to start to 
get to know the town. My plan was to follow up on the leads on local Ladinos, then, as 
that part of the picture came into closer focus, decide which village or villages to live in 
for an extended period.  
After I had lived in the town center in San Pedro for two months, with several 
extended stays in outlying villages, I felt more secure and resumed interacting with my 
friends from CEIBA. This raised several eyebrows, and I was asked several times by 
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locals if I was working with CEIBA. But I soon realized that CEIBA was not a source of 
suspicion for people in the town, at least not openly, and not the majority, who saw them 
as simply another organization working in development, one of the dozens who had 
descended on San Pedro especially since the signing of the Peace Accords.  Even some 
FRG supporters participated in their programs. 
My identity as a North American was both a limitation and an advantage.  
Walking in communities never ceased provoking laughter and chants of gringo.  Young 
children, especially in the more distant villages, were often terrified at the first sight of 
me, scared that I was a cholero (baby stealer).  Several people thought that I worked for 
the US government, or for the Guatemalan military.   Many times I felt jealousy, which is 
intense and palpable against gringos, who are universally seen as rich and pampered.  
Certainly, many people refused to speak to me on the basis of my origin.  Luckily for me, 
however, Guatemalans—Ladino and indigenous alike—are also fascinated by the United 
States.  After all, most have friends or family members who live there.  They want to 
know how much it costs to travel there; what it is like to live there; what we eat (You 
don’t eat tortillas, only bread, right?); what marriage meant to us (It’s just for two years, 
and then you divorce?).  I patiently answered these questions and many others countless 
times.  Over time I was able to make many friends who very generously shared their 
perspectives with me.  Being a North American also allowed me great flexibility in 
maneuvering within Ladino society, where association with me was a sure sign of 
cultural capital.56  I was also much more free to speak and interact with Mayans than are 
most Ladinos.  One Mayan friend told me, after we had a long discussion over dinner, 
 39 
that he enjoyed the fact that I could come and visit in his house.  “Ladinos can’t 
participate with us.  They can come to the door, but they can’t sit at our table and eat.”  
This sad insight reminded me of the privilege I enjoyed by not inheriting the racial 
divisions in Guatemalan society, which run much deeper than any individual and form 
very real barriers for relationships.       
Studying counterinsurgency strategy in a post-conflict society is rife with 
difficulties, both practical and psychological.  My research brought risks to me, as well as 
to my research subjects. Much of the data presented in these chapters implicates 
individuals in criminal acts.  Many people were afraid to speak to me about their political 
participation, especially during the late 1970s.  Several told me that they were afraid that 
after speaking with me their name would appear on a list, and that there would be a 
consequence.  I was incredibly careful not to talk to others about what one person had 
told me.  It seemed, however, that the effects of the violence on public expression have 
thawed enough to allow a level of historical inquiry that heretofore has been impossible.  
The discussion of San Pedro’s history constitutes perhaps the most important contribution 
of this research.   
Research in a post-crisis context like Guatemala places specific ethical burdens on 
researchers.  It is impossible to remain neutral in the face of extreme violence and social 
control.  In addition to calling attention to human rights violations that I encountered, and 
the everyday operations of power to which, as an ethnographer I was especially well-
positioned to identify, I wanted to produce knowledge that would be useful to grassroots 
Mayan political organizations.  This research is activist in that its questions were 
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formulated in alignment with Mayan movement activists, locally and throughout 
Guatemala, in their struggle against state and colonial power.  This includes many young 
professionals, many of whom eagerly devoured popular Spanish language versions of my 
research findings. I also publicly presented my work in San Pedro.  Furthermore, this 
work provides a map of governance and state effects that can assist in local political 
actors reflections on the pitfalls and spaces of opportunity in state strategies. By 
providing ethnographic detail of the micro-practices though which social and political 
reality is reproduced and contested, my research points to alternative political futures and 
diverse ways of being human. A main goal of this research is to show the limits of 
neoliberal multiculturalism, particularly its complicity with colonial governance.  In 
particular, it also orients our thinking towards political alternatives resonant with 
Mayans’ sensibilities, responsive to their immediate need for resources, and consistent 
with their long-term struggles for racial justice and community autonomy.   
Completing this project required experimenting with new ways of doing 
fieldwork.  Some of my methods might be described as disrespectful or even hostile by 
those more accustomed to traditional ethnographic approaches.  Others might find them 
based in an ethics of respect and accountability that transcends the typical relationship 
between ethnographer and informant.   In addition to soliciting and recording individual’s 
narration of events, I found that questioning people’s public representations—at times 
even challenging them outright—can produce a level of candor otherwise unobtainable.  I 
found that this candid approach (“you don’t expect me to believe that, do you?”) helped 
break down a naïve assumption that we as ethnographers often question, but rarely do 
 41 
anything about: that informants tell us things that they feel are comfortable and 
convenient for them, not necessarily what they really think or feel.  This method also 
reproduced, however imperfectly, the situation of disagreement and debate that I found to 
be endemic when doing research on politics in the San Pedro.   
 
ARGUMENT AND CHAPTER DESCRIPTIONS 
I found that the majority of rural Mayans in San Pedro Necta either sympathized 
deeply with or participated enthusiastically in the revolution, despite deeply felt 
criticisms of their strategies and their cultural politics.  Even today, most Mayans in San 
Pedro, and in Huehuetenango more generally, share a Marxist-inflected poetics—a mix 
of indigenous and revolutionary nationalism embedded in communal and familial 
struggles for dignity and well-being.  This imaginary is characterized by a deep feeling of 
distrust for the state and multinational capital.  It is informed by an insight that racial and 
economic oppression are intimately interlinked. I explore the emergence and of this 
political imaginary in Chapter 1, “Indigenous politics in San Pedro, 1944-2003,” which 
documents Mayan engagements with national and local politics. 
These shared, often taken for granted, ways of thinking, feeling, and acting in 
relation to politics provided the basis for revolutionary politics, post-genocidal 
organizing, and even today transcend the most divergent party affiliations.  However, 
state violence and state development programs have transformed the affective, conceptual 
and material bases of revolutionary politics, and created new forms of political agency.  
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Far more than any ideological shift, I argue that it is the convergent effects of these 
strategies—some unpredicted—on the conditions of possibility for Mayan political 
agency that give traction to neo-authoritarian politics in Mayan communities. These 
strategies have created the conditions under which neo-authoritarian politics became 
appealing in to differently constituted and differently positioned Mayan subjects. This 
research elucidates several conditions of possibility for FRG and conservative political 
dominance in Mayan communities, including some that have been overlooked.  I describe 
several ‘paths’ to authoritarianism. 
The first path concerns memory politics.  State repression and efforts to control 
the truth regarding history has fostered a widespread lack of awareness and understanding 
of past political struggles among current Mayan politicians and in the general public.  
Mayan politics is largely imagined as separate from class politics.  In Chapter 2, “The 
Slow Uneven Thaw of Imposed Truth,” I explore the conditions under which Mayans 
remember themselves as ‘caught between two armies’ and never having participated in 
the revolution.  I locate the emergence of this narrative in Mayan attempts to articulate a 
criticism of state violence during military occupation and of guerrilla strategies that left 
them vulnerable.  I also show how this narrative legitimates specific identities (as 
victims, as intelligent), and how this narrative is appropriated for political purposes. 
State violence also plays a role in shaping the trajectory of postrevolutionary 
Mayan politics.  In addition, the re-invocation of past violence through persistent attacks 
on social movements sustains a collective fantasy of the state as an implacable obstacle to 
reform.  This convinces many Mayans that far-reaching social reform and the Peace 
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Accords in particular, while desirable, remains impossible, and that pursuit of state-
sanctioned alternatives, while limited and problematic, is in their best interest.  I show the 
operation of this vampiric state imaginary in Chapter 3 “¡Que se vaya MOSCAMED!” 
which examines the affective and narrative formation I call “revolutionary pessimism”.  
It also examines the conditions of emergence of a conspiracy theory regarding the 
USDA’s program to stop the spread of the fruit-fly at the southern border of Mexico.  
This chapter also calls into question the legality of this program, and highlights its 
harmful health and economic effects on rural Mayans.   
Furthermore, state agrarian modernization programs further destabilize the 
revolutionary narrative. Discourses and practices of individual capacity development, 
‘capacidad,’ promoted by state agrarian modernization programs undermine some of the 
central tenets of the revolutionary narrative regarding the origins and causes of poverty as 
well as the available and effective political alternatives.  These discourses work to make 
revolution seem unnecessary for many Mayan activists who were the leaders the postwar 
generation.  In addition, discourses of capacidad also generate a new form of 
discrimination among Mayans, and a monopoly on village leadership positions for people 
considered more developed, or capacitado.  These dovetail with an FRG strategy to 
recruit people (men) who desire leadership roles, but have been systematically 
marginalized in their villages.   There are important ideological and non-ideological 
differences between Mayans who participate in neo-conservative movements and those 
who follow FRG politics.   
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I take a historical and genealogical perspective to gain perspective on the 
contemporary Mayan politics of capacidad.  Chapter 4, “Greening the 
Counterrevolution”, analyzes the imaginative constitution and implementation of 
Guatemalan-USAID cooperative development programs in the early 1970s. This chapter 
uses declassified documents to describe how development planners believed cooperative 
led agrarian modernization would satisfy Mayan desires for well-being within the 
dominant social order.  I argue that this mix of banality and naïveté generated optimism 
that entrenched opposition to political reforms and set the stage for violent confrontation 
between state and guerrilla forces.  Chapters 5 and 6 examine how Mayans’ selectively 
responded to state agrarian modernization programs, technologies and training according 
to their own notions of development, self and community.  Chapter 5, “Making 
DIGESA,” focuses on Mayan immediate responses to the program in the late 1970s.  In 
Chapter 6, “Nos falta capacidad,” jumps ahead to the present to show how development 
practices and categories have filtered unevenly into local understandings of self and 
social world.  People categorize themselves and others as “capacitado” (developed) or 
“professionals”, while some “don’t want to develop” and others have “gotten ahead”.  
Investments in these identities are produced through different habits of consumption, 
personal discipline, and self-management. Chapter 7 “Re-imagining Mayan Politics 
through Capacidad” explores how notions of capacidad have reshaped Mayan political 
movements.  Development responded to desires for economic well-being and gave moral 
resonance to local Mayan contestations of Ladino power in the period after extreme 
violence.  However, this enshrined personal development as a pre-condition for Mayan 
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inclusion in national life, depoliticized poverty and created local forms of discrimination.  
Chapter 9 “Revolt Against Capacidad?” brings the chapters on development back around 
to the central puzzle, focusing on how discourses of capacidad led to the community 
divisions later exploited by the FRG.  
Perhaps more important than all of these other conditions which make neo-
authoritarian politics thinkable for many rural Mayans is the politics of project-centered 
development. I argue that state-led community development programs are constituted by 
violence and extend its effects. Aid is conditioned on the norms of political passivity 
defined by state violence, and serves as a reminder of the consequences for disobedience.  
Conditioning assistance reinforces the sense of powerlessness established by state 
violence, defines projects as the sole political objective, and focuses desires for well-
being on the state. The regularity and inadequacy of individual assistance programs 
transform widespread economic insecurity into widespread feelings of dependency on the 
state for survival.  Politicizing insufficient development also fosters a conception of 
politics as a zero-sum competition for limited resources, refocusing political energy on 
enervating political divisions.  However, Mayans from across the political spectrum voice 
resistance to favoritism, the failure of projects to combat poverty, false promises of aid, 
and divide and conquer strategies that reproduce neo-colonial relations.  Neo-
authoritarian parties capitalized on widespread anger over many of these issues to win 
San Pedro’s local elections in 2003, only to exacerbate the problems on their watch.  I 
make these arguments in Chapter 7, “Violent Development and Community Autonomy,” 
which examines Mayan responses to the proliferation of development programs that have 
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become the primary zone of contact between post-genocidal rural Mayan political 
organizations and national political entities as a result of the new cycle of public works 
projects that were initiated with the 8% municipal tax in 1985. 
Each of these processes contributed to the conditions under which neo-
authoritarian politics became desirable and thinkable for rural Mayans; but none of them 
could settle the issue of who was in control.  Governing strategies and techniques 
produced effects, but do not always work in the same way that state planners had 
expected.  Sometimes they produce the opposite of their intended results, or no results.  
Politically organized Mayans resisted, accommodated and embraced state and 
revolutionary strategies according to local constructions of need, risk and their strategic 
reading of the political field.  In some cases, they clearly directed events.  The long duree 
of the Mayan movement resistance has caused a progressive, from the authoritarian to the 
democratic, flexibility in governance strategies.  These spaces contain affects, narratives, 
and practices that form ample conditions of possibility for new forms of political agency 
with the power to transform Guatemalan society, and also to create novel forms of 
sovereignty, identity, and development—elements of a future autonomy.  
                                                
NOTES 
1 Weeks later, four journalists from the Prensa Libre were taken hostage by some of the 
same civil patrollers when they arrived to report on a demonstration of ex-PAC that had 
taken over Puente Cable, blocking the highway Inter-Americana. They were beaten, 
threatened to be burned alive with gasoline, kept overnight, then released the next day 
when the government fulfilled their demands and promised payments For a full report on 
the harrowing events at Puente Cable, see the Prensa Libre November 3, 2003. 
http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/domingo/archivo/domingo/2003/noviembre03/021103/cen
tral.html).  This article includes narratives by each of the hostages taken that day. The 
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press described this kidnapping as a central part of FRG strategy, Prensa Libre October 
28, 2003 
2 Q=quetzal the Guatemalan national currency, named after the national bird. 1 US dollar 
=approx 7.5Q 
3 For a recounting of the day’s events see Prensa Libre July 25, 2003.  “Jueves Negro: 
Turbas del FRG Causan Terror en la Capital.”  Events that day were dramatic, closing 
down the city.  TV reporter Hector Fernando Ramirez died of a heart attack running from 
the crowd after attempting to rescue his friend from attack. Several party leaders were 
charged with social disturbance and had to pay fines.  Ríos Montt, who some argue 
orchestrated the protests, was exonerated.  
4 The new ruling held that the law banning ex-dictators from the presidency was not 
‘retroactive’ and therefore did not apply to Ríos. 
5 For a discussion of FRG ‘vote buying’ tactics see Prensa Libre October 19, 2003. 
Another article in the Prensa (October 28, 2003) gives a run down of FRG strategies, 
starting with the inscription of Ríos Montt.   
6 In the first round of voting for president of the republic, Oscar Berger (GANA) won 
47.46%, Alvaro Colom (UNE) 26.38%; and Ríos Montt (FRG) 11.21%. (Prensa Libre 
November 10, 2003) 
7 See Prensa Libre November 11, 2003.  For a discussion of the FRG’s continued power 
see Prensa Libre November 13, 2003 “Ofrecen fuerte oposicion” 
8 Prensa Libre November 13, 2003 “eferregistas lideran en alcaldias”.  GANA had only 
69, followed by UNE with 33, the PAN (Partido Avanzo Nacional) 31.  These gains were 
largely a result of votes in the rural highlands.  The results for municipios in highland 
departments are as follows: In Huehuetenango, the FRG won 10 out of 22 elections; San 
Marcos, 5 out of 29; Totonicapan, 4 out of 8; Quetzaltenago 9 out of 24; Quiche 13 out of 
21; and Solola, 5 out of 19. 
9 This is characteristic of the dearth of studies of right-wing political movements in Latin 
America more generally (Edelman 2001). In Guatemala, there is a good reason for this 
gap: such research is dangerous, for both researchers and participants, and has been more 
dangerous in previous years. Only now are the conditions emerging for detailed 
investigations of the long-term effects of counterinsurgency strategies on Mayan politics. 
Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack was stabbed 13 times in Guatemala City, 
presumably for research she was conducing into the ideological education taking place in 
the ‘model communities’ that Guatemalan army set up in the 1980s to reorganize 
displaced Mayans villagers. It is certain that this study done in San Pedro Necta could not 
have taken place as easily in some communities that experienced more extreme levels of 
violence during the war, and therefore remains more socially polarized.  An example is 
Nebaj, in Quiche.  Unfortunately, there is a tendency of post-conflict research to 
concentrate on areas where the ‘most’ violence occurred.  While this might have reasons, 
it certainly presents a difficulty for trying to get a sense of the entire highlands. 
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10 Truth Commission reports, for example, describe how state violence disarticulated the 
guerrilla movement from its rural Mayan base, silenced all public political opposition, 
and overwhelmed the population with intense feelings of loss, despair and powerlessness. 
11 The strongest rendition of this argument comes from Victoria Sanford (2003).  With a 
shrill and suspicious tone, she says that the symbol of the FRG, a white hand, is also the 
same as the name of a paramilitary group, the mano blanco.  However, Sanford misses 
the fact that the FRG hand is not white, it’s blue, and its fingers are a like a loose victory 
sign.  Everyone I spoke in San Pedro recognized this and did not confuse it for a 
paramilitary group.  Another friend of mine, a left-leaning Ladina intellectual in 
Huehuetenango, suggested that instead of a victory sign, the FRG would more accurately 
be portrayed by a gesture in which the thumb is inserted between the index and middle 
fingers in a closed fist—a common symbol for a vulgar act. 
12 This depiction of Mayans as pure victims that results often says more about the people 
working in solidarity movements and some social scientists than it does about Mayan 
politics. 
13 Annis’ argument is mostly speculative, based on analysis during the early 1980s.  
There is little empirical evidence for the fit between the rise of Protestant belief among 
Mayans and support for Rios Montt.  Did Mayans see Rios Montt’s Protestantism as 
credible? Annis also tends to conflate Protestantism with an elevated class position.  This 
might or might not be prevalent across the highlands.  There were even more 
modernizing Catholics at the time.  He also assumes a tight fit between Protestantism and 
political ideology and participation.  This is not the case in San Pedro Necta, or across 
Guatemala (Garrard-Burnett 1998). It means that Mayans also ignore the findings of the 
Truth Commision reports of the UN and the Catholic Church.  The idea that a “new 
moral center” sustains Montt does not explain current support for Montt among 
Catholics, especially now that the Catholic Church has taken a stand against Rios Montt, 
calling him an assassin and holding him responsible for genocide.   
14 There is little to suggest that the internal cultural politics of the FRG have departed 
much from the racist mentality.  One notable example was when Rigoberta Menchu went 
to the Corte de Constitucionalidad CC to dispute Ríos Montt’s candidacy.  In the tribunal 
building, she was accosted by nearly 200 FRG supporters and party leaders who yelled 
insulting racist slurs including, “Dirty Indian!”; “Go sell tomatoes in the market!” and 
“India hija de puta!(Indian son of a bitch)” Dr. Sam Colop, the indigenous linguist and 
outspoken editorialist, regularly denounces, in powerful language, racism in the FRG and 
in the state in general.14  A less egregious, but probably indicative, moment of FRG 
racism was witnessed by a friend of mine in Mayan town of Todos Santos 
Cuchumatanes.  Members of the FRG departmental and national leadership came for a 
rally and a luncheon, the latter hosted at a local hotel.  While the Ladino leadership ate 
their lunches on the sunny patio area of the hotel, enjoying the view of the mountains, the 
indigenous mayor and his indigenous supporters ate cramped together in a small front 
room. Most Mayans I spoke with, regardless of political affiliation, felt strongly that all 
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the parties were racist.  Indeed, in San Pedro, many regularly denounce Montt as a 
genocidio. 
15 This dissertation follows other have oriented our attention towards the multiple, 
overlapping governing mechanisms that aim to reshape the terrain of Mayan politics 
(Green 1999; Hale 1996, 2000, 2002, 2006; Kobrak 1999; Manz 2000, 2004; McAllister 
2003; Schirmer 1998; Smith 1984, 1990; Smith et al 1991; Sandford 2003; Stepputat 
2001). Finn (2001) discusses how a number of forces, including the church, the army, the 
guerrilla, development institutions and the villagers themselves have converged to 
constitute villages as spaces of governance.  He envisions the stabilization of property 
ownership, community membership and public symbolism as the key features of this 
process of “villageization”—which has increased significantly since the end of the armed 
conflict and has altered rural Mayans’ relationship to the state.  This analysis is 
persuasive, but more research is needed that explores differences between approaches to 
development and local forms of resistance to these processes, as well as participation in 
them.  Differences between approaches may significantly impact the types of political 
criticisms that emerge from these spaces, the inclusivity of these processes with respect to 
women and poor populations and the political affiliations they foster.  My comparative 
study builds on and addresses these lines of inquiry. 
16 My understanding of community has also grown through many interesting 
conversations with Ab’jee Jimenez, Mayan-Mam. 
17 The guerrilla first arrived to the Ixcan, a recently populated region, where hundreds of 
land poor, mostly indigenous families from different locations throughout the highlands, 
had immigrated to start a colony with the help of the newly formed INTA (National 
Institute for Agrarian Transformation).  This population was working with the assistance 
of Padre Woods, a Maryknoll from the US, who had assisted with the formation of the 
Cooperative Ixcan Grande.  The local leaders, part of the EGP, the Ejercito Guerrillero 
de los Pobres, began raising consciousness about a revolutionary movement to divide up 
the land in Guatemala and forming community bases with the Ixcan settlers. Payeras 
provides an intriguing first hand account of this group of revolutionaries’ experiences in 
the Ixcan, For an equally intriguing textual analysis of this work, read Revolutionary 
Imaginary in Latin America in the Age of Development by Salvador-Portillo (2003) 
18 Several members of this initial group were indigenous. See Payeras (2003)  
19 Several activists and scholars critique the Peace Accords as insufficient to deal with the 
national problems of economic inequality and the concentration of power in the military 
state.  Green (1999) argues that, “because they did not address the indissoluble link 
between structural and political violence, they in fact reinforced exploitation, 
marginalization, and powerlessness.  At the root of the accords are two key 
contradictions: the fundamental paradox between democracy and capitalism—the 
ideology of equality alongside persistent and deepening social inequalities under a free-
market model.  Secondly, the accords ignore the extent and strength of the military 
project—reinforced by ongoing impunity.”  While I agree with the spirit of this critique, I 
think that the political effects of the accords open spaces for political thought and action 
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that cannot ultimately be controlled by the military project.  Achieving the accords would 
not necessarily consolidate a regime of power, but could open spaces for even deeper 
reforms. 
20 Two days after issuing this report, Bishop Juan Gerardi, the director of the REHMI 
project, was found dead in his home, bludgeoned to death.  An intentionally botched 
investigation followed, as well as an official misinformation and smear campaign. 
21 The rest of the title is “and this is how my consciousness was born” 
22 Women are regularly excluded in their homes and communities, and are therefore 
subject to multiple, overlapping forms of oppression, as poor, Mayan, rural and women. 
23 In my recent study of Mayan women from the town of Colotenango, I found that 
women participants in the programs of Asociación CEIBA-a left-aligned NGO, were 
much more likely than non-participants to consider themselves equal to men, to valorize 
their own labor, to recognize their own right to freedom from abuse, and to participate in 
making decisions in their homes and communities. 
24 FRG party leaders tend not to be business elites, but many plantation owners and 
nouveau elites from military backgrounds.  Ríos Montt grew up in San Rafael Petzal, a 
rural town in Huehuetenango, until he entered the Escuela Politecnica in Guatemala City. 
Their base consists of military junior officers, and, before their turn to populism, a large 
proportion of the urban and Ladino middle class.   
25 Reforms were already slow to come under the Arzu administration (1994-1999).  
Constitutional amendments to implement many of the far-reaching elements of the Peace 
Accords were voted down in a popular referendum in 1998.  I suggest that this electoral 
outcome is related to similar processes that I am describing in this dissertation. 
26 Communities of retornados (returned refugees) are commonly assumed to be aligned 
with the left and therefore encounter ostracism and hostility.  For a wide ranging 
discussion of Guatemala’s returned refugees in the early post-Accords era see North and 
Simmons et al (1999. 
27 I am thinking of Ecuador and Bolivia.  There are many cases of conservatism among 
indigenous groups in Latin America.  Many miskitu in Nicaragua supported the contra 
army against the Sandinista, and many Mapuche in Chile supported Pinochet.  
28 I am indebted here to Moore’s insight (2005) that territory is a product of historical 
power relations, not an always-existing backdrop. 
29 Labor was always in short supply for the plantations. Liberal governments in the late 
19th century made little pretense about their efforts to block the efforts by the church to 
safeguard communal land claims to land and to protect Mayans from hyper-exploitation 
in the fincas.  Church authority was reduced, including the removal of all pastors from 
rural areas.  Landed class pushed through forced labor laws mandamientos, requiring 
each Mayan man to carry a book, that had to be signed by plantation owners.  Villagers 
went to great lengths to avoid work on the plantations, which started with a brutal and 
sometimes deadly walk to the coast, and then long hours with poor food and inadequate 
shelter.  Arevalo’s regime eliminated the mandamientos.  After 1954, the military 
government of Castillo Armas did not revert back, but only because, by that time the 
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growth of the Mayan population and corresponding demand for money, created a labor 
market favorable to the plantation owners.   
30 Carol Smith aptly describes the asymmetrical pattern of state Indian relations as 
follows: 
The general state policy has been to target Indians for work, ignore their 
“backward” traditions, allow a few of the more “civilized” to become Ladinos, 
and brutally mow down any who pose a direct challenge to Creole or Ladino 
dominance. The general Mayan response has been to push for economic 
advantage wherever openings or weaknesses exist, Mayanize useful Western 
imports, and eject the assimilated from their communities.  Mayans rarely pose a 
direct challenge to state power; they limit it through economic and cultural 
diversification. 
31 This historicization is crucial to understand why it was thinkable for the Guatemalan 
government to lay waste, in such a cruel manner, to such huge numbers of their own rural 
population in the 1980s.  Mayans were never full citizens, and their deaths simply did not 
matter within racist narrations of the nation, and doctrines of national security.  Several 
note how fears of “Indian rebellion” have formed an important part of the colonial 
imaginary (Adams 1984, Hale 2006). 
32 Foucault identified two “poles” of power used to construct subjects and regulate 
populations. Disciplinary power was more efficient than previous forms of power, which 
were inefficient, riddled with gaps and blind spots.  Instead, it offered a “microphysical” 
control.  One of the most important techniques that helped close these gaps was panoptic 
power, which makes subjects visible to disciplinary power. The regularity of discipline 
and reward encourages people to regulate themselves according to certain conceptions of 
normal and healthy behavior.  Power moves from the body to the soul.  Foucault showed 
that this was more than a model, but a technique that has disseminated widely and has 
been built into the physical infrastructure of modern social institutions, not only in 
prisons but also in schools, hospitals and state bureaucracies of all kinds. Intervention 
focuses directly on life itself, such as health and illness, education, recreation, marriage, 
the family—each of these fields became open for theraputic interventions. Foucault 
reiterates the relevance of these poles of power in his later writing on governance. 
33 The question of how to govern a state was only one problem for governance; others 
included how to govern children and souls.  Foucault suggests that we think of the state 
as a “mythicized abstraction” whose unity we posit as the orchestrating agent behind 
different regimes of governance.  It would be more fruitful to examine how we are 
governed, and opposed to who is in control of the state apparatus at a given time. 
34 This is what Foucault means when he says that disciplinary power if both 
‘individualizing’ and ‘totalizing’ (1979). 
35 In his preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Foucault says that the “major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism. […] And not 
only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini—which was able to mobilize 
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and use the desires of the masses so effectively—but also the fascism in us all, in our 
heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire 
that very thing that dominates and exploits us. (1972; xiii) 
36 Foucault saw modern societies as playing a dangerous game, actually combining two 
irreconcilable and divergent games: “the city citizen game” of sovereign power, and the 
“Shepard flock game” of bio-power (Foucault 1997, Dean 2001).  The city-citizen is the 
concern of liberalism, that principle that government should recognize and protect the 
rights of its citizens while giving them whenever possible, responsibility for their own 
welfare.   The shepherd flock game refers to the pastoral governance of each and all 
associated with bio-power. 
37 See also Agamben (1998), who refers to forms of life deemed eligible for death or 
outside of the state’s responsibility to promote life as “bare life.” 
38 The example that he used in the History of Sexuality was the Holocaust, the 
extermination of the Jews was viewed as necessary by Hitler and his followers in that it 
defended the ‘true’ German population from an outside threat. 
39 Several authors have focused on post-disciplinary forms of social organization, more 
mobile networks of surveillance and regulation made possible by new information 
technologies (Deleuze 1989, Hardt 2000).  Nikolas Rose (1996) identifies the emergence 
of modern, enterprising, self out of different “psy-based” forms of regulation. Rose also 
(1996b) identifies the ascendance, alongside the ‘social’ and the population, of the 
community as a target and object of governance.  Rabinow’s notion of bio-sociality, a 
new and intensifying process through which identify and form groups primarily on the 
basis of a new knowledge of their genetic makeup, is one such example. What this field 
entails exactly is vague, and perhaps rightly so, due to the fact that new methods are 
being innovated and deployed in different areas, and then passing along circuits that it is 
the task of current analysis to explore. 
40 Ian Hacking (1995) draws attention towards attempts “to scientize the soul through the 
study of memory” (5).  Hacking clarifies that he does not see the “soul as unitary, as an 
essence, as a single thing, or even as a thing at all.  It does not denote the unchanging 
core of personal identity”; instead, “it stands for the strange mix of aspects of a person 
that may be, at some time, imagined as inner”(6).40  Selves are crafted through the forging 
of proper memories.  He describes the spread of this mode of memory control through the 
19th and 20th century psychology and social welfare programs.  Also speaking of memory, 
Trouillot (1995) directs our attention towards the conditions under which historical 
memories can emerge, thrive and transform opening and closing horizons of 
“thinkability” which are crucial to the formation of political identities.  I will further this 
research by examining how over attempts to control Mayan behavior by erasing old 
memories of the past and implanting new ones as part of a vast and dominating 
counterinsurgency apparatus. 
41 Neoliberal governance is a catch all category that refers to forms of regulation 
characteristic of free market capitalist societies, including those that operate through 
‘deregulation’.  Instead of focusing only on advanced capitalist societies (Rose 1991), 
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others emphasize the spread of these discourses through globalization (Gupta and 
Ferguson 2002).  Many have argued that the decline in state regulation does not mean a 
decline in overall regulation, but a farming out of state responsibilities to other 
institutions, mainly NGOs in the context of developing countries.  What is specific about 
neoliberal forms of governance is their emphasis on the creation of enterprising, self-
sufficient subjects, capable of absorbing and managing risk.  This is governance through 
empowerment, the creation of resilient, market-ready subjects.  Central to the process of 
creating these subjects is redescription of social life in terms of ‘choice’, ignoring the 
contexts in which these choices occur (Gordon 1991). Ali (2002), for example, shows the 
centrality of pedagogical notions of choice to family planning operations in Egypt.  He 
argues that the goal of these programs is not primarily to decrease population size, but to 
prepare the population for neoliberal structural adjustment. 
42 Many scholars have criticized Foucault and many post-foucaultian scholars for their 
exclusive focus on western political systems.  This ignores the centrality of the colonial 
experience in the creation of ‘modern’ regimes of governance (Chatterjee 1993, Stoler 
1995).  Although unintentional, this optic relegates non-western experience to imitations 
of something that “happened first” and archetypically in the west, and thereby prevents 
an apprehension of the irreducibility of non-western attempts to constitute political 
societies (Chatterjee 1993, Chakrabarty 1993).  It also renders invisible an international 
system of governance that only recognizes political communities constituted as nation-
states (Malkki 1995). 
43 He clarifies that in particular he is concerned with the ways that modern power operates 
through “expanding a range of choice” (4) and creating an environment where particular 
kinds of modern choices are available. For Scott what was specific about colonial 
governmentality was the way that it “relied on a systematic redefinition and 
transformation of the terrain on which the life of the colonized was lived” (13). 
44 Gupta (1998) refers to development as “Orientalism turned into a plan for action.” 
45 Foucault was very much a philosopher of control, not a philosopher of agency. In his 
famous essay ‘On Governmentality’, Foucault writes that the intricate aims and 
objectives of population regulation take place “without the full awareness of the people”.  
Although the “population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in 
the hands of government, aware, vis a vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant 
of what is being done to it.” (217).  In this conception, popular consciousness and 
subjectivity are effects of government, which give it its birth in the form of a population.  
Populations, in this view, do not constitute their own needs; instead these are 
prescriptions of planners and agents in remote institutions and are continuous with 
strategies of population regulation.  Governance constitutes populations in such a way as 
that people’s pursuit of their end goals for health, survival, security and well-being is the 
very means by which their subjectivation is secured.  Such a smooth and continuous 
model of power overstates and overestimates the rationality, continuity, and 
impermeability of governance.  It also precludes politics, understood as the collective 
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construction interests (Hirst 1997). Despite this pessimism, Foucault’s mapping of power 
relations can be very useful to human agents engaged in political struggles.   
46 In an interview with a French Marxist entitled Omnes et Singularum, Foucault defined 
his own project as not dealing with dialectical struggles between competing forces on the 
political sphere. Foucault (1997).  In this interview, Foucault rejects the idea that 
although his politics was non-reducible to Marxist concerns, it was not competitive with 
them.  I think he spoke prematurely. 
47 The global proliferation of identity-based movements introduces new possibilities and 
limitations for social movements and governance.  Proponents of new social movements 
argue that de-centering class politics opens space for a radical democratic project based 
on connecting diverse axes of social struggle through expanding conceptions of 
citizenship, rights and of legitimate political actors (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Mohanty et 
al 1991, Escobar 1992, Laclau 1994, Alvarez et al 1998, Sandoval 1999).  Critics, 
however, impugn identity politics as commodified and easily absorbed (Jameson 1984) 
and as essentialist, inward looking, and divisive (Melucci 1989, Chatterjee 1993, 
Appadurai 1996, Gilroy 2000).  Povinelli (2002) further warns that state multiculturalism 
recuperates affective investments in exclusionary nationalisms.  And others decry new 
state strategies that incite identity-based movements to derail class movements (Rouse 
1995, Brown 1997) as well as the general tendency of identity claims to displace class 
based goals from the political horizon (Foweraker 1995, Comaroff and Comaroff 2000).   
Recent theories, however, reject non-empirical characterizations of identity politics as 
always either co-opted or liberatory (Hale 1997b).  In addition, these critics refuse both 
the distinction between cultural and material demands (Warren 1998a) and the equation 
of the recognition of difference within social movements with essentialism (Mouffe 
1993). More research is needed that compares state and oppositional forms of identity 
politics in order to clarify differences in emphasis and outcome.   
Most studies of the Mayan movement focus on ideas and actions of leaders 
(Fisher and McKenna 1995, Galvez-Borrel 1997, Warren 1998).  Recent studies of State 
multiculturalism in Guatemala do not investigate its effects on local political 
subjectivities (Hale 2002). 
48 Hall suggests that both ideology and practical consciousness are crucial kinds of 
knowledge “enable people to ‘figure out’ society, and within whose categories and 
discourses we ‘live out’ and ‘experience’ our objective positioning in social relations.”  
Practical consciousness is the “spontaneous thought” and is therefore essential to the way 
that certain political ideas “grip the minds of the masses and thereby become a ‘material 
force. 
49 For Gramsci civil society is inherently a space of resistance, for the formation of an 
alternative consciousness.  This is based in his view of the state as a sum total of the 
social positions of the ruling class.  Foucault’s dismissal of the state then can be seen as 
related to his disinterest in class politics, or politics along the more obvious axes of social 
inequality. Responding to criticisms of civil society leveled by Foucault, Evelina 
Dagnino (1998) argues for the necessity of the concept in Latin American post-conflict 
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societies.  She argues, roughly, that during the internal wars in the continent, the 
state/civil society distinction took on specific meanings that give civil society an 
increasingly important role during democratization, as a space where people need to be 
taught that they possess the “rights to rights.” Hale (2002) makes a similar point.  For an 
informative series of perspectives on civil society, see Hardt (2000) and Calhoun (1998). 
50 As clarified in Laclau and Mouffe (1985) the social does not exist as a given, but must 
be constituted through discourse.   
51 What comes to represent the people is, necessarily, an empty signifier.  Emptiness does 
not mean non-signifying, but in the ability to signify a diversity of particular demands.  
Particular demands of heterogeneous groups, due to their non-fulfillment in a given 
political system, become linked in a conceptual chain of equivalences—as the collective 
interests of the ‘people’—a category given life by the very act of naming itself.  This 
naming has to be vague because demands, despite their being linked together in a chain 
of equivalences, are particular, and could potentially conflict with one another. Focusing 
on internal differences—which are inevitable within any amalgamation such as the 
‘people’—would impede the unification of a populist movement, would break the chain 
of equivalences.   Laclau describes a process of substitution, whereby a particular 
demand and a particular person (both are necessary in his conception of populism) come 
to stand in for, synechdochically, for the fulfillment of the demands of the people. 
52 For Laclau, only socialist governments can be fully populist.  
53 Ferguson (1991) provides a similar synthetic argument about development.  He argued 
that development discourse was a machine that extends state power by spreading 
bureaucracy and surveillance, creating dependency, rendering state authority productive 
and legitimate, re-organizing populations, and recoding social and political problems as 
individual and technical ones.  While useful, this “machine” metaphor is much more rigid 
and formulaic than the type of analysis I am proposing here.  
53 Current literature reveals an ambiguous relationship between development and social 
movements.  Some contend that social movements reshape development to encompass 
the political objectives of marginalized groups (Alvarez et al 1998).  Others suggest that 
development is an effective galvanizing principle for social movements among the rural 
poor (Gupta 1998).  And several theorists advocate a form of development as a means of 
promoting a consciousness of how oppression operates and of teaching effective modes 
of resistance (Haraway 1991, Sandoval 1999).  Many studies have shown how ideologies 
of modernization replicate governmental effects of discipline (Guha 1993), class division 
(Chatterjee 1993) and ethnocentrism (Lloyd 1997) in anti-colonial and revolutionary 
nationalisms.  And Schild (1998) demonstrates parallels between common personal 
empowerment models used by social movements and neoliberal definitions of 
citizenship.  Few studies examine the extent to which redeployments of development by 
social movements lead to governmental outcomes. My own research extends these lines 
of inquiry through exploring how problems associated with development re-emerge in 
and complicate grassroots Mayan political struggles. Furthermore, in Laclau’s 
clarification of his conception (2005), the identification as people is not simply 
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ideological, but an affective investment in the political demands and in the populist 
leader. 
 
55 See also Wendy Brown (1995). She makes a distinction between resistance and 
empowerment, the former being more situated and partial, the latter being connected to 
longer term strategies and practices of freedom. 
56 My friend and colleage Abj’ee Jimenez, a Mayan-Mam from the same region who was 
doing fieldwork simultaneously in the town of San Idelfonso Ixtahuácan, had much more 
difficulty in interviewing Ladinos, and encountered significant racism while in the field. 
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Chapter One: From Hope, through Terror and into Compromise: 
Mayan Politics and Community in San Pedro Necta, 1944-2006 
 
This is a history of indigenous politics in San Pedro Necta from 1944 to the 
present.  It examines important events in this period and their impact on Mayan 
communities and Mayan political consciousness and political affect.   The importance of 
community as a vector of analysis is particularly salient in rural Guatemala.  The Catholic 
Church and the Spanish Crown shared a vision of rural Mayan towns as “autonomous and 
isolated entities” (Handy 1984a).  The community structure used to accumulate souls for 
God and tribute for the Crown, by the Liberal period primarily facilitated the 
accumulation bodies for labor on the fincas.1   But communities always had their own, 
autocthonous forms of organization.  Mayans shared land communally, supported 
cofradías (religious brotherhoods) that took care of images of town saints, and organized 
their own internal affairs according to a political-religious hierarchy, led by principales 
(elders) well-versed in customary knowledge (Brintnall 1979, Handy 1984, Smith 1984, 
Watanabe 1992). Communities closely regulated internal affairs as much as they did 
relationships with the outside world.2  Not everyone who lives in rural Guatemalan towns 
identifies as Mayan or indigenous.  Ladinos, a small minority in rural towns, concentrated 
in the town centers surrounded by indigenous aldeas (villages), arrived in the late 1800s, 
along with liberal reforms. Mayans and Ladinos have a long history of antagonistic 
relations, with Ladinos enjoying almost uncontested political, economic and cultural 
dominance.  The most devastating aspect of this relationship has been in the form of land 
appropriations.  Sometimes in massive dispossessions, and other times steady 
encroachment, Mayans have steadily lost land to Ladinos, who enjoyed the decisive 
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backing of fraudulent legal authority.  These enclave-like communities, preyed upon as 
they were by outside forces—especially the intensive labor demands of the Liberal and 
post-liberal governments, and earlier with the introduction of coffee under in the 1840s, 
sustained a particular form of identification that was suspicious of outsiders, especially of 
Ladinos and the state.  Mayan communities have shown resilience, not for the rigidity of 
these institutions, but for their operation as “fluid sets of community identifiers that 
helped defend community resources and foster allegiances to the community and its 
values” (Handy 1984a, 701).   
During the tumultuous events of the twentieth century, community-based Mayans 
have won amazing victories against both the colonial economy and local Ladino 
authority.  They have also suffered terrifying and saddening defeats.   These changes 
have accompanied, and in many cases have demanded, massive, irrevocable changes in 
community political structures as well as in the socio-political conceptions and forms of 
participation prevalent among community members.   These events do a great deal to 
undermine perceptions that Mayan communities are simply locally oriented, despite this 
strong community orientation and group identification.  Based on his investigation of 
Mayan identity in neighboring Santiago Chimaltenango, Watanabe (1992) argues that, in 
most cases, what has been changed has changed in order so that other elements of 
community life stays the same.  In describing these transformations in community and 
consciousness, I want to draw attention to the ways that they are not linear, nor 
predictable, but, rather, as open possibilities. 
This chapter identifies significant ideological, affective and structural breaks in 
Mayan politics and community in San Pedro over the last 60 years.  One of the major 
questions addressed by this chapter is how Mayans responded to the revolutionary 
movement and why: what their participation meant to them, what these understandings 
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‘did’ to them, and what they ‘did’ to these understandings and what they did with the 
energies that the revolutionary movement generated.  Much of this not-too-distant past 
remains shrouded in mystery.3  Decades of military repression have made an open 
accounting of local history almost impossible.  Many of the people who participated most 
enthusiastically and led the movement were killed by the military or fled to Mexico.  
And, until recently, those who remain in San Pedro and who know the stories of the war 
have been afraid to talk for fear of being labeled as guerrilla, or for fear of talking to 
outsiders who might be trying to gather information that would put them at risk.  Mayans 
still get nervous when they think their name might appear on a list.  This history could 
not have been written ten years ago, much less fifteen.   It is a central contention of this 
dissertation that in order to build a new future it is important that the events of the recent 
past be discussed by the people who lived it, and the people whose lives remain affected 
by it in many ways that they may very well not be aware.  My primary goal in writing 
this history is to provide Sampedranos, and people living in communities like it, with a 
different perspective of this history.  The goal is not to create a new “truth” but to 
encourage a more open dialogue about the past than is currently possible.    
 
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 1944-1954 
In 1944, Mayan Sampedranos turned out by the hundreds to vote for Juan José  
Arévalo and his promises of democracy, the end forced labor and land reform.  Baudillio 
Guittierez, a town Ladino and first director of the town high school, told me the story of 
how, on voting day he secretly rode his horse midway up the mountain towards a spot 
where several trails that connected the rural villages to the town center converged.  As the 
Mayan villagers passed by on their way to the polls, Baudillio advised them voting for 
Arévalo would end the vagrancy laws which amounted to forced work orders, and give 
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everyone land.  Baudillio might well take credit for being the first to inform Sampedranos 
of the benefits of voting for the democratic Revolution, but it is more likely that Mayans 
needed no additional prodding to oppose the government established by the recently 
unseated Jorge Ubico.  Ubico, the charismatic, anti-communist son of a planter who 
governed Guatemala by decree since the early 1930s had created mandatory orders to do 
plantation work on the south coast, where pay was negligible and the conditions often 
deadly. Every indigenous man had to carry their libreto (notebook) with signatures from 
labor bosses.  
Elderly Sampedranos remember with anger and amazement their suffering under 
the forced labor decrees, in use in some form or another throughout the altiplano since 
the establishment of the agro-export economy in the 1870s (McCreery 1994).  Entire 
families would leave their houses to make the three-day walk, most often barefoot, to the 
giant banana and coffee plantations on the south coast in San Marcos.  Carrying three 
monts worth of food and clothes with a mecapal (tump line), Sampedranos annually 
joined Mayans from neighboring towns in the region in following a trail that led east 
from the Naranjales bridge.  One of my friends, an eighty-five year old, remembered 
when his father was walking to coast and got a splinter in his foot the size of a nail, and 
spent the afternoon howling, trying to fish it out.  Mayans also despised the work orders 
because they robbed valuable time from their own family subsistence plots, which 
suffered greatly.  Workers did not make enough even to sustain their own existence 
(Ibarra Figueroa 1980).  Not wanting to pay their subsistence year round was likely the 
only reason the planter class in Guatemala allowed indigenous communities to exist. 
Later, Ubico commissioned free indigenous labor to cut the path for the Inter-American 
Highway.  Falling rocks, illness and parasites killed several Mayans engaged in this 
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lengthy, treacherous and grueling task.  Even though forced labor had been in use for 
decades before him, many refer to these laws as the ley de Ubico.   
Beyond their own opposition to such obvious exploitation at the hands of the 
planter class, it is almost certain that Sampedranos were exposed to the oppositional 
currents brewing in the rural sector from even before the revolution began. Their 
migrations to the plantations in the coffee zone of San Marcos placed them in a hotbed of 
indigenous and campesino (peasant) labor organizing that had been brewing for at least a 
half-century.  These groups, inspired by the Mexican revolution of 1910 and the 
Salvadoran revolution in 1932, had already organized against Ubico (Forster 2001).  In 
fact, this prior organization provided crucial support to the democratic Revolution of 
1944, when Juan José Arévalo Bermejo defeated Adrian Recinos (78).4  Perhaps it is not 
surprising that Baudillio thought he was the first person to bring this news, since he never 
made the trip to the coast himself and this history of autonomous labor organizing was 
occulted after the Counter-revolution in 1954. 
The democratic Revolution was the first serious disruption of Mayan community 
and political consciousness in the twentieth century, besides the grinding effect of agro-
export capitalism itself.  News of the revolution was cause for immediate and prolonged 
celebration throughout the highlands.  Mayans welcomed the announcement of the right 
to vote, the right to organize freely and, most of all, the suspension of forced labor.   José 
Arévalo also passed the municipal law, allowing political parties to enter into the town, 
inviting public debate about national politics.  The new regime also sent misiones 
ambulantes de cultura, itinerant groups of “teachers, medical students and representatives 
of the military and the ministry of agriculture”, with the mission of spreading the news of 
the revolution to far reaching communities (Handy 1984a, 703-4). Grassroots hopes for 
reform far outstripped the vision of the Arévalo regime, whose commitment to reform 
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was mainly rhetorical.  For example, José Arévalo maintained the forced work laws on 
the books in response to planter fears about losing the coffee crop.   He also used the 
military to recruit labor and to put down strikes.  Despite these limitations, the promises 
of the Revolution transformed rural politics by introducing new political demands, 
practices and institutions and fueling hope for a brighter political future free of class and 
race inequalities.  A call for racial justice was at the center of the fervor. In the coffee 
zone of neighboring San Marcos, movement participants who viewed race as the root the 
economic inequalities chose inter-ethnic organizing as the natural response (Foster 2001, 
139).5 Almost all of the actions taken by rural campesino unions in the first years until 
Arbenz made the new labor laws in 1948, including organized strikes, land grabs, and 
union organizing, were done by autonomous local groups themselves, and strictly 
illegally (Foster 2001).  This included mobilizing around issues that were not postulated 
by the regime, such as land redistribution from local finqueros, years before land reform 
was announced.   
The Arbenz regime responded more closely to the desires expressed ever more 
clearly and urgently at the grassroots.  Confident that their goals of agrarian reform and 
the “integral policy for the economic, social and cultural advances of indigenous groups,” 
would meet with the approval of the rural majority, the Partido de Acción Revolucionario 
formed peasant leagues (Handy 1994, 50).   Leagues brought together local leaders and 
trained them in democratic principles and ideals of social and political justice for all 
Guatemalans. Such reformist themes were indeed well-received as they spoke directly to 
the needs of a land starved and politically excluded rural population. Whereas Arévalo 
maintained these groups in check, even calling the military to force labor into the fields to 
not lose the harvest of 1948, Arbenz granted unions increased power.  Community 
leaders regularly attended monthly meetings about the new ley democrática, as Arévalo’s 
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changes were popularly known, and carried these messages back to their villages.  The 
party was forming leaders in the communities.   
The importance of municipal governments for implementing revolutionary 
policies led “national parties [to] shape themselves around a variety of local 
confrontations to win adherents” (Handy 1994, 58). Obtaining a local orientation meant 
participating in ethnic and class conflicts.   Handy describes the significance of the 
particularly violent municipal elections of 1948 as “challeng[es] [to] the local Ladino 
elite or the traditional hierarchy, often for the first time in history” (58). There was also 
competition between the peasant leagues and labor unions for followers, increasing the 
influence of Mayan communities (Handy 1984a, 710). Often these leagues were 
restrained due to the fears they generated among military and planter classes, always 
preoccupied by the possibility of labor shortage.  Handy describes this period of local 
ethnic mobilization gave the communities “greater strength and increased internal 
cohesion” (709). At the same time, however, the peasant leagues did constitute a 
challenge to community authority, vested in hands of the principales and the cofrades. 
Handy also suggests that the growing political autonomy and political boldness of these 
groups, and the fear that their autonomy and agitation generated about an “Indian 
uprising,” were the main cause of opposition from Ladinos and elements of the military 
to the Revolutionary governments within Guatemala.   
As far as Arbenz went, however, his policies still could not keep up with local 
desires for reform; and the power of local organizing, which had existed even in the many 
remote rural areas since before the revolution, continued to increase (Foster 2001, 146). 
Land hungry peasants, mostly indigenous, continued to push for land from large 
plantation owners, even those whose land was not supposedly affected by decreto 900, 
which only applied to fallow land holdings.  They occupied empty finca lands and started 
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demanding land from Ladinos who had, through a variety of legal and extra legal means, 
grabbed up a great deal of quality productive land in Mayan villages, especially land 
suitable for coffee.  When I spoke to a seventy year old Ladino from San Pedro about 
how land reform was understood and acted upon locally, he recalled a massive confusion.  
In his memory, the indigenous had misunderstood the true application of the law, and 
people were “stirring them up” by placing false ideas in their head.  Many land poor 
Mayans thought the new law guaranteed them land, which could be taken from any 
wealthy Ladino plantation owner.  Recent investigations of rural organizing during the 
revolutionary period suggests that this misreading of the law might have been instead an 
accurate reading of the force relations of the newly opened political field (Foster 2001, 
Grandin 2004). Still, uncertainty about the implications of the new law generated conflict 
between municipios and between aldeas over land (Handy 1984a, 714-718). Many 
communal land holdings were broken up.6 In addition, the new political parties also 
encroached on the authority of the community hierarchies (719). 7 
Whatever dreams and expectations for reform inhabited the minds of Mayan 
Sampedranos, these came crashing to a halt when Arbenz was removed in the coup of 
1954.  Immediately afterwards the peasant leagues were dismantled and many of the 
leaders were imprisoned, executed or, like Arbenz himself, forced into exile. Army 
representatives, with the help of local planters, commanded alcaldes auxiliaries to round 
up peasant league leaders.  One man, an alcalde auxiliar at the time, recalls the event.  
“We went at night to get people, the leaders of the community groups.  We took rope to 
tie them up.  We didn’t want to, but they made us as mayores.  There was a jail in the 
town, the size of a house, full of people.” After stiff beatings and several months in the 
makeshift jail, the calabosa, these leaders were forced to sign oaths renouncing Arbenz, 
the land movement, communism and social organization in general.  San Pedro Ladinos 
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jumped on this defeat to reassert their own authority.   Several villagers told me story of 
Ladinos who, after counterrevolution, made rounds to rural villages with a poster of 
Arbenz, claiming that he had been killed.   Immediately after the revolution, planters in 
San Pedro tried to convince rural farmers that the agrarian reform would have been bad 
for them.  They spread the rumor that land reform laws would cause villages to lose 
communally held land, that it too would have to be broken up and sold in individual plots 
of equal size as per the requirements of “communism”—the same story about 
communism they would tell decades later when the guerrilla was pressuring.  While 
exaggerated, this story no doubt vexed several communities that still had held land 
communally, especially Ajal, where conflict over control of communal land broke out 
again in the 1960s. Regardless of the truth, the point was to capitalize on the overthrow of 
the democratic regime to whatever extent possible in terms of quashing local Mayans’ 
expectations for land reform.  
The clamor for land would not re-emerge in a concrete form for another several 
decades, but that did not exhaust the political repercussions of the democratic period in 
the intervening years.   The resounding defeat of the revolutionary government may have 
dashed the immediate political hopes of many rural Sampedranos, but it left a powerful 
mark on their consciousness, especially their conception of what an alternative political 
order might look like.  It had positive and negative aspects, and was definitely unique.  If 
it challenged community hierarchies, it also gave Mayans valuable experience with 
flexing collective muscles locally and across municipal boundaries, and, possibly for 
some, of working together with Ladinos for common goals. Most man, and many women, 
old enough to remember those days describe them with a gleam in their eye that speaks 
volumes.  If indigenous were radicalized by this experience as indigenous, so were 
Ladinos, many of whom became strident anticommunists as a result of their defeat at the 
 66 
hands of the primarily indigenous peasant leagues, who locally had begun to question 
Ladino control of land and politics.  These confrontations would intensify due to parallel 
processes that were already taking hold across the highlands. 
 
RELIGION AGAINST COSTUMBRE 
The arrival of organized religion had lasting implications for Mayan political 
participation and community hierarchies across the highlands.   In the early 1950s, a 
Maryknoll priest who came to live in San Pedro, Padre Richard, came to live in San 
Pedro.  Padre Richard selected a number of school aged Mayan youths, young men, to 
attend special classes in the diocesis in Huehuetenango.  These courses focused on church 
doctrine provoked massive changes in community structures and local identity (Warren 
1978). The teachings of evangelical groups were less dramatic, but both churches 
opposed and undermined the influence of costumbre—their shorthand name for the 
community hierarchy.  Although Evangelical conversion started at nearly the same time 
as the new Catholicism, not until the 1980s would it have a similar reach and influence in 
community life. The Catholic Church focused its energies not on doctrinal conflicts with 
Evangelicals, who at the time were few in number, but on a campaign against the power 
of the cofradía system, and to reduce the symbolic emphasis placed on the saints, the use 
of alcohol, and traditional Mayanized Catholic belief systems and ritual practices—
especially the ritual use of alcohol and animal sacrifice—in favor of focusing on the 
personage and teachings of Jesus Christ.  When Padre Richard took over the mass, some 
villagers were unhappy, but the majority acceded to the new authority without a high 
level of protest, such as was the case in many other municipios.  One of the first, and 
foremost, indigenous catequistas, Arturo Ramírez, and the first sacristan, reportedly 
burned 22 of the tables used by chamanes or sacerdotes Mayans (Mayan priests or 
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shamans).   The sacerdotes Mayans kept small tables adorned with candles and other 
offerings that were used for communication with the gods and divination.  Judging from 
the continued strength of the cofadia system, and traditional practices and beliefs in 
general in neighboring Santiago Chimaltenango, Ixtahuacán, San Juan, and Colotenango, 
and the relative weakness of these traditions in San Pedro Necta, where there are no 
longer practicing sacerdotes Mayans or curanderos, the continual presence of a town 
priest probably helped greatly the ascendance of the symbolic authority of the new 
Catholic Church.8  
If internally to the villages, religious conversion and increasing participation in 
the market economy meant the rise of a younger group of leaders to displace the age-
based community heirarchies, externally it meant breaking the dependency of village 
authority to Ladinos (Falla 1978, Brintnall 1979, Warren 1978).  These studies suggest 
that without these constraints, indigenous politics within communities were more 
independent of Ladino control.  Abandonment of the traditional hierarchies meant relief 
from financial obligations in the fiesta system, allowing individuals to save and to invest 
in market crops.  Arturo Ramírez exemplifies the linkage between the move away from 
costumbre and the focus on development.  Through his contacts in the Catholic Church, 
Ramírez received training as a promotor sociale in the University of Rafael Landivar and 
became a spokesperson for the new science of agriculture and for market cropping.  The 
Church also arranged his travel to Houston, Texas. Changes on the symbolic level were 
probably at least as important, specifically the idea of equality emphasized in both 
Evangelical and Christian faiths.  Indigenous people were children of God, just like 
Ladinos, and had to be treated as such.  This idea—obvioulsy a factor in Morales’ brief 
political success—was strong within the more popular Catholic Church. Another way in 
which religious conversion affected the social and political thinking of local Mayans was 
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the committment, common to both religions, to the development and advancement of the 
indigenous population.  
But costumbre did not simply go away.   The cofradía, although less powerful, 
still exists and takes care of the statue of San Pedro that is paraded around town on the 
day of San Pedro.  Many traditional practices continue to exist, blending in when not in 
direct or overt conflict with official church doctrines.  Today many people outwardly 
denounce costumbre have abandoned many of its practices especially those concerning 
drink. As far as I could determine, there are few or no sacerdotes Mayans in San Pedro, 
as there are in neighboring Colotenango and Ixtahuacán.  It seems that outwardly people 
deny religion, especially to strangers who they think will not approve or criticize them; 
but they cannot help but believe for themselves.  At least, in times of emergency, people 
do not hesitate to hedge their bets. Additional evidence that people still retain a form of 
Mayan spirituality is the pervasive belief in, and fear of, witches and ghosts, as well as 
other creatures with supernatural powers.  To some extent this is evident in their belief in 
and use of curanderos (traditional healers). Baby thieves, choleros, are part of this world.  
This is different from the Church’s perspective, which sees all costumbre as witchcraft; 
villagers see witchcraft as a particular practice separate from costumbre, but related to it 
in the sense that it deals with some of the same supernatural forces that they see to be at 
play in human events.    
 
LOCAL POLITICS AFTER THE COUNTERREVOLUTION 
Spaces for local politics were few and far between in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.   Successive military governments vigilantly opposed any peasant organization 
and labor union activity, aided and abetted by rural Ladinos.  A brief and partial respite 
came in 1966 with the presidency of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenego from the Partido 
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Revolutionario (PR). This party was a center-left, even to the right of the Democracia 
Cristiana (DC) but had little power to make national-level changes, as all real decision-
making power remained in the hands of the military (Melville and Melville 1971, 
Grandin 2004).9  This opening coincided with the decline of the authority of the village 
hierarchy affected by religious conversion, a process now fully underway. Pedro Morales, 
an early evangelical, was elected the first indigenous alcalde in San Pedro Necta, as a 
member of the (PR) in 1966.  Morales had been at the forefront of the peasant leagues in 
San Pedro.  According to his son, a retired school-teacher who runs a small business in 
San Pedro, when the counterrevolution came, he counted himself lucky for having been 
arrested in Huehuetenango, and not San Pedro, where the planters, in his estimation, 
would have killed him for certain.  He did his time—three months—and left unharmed.  
Morales was also the first indigenous member of the evangelical Centro Americana 
church in San Pedro, and the first indigenous preacher.  Little is known about his decision 
to convert.  He almost certainly faced resistance from the cofradía system, perhaps less 
pronounced because he lived in the Ladino dominated town center instead of a village 
and was, from all accounts, economically differentiated from most Mayans who lived in 
the villages.  Pedro reportedly helped missionaries translate the Bible into Mam, and was 
also a lay preacher.  Two North American missionaries who knew him in those times 
described him as one of the only indigenous people they had met without fear of Ladinos.  
Although the rest of church members were Ladinos, Morales moved comfortably within 
these circles, remaining the only indigenous member of the congregation for several 
years.  Morales had studied to sixth grade level, which at that time was a rare 
accomplishment, one earning the title of promotor bilingue, and much more common 
among indigenous from the pueblo, usually more economically advanced than those in 
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the aldeas.  Then, promotores taught primary grade school in the few villages that, by the 
late 1950s, had begun to build schools.   
Despite Morales’ commitment to land reform, the main issue in Morales’ mayoral 
campaign was not land—that issue was closed by the counterrevolution—but the unequal 
treatment of indigenous Sampedranos by Ladinos in municipal affairs.  In those times an 
indigenous person had almost to beg to get a meeting with the alcalde, even after walking 
long distances.  When audience was granted, often on another day, if then, indigenous 
petitioners had to treat the alcalde with even more deference than they would any other 
Ladino.  Attendants made sure that indigenous visitors to the municipio removed their 
shoes at the door.  There were also more material abuses.  As they had been for decades, 
local disputes and crimes were resolved with fines and short sentences in the municipal 
jail.  Previously, unscrupulous Ladinos would charge exaggerated fines, enforcing them 
with threats of equally exaggerated sentences.   Indigenous Sampedranos, most who 
could not read or write, could never prove abuse, making it all the more frustrating.  
Ending this form of discrimination gave the moral high ground to Morales’ campaign, 
especially among indigenous.  Town Ladinos were angry that an indigenous man had 
taken over the alcaldia.   
As it turned out, many indigenous residents were also unhappy with Morales’ 
approach to governance.  Morales, working as both Justice of the Peace and alcalde—in 
those days the tasks were combined continued to impose fines for small infractions.  
Before the municipal tax, these fines were the only real source of income for the 
municipality. Some recall that his decision to continue taxing indigenous Sampedranos 
represented his ‘even-handed’ approach—to apply the law equally based on the offense.   
But many claim that Morales used fines corruptly as a form of personal financial gain.  
Whichever was the truth, a good many indigenous people resented his liberal use of fines, 
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and resented the fact that their own mayor was doing the same thing to them as the 
Ladinos had done before.  In the end, it was the local Ladinos, unhappy with indigenous 
control of the alcaldia, who eventually ran Morales out of office.  They brought a case 
against him for cutting down a tree on his own property, making him ineligible to run 
again.  Regardless of this somewhat poetic justice, discontent among indigenous residents 
made it unlikely that he would have won a second term.    
 
VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Acción Católica (Catholic Action, AC) talked about development, linking the 
notion to the development of the person through education. The Promotores bilingües 
from the urban center held community meetings with leaders in the aldeas to persuade 
them to form a commitee to build schools.  At one of the first of such meetings, the wife 
of one of these promotores recalls, “They almost ran him out with palos, (sticks). They 
didn’t want anything.  Finally he convinced them.   He didn’t give up.  Then the people 
liked it.  They made a salon of sticks and pajas (thatch).  Later, little by little they asked 
around Guatemala for help.”  Economic development had not been as a political issue 
since the Arbenz regime, when it was a broad goal almost drowned out by cries for land 
and democracy.  Padre Richard had brought chemical fertilizers to San Pedro for the first 
time in the late 1950s. But this was on a very limited scale and the situation was dire.  
During the corn shortage in Huehuetenango in 1967, many families went hungry 
(Melville and Melville 1971, 273). Other years were not much better.  Padre José  Tol 
arrived in 1970.  He began more intense work with the formation of catequistas and 
placed strong emphasis on economic development.  Father Tol founded a cooperative 
named the Santa Teresita, which was part of the The National Federation of Savings and 
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Credit Cooperatives, (FENACOAC) (Gaitan 1972).  Ideas of economic development 
were welcomed by the rural villagers. 
The widespread use of new agricultural inputs and of awareness of the benefits of 
scientific agriculture was made possible by the cooperative system, which, by allowing 
an economy of scale, lowered their prices for the farmers.  Cooperative organizing 
repressed in the counterrevolution was slowly re-legalized bewteen 1956 and 1959, by 
president Peralta Azurdia. There were 19 cooperatives in Huehuetenango by 1972, 
including two in the department capital.  Cooperatives thrived in the late 1960s in the 
meager political openness afforded by the PR presidency of Montenegro.  The national 
cooperative movement was left-leaning, progresive and pragmatic. Local cooperatives 
introduced a number of new ideas, technologies and practices to community members. 
The cooperative introduced chemical fertilizers and pesticides at low cost and instructed 
farmers how to use them.  It also taught other agricultural skills, such as seed selection, 
crop diversification and marketing techniques.  Cooperatives also arranged for the 
transportation of their members’ products and gave credit to small farmers and educated 
their members on savings.   There were a variety of other activities and services, 
including: 
Storage systems; moveable and permanent refrigeration units; fruit classification 
(by size and weight; paper and plastic packing machines; ovens to dry vegetables; 
mills for vegetables and spices; silos for basic grains that will hold on average 200 
quintales (100 lb bags); 50lb scales; manual machine to tie yute sacks; … (Gaitan 
1972, 53) 
Hundreds of small farmers participated, from every village.   Even those who did not 
participate in the savings and loan services still benefitted from some of its programs.  
Cooperative organizing brought the issue of sustainable, long term development 
for small farmers clearly on to the political agenda in San Pedro.  In addition to exposure 
to development ideas, the cooperative espoused a very progressive politics, and provided 
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linkages between local groups and national politics through the assembly systems.  
Cooperative meetings were spaces where national politics of interest to poor campesinos  
and Mayans were discussed, especially the issue of land.10  Constant oversight from town 
Ladinos, many of who were perturbed or threatened by the program, prevented unions 
from emerging; but the ideas were there.  Community leaders underwent constant 
training and preparation. The majority of their members were indigenous, something their 
national leadership saw as a point of pride (Gaitan 1972).  
FENACOAC cooperatives, closely associated with the reformist Christian 
Democrats and the Catholic Church, had the aim of lifting people, primarily rural 
Mayans, out of grinding poverty.  They viewed and discussed the basis of poverty as the 
conditions of land inequality.  This dissenting discourse is evident in their monthly 
publication, La Voz de FENACOAC, containing federation news.11  Cooperative ideas 
were presented as in harmony with Mayan culture (Gaitan 1972, 57),12 while at the same 
time voicing a strong criticism of certain elements of indigenous tradition (58).13  
Furthermore, cooperatives espoused a vision of development aimed at the entire 
community.  Strenthening community was the expressed aim of their credit program, 
which attempted to “transfer productive credit inside the same community” which the 
idea that this would “provokes and will provoke essentially in the short and long term the 
growth and improvement of the community, in the sense that all of the benefits obtained 
in the increase in production will be captured and transferred in the system of credit-
savings for the communities” (53). The cooperative ethos of community advancement 
was central to the enthusiastic manner in which villagers participated in the cooperative; 
many villagers saw cooperative teachings and methods as part of their struggle to gain 
collective and individual equality with Ladinos 
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In addition to the autonomous cooperative movement, several state programs 
were created with the goal of developing Mayan communities.  One of the first 
government programs directed towards the well-being of the indigenous population was 
SFEI, the Sociedad para el Fortalecimiento de la Economia Indígena.  SFEI promoters—
there were three for the entire department, one from San Sebastián, and another from San 
Idelfonso Ixtahuacán—went from town to town in Hueuhetenango from the mid-1950s to 
the late 1960s promoting chemical fertilizers and market agriculture (Manz 2004).  
SFEI’s coverage was miniscule however, covering perhaps 1% of the population.  A 
state-led, USAID funded program designed to achieve these goals was DIGESA, which 
did not arrive in San Pedro until 1978. Community enthusiasm about DIGESA, the 
Directoria General de Sciencias Agricolas—one of the most  wide reaching development 
programs formed part of the Sector Publico Agraria in 1970—reveal a strong desire for 
economic advancement that drove the formation of local cooperatives.  DIGESA had 
many of the same tasks of the Santa Teresita cooperative: it emphasized new chemical 
inputs, market cropping, savings, and economic risk taking in the form of loans, which 
were increasingly available to small farmers through agencies like BANDESA, the Banco 
del Desarrollo Rural (now Banrural).  
Economic advancement was a slow and painstaking process.  The path to 
development was hard work. Perhaps more important than the economic impact of the 
program was the ideology.  The cooperative was a sign that collective energy could result 
in substantial improvement in the quality of life. It is also significant that while most of 
the members were indigenous, many Ladinos campesinos also participated.  In fact, this 
was the one of the only spaces in San Pedro besides the church where Ladinos and 
Mayans worked together for a united goal. As for the poor Ladinos who pariticipated in 
the cooperative and DIGESA programs, most seemed not to mind that they shared their 
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struggle with indigenous, as long as they could reap program benefits equally. Ramírez 
and other indigenous leaders advised not to work on the fincas because of the low pay 
and the poor treatment.  “you shouldn’t have to kill yourself for the boss. Even if you only 
have two cuerdas, it’s better to work your own land.”   Nevertheless, cooperatives were 
often taken over by town Ladinos, who, because of their larger land holdings, were better 
situated to benefit from cooperatives (Warren 1978).  Warren indicates that many 
indigenous cooperativists in San Andrés, a town in the department of Solola, became 
disillusioned when the gains of cooperativism did not make up for the vast wealth and 
power differences between the two local ethnic groups (142). 
Despite these limitations, the association of development with the idea of 
indigenous advancement was evident in the hostile reaction of local Ladinos, many of 
whom misinterpreted them as “one step away from Communism.”  One Ladino planter 
who lived in the pueblo reportedly told Ramírez, “If we weren’t friends, I would kill you, 
because now I don’t have any mozos (day laborers) to work my land.”  Convinced of the 
importance of their message, Tol, Ramírez and other Mayan leaders continued.  Coffee,  
which before 1970 was planted almost exclusively in the lush fincas of San Pedro’s 
northern slope, was by 1970 a cash crop for more and more Sam-pedranos—Ladinos as 
well as indigenous.   Credit from the cooperative helped many farmers invest in land.  
Others, helped no doubt by the increased production granted by green revolution 
technologies, converted land previously dedicated to corn production.  Many leaders of 
the next generation still point to the influence and guidance of the Church, the 
cooperative, and science itself as inspirations for thier efforts to make a better life for 
themselves, their families, and the community.   
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CONFRONTING LADINO PRIVILEGE 
The decline in the political significance of the hierarchies and the rise of new 
conceptions of development and equality brought the possibility of openly challenging 
Ladino political authority in the municipality.  It is probably more accurate to say that 
these processes made this confrontation almost inevitable. There were many signs that 
Mayan leaders’ patience with persistent racism, abuse, and monopoly on municipal 
power was wearing thin.   This growing sense of injustice erupted in several ways.   One 
was a confrontation of the mayores system by Francisco Domingo, a cateqista and a 
promotor bilingüe, who also lived in the urban center.   The mayores were the alcaldes 
auxiliares elected from each community every year to do service, free, to the 
municipality.   They would run errands and do different jobs, some of them physically 
demanding, for the alcalde.  Reportedly, Pedro Morales had opposed these practices as 
well.  Domingo started speaking against the system in the early 1970s.  Word got back to 
the aclade who asked Domingo if it was true that he was riling up the people.  He said 
that it was.  The alcalde argued that they need to serve the country.  Domingo asked 
where this was written, asked the alcalde to produce the book of laws.  When the alcalde 
did not, Domingo said that the law states that the people have to be paid for their work.  
Defeated in the argument, the alcalde refused to give ground.  He threatened to jail 
Domingo, who told him to “Go ahead, throw me in jail.  But tomorrow, all the people 
will be here.  I don’t know what will happen.”  The alcalde made a counter offer, to quiet 
him, saying that if he would begin to work for them, they would pay him Q50 per month, 
a healthy salary for the time, when you could still buy a cuerda that produced coffee for 
less.  The alcalde did not jail him, however; and Domingo continued his “agitation.”  
Domingo continued to ask difficult questions regarding why educated indigenous, like 
himself, were free of the labor obligation.  Local protagonism over race issues converged 
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with a limited opening in national politics that allowed for the existence of center-left 
political parties, most notably the Partído Revolucionario (PR) and the Democracia 
Cristiana (Christian Democrats, DC).  Although president Mendez Montenegro was 
somewhat progressive, his ability to pursue reformist legislation was almost completely 
curtailed by the military and planter elite, both of which saw the advancement of the rural 
majority a threat to their power, their labor pool, and definitely not worth their tax dollars 
(Melville and Melville 1971).  But only focusing on their national failure misses the types 
of spaces for ethnic politics opened by these oppositional parties.  
The new generation of Catholic developmentalists made their entry into town 
politics in 1974 with the Frente de Oposición Nacional (FON), a coalition that included 
the DC, the newly formed Frente Unido de la Revolucion, and the PR.  The Christian 
Democrats called for the creation of a government founded on Christian principles that 
would protect indigenous people from abuses and exploitation, and allow them the 
resources and opportunities necessary to development themselves as equals to Ladinos.  
Like the PR, were allowed to operate in Huehuetenango during the mid 1970s, and came 
out in opposition to the Ladino dominated MLN.   These parties’ calls for national 
changes were well received by rural Mayans whose desires for advancement had been 
boosted by the new Church doctine and discourses of development. The DC presidential 
candidate was Efraín Ríos Montt, a Huehuetecan who had graduated from the Escuela 
Politecnica in Guatemala City, and had been minister of defense under Arana Osorio.14  
According to some reports, Ríos Montt campaigned as a poor person, wearing torn pants 
and talking about reform for the poor, albeit with little reference to specific details. Ríos 
Montt won the presidential election but was denied entry by the military government. 
The first DC candidate from San Pedro was Jacinto Garcia, a tailor who lived in 
El Llano, the village closest to the town center.  Garcia won 1974 election but was 
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blocked from taking power by local Ladinos who refused to accept what for them was, at 
the time, unacceptable: being governed by a indigenous mayor.  The land issue, 
unresolved, remained a source of Ladino-indigenous antagonism.  Angered at the 
growing threat to their political authority represented by the formation of indigenous 
leaders in the Catholic Church, town Ladinos drove José Tol out of San Pedro.  Tol’s 
removal was precipitated by the 1974 campaign.  After campaigning in San Pedro, Ríos 
Montt had an appointment to appear in Santiago Chimaltenango at 3 in the afternoon.  
Meanwhile, MLN representatives had punched holes in all four tires of his truck.  Tol, 
seeing the injustice, gave him a ride in the church’s vehicle.   Town Ladinos denounced 
this as political interference, and used it as an excuse to replace Tol.  Ladinos had another 
reason to be suspicious of Tol. Tol preached liberation theology, a political reading of the 
Bible as a message of advancement for poor and marginalized peoples. None of this was 
appealing to planter class town Ladinos, who equated it with communism, a far worse 
crime than “stirring up” the Mayans with talk about development.  
As important as the reformist aspirations of the DC, and the populist discourse of 
Ríos Montt, a major public issue in the 1974 election, and the issue still remembered 
today, was a dispute over communal land.  Overlooking the urban center in San Pedro is 
a plateau there is a grassy field about half a kilometer square.   It is divided by a cliff, 
which has another patch of land on top of it.  Passing through this land converged several 
trails that connected the indigenous mountain villages with the town.  During town 
celebrations, such as the day of San Pedro or the town fair in April, indigenous people 
would tie up their horses and other animals in the field to safely graze while they enjoyed 
the celebrations, which would often last a couple of days.   The land was owned by the 
municipality, or, that is to say, owned by no one individual.  Augustín Herrera, the 
Ladino alcalde at the time, took over municipal land, which was located not far from the 
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town center and was mostly flat—a valuable anomaly in San Pedro—and had soil quite 
suited to the planting of coffee.  This move was immediately denounced by indigenous 
leaders—specifically Jacinto Garcia and Alfonso Garcia—a promotor bilingüe—who 
claimed that the mayor had sold, or given, the land to one of his friend, another Ladino, 
and in the process ruined something that belonged to the entire community. The Garcia 
brothers began a movement, and were able to gain wide appeal.  The Garcia brothers and 
others organized a protest against the decision in the town square that was attended by 
hundreds of angered villagers. Herrera’s high-handed treatment of the land issue added 
justification and urgency to the continued desire to have an indigenous mayor.  
 
FROM CULTURAL STRUGGLE TO REVOLUTION 
From 1975 and onward, and possibly sooner, political processes in San Pedro 
cannot be understood outside the context of the guerrilla movement.  The EGP was the 
first guerrilla movement to arrive in San Pedro Necta, followed soon after by ORPA.  
These groups had a similar message—land for the poor gained through revolutionary 
struggle—despite their differences. The EGP was both a political and a military 
organization.  Through their clandestine military cell network, the guerrilla worked 
directly with community members to raise consciousness and to form leaders.  They 
focused primarily on established communities. ORPA, on the other hand, was primarily a 
military organization.  Initially, they focused their efforts in the finca zones in the north 
of the township, looking for young men and women willing to leave their communities 
and become combatants. After talking to dozens of villagers about the mood at the time 
of when the guerrilla first began operating in San Pedro, a pattern emerges.  Villagers 
were receptive and curious. A good number of those leaders, or their fathers, had learned 
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about and identified with the idea of the lucha de los pobres, the struggle of the poor, 
since the democratic Revolution.  Many remembered clearly the campesino unions of the 
Abenz regime and talk of land reform.  Some had spoken too organizers on the coast, and 
now were seeing more here in the villages.  Many were now very interested to hear that 
there were armed groups.  As villagers received ongoing education from the guerrilla 
about the nature of capitalist exploitation and their plans for a new regime, they hid 
guerrilla in their communities, served as their lookouts, and prepared them food.   
The guerrilla’s message resonated with Sampedranos for several reasons. One of 
the major factors influencing the guerrilla was the economic situation.  Although there 
were improvements from the green revolution, villagers were terribly poor (Smith 1984, 
Jonas 1991).15  Most were already angered by low wages and abusive treatment in the 
fincas.   Many were land poor, and some were even landless. The promise to divide up 
finca lands was an enticing prospect indeed. Families were still living in the “sub-
subsistence” level. The population had increased dramatically in recent years, and family 
budgets were strained. Land, while more productive, was becoming scarcer and more 
expensive.  The early cooperatives had hardly enough money to satiate the local demand 
for credit.  In 1975, when the guerrilla was talking to villagers about revolution, nearly 
70% of the villagers would still make the annual trip to the south coast, facing the same 
conditions that had tormented generations of Mayans. Another factor was the almost 
unequivocal support from the Catholic Church. For many, especially the new AC 
Catholics, the guerrilla movement was in line with their spiritual beliefs, especially the 
criticism of the rich and the idea that the “last will be first.”  Although at first the Church 
took no position on the revolution, its emphasis on development seemed in accordance 
with its fundamental ethical principals. Several recall that Padre Roberto, the successor to 
Padre Tol, was a liberation theologist and spoke openly about social justice from the 
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pulpit.  Some claim that Roberto privately advocated the guerrilla movement within a 
small group of educated indigenous cateqistas and leaders.  Finally and very importantly, 
for many, revolutionary ideologies blended into the conceptions among goals of local 
leaders developed through struggles with Ladinos.  Mayan struggles against racism were 
seen as coterminous with this movement, even if official discourses and daily practices of 
the guerrilla did not emphasize ending racial discrimination as a specified goal of the 
revolution.   
Although it is impossible to gauge precisely the level of involvement of particular 
individuals, especially since many of them are now dead or had fled when military 
repression took over the town, most indigenous leaders, and most villagers, were either 
sympathetic to the guerrilla movement, if not directly involved.   Local guerrilla leaders 
estimate that well over half community members were organized, and that more were 
sympathizers. While clandestine, most everyone in the village knew they were there and 
had a general idea, if not entirely accurate, of who of their neighbors were and were not 
supporting them.  Sometimes they held open meetings with villagers in the school 
buildings.  Numerous villages had become territorios libres (free territories) by 1980.  
One local leader from ORPA recalled that, “we had people donde quiera,” (everywhere). 
By late 1977, many Sampedranos had joined the new peasant organization Comite de 
Unidad Campesino, or CUC, which had a loose, underground affiliation with the 
guerrilla, but enough autonomy to give them the plausible deniability necessary to 
operate with some moral force publicly.  CUC pushed for many of the same goals 
embraced by the cooperatives, and made broader criticisms of conditions in the 
plantations and military power (Grandin 1997, 13).16 
Although the revolutionary movement was highly resonant with existing struggles 
for social and racial justice, it introduced way of thinking and feeling that did not 
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previously exist.  This was a far cry now from traditional beliefs about power and 
political agency.  The antagonism between Mayans and the dominant Guatemalan social 
order has deep roots, but was formerly conceptualized in different terms, some of which 
are condensed in Mayan folklore about the lord of the mountain, or witz in Mam.  The 
witz is a rich, evil, white (probably Spanish) man who magically appears to poor Mayans, 
offering them wishes, but only in return for their soul.  The witz stories have a similar 
plot.  A Mayan (most commonly male) encounters a strange man while on a walk alone.  
The man invites him to his home, and, when he agrees, the two are immediately 
transported to a beautiful home on top of the mountain.  Having revealed his identity in 
this way, the witz then offers the man wishes or incredible wealth.  The man accepts the 
gift, but eventually regrets it.  Because the wish is cursed, the man dies and the fortune 
turns to ashes.   In these stories, the witz owns the mountain, symbolizing a plantation 
owner; but he is also the devil. Others have pointed out how this and similar popular tales 
allegorize the relationship between the rich Ladino landowners and poor Mayans, and 
serve to warn against the evils of engagement in individual profit seeking, which violated 
traditional community-oriented moral economy, where status was derived from the 
destruction of wealth in the cofradías (religious brotherhood) (Watanabe 1992, cfa 
Taussig 1981).  The witz’s motivation is the pure otherworldly evil of the devil: he wants 
to consume a soul—a poignant transfiguration of the life poured out in the years of forced 
labor in the coffee and banana fields of the landowners.  This does not mean to say that 
rural Mayans used to believe that Ladino landowners were the devil and possessed 
supernatural powers; but it does strongly indicate a shared sense of inevitability regarding 
the prevailing social order.   
The revolutionary narrative offered a new hermeneutic for understanding 
Guatemalan society, complete with a new set of metaphors, details and scenarios.  In the 
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1970s, clandestine meeting with guerrillas introduced Mayans to many intricate details 
about the profit system.  Like the witz story, the revolutionary discourse proclaims 
current social relations unjust, but does so by defining the current mode of production as 
exploitative profiteering, done by humans for human motives.  Mayans came to see the 
land tenure system as a theft of what rightfully belonged to “los pobres.”  Planters were 
now seen as “los ricos” who profited from the exploitation of Mayan workers, whose 
labor they “stole” by paying low wages.  It was also seen as a form of discrimination 
against Mayans, who were “enslaved” by rich Ladinos.  This version is secular, 
preempting the search for an appeal to the supernatural—which it labeled as pre-modern 
and superstitious—by emphasizing the human motives that animate capitalist relations of 
production.  It accuses those at the top of the system of criminally excessive 
accumulation borne of greed.   
There was another important difference: Unlike the witz, who is non-human and 
magical, the finquero (plantation owner) was human.  Once human, a finquero could 
die—something unthinkable about a witz, but a foundational assumption of the 
revolution.  The revolutionary narrative demystified the social structure, presenting it as 
man-made and reversible.  It described society as a diametrical antagonism between two 
forces destined to collide, or maybe that were always already locked in combat.  The first 
direction nullifies, the other liberates.  It is not like the witz story, where the money taken 
is cursed: the guerrilla communicated a faith in the power of the peasantry to overthrow 
the elite and to create a new society.  It sets up the people as inevitably challenging this 
power structure, and inevitably succeeding.  Mayan understandings of the revolutionary 
narrative were refracted through local conceptions of morality and social justice, which 
were also evolving in relationship to religious and economic transformations.  This 
narrative mapped itself onto these terms, embellishing them at points and transforming 
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them while never replacing them entirely.   The result was more ‘Mayan’ than it was 
‘revolutionary’.   Mayans identified with the revolutionary goals, taking land from the 
rich and giving it to the poor; but for most of them, the  ‘rich’ meant Ladinos and the 
‘poor’ meant indigenous, them. Struggles for race and class justice were inextricable. 
Mayan conceptions of anti-racism also included their contests with local Ladinos.   This 
generated an excitement about the possibility of political utopia within their reach.  
Paralleling this growing organization at the clandestine level was the local 
Mayan-Ladino politics for control of the town.  In 1976, the DC fielded time with Arturo 
Ramírez as the candidate.  Again, municipal land remained a central issue.  This time, 
however, Ramírez faced more sophisticated electoral tactics from the MLN.  Aware that 
many communities had began to solicit potable water projects since 1970s, the MLN 
candidate began to promise these projects would be delivered, provided that they vote for 
the MLN.  Many Sampedrano indigenous, even close family members of Arturo 
Ramírez, traded their support for this promise.   Mayan villagers insist that Arturo won 
the election, only to be denied entry, in another example of anti-democratic intransigence 
by Ladino elites.  After this imposed victory, the new alcalde, Villatoro, never made 
good on his promise: communities would still have to wait several more years for their 
water.  Instead he declared the title invalid, and the communities lost the claims to water 
sources they had already bought.  They still rent the water they once owned, and worry 
about their children’s futures.  Obstacles to placing even victorious indigenous alcaldes 
in previous elections did nothing to stop local political organizing.   Actually, it seems to 
only have intensified.  In the electoral campaign of 1978, Jacinto Garcia was the 
candidate—this time for the FUR, the Frente Union Revolucionario—an openly 
revolutionary party.  Alongside the party’s revolutionary image, once again the issue of 
municipal land continued to be at the forefront of the elections.  And it appeared that 
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Jacinto would win this election. Whatever these hopes were, they disintegrated with the 
assassination of Miguel Colom Argueta, the party’s vice presidential candidate, one week 
before the elections, causing the entire national party to collapse. The Ladino candidate 
won easily.  Nationally, Lucas Garcia assumed control of the presidency, and the 
violence against guerrillas and suspected peasants escalated.   
Although sympathy for or participation in the guerrilla was widespread, there 
were also strong currents of opposition.  Not all community members were interested in 
the guerrilla movement, and some were steadfastly opposed.   Many evangelicals, but 
definitely not all, refused to help the guerrilla.   One reason was an interpretation of a 
Biblical verse in Romans, common among evangelicals, which held that the law of the 
land is established by God himself, and therefore should not be opposed. Many, 
especially military commissioners and contratistas (labor contractors) sought their own 
best interests through alignment with Ladinos, plantation owners and the army.  Many 
spied on community members, reported their activities, or suspicions of their activities, 
directly to the military. Guerrilla organizers and villagers recall divisions over the 
guerrilla movement stemming from class position.  Indigenous who had some land, and 
were comfortable were much less interested in participating, thinking either that they 
would risk losing their own lands to the revolutionary goal of land redistribution, or 
simply not feeling like they had anything to gain, and much to lose.  Another reason why 
some Mayans did not support the guerrilla was based in their alliance to the planter class 
party MLN, and the populism of Lucas Garcia, who claimed to support the poor against 
the rich by raising the minimum wage from 50 centavos to three quetzales.   But without 
a doubt the most important reason why many Mayans, regardless of religion, did not join 
or support the guerrilla cause was their opposition to the use of violence as a means of 
social change.  Some feared the consequences, while others just thought it was wrong.   
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Worries about potential risks went alongside many of the other justifications 
given for not participating, and almost certainly influenced them.  It was an opinion 
shared by the previous generation of indigenous leaders who remembered the defeat of 
the Arbenz government and the violent dismantling of the Comités Agrarios.  One Day of 
the Dead, I was told by one of my friends in San Pedro that his uncle was coming for a 
visit and that I should talk to him about local political history.  His uncle Anastasio 
turned out to be the former leader of ORPA in the San Pedro who fled to southern 
Mexico during the violence.   During a long conversation about his life in Mexico, his 
reaction to town politics, and differences between people now and people before, 
Anastasio recalled the conversation that transpired when he went to ask the advice of 
Francisco Lazaro and the ex-alcalde, Pedro Morales about whether or not they should 
join the guerrilla: 
Anastasio: We want to get ahead in a legal way.  But it is illegal for those 
governing now.  What can we do?  We want to arm ourselves.  
Pedro: “You won’t be able to.  We already passed a stage of that.  We did it.  But 
we didn’t win.  We wanted it, but we proved it’s impossible.  What they’re going 
to do is kidnap some of you.  That’s 100% certain.  Here in San Pedro Necta you 
still don’t know.  You’re ignorant.  You want to fly, but it’s going to be difficult, 
you’re going to be kidnapped.  There’s going to be war.”   
“But” Anastasio recalled, “we were already way ahead in the process.” This 
conversation suggests a diffuse, and loosely organized local political scene, and in 
particular a gap in communication between key political actors from two generations, a 
far cry from the image of a collective Mayan consciousness that seems to underlie much 
analysis of town and departmental politics.  Once in the communities, many villagers, 
participants and non-participants, disliked the authoritarian and violent tactics of the 
guerrilla within the community.  Although the guerrilla left many people alone who did 
not want to get involved, some were threatened and beaten up.  There were even threats 
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among people who had already agreed to help, based on rumors that they had begun to 
help the army.   
Complicating matters further, unresolved internal divisions within the guerrilla 
groups also raised doubts among community leaders about their comPeténce.  Speaking 
with an irritated tone, as if the events he was speaking about had just happened last 
month, Anastasio recalls the split between ORPA and the EGP.  ORPA, the more military 
professional oriented group, was increasingly dissatisfied with the operations being 
carried out by the EGP: 
The EGP didn’t want ORPA in their zone.  But we [members ORPA] realized that 
the EGP wasn’t working well.  If there was a combat, it was sure that three or four 
people would die.  They didn’t know how to take a town.  They always had 
contradictions in their work, because they accelerated things a lot.  Every time.  
They didn’t explore the place before making war.  The entry they knew well, but 
they fell apart on the exit.  We [ORPA] have to go in and see the place—even if it 
takes five days.  Where are you going to go in? How are you going to get out?  
Where are you going to place the mine?  
The EGP’s criticisms of the ORPA was, not surprisingly, their single-minded focus on 
combat and their relative disinterest in building long-term bases through consciousness 
raising and organization.  Some complain that ORPA arrives, grabs a person that they 
want to train, and leaves the community behind. Although the EGP and ORPA had 
initially agreed to divide the town into distinct zones—the ORPA working in the finca 
villages and the EGP handling the rest—the reality is that these groups competed for the 
same communities.  In the midst of such competition, community leaders were 
sometimes unsure of how to respond.  One prominent village leaders, who later entered 
town politics remembered their frustration that, “There was competition between them 
[the guerrilla] also, and for that reason it gave us doubts about deciding which group to 
go with.  If they were fighting with each other, we did not feel secure with them.” The 
result was often less enthusiastic participation, hedging of bets. “We helped, but kept our 
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distance.” To be sure, the distance between guerrilla involvement and non-involvement 
was filled with levels of internal gradation and critical reflection.   
There were also important divisions within the guerrilla organization.  Local 
guerrilla organizers within the ranks of the guerrillas were dissatisfied with the actions of 
a command structure that they saw as out of touch with local reality.   First, they saw the 
conflict between guerrilla forces as an unproductive conflict whose origins were at the 
top.  As Anastasio put it, “If the four guerrilla commanders (EGP, ORPA, FAR, PGT) 
were allied, the [guerrilla] would have won.  The commanders never thought ‘how are 
we going to do this? … because they’re dying’”  Beyond this incomprehensible matter of 
counterproductive strategy, doubts about the use and distribution of resources were 
another source of tension between the local base and the high command.   Problems with 
distribution followed ethnic lines, and raised doubts regarding the extent to which the 
guerrilla actually represented the interests of the indigenous bases.  Anastasio described 
this clearly, and it is worth quoting him at length: 
On the other hand, it could be that those maximum leaders—they’re Ladinos 
also—[think] ‘if one part of them die it doesn’t matter.  It could be that they were 
poniendo el clavo (driving in the nail).  Because we found out at the last hour that 
a commander was sending money a the subteniente (lieutenant), and the 
subteniente says that he would get the shoes and uniforms that he would have to 
have the boots for 15 days before he would give them over to a militant.  How is 
that possible?  For that, selfishness exists.  But we are studying truth and equality, 
but here we are seeing that inequality.  How is it that a subteniente is going to 
wear shoes some 20 or 15 days before he gives them over?  It’s contaminated at 
the top then.  There are problems.  That’s why the war failed here.  If not, it would 
be different.  There is never going to be a clean thing.  Never but never.  Every 
mind is a world.  We can’t do it alone.  There is always going to be someone who 
wants to be bigger than the other person.  And the money too…when they would 
send money the comandantes themselves would grab the money.  According to 
what they said, there was no money. I talked to a Swiss man, he was with us.  
“Look comandante.  What are you going to do with the money that comes in?  
“The money is being invested in weapons and uniforms.”  For me this wasn’t real.  
Because here we are cooperating.  Here we are putting in our grain of sand daily.  
Because from me comes the first part.  A person 100% given over, giving beans, 
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corn, courses to the sympathizers who come to me.  How is it possible that there 
is no money?  If there is money, why don’t they give me a kilo of sugar?  If there 
is money there, then there should be some here also.  That’s just the way the war 
was made.  It [the money] stayed with them.  They said there was no money.   
These doubts regarding the importance of the primarily indigenous base to Ladino 
commanders were clearly shared by many leaders who were not as involved, leading 
many not to participate, or to not participate as fully as they otherwise might have.  More 
than insulting, such hierarchies are seen as hypocrisies of the revolutionary commitment 
to equality.   
The presence of clandestine armed groups in the villages had other negative 
consequences.  In some cases, villagers denounced their personal enemies—people with 
whom they had a land dispute or a personal grievance—to the army, claiming that they 
were working for the guerrilla.  In one village, a man was killed days after publicly 
opposing the guerrilla.  Family members blamed their neighbors, claiming it was because 
he was opposed and that it was feared he would begin to name names.  Others suggest 
that it could have been because he was a contratista for finqueros on the coast, and that 
different people who had taken out loans in advance of working contracts killed him so as 
to not have to pay back their loans, using his opposition to the guerrilla as a disguise.  
Undoubtedly, this and other cases of guerrilla violence against villagers led to 
resentments and community divisions.   There are also various reports of several groups 
claiming to be guerrillas carrying out robberies against villagers.  Events like these were 
a source of constant uncertainty that defined the war. The war was a context that could be 
adapted in many different ways by different people, for multitudes of ends.  
Guerrilla organizing and activity steadily increased in Huehuetenango from 1979-
1981, and events in San Pedro were part of a larger department wide campaign (Kobrack 
2003). In one operation, guerrilla operatives knocked down light posts in various villages. 
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The finquero—Gilberto Herrera—the local leader of the MLN party—was executed in 
hishome in 1979 in Ixnul.  Once, guerrillas had a firefight with the local police that left 
one guerrilla dead.  Most dramatic of the guerrillas’ public actions, and the most poorly 
received by the populace, was the burning of the building in 1981.  Guerrilla fighters 
bombed bridges over the Rio Selegua in Colotenango and San Sebastian.   They 
ambushed army convoys moving along the Inter-American highway.  Army patrols were 
attacked regularly.  Guerrillas kidnapped public officials, and for ransom ran their 
propaganda in the press.  Sampedranos were aware of all these activities through radio, 
newspapers and rumor.  Amidst this maelstrom of violence, planters who previously lived 
in San Pedro moved to the capital for get out of the line of fire. After the violence the 
temptation to read history backward is almost overwhelming; yet during the first two 
years the guerrilla was in the communities, it seemed like revolution was on the horizon.  
And it could have happened. 
Although revolutionary discourses and practices did not recognize Mayans as 
possessing distinct needs and desires as an ethnic group, the presence of the guerrilla 
movement in the municipio and in the countryside in general altered the perceived 
balance of power between Ladinos and indigenous in the municipio.  Planters feared for 
their lives.   One son of a finquero even joined the guerrilla movement in hopes of 
avoiding reprisals against his father.  The new guerrilla revolutionary ideology and the 
presence of an armed force emboldened local activism. All of the local conflicts over 
discrimination and power intensified with the arrival of the guerrilla. One local guerrilla 
leader, engaging in activities completely unrelated to guerrilla objectives, went to uproot 
coffee planted in the newly privatized communal lands in El Llano. Guerrilla activism 
produced a synergy with pre-existing indigenous struggles. These new sensations of 
political agency, and new conceptions of the types of political changes that were 
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desirable and possible underwent a sudden, and terrifying reconfiguration with the arrival 
of the army. 
 
YEARS OF TERROR  
Early in 1982 army attacks on villagers increased dramatically. Between March 
and April, the army killed 7 in the aldea el Cable (CEH 1998, 5322). On the 2nd of 
August in the aldea Ixnul, members of the army raped and executed 6 women, torturing 
two of them first, along with three other men from the village. A newborn infant, the son 
of one of the women died shortly after of hunger (CEH caso 5052).  On October 28, the 
army killed eleven people in the aldea Canoguitas.  Two were tortured and two were 
burned alive in their houses (CEH 1999, caso 5527). This changed villagers’ relationship 
to the guerrilla movement, which was soon seen as a lost cause, and a dangerous one at 
that.  It gave a new force to the patrols as well, which now turned completely against 
guerrilla involvement in almost all villages.   
The first head of the patrols in San Pedro was Marco Tulio, who was replaced in 
the late 1980s by Victor Hugo Laparra.  The military imposed an alcalde in 1982, 
suspending elections.  The patrols began ideological training in the communities, 
denouncing the guerrilla, human rights, and democracy. In some villages, the patrols took 
root quickly, and took a hard line against suspected guerrilla supporters. In the village of 
Niya, the army, with the help of civil patrollers from the aldea, captured and tortured 
Olimpia Carillo and Yolanda Carillo for six days (CEH caso 5134).  Abuses of power 
were built into the civil patrol system, the entire structure of was a human rights 
violation, one which demanded community members to participate in mutual punishment.  
However, community members in some villages participated with doble cara, 
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participating in both the guerrilla and the patrols.  Some even volunteered to be the patrol 
leaders.  
There are different theories about why the army came to San Pedro when it did, 
and why it selected the targets that it did. Most Ladinos and some indigenous believe 
most of those killed were known guerrillas.  Another theory, voiced mainly by 
indigenous, is that more radical agitation over discrimination and municipal power led 
certain Ladinos to denounce the indigenous leaders to the army for personal interests, 
with no proof of their involvement.  The pattern of violence that ensued provides 
evidence for the latter scenario.  Among those killed were the Garcia brothers—Jacinto 
and Alfonso. They were tortured all night long and killed the next day.  Ten days 
afterwards the army disappeared Francisco Domingo from Tepan, another leader of the 
Alcoholics Anonymous chapter (first brought to Guatemala in San Pedro by Padre 
Richard in 1958) suspected of being a front for guerrilla operations. In 1982, Arturo 
Ramírez was kidnapped while on a bus in Huehuetenango and never seen again. Family 
members of the deceased fled, fearing for their lives.  Once gone, these people were 
presumed to be guerrillas and their houses were burned.  The military soon set up a 
permanent base in town, where hundreds of suspected villagers were tortured and killed, 
their tortured screams piercing the night air.  The army imposed a toca de queda a curfew 
from 6pm to 6am.  Those found out afterwards were beaten and thrown in jail by the 
patrollers, and often suspected of guerrilla involvement.  Community members with cars 
were ordered by the army to take turns driving costal bags filled with their corpses down 
to the Selegua River. Sometimes their land or houses were stolen.  Rumors circulated that 
entire villages were going to be wiped off the map, a threat that by this time had been 
made reality in several townships in Huehuetenango. Bodies of suspected guerrilla 
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leaders, such as Natividad Ruíz Ramírez, were hung under the bridge in Chemiche, so 
that everyone could learn the fate of subversives.  
The decision to abandon the guerrilla did not mean that villagers began to 
enthusiastically support the military, although some certainly did collaborate 
enthusiastically.  Most hated and were disgusted by the abusive behavior of soldiers, 
extreme violence and disregard for the sanctity of human life.  Soldiers would steal food 
and money, rape women, and torture people, and mutilate bodies of the deceased.  The 
army’s refusal to distinguish between civilian and military targets was seen as especially 
cowardly.  Villagers disliked the intense supervision imposed by the patrols, loathed the 
long cold hours spent patrolling, afraid and cold, and the punishments for abandoning 
duties—a cold bath in the pila (large cement sink) after which one had to patrol wet, or 
days in village jaulas (makeshift cage).   Villagers lived in fear that their names might be 
on the military’s list, or that their village would be burned.   The majority of steadfastly 
anti-guerrilla community members refused to collaborate with the military’s attempts to 
find names of guerrilla participants and sympathizers. Despite their dislike of military 
control and violence, over time, many community members came to appreciate the unity 
that the patrols brought to the village, even if it did so in a mandatory fashion.  “If there 
was a meeting, everyone would come, immediately.  We were united in those days, 
working for the community.” Because the military imposed patrol leaders, there was also 
clear leadership, and little room for discussion.   The curfew made crime, such as 
property theft between community members, almost impossible.    
 
POST VIOLENCE MAYAN POLITICS 
Fighting continued between the guerrilla and the army, and between the guerrillas 
and Civil Patorllers, especially in neighboring Colotenango—a guerrilla stronghold, 
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deeply divided between patrollers and guerrillas.   But for the most part, the military 
power of the insurgency had been destroyed.  In 1985, the army decided to move towards 
democratization.  They ratified a new constitution and agreed to have open civilian 
elections.  After the violence in the early 1980s, a group of indigenous leaders from 
Guachipilín, a aldea near the town center, formed a new organization.  Their goals were 
development projects and an indigenous alcalde.  Members of this organization included 
some who had symphathized with guerrilla activities and some who did not. José  
Antulio, Morales remembered in one interview that the organization was informed by the 
previous geurrilla sympathies of many group members.“[Before] we were in favor of the 
guerrilla, and we had learned a lot from that experience about discrimination.”  This 
matches the description given by another leader in the group. “The idea to have a 
campaign for mayor came from the guerrilla—to end the discrimination.”   
Discrimination was easy to spot. Villages had long since formed development 
committes in hopes of getting potable water, schools and roads for their villages since the 
ealry 1970s, but had had little success in gaining funding from the Ladino alcaldes, who 
in any case had little funding for such projects.  In 1985, the government instituted the 
8% municipal tax, the funds for which were to be used to finance public works projects.  
As I discuss in more detail in chapter 9, the new indigenous political organizations eyed 
these funds as a way to raise the standard of living in their villages. Still, community 
leaders did not know how to run a campaign, and had little resources.   The solution came 
when representatives of the conservative party Partizo de Avanzo Nacional PAN 
approached the organization in 1989, offering to finance a mayoral campaign, and 
promising projects for the indigenous communities in San Pedro. There was one huge 
condition, however, as one of the members of this group recounted:  
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When we entered into the party PAN they gave us opportunties for projects, the 
only thing was that they told us that we couldn’t participate in or help social 
movements, like the URNG or CUC.  They made this very clear to us.  If we were 
going to help groups like the URNG, there would be no projects.  We were taking 
advantage of them, but they were also taking advantage of us.   
Convinced of the ineffectiveness of popular movements, and eager to get a space in 
power and to begin development—which since the institution of the 8% tax had all gone 
to Ladinos in the pueblo—the group agreed to the conditions.   
Pedro Ramírez volunteered to be the first indigenous candidate.  Pedro had helped 
the community by finding funds for a road project, establishing his credentials as a 
community leader. Initially, there was a great deal of support from the communities for 
his campaign. Almost immediately after they began, however, Ladinos from the pueblo, 
with the help of an indigenous military commissioner, began a smear campaign, calling 
Pedro and his group guerrillas who were going to bring back the violence.  What looked 
like a possible victory turned into a humiliating defeat to the Marco Tulio, the first head 
of the civil patrollers, representing the center-right Partído de Solidaridad Nacional, 
PSN. By this time, there were a number of infrastructure projects arriving to the rural 
towns.  Indigenous leaders still felt strongly that there was a poor distribution of 
development funds between town Ladinos and rural villages, the very place where they 
saw the most necessity.  
Frustrated, but determined to win, the group continued in the next round, this time 
their candidate was Natanael, a teacher from Canoguitas who lived most of the time in 
Huehuetenango, still the only indigenous candidate, for a different party. This time the 
conditions were different. With so many funds coming in to the municiality every few 
months, allegations of corruption began to emerge against Marco Tulio.  There was never 
any hard proof, but dissatisfaction with Marco, who naturally denies the charges, grew.  
The war had also cooled down.  Preliminary peace agreements were being negotiated 
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between guerrilla and army factions.  There was a cease fire.  Refugees had begun to 
return from Mexico.  There was little material available to fuel a credible scare campaign 
against Natanael.  In a shock to town Ladinos,  Natanael won by a landslide.  Finally, the 
group, with the help of a broad base of indigenous leaders in a variety of communities, 
had gotten their wish.  With José  Antulio as the first councilor on an all indigeonus team, 
Natanael began to work.   As promised during the elections, numerous projects arrived in 
the communities that had pledged their support to the campaign.  The communities were 
evidently pleased.  After a two year term, Natanael was re-elected, this time with the 
center right Unión Democratica. The political climate continued to thaw, with Peace 
Agreements on the horizon.   
After the second victory, a division emerged between José Antulio Morales and 
Natanael when Natanael announced his intention to seek a third term.  According to 
Morales, this violated the agreement of the group to only serve two terms each.  Natanael 
argued that the first term was only for two years, and that the alcaldia term had only been 
extended to four years for his second period.  Nonetheless, Morales, who spent more time 
in the municipal building than Natanael, who worked and lived in Huehuetenango, 
divided off.  Apparently, the community leaders in the group, which had grown 
substantially, were in agreement.  Morales defeated Natanael in the next elections.   
Morales had the advantage of being alcalde at a when international development 
funds earmarked for postwar reconstruction were pouring into Guatemala.  The 
government had established Fondo de Inversion Social (FIS), Fondo de Desarrollo 
Indígena de Guatemala (FODIGUA), the Secretario General de Planificacion Nacional 
(SEGEPLAN)—among other national groups involved directly in infrastructural 
development.  Internationally administred funds came in from Community Developmnet 
for Peace (DECOPAZ), and the National Peace Fund (FONAPAZ) and dozens of other 
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groups.  These programs supplemented the funds the alcalde had at his disposal from the 
municipal tax, which by this time had risen to 10%.  Morales was a skilled reader of the 
Guatemalan political landscape, and an astute politician.  He was also known as a gifted 
and inspiring orator, a much-admired ability among Sampedranos—Ladinos and Mayans 
alike.   The next elections, in 1998, were also won by José Morales, against more than six 
indigenous candidates, from more than 10 parties.  This time Ladinos had joined his 
team. By the time Morales’ second term ended, he had left an indelible mark on the town: 
in eight years, over 70 projects, including numerous large ones, had arrived to San Pedro, 
at least one in each aldea, and several in the municipal center, including a new municipal 
building which is only now being completed.  By anyone’s estimation these 
accomplishments represented a dramatic change in the distribution of municipal 
resources and the balance of power between indigenous and Ladinos, and between the 
rural and the urban sectors of the town.  But certain factors began to sour the victory.  
Accusations of corruption were mounting, and would soon become a fixture of rural 
political life.  
In the 2003 campaign for Mayor, Morales, keeping with his agreement to only 
serve for two terms, left the mayoral race and entered into the CASA, an indigenous party 
headed up by the then alcalde of Quetzaltenango, Rigoberto Queme Chay.  Morales 
wanted to be a diputado, and CASA gave him the space.  When Queme left over internal 
divisions, this party collapsed, and Morales, and his followers—he had helped pick his 
own replacement mayoral candidate—joined the Alianza Nueva Nacion which Morales 
described as the “sister party” to CASA, and the natural choice for a replacement.   They 
also offered Morales a spot as a diputado.  In addition to his desire to seek a diputación, 
there was an ideological motive behind his decision to leave the PAN. He liked the 
CASA party because they were fielding an indigenous candidate; Queme would be the 
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first in the country’s history.   Morales had another progressive streak.  He emphasized 
the importance of women’s participation in local politics, an exclusive and hostile male 
terrain, in his public speeches and also in his political team—working well with a 
powerful female politician. Petrona Lazaro became the first woman, and the first 
indigenous woman, to work as a consejal (councilor). 
Things went badly for Morales’ organization. The PAN party, represented by 
Alejando Ortiz, an indigenous teacher from San Pedro who lived in Hueuhetenango, 
seemed to have the most followers going into the final weeks of the election. The FRG’s 
candiate, Mariano Díaz, who had been defeated by Morales in the last election, was 
coming on strong. Lifted at the last minute by by the FRG’s politicization of the pay for 
the ex-PAC. Díaz won by a huge margin, almost doubling the number of votes cast for 
PAN.  ANN, disorganized still after regrouping  from the fallen CASA party, came in 
fourth after the URNG, who surprised many by such a strong showing.   Antulio Morales 
also lost his bid for diputado, a failure he blamed on the ANN’s failure to invest enought 
in the departmental campaign.  He was looking for another party, possibly the newly 
formed UNE, when he died in a car accident while driving home alone on the 
Interamerican highway in October of 2004.   
 
REFLECTIONS 
The forms of organization and spirituality characteristic of Mayan communities 
for nearly a century are all but unknown today among Mayans in San Pedro, who have 
opted or been forced through decades of political and social transformation and upheaval, 
to pursue alternatives.  Despite the fact that they go unrecognized, it is possible to see 
elements of these forms still very much at play.  These are not ‘survivals’ but adaptive re-
articulations adopted under particular circumstances of something that never had a single 
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essence.  Most striking in this history is how, after every defeat, Sampedranos recover, 
regroup, and find new ways to improve their life conditions. Also impressive is how, 
despite a diversity of opinions, perspectives and positionings, community members 
struggle to remain united.  Mayan responses to changing historical situations reveal a 
political consciousness that is heterogeneous, sophisticated and evolving.  This history 
provides much evidence that problematize contemporary categorizations of Mayan 
politics as inherently either left, right or solely community focused (cfa Hale 2006).17  
Contrary to interpretations that sees Mayans as ‘anti-guerrilla’, or caught between 
two armies (Stoll 1993, LeBot 1992), or a ‘Mayanista’ frame that downplays Mayan 
support and concern for revolutionary politics (Cotji 1997), many Sampedranos Mayans 
participated enthusiastically in the revolution because they saw the struggle of the poor 
against the rich as continuous with their local struggles against discrimination.18  Mayan 
political actions and alliances exhibited strong distrust of Ladinos as well as of the state 
and multinational capital.   These political actions suggest a strong, shared knowledge 
that they have been discriminated against because of who they are.  Rather than thinking 
of these as contradictory poles, their actions suggest that during the period of 1976-1982 
they saw these forces as fundamentally, inextricably linked together.  Left-organized 
Sampedranos understood that being Mayan had everything to do with why they were 
poor, and why they were treated like slaves for generations.  It is also likely that national 
level politics had been a concern since the democratic Revolution.  Some of the oral 
history data discussed in this chapter suggest that instead of a ‘lack of national vision’ 
among the new generation most directly affiliated with the guerrilla, there was a lack of 
knowledge about the local history of participation in national politics.19 However, many 
Mayans, and almost certainly community leaders, already knew about national politics, 
and had very strong opinions about it, forged through decades of work on the plantations, 
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oral history of participation in peasant organizing during the democratic Revolution, and 
the influence of the cooperatives.  Prior participation in these other movements, as well as 
their prior experience in struggles against Ladino domination locally, shaped their 
receptivity to the revolutionary ideas.  Nonetheless, the guerrilla movement was a strong 
reminder of the need to consider the national.  Before their arrival, the actions of many 
Mayan leaders indicate that they viewed ‘national politics’ not just as a field in and to 
itself, but as a realm of activities and events that could open spaces to contest local ethnic 
hierarchies.  Long before the arrival of the guerrilla, Mayans sought affiliations with 
national parties, like the DC and the PR to give them leverage in local struggles with 
Ladinos for resources, power and respect.  It appears that the most significant effect of 
the guerrilla presence on Mayans who participated was on their shared sense of the 
possible efficacy of national level political change.  
Sampedranos who opposed the guerrilla movement took issue mainly with 
strategy, particularly the morality and efficacy of the use of violence, and not their 
diagnosis of local or national problems or their general vision of social justice.  
Sampedranos did not criticize the revolution because they wanted instead to create a 
Mayan-only state, for example.  They affirmed a society where Ladinos and Mayans 
were not only treated as equals, but had the same life opportunities.   In addition to 
voicing concerns over strategy, and the risks it presented, local guerrilla sympathizers and 
participants criticized the ethics of the racial hierarchies that were part of the daily reality 
of guerrilla organizing.  Participants were deeply offended and frustrated with these 
problems, but their belief in the struggle itself, and possibly a good deal of thick skin 
built up over years of dealing with Ladinos, led them to continue in spite of ethnic double 
standards.  Many Mayans were sympathetic with and willing to participate in the 
revolution despite their dissatisfaction with the general operation of the program.  For 
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many Sampedranos, criticisms of state power appeared to outstrip anger at the practices 
of subordination exclusion within the guerrilla movement.  Not enough attention can be 
paid to the fact that the main preferential treatment for Ladino commanders of the 
revolution, the one that would prove to be enormous difference later, was their distance 
from the violence on the ground.  
With this rich history of attentiveness to national politics, it is hard to agree with 
characterizations of Mayans as “localistic.” But Sampedranos seem to be, at least in one 
important sense, ‘localistic’: they are deeply concerned with community well-being and 
with local struggles for dignity and equality with town Ladinos.  Their patterns of 
political engagement indicate a strong sense of belonging and acting together as a group 
for collective ends.   Even when disagreements occur—such as was the case with the 
guerrilla movement—it is usually a question of how best to pursue the security and well-
being of the group.  There are a few instances during the war when certain people became 
seen as a danger to community well-being, and those were the times, with some 
exceptions, that villagers killed other villagers: military commissioners, and people who 
refused to participate in the civil patrols.  Beyond this, community members went to great 
lengths to stop the army from hurting anyone in the villages.  Most people who were 
opposed to the guerrilla regularly lied to authorities to prevent the army from coming 
after their neighbors.  Even when villagers killed other villagers, it was rare that the 
villagers turned to the army to settle the dispute, although there were certainly cases.   
Hale (2006) suggests that racist Ladino refusals to permit indigenous ascendance 
into municipal politics, in an attempt to maintain a “separate but equal” world, probably 
forced movements with “relatively moderate political sensibilities” to radicalize (61).20  
This is evident in San Pedro, where events suggest additional tendencies.   First, it 
appears the lack of opportunities for national politics seems to have intensified the focus 
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on town politics.  This was certainly true in the late1960s, even when the stakes of local 
politics were comparatively low because of the reduced power of the alcalde due to the 
lack of municipal funds.  Never has the focus on town politics been so strong as it is now.  
Second, the presence of the guerrilla emboldened Mayans to take on more active pursuit 
of their own objectives, town land, indigenous alcalde, which only came on with more 
fury once collective organization was underway. This feeling of empowerment spilled 
over into local struggles almost immediately, leading to ever more strident confrontations 
with town power as well as the authority of the contratistas, some of who were killed. If 
a renewed appreciation for the dilemma of national politics and the enhanced sense of 
being able to actually do something about it were the main advantages of the presence of 
the guerrilla movement, the main disadvantages seemed to be more pressing.  The most 
obvious effect was the violence itself.  Although Mayan who participated knew the risks, 
few could have predicted the brutal extent of the army response.  And not only did the 
movement split Mayans, who were, whatever their political sensibilities, in the 
impossible situation of having to either be ‘for’ or ‘against’ the revolution, and, therefore, 
‘for’ or ‘against’ the army.  Both the guerrilla and army were guilty, in different degrees 
and with different consequences, of this type of thinking that soon made any middle 
ground disappear.  Because of impossibility of neutrality that both sides demanded, it led 
to serious internal divisions in among Mayans, sometimes seen, or at least treated, by 
their neighbors as either with one or the other.   Mayan political organizations in San 
Pedro Necta were able to overcome, for the most part, factional divisions caused by the 
war.  But this unity was fleeting.  Divisions emerged again in the field of electoral 
politics in the early 1990s.   
 




                                                                                                                                            
NOTES 
1 This pattern was so strong that substantial dialectical differences in the same Mayan 
languages appear in neighboring towns.  Each one has their distinctive variations for even 
some the most common of words.  For a discussion of the effects of Liberal reforms on 
Mayan communities, see McCreery (1976, 1984), Cambranes (1985) and many others.  
2 Village men would take turns performing community cargos.  Contemporary variations 
in the cargo system will be discussed in the next chapters.  Also, one of the important 
effects of the cofradia, often commented upon, was to regulate wealth differentiation 
between community members.  Cofradia members, also elected on a rotating basis, were 
obliged to throw lavish and expensive parties, inviting the entire community.   
3 This chapter is limited by the fact that the municipal building, including all of its 
records, burned in 1981 during the war.   
4 Although Forster provides great detail on this little known history, she is herself puzzled 
as to why the department of San Marcos experienced such high levels of organizing and 
neighboring departments did not.  She notes that:  
“The Indigenous poor of Huehuetenango did not seize the initiative in the same manner 
as the Indigenous of San Marcos [in the time before the Democratic Revolution].  
However, the labor records of the revolutionary government indicate that campesinos in 
Huehuetenango took the agrarian policies of the 1940s extremely seriously, and 
unleashed similar organizing demands on plantations distant from their home 
communities.  Perhaps one could conclude that a large plantation economy—with 
Indigenous workers in this case—provided a critical foundation for widespread 
revolutionary participation in the countryside.”  
5 Foster’s study also shows that, in labor unions in rural San Marcos: 
class conflict was described in language of race relations, everywhere but in the 
Mam-highlands, where “the rich” were also indigenous. In the plantation zone, 
the presence of Ladinos as a minority among the campesino population did not 
alter the ideological equation of Indigenous campesinos versus non-indigenous 
elites. 
6 Handy concludes that this did not, and was never intended to, decrease community 
autonomy, however.  He argues instead that “in most instances” these were more likely 
efforts to “reallocate a scarce resource more equitably” among poor townspeople.   
7 Handy makes the following argument: “In the early stages of the revolution, either local 
Ladinos or slates of Indian candidates that fulfilled traditional requirements and rules 
with the aid of the principales were elected. However, as the strength of peasant and 
worker organizations grew and the importance of the political affiliations became more 
apparent, slates for election to office were presented composed of people who had not 
held important position in community structures and could not be approved by the 
principales.  In these villages, elections occasionally became contests between the 
traditional structures of the community and mostly young usurpers who viewed their 
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national affiliations and their organization into political parties and peasant leagues as 
more important requirements.”  
8 This possibility was brought to my attention by Father Kevin Lynch.  Father Kevin 
viewed this displacement as inevitable and ultimately for the best.  
9 Grandin (2004) qualifies the PR along with the Democracia Cristiana as “the most 
important reform party allowed to operate after 1954” and “the MLN’s [the Movimiento 
Liberacion Nacional] chief rival in the countryside” (88). 
10 Manz, Beatriz. 2004. Paradise in Ashes: A Guatemalan Journey of Courage, Terror, 
and Hope. Berkeley: University of California Press.  p. 39 
11 In her recent book, based on over twenty years of experience with the town of Santa 
Cruz del Quiche, Beatriz Manz describes the mix of ideas circulating in the cooperatives: 
“The discussion of cooperatives ranged from an analysis of broad social issues or 
political conditions to local accounting practices.  Discussions covered the causes of 
poverty, the policies of the government, the unequal distribution of land, exploitation, 
lack of organization, or lack of employment.” (2004, 55) 
12 Gaitan’s report on FENACOAC in 1972 contends that small producers are coming to 
understand the value of savings, and also “demonstrating that the habit of savings is a 
systematic practice that can be combined with traditional and ancestral customs of our 
population, with a combination for the improvement of the community.” (57) 
13 The goal of training cooperative leaders was that:  
 “the campesino or the cooperativist worker will turn into a new man. Discover their own 
capacidades (capacity, capabilities) and work to liberate himself from traditionalism, 
demonstrating that he is capable of responsibly assuming the challenge that we all 
confront underdevelopment, ignorance, and misery.” (Gaitan 1972, 58) 
14 This was brought to light by a personal communication with Virginia Garrard-Burnett, 
who also suggested that he might have had a role in a horrible massacre that took place 
during the time he was in charge of the defense ministry.  
15 These authors suggest that a growing economic insecurity was integral to the decision 
of Mayans to join the guerrilla movement. Stoll (1999) provides an alternative 
accounting, arguing that Mayans were economically and politically ascendant before the 
guerrilla’s arrival, and the political goals of local organizations were hijacked by 
revolutionary organizing, and set back decades.  Making the baffling decision to ignore 
more systematic analysis of the rural economic situation, Stoll uses anecdotal data, 
notably his favorite target, Rigoberta Menchu’s passing reference to the fact that her 
father was a merchant.   
16 Grandin describes CUC’s activitites as including the following:  
access to credit, land titles, fair prices for both goods that campesinos bought such 
as fertilizer and agricultural products that they sold, adequate plantation wages, 
and an end to military repression, the CUC developed a revolutionary ideology 
that rejected the legitimacy of the state and placed a united Indian-Ladino peasant 
movement squarely within the growing popular movement.   
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17 Hale sees three key narrative frames that emerged from the violence: revolutionary 
triumphalism, the idea that Mayans needed the revolution to establish a truly 
emancipatory politics; two armies or “dos demonios”, the notion that Mayan politics are 
community oriented, local, and that the war was imposed on them from both sides, and 
that they suffered the most consequences; and the Mayanista frame, which follows the 
two armies narrative except that it calls for a Pan-Mayan identity and a desire to reach 
across differences between Mayan communities.  He rejects all of these as explanations 
for Mayan political activities and offers an alternative view of Mayan consciousness as 
complex, locally concerned but not ‘anti-national’.   
My chapter two examines some of additional reasons for the dominance of this 
two-army narrative, within the general framework outlined by Hale. None of these, 
according to Hale, make sense of Mayan political participation prior to the arrival of the 
guerilla, and the course of events that ensued afterwards. 
18 According to Hale (2006) revolutionary participation, in fact, has played a crucial role 
in the shaping of the Mayan movement, which later disavows these roots, focusing on a 
long-duree of struggles against colonialism.   
19 This is likely due to the fact that historical changes in national politics were not openly 
discussed by the DC or the PR, whose party platforms, in their silence, acknowledged the 
supremacy of the repressive apparatus of successive military regimes. 
20 There is a danger in that this argument could be taken to mean that in towns where 
indigenous were able to achieve some level of control and power would be less interested 
in joining the guerrilla movement.   But why would Mayans abandon these national level 
objectives after winning a local victory, which, although sweet, would not do much to 
change their dire economic situation?  Why would a local victory only lead to a more 
expansive sense of the types of social changes that would have been possible?  Perhaps 
future comparative studies of indigenous communities will shed light on this question.    
It is also debatable that that the goals of Mayans were all so ‘moderate’, which seems to 
imply a focus on economic advancement and local power.   There is a good deal of 
reason to think that Mayans, who travel to the coast, already had some critique of the 
plantation economy, just as stinging as the Marxist critique, albeit framed in distinctive 
narratives and concepts, and certainly not linked, in most minds at least, to a 
revolutionary struggle. Hale’s association of ‘radical’ politics with the guerrilla ignores 
the possibility that there were local activists who were not guerrilla supporters yet who 
were nonetheless ‘radicals’.  This risks falling into some of the categories of “Mayan” 





Chapter Two: The Slow and Uneven Thaw of Imposed Truth: 
Revolutionary Mayan Politics Reconsidered 
“Me duele mucho cargarlos [huesos]... es como cargar la muerte... no voy 
enterrarlos todavía (...) Sí quiero que descanse, descansar yo también, pero 
todavía no puedo... Son la prueba de mi declaración ...no voy a enterrarlos 
todavía, quiero un papel que me diga a mí: ‘lo mataron (...) y que no tenía delito, 
que era inocente...’, entonces vamos a descansar.” 
“It hurts me a lot to carry them [the bones].  It’s like carrying death.  I’m not 
going to bury them yet.  Yes, I want him to rest, and I want to rest myself, but I 
still can’t.  They are the proof of my declaration.  I will not bury them yet, I want 
a paper that tells me ‘they killed him, and he had not committed any crime, that he 
was an innocent…’ then we will be able to rest.”   
-Back Cover, Comisión Esclaramiento Historico (1999) 
 
“Y les dije [a los soldados] matame si quieren, pero se que no he hecho nada.  Me 
van a matar y soy un inocente” 
“And I told them [the soldiers] kill me if you want, but I haven’t done anything. 
You’re going to kill me and I am innocent” 




We know that memory fades, but can memories die?  How does this happen, and 
what happens when people, activists and historians try to bring them back to life?  This 
chapter focuses on public memories and perceptions of the guerrilla movement, violence 
and state repression in San Pedro Necta.  Control of the truth, specifically of Mayan 
memories of the political past, has been a central aim of state repression and other 
governance strategies, including the guerrilla, in Guatemala for several decades.  State 
monopoly of the truth, however, like their monopoly on power, has never been total.  
This chapter examines the conditions under which certain versions of San Pedro’s past 
circulate publicly as truth, how other versions have become marginalized, and the impact 
that these patterns of remembering and forgetting have had on Sampedrano Mayans’ 
political behaviors in the present, particularly their understanding of the scope and 
potential of Mayan politics. Recent political events and actors have allowed a dissenting 
perspective to germinate and gain ground in the fledgling public sphere.  In relationship 
to these changes, Sampedranos’ memories have shifted in unexpected ways. 
 
MILITARY IMPOSED TRUTH 
The dominant narrative about Mayan participation in the revolutionary movement 
in San Pedro at the time I did fieldwork in 2004 hews closely to the military’s version of 
the facts.  The people who circulate this narrative today are Ladinos.  The specifics of this 
discourse vary, but include many of the following elements: Mayans did not want the 
military—obviously—but they never wanted the guerrilla in the first place.  Those who 
supported the guerrilla were either coerced or tricked.   Only very few were really 
involved in the guerrilla movement, and those were, for the most part, the ones who were 
killed.  Most town Ladinos, while admitting to some errors, tend to view most of the 
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people killed by the military, prominent indigenous leaders especially, as guilty-as-
charged. One politically active Ladino who had grown up in an outlying village known 
for excellent coffee production told me that the guerrillas in San Pedro were contados 
(few), and were found and killed immediately.  In this perception, overall numbers were 
low, but the ones who were killed were certainly guilty.  In addition, army violence was 
the guerrillas’ fault for placing Mayans between “dos fuegos.” After inviting military 
repression, the guerrilla, true cowards, fled, leaving the population defenseless to face the 
wrath of the army. The guerrilla movement never had a prayer of changing power at the 
national level.  Even if they did, the guerrillas’ final goal— communism—was utterly 
bankrupt.  It would require a rationing system that would take half of the land, chickens, 
and anything else of value from everyone, forcing them to go to the alcalde to ask for 
their weekly ration—no matter how much work a person did or how much need they had.  
In some versions, communism was itself just a sham—just a front for bad behavior: 
guerrillas were subversives, terrorists, atheists, delinquents, and thieves.   They stole 
money and food, knocked down light posts, blew up bridges—everything working 
against the interest of the people that they supposedly were fighting to support. Not only 
did the guerrilla’s presence make violence inevitable in this narrative, violence against 
the guerrilla was completely justified.  The army was there to protect people from the 
subversives, reiterating the clear line between community and guerrilla.  It was a form of 
defending Mayans from confusion, ideological misdirection, moral perdition, future 
poverty, hare-brained authoritarian governmental schemes, and crime.  Community 
members voluntarily supported the civil patrols, because they were just as eager as the 
army to get the hated guerrilla out of their villages.  State violence stopped Guatemala 
from becoming another Cuba, with all the negative implications that this carries.1 
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This framing of politics completely normalizes the massive social inequalities that 
characterize Guatemalan society. These narratives legitimate genocidal and 
indiscriminate attacks on Mayan communities.  They completely ignore the fact that 
these attacks made no distinction between civilian and combatant, attacks that included 
torture and killed women, children and the elderly. They ignore that the massacres were 
far out of proportion to the guerrilla threat.  They treat Mayans as infantile, weak-minded 
creatures, easily misled and unable to make responsible decisions about their future.  
They are too immature for democracy. They also completely disqualify revolutionary 
politics. 
This version of reality and history was hammered into the minds of Mayan 
villagers by the army, Ladinos, and especially through the civil patrol system.  When I 
was in San Pedro, an ex-village patrol captain showed me the ledger book used to record 
the minutes of the civil patroller meetings.   Meeting minutes recount how villagers were 
routinely required to denounce the guerrilla, and hear and repeat admonishments and 
lectures about the dangerousness of human rights, communism and democracy.  They 
listened while military officers and Ladino patrol captains from the town lectured to them 
about the evils of communism.  The most common myth was that everyone would have 
to give up half of their land, no matter how much they had; and they had to bring 
everything they produced to the alcalde, whose job it would then be to ration out 
everyone’s food.  Most village men of over 35 years old could tell you all about 
‘communism’. Misinformation about violence was another strategy employed by the 
army to discredit the guerrilla. The military, taking advantage of its absolute monopoly 
on public modes of communication regularly blamed guerrillas for army violence (CEH 
1999, REHMI 1999).  There were several cases of this in San Pedro.  In this chaotic and 
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insecure condition of nearly absolute military threat, surveillance, and confusion there 
were no alternative spaces for a counter-discourses.   
During my fieldwork in 2004, I found that most Mayans in San Pedro, and many 
left-minded Ladinos, share a similar, but distinct memory of their political past.  They 
remember Mayans, as “caught between two armies” during the internal conflict. They 
supported neither the army, nor the guerrilla.  Mayans were neutral and innocent victims 
of both groups.  Both sides were the same to them.  Both were violent and both were 
responsible for bringing the violence to San Pedro.  They view those killed by the army, 
especially indigenous leaders from the previous generation who were targeted by military 
strikes, as having no relationship to the guerrilla movement.  Mayans express these views 
in their public memorial practices and public discourses about the past.  These views also 
predominate in private memories and private conversations, even within families.  
 
THEORIZING HISTORICAL MEMORY IN THE GUATEMALAN HIGHLANDS 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, David Stoll (1993) takes Mayan 
expressions of the two armies discourse at face value.  In Between Two Armies, Stoll also 
blames the guerrilla for provoking the violence.  He argues that guerrilla commandos 
knowingly placed the communities in the line of fire in their attempt at revolt.  Stoll 
scolds solidarity scholars who have contended that state violence was motivated by a 
desire to squash civilian opposition to army land grabs in the highlands.  He concludes 
that in the Ixil territory, the guerrilla presence in rural communities led to military 
attacks, not that military attacks precipitated guerrilla membership.  Moreover, he 
explains, these attacks backfired strategically and led to dramatic increases in guerrilla 
support that forced the military to resort to genocidal tactics.  Stoll provides Mayan 
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testimony about guerrilla extortions of aid, recruits, information and other forms of 
loyalty from rural communities.  Stoll reads the Ixil’s mass abandonment of guerrilla 
forces following the attacks to mean that guerrillas who joined did so because they were 
forced to choose sides in a polarizing environment.  Stoll refers to the Ixils as “dedicated 
neutralists.”  LeBot (1995) elaborates a position that is similar to Stoll’s, attributing 
Mayan reticence to participate in revolutionary politics to their communal orientation and 
internal divisions between modernizing and traditional factions within Mayan 
communities. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Stoll’s work has been attacked more than that of 
probably any other anthropologist working today.2 The Truth Commission report is at 
pains to dispute the idea that the guerrilla was responsible for the violence, arguing 
instead that the vast inequalities of Guatemalan society, with their roots in colonialism, 
made armed conflict inevitable.  Hale (1997) questions why Stoll refuses to consider in 
his analysis the possibility that fear of military reprisals in the context of Orwellian social 
control of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency apparatus might influence what types of 
public memories are available to ethnographers.  Several have pointed out his omissions 
of critical information to make his case.  Many also argue that this and subsequent work 
has been devastating to the cause of democratization in Guatemala, namely by his 
decision to write, in another book, an exposé of the narrative testimony of Rigoberta 
Menchú.  
While overwhelmingly critical of the political implications of these conclusions, 
prominent scholars, and, I would argue, most Guatemalan Ladinos, seem unable to resist 
the fundamental assumptions of this perspective.  Reviewing a recent ethnography of 
Mayan survivors is instructive on this point.  Sanford (2003) criticizes Stoll and LeBot’s 
blaming of the guerrilla for attacks on Mayan communities as an act of symbolic violence 
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complicit with military attempts to justify the massacres and whitewash genocide as the 
“killing of communists”(202-203). She argues that blaming the attacks on the guerrilla 
presence this plays into military discourses that claim that only guilty villagers were 
killed.   Alliances with the guerrilla, she contends, are not sufficient to explain the army’s 
targeted killing of civilians, including elderly and children.  She presents ample evidence 
that, in many cases, ‘Indian’ meant ‘guerrilla’ to the army.  She also says that by locating 
Mayans as either supporting or not supporting the guerrilla ignores “other alliances.”  As 
an alternative, she calls for a nuanced understanding of Mayan political allegiances 
during the armed conflict and argues that we need to listen to survivors’ voices. She 
argues that ignoring Mayans potential alliance with the guerrilla erases their agency.   
Yet for her, accurate representation of political alliances is impossible.  Her 
definition of ‘nuanced’ appears to be the same as un-represenatable.  She feels that it is 
impossible to discuss village alliances without reproducing an either or division or falling 
into counterinsurgency logic of guilt and legitimate violence.  Is it possible to discuss 
Mayan support for the guerrilla movement without justifying military violence?  As an 
alternative she offers the authority of survivor’s voices. For her, Mayans, having lived 
through genocide are: “survivors who give testimony are speaking truth to power—
whether the power of the army, guerrillas, local and national governments or the 
international community” (181).  However, this leads her to wholeheartedly embrace 
Stoll and LeBot’s central ethnographic conclusion—that Mayans were innocents “caught 
between two armies.”  Here again, Mayans occupy a pure space outside of and in 
opposition to power, which is universally oppressive and productive of false 
representations to mask itself.  Despite her denials, her location within the two armies 
narrative is apparent throughout her description, based on oral history data of the wartime 
experiences of Ixiles from the village of Acul.  
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Villagers in Acul told Sanford how the guerrilla demanded villagers to follow 
them, making threats.  She says that the villagers dug buzones, or underground chambers 
because they had to “follow guerrilla instructions” (85). The guerrilla presence led the 
army to commit a horrific massacre in their village, described by Sanford in sickening 
detail.  Afterwards, surviving villagers followed the guerrilla into the mountains to seek 
refuge from the military, which had burned down their villages.  There, villagers suffered 
inhuman deprivations and, under the constant threat of army attacks, guerrilla coercion 
grew more intense.  Mayan mothers describe, for example, how they were ordered to 
smother and abandon children to keep the group hidden from the army.  Later on, when 
military amnesty programs were announced to refugees by army helicopters flying over 
the mountains, villagers who wanted to leave were threatened by the EGP command; and 
some who attempted to flee were killed.   When they eventually fled and made it back to 
Nebaj, they were tortured, forced to help the military search for the CPR communities 
that they had fled, and subject to numerous other forms of extreme abuse, including 
regularlized rape of women and girls, forced labor, and life in near starvation 
conditions—not to mention forced participation in the PAC. Sanford describes daily life 
for the Ixiles In the mountains a series of “balancing acts of survival between hunger, the 
guerrilla and the army” (101).  Her position wavers a bit (86).3  Her stance regarding 
local enthusiasm for guerrilla politics in the village, and later in the mountains, claims at 
times to be agnostic, but ultimately collapses into belief in the denials of active 
participation made by survivors.    
But taking survivors’ narratives as transparent representations of the truth leave 
the reader with an incoherent understanding of the consciousness of rural Mayans in the 
period leading up to massive state repression.  There are many questions left unanswered 
by her rendering of the years leading up to the violence, 1976-1982.  First, her story 
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about the local reluctance in participation does not match their seeming eagerness to 
comply with guerrilla directives.  In San Pedro, even in the villages where the EGP was 
also strong, they ignored sectors that did not want to participate.  Only the most 
committed dug buzones.  It strikes me as odd that every member in a village had a buzon 
and yet felt a general indifference to the guerrilla cause.  Her word is ‘reluctant’. And, if 
the community members felt no allegiance to the guerrilla, why did villagers follow the 
EGP into the mountains?  There is no evidence that they were forced to follow them.  Her 
own narrative erases Mayan agency in the guerrilla movement just as neatly as Stoll’s 
ethnography. The only difference, putatively, is that her ethnography relies on survivor’s 
voices; thus Mayans erase their own agency.   Another problem for Sanford’s analysis is 
what to make of survivor’s stories that do not articulate scathing criticisms of the 
military, or, in fact, follow state discourses?  Her framework renders invisible the actual 
complexity of contemporary memories of the past. 
McAllister (2003) suggests a more coherent corrective to the two armies 
discourse, arguing for the need to account for Mayan agency in the revolution. She finds 
evidence of support among Chajulenses, who today are embarrassed for having 
participated.  Her interest is to refute Stoll’s analysis empirically, showing that Mayans 
did indeed support the revolutionary movement, only to find out that their agency was not 
“efficacious.”  She argues that only by recognizing the prevalence of Mayan investments 
in the revolution can we appreciate Mayans as full, historical agents. The price for 
innocence is continued powerlessness.  But McAllister does not examine the 
contemporary dominance of the frame that her own historical analysis tries to 
problematize.  
This is Hale’s (2006) project.  He argues that we must to examine the different 
conditions under which these memories took root, and continue to flourish among 
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Mayans, who circulate them to pursue certain ends.  Hale adopts a framework outlined by 
Rolph-Trouillot (1995), who distinguishes between two types of historicity: what 
“actually happened”, which he calls “historicity one” and the narrative frames through 
which past facts are organized and interpreted, or “historicity two”.  In this view, events 
are never pre-given in themselves; their contours and meanings are constituted in the 
present through different narratives and memorial practices that inflect them in particular 
ways.  Therefore, memories and narratives are always constrained and enabled by power 
relations.  Historical narrative is important for Trouillot because he sees it as the 
condition for the possibility for the formation of different types of political agency in the 
present. It is toward these shifting possibilities for the construction of historical narratives 
about Mayan politics and their relationship to the possibilities for political thought and 
action in Mayan communities that Hale directs his energies.  Hale explains the 
ascendance of the “two armies” frame emerged in a confluence of state and Mayan 
agency.  The military, eager to establish a veneer of legitimacy in the newly razed 
highlands, opened space for criticism of military excesses in preparation for 
democratization, which most elements of the military saw as inevitable by 1983.  Mayan 
“survivors” had a strong desire to: 
make sense of the nightmare of the previous few years.   Religious mysticism 
(especially of the Evangelical variety), met that need for some; others sought 
refuge in sullen cynicism.  Many others found in the dos demonios idea a 
reassuring, effective, and convincing source of common sense: a conflict between 
two military forces, equally self-interested and brutal, both victimizers of civilians 
caught haplessly in between. (2006, 94) 
Mayans had every reason to disavow their prior involvement with or sympathy for the 
guerrilla under military occupation when the penalty for guerrilla involvement was death.   
Hale argues that Mayans today confront a different dilemma: how to affirm their 
role as both protagonists in and victims of the armed struggle, in a political culture in 
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which, as Sanford notes, admitting involvement means admitting culpability, adopting a 
disqualified position within a narrative that justifies the violence.  He differentiates the 
major contemporary historical narratives that have emerged from the violence by the way 
in which each of them resolves this paradox. As discussed in the last chapter, Hale 
identifies three frames—Mayanista, two armies and “revolutionary triumphalism—
through which Mayans encounter the past.  He argues that none of these explain the high 
degree of heterogeneity and fluidity of Mayan political participation in Chimaltenango, 
the department where he focused his investigation.  The revolutionary frame now seems 
“anachronistic” and glosses over substantial problems with the guerrilla, especially 
divisions between indigenous intellectuals and leftist groups that grew as the war raged 
on. The Mayanista frame affirms Mayan agency after the conflict, but not in the years up 
to the conflict, a move Hale calls a “Faustian bargain” that runs the risk of undermining 
points of substantial overlap between these two political vectors, as well as some of the 
credibility, complexity and wisdom of these same Mayan actors in the present” (107).  
Hale attributes the ascendance of the dos demonios frame to the way that it approaches 
this central dilemma:   
Many civilians—Mayans and Ladinos alike—find in the dos demonios image a 
resonance with previous experience and a source of solace: as victims rather than 
protagonists, they have less burden of responsibility for the problems spawned by 
the violence, greater claim for redress and more room for maneuver in the present 
(108). 
In this perspective, Mayans, like other academics, were persuaded by an economical truth 
with reasonable explanatory power, and gave them specific benefits. This interpretation is 
not without political consequences in the present.  Hale argues that: 
Each narrative frame rests on certain categories of political consciousness (for 
example a distinction between Mayan cultural rights and popular or class 
demands) and certain political distinctions (for example, separating the Mayan 
movement from the Left), which later became to appear entirely self-evident, but 
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which had not come to predominate during the volatile and heady years between 
1976 and 1981. (2006, 87) 
For Hale, the two armies frame represents the impossibility of a Mayan politics that 
includes leftist demands, or a leftist politics that appeals to Mayans’ specific interests.  In 
this view, these narrative frames undermine the possibility of imagining the conditions 
under which Mayans can pursue radical politics and still be Mayan, and under which 
Mayans and Ladinos can work together in a unified movement.  The concern is that this 
historical consciousness, while challenging traditional Marxist categories, also closes the 
imaginative space necessary for a politics that combines anti-racism with an appreciation 
of the need for many of leftist economic and political reforms.  
Although I do not feel that the notion of ‘persuasion’ is adequate to describe this 
transformation, historical narratives in San Pedro—nearly ten years after the Peace 
Accords—fit the pattern described by Hale, and bear out much of its conclusions 
regarding of the stakes of these public memories.  The very one-sided interpretation of 
reality and of the Mayan political past promoted by the military has shown some 
resilience.  This is, in part, as described in the last chapter, rooted in the fact that many 
Sampedranos experienced the arrival of the guerrilla as an imposition from the beginning.  
Even more became disillusioned with the guerrilla after the violence. Another obstacle is 
forgetting.  Without any process to keep narratives about the past alive in the present, 
these narratives will wither and die.  Of course, many Sampedranos never knew in the 
first place: the younger generation of Sampedranos never had first-hand experience with 
the guerrilla movement. And in San Pedro, unlike in many highland communities, there 
has been no collective process of mourning and memorialization.   
Ethnographic fieldwork revealed additional factors in shaping individual 
decisions to circulate certain narratives of the past. I show how contemporary challenges 
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to official discourses run into the obstacle of the new identities whose status and 
legitimacy are founded upon the rejection of participation in revolutionary politics in the 
past.  The denial of the revolutionary past continues to be motivated by numerous factors, 
including: fear; shame; desire for legitimate victim status; and political opportunism.  
State approved norms for political subjectivity are populated by new forms of identity to 
which many Mayans have developed powerful attachments.  However, my research also 
revealed a rupture in the two armies narrative. Since the Peace Accords, although many 
community members have begun to openly question this interpretation, dominant public 
discourses and memorial practices still show much continuity with the military views on 
the facts.  This rethinking, while incomplete, is a real desire for many Sampedranos, 
especially those who never ideologically abandoned the revolution. 
 
EMERGENCE AND DOMINANCE OF THE TWO ARMIES NARRATIVE IN SAN PEDRO 
The dominant interpretation today departs drastically from the dominant view of 
the guerrilla movement prevalent among indigenous Sampedranos in the late 1970s.  
Obviously, however, the threat of state violence shaped public discourse about the 
guerrilla since the beginning.  It was never legitimate to identify as a guerrilla supporter 
in the town.  Even when the guerrilla was at its apex in 1981 in San Pedro, no one would 
say it publicly.  From the time of the guerrilla’s arrival, such an admission was 
tantamount to signing a death sentence.   Clandestinity was an absolute necessity.  The 
cell system ensured that many guerrilla operatives did not know the names of more than a 
few participants.  Participants had plausible deniability and a reduced ability to implicate 
others.  The primary aim of regular, certain and unremitting violence was to strike terror 
into the hearts of those who witnessed, or became aware of, these acts of brutality.  
Torture in the military base had the additional stated purpose of finding out information 
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about supposed participants.  However, for several years between 1978 and 1982, it was 
considered legitimate by many villagers, even respectable to identify as a guerrilla 
supporter.  In fact, in some villages during this period it was much more dangerous to 
speak out publicly against the guerrilla.  The deaths of several military commissioners— 
including one in Canoguitas in 1981 and in Michicoy in May of 1982 (CEH 1998, casos 
5529 and 5500) and possibly others that were not recorded by the Truth Commission—
stemmed, at least in part, from their neighbors’ fears that they would report guerrilla 
activity. To a certain degree, neighbors knew who in the village was and who was not a 
guerrilla sympathizer, who was training as a combatant, where the guerrilla combatants in 
the village stayed, locations of any traps and trenches dug by the combatants, where food 
was stored, who was messenger, and other similar details.  
This relative acceptance of the guerrilla and relative openness within communities 
regarding guerrilla involvement was shattered as state violence increased sharply in 1982.  
Afterwards, the constant presence of the military meant that the simple accusation of 
guerrilla involvement could bring death at the hands of an army uninterested in investing 
individual cases.  In addition to a network of Mayan spies, who were rewarded 
monetarily for denouncing fellow villages to the military, military power in communities 
was enhanced and members of the PAC increasingly abandoned their stance of doble 
cara (two faces).  Having witnessed massacres of their neighbors or hearing of rampant 
violence in neighboring aldeas, most communities, regardless of prior involvement, 
became anti-guerrilla for reasons of survival. During the intense violence and after the 
consolidation of patroller authority, the relative openness regarding involvement was shut 
down entirely. It was now incredibly risky to give an open opinion or knowledge of 
involvement to neighbors.  Even family members had turned against each other.  In many 
cases, trust broke down, compromising space for non-manipulated communication.  
 120 
Continued violence against military commissioners—there were several in 1982 and 
1983—in villages indicates a growing uncertainty about survival, as does the fact that 
people who were openly known as guerrilla supporters or combatants began to flee in 
large numbers to Mexico.  Clandestine support continued in several communities where 
investment in the revolutionary movement was strongest, but nothing like the widespread 
support that had existed previously.  
Denial as Community Defense Mechanism 
Villagers, distraught by the death of close family members and friends, by the 
threat that their name was on a list to be executed, or with the fear that their entire village 
had been scheduled to be destroyed by the army, began a very vocal and desperate 
process of publicly denouncing any involvement with the guerrilla.  I some cases, feeling 
that the army would suspect at least some individuals in each aldea, villagers in some 
communities began to blame their neighbors, often from other families, for guerrilla 
involvement, even though all had been involved at similar or exact levels.  In most cases, 
however, the community members circled their wagons. Many took great pride in their 
ability to protect themselves and their neighbors from the army: 
We didn’t completely organize with the guerrilla.  We were together with one 
idea.  We named a person from the community to be the spokesperson.  If there 
was a problem in the pueblo, then there goes the moshera [spokesperson] like a 
wasp.  We didn’t let them kill us. We didn’t let the Ladinos dominate us.  “Who is 
advising you?’ We are advising ourselves.   We had ourselves trained not to point 
the finger at anyone, ever. 
When the guerrilla did pass, most did not report anything, just remained quiet, out of fear 
that a report would bring the army to the village. One evening, I listened while village 
leaders from different religious and political affiliations recounted proudly how they kept 
silent, told the military nothing and kept their neighbors alive.  One of these men was an 
 121 
ex-military commissioner.  Although he did not support the guerrilla, he was more 
strongly opposed to army attempts to kill villagers.  
Problem of ‘doble cara’ for Historical Memory 
Many have commented on the power of the oft-repeated lie in creating truth.  One 
particularly telling example of this during the war was the notion that the civil patrollers 
were voluntary.  This was not only true in the sense that no one would openly dissent 
from it.  Later, as the PAC began to take on a productive role in the community 
organization, specifically for development goals, many influential community members 
became more invested in the existence of the patrols.  Some today, while recognizing 
their abuses and the hard work that went along with patrolling, lament the lack of 
community organization.  
Participating in the civil patrollers made community members into the agents in 
the army’s strategies of repression.  Regardless of their personal feelings, community 
members became complicit in violence against neighbors and even family members who 
did not follow the orders to the letter, hence risking community safety. This complicity 
creates cognitive dissonance, which leads to repression of thoughts and feelings that run 
counter to the logic of the act that one is performing.  Some villagers who previously 
supported the guerrilla undertook these duties with zeal, even becoming oppresors 
themselves.  Even those with “doble cara” had to confront the nagging truth of the fact 
that they themselves were the army that they hated.  In some, this likely led to a revision 
of past feelings to fit more closely with the military interpretation of reality, and within 
which their actions were ethical.  It is hard to determine with precision the extent of this 
form of enacting state violence on community memory, but it is impossible to discount it 
as a contributing factor.   
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Fear and Shame 
Fear continues to play a role in public memory about political participation. Many 
expressed fear of interviews, even when political involvement was not the specific issue 
to be addressed, quite worried that their name and interview responses would later appear 
on a list that could possibly fall into the hands of someone, most likely the army, who 
could do damage, even ten years after the war was over. Not only does almost no one talk 
about it publicly, but there were many people who I knew, on the basis of extensive 
conversations with many other people who were willing to talk, had participated in the 
guerrilla at least in the early days of 1976-1981—some even had leadership positions—
but were absolutely unwilling to discuss these matters with me.  Most of these people had 
been accused for decades of having participated.  Most of them have had their lives 
threatened and have seen some of their closest friends tortured and killed.  One of these 
people, who finally agreed to talk with me after months of avoiding an interview and 
denying knowledge, told me that there are still people in town who work with the military 
and would not hesitate for a moment to kill someone.  He thought that the work that I was 
doing, writing the history of San Pedro, was dangerous.  He warned me that my dredging 
up of the past could stir up problems, even if I left out the names of specific individuals.  
Apologizing profusely, he refused an interview and asked to be left out of my study.   
Here is a excerpt from an interview I conducted with a the male heads of 
household of a family who many other villagers assured me were enthusiastic participants 
in the guerrilla: 
We didn’t have any part in the guerrilla.  At least my uncle didn’t participate.  My 
father, no, he didn’t participate either.  They didn’t carry a weapon.  Those that 
did participate only gave them [the guerrilla] tortillas.  But to go and fight? Not at 
all. Why are they in favor of Ríos Montt now, those that participated?  In that 
time, a person doesn’t forget.  When a person participates they never forget. 
We’re talking about the URNG and those that are still around.  They are never 
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going to help Ríos Montt.  They had weapons.  They already did that.  But in our 
particular case here we didn’t have anything.  What I mean is that we didn’t take 
[the revolution] into account.  And then later, like my uncle said, it calmed down 
after Ríos Montt.  [The PAC] was a good thing for the people.  And then Ríos 
Montt himself thought about paying the people a little for their work.  We gained 
our compensation.  Who doesn’t want money?  That’s why we wanted that 
candidate. 
This response was typical of the people I interviewed.  This man, in his early 30s, (so he 
would have been a little kid in the 1980s) denies any involvement on the part of his 
family. He emphasizes carrying a weapon as the threshold for guerrilla involvement.  He 
admits that some others might have helped, because they were forced and only with food, 
but that his family did not even do this much.  Later on, an individual, a young man in his 
late 20s and a schoolteacher, a family member who was present in this interview, 
approached me privately, eager to discuss the family’s participation in the guerrilla 
movement, and how their family has suffered as a result.  He says that their family 
members who live in Mexico, where they fled after the war, now, on the rare occasions 
when they visit, only visit one of the family members and not all of them.    
Part of this family’s motivation to not be associated with the guerrilla 
movement—well after the fear of retribution by the state had diminished substantially—
was their guilt for having been involved in guerrilla violence in their own village. He 
went on to express anger at the fact that other families in the village always make fun of 
their family for having participated.  A cousin of this family told me that:  
During the war, everyone in the village was in favor of the guerrilla.  Then after 
the civil patrols, the other families turned against them, and blamed our family for 
participating. The guerrilla says a good thing […] that they’re going to struggle 
for the poor.  But where? How? What happened? The army came to kill and they 
couldn’t defend them.”   
Perhaps most determinative element in the contemporary denial was the then obvious fact 
of the military defeat of the guerrilla. There was a profound feeling of disappointment in 
 124 
the guerrilla.  Military emphasis on the fact that the guerrilla had abandoned the 
communities and never intended to protect them seemed like a fact.   Compounding this 
feeling of abandonment was a sense of shame.  It was common for community members 
to feel foolish for having ever thought that the cause was winnable.  Many began to feel 
ashamed, and tricked by the guerrilla.  This shame was enhanced by criticisms launched 
by neighbors who might have participated at lower levels of involvement or not at all.   
Feelings of guilt for participating in the violence associated with the guerrilla 
movement—violence in many cases committed against one’s neighbors—may be one of 
the most powerful factors in the contemporary denial of guerrilla politics among Mayans. 
It is likely that these denials prevent community level discussions about responsibility for 
such acts, a lack of accountability that in turn precludes the possibility of forgiveness, 
keeping long-standing community rifts intact. I was struck by the fact that the younger 
generation of family members, too young to have participated in the guerrilla movement 
themselves, were just as, and in some ways more, vocally opposed to the implication that 
their family members had been involved than were their parents, the ones who were 
actually participating in those years. In addition to fear, shame and guilt, a multitude of 
intervening factors reinforced community members’ desires to conform to the two armies 
discourse and deny their willing involvement in the revolution.  
Mourning Legitimate Victims 
One of the most profound expressions of the “two army” discourse emerging in 
this context comes from family members and friends of individuals who were killed by 
the military.  The deaths of these individuals and the meaning of their deaths has been a 
key site in the construction of public memories regarding the violence in San Pedro, as it 
has been in other Mayan villages throughout the highlands.  In San Pedro the dominant 
tendency is for family members to deny any involvement that their loved ones might have 
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had with the guerrilla, insisting that they were innocent of the crime for which they were 
assassinated.   This occurs for a number of reasons.  
While in San Pedro, I witnessed how Concepción, a war widow, mourns her 
deceased husband Raul, a locally famous and respected indigenous leader who was killed 
by the military in the early 1980s on the grounds that he was a guerrilla. Sampedranos 
who knew I was studying local politics and wartime history urged me to speak with 
Concepción.  “Es una viuda, una victima. Vayas a hablar con ella!” (She’s a widow, a 
victim. Go talk to her!) one prominent Ladino told me when I told him I was doing a 
study of town history.  Unlike the majority of war widows, Concepción is Ladina who 
married Raul in the early 1970s—a mixed marriage being very uncommon at that time 
and still. She still has the good-natured, somewhat irreverent humor appropriate to a 
cantina owner.  Although she is Ladina, her mourning practice is exemplary of 
indigenous widows of past indigenous leaders, most of who tended to be middle class and 
to reside in the urban center.  As we began to meet and talk about town politics and 
history, our conversations often, through both of our prodding, turned towards her 
husband.   I had already heard of Raul from conversations that I had had with other 
Sampedranos who I had asked about local political history.  I knew that his brother was a 
candidate.  I thought that Concepción might tell me something about who her husband 
was, what he hoped and believed.   I was curious.    
Raul was well known throughout San Pedro as an outspoken and respected 
indigenous leader.  Sampedranos remember Raul as one of the first indigenous primary 
school teachers in the town.  He had a strong personality, and was fairly intimidating 
because he was quite tall and spoke with a booming voice.  As a teacher and in public 
life, I was told by many, Raul adamantly and vocally supported the then radical idea that 
indigenous people were equal to Ladinos, that they could become just as smart and 
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educated, and should be treated, and carry themselves, accordingly.  After normal school 
hours, he stayed on and taught older men from the village to read and write, always 
encouraging them.  And he talked about politics. 
Unsolicited, and in gruesome detail, Concepción told me of how Raul, along with 
his brother, was tortured, executed, and their bodies disposed of in the river Selegua 
below the town.  Raul was one of the first of the visible community leaders in San Pedro 
to be killed by the army.  He was grabbed away publicly and people heard his screams all 
night coming out of the military base in the town. She describes in detail how the army 
tortured Raul. “They cut him all over his body.  Then they cut out his tongue when he 
would not talk.”  As she was speaking, I wondered how she knew they had cut out his 
tongue, or that he had not given away any secrets.  He was one the last one to be killed by 
the army; afterwards Concepción recalls that the army began “agarrando parejo” 
(grabbing people, almost randomly).  After he and his brother were murdered, the rest of 
his brothers and his sister were forced to flee to Mexico, and Canada. As Concepción 
laments the cruelty and arbitrariness of Raul’s fate, she denies that he ever participated in 
the revolution, saying that “El no tenia delito.”  (He had no crime)  That this statement is 
intended to give an additional emotional charge to her story is evident in the manner of 
her speech and the silence that follows.   
In Concepción’s narrative, several powerful Ladinos had Raul killed to maintain 
their privilege over municipal resources.   As discussed in the first chapter, several 
powerful local Ladino politicians were attempting to claim communal land for their own 
profit.   When Raul and his brothers led the charge against these attempts at appropriation 
in the name of the community, the Ladinos vindictively denounced him and his brother to 
the military on the grounds that they were guerrillas.  Raul and his brothers had been key 
figures in the movement that become the flashpoint issue in three indigenous mayoral 
 127 
bids from progressive parties in the 1970s.  His brother lost the mayoral race in 1978 
because the national party candidate was killed two weeks before the election.  But the 
land was returned to the municipality.  “Look how useful that land is now,” Concepción 
proudly commented, “It has the instituto” [the local public high school] and also a 
community slaughterhouse.”  In her telling, Raul martyred himself for the indigenous 
people. “He was working for the community,” she recalls, adding disdainfully the 
comment that “the mayor today [a Mayan] is a chucho por el pisto.” 
Most local Mayans I spoke with who knew Raul follow the narrative strategy 
proposed by Concepción.  They claim not to know for sure, but say that they think Raul 
was not guerrilla.  Others disagree. Most Ladinos, for instance, subscribe to the military’s 
view that those killed were mostly guerrillas.  There are several indigenous people who 
will readily mark Raul as a revolutionary.  Members of one family in particular blame 
Raul for giving the order to kill their father, a military commissioner and contractor for 
the finca who publicly opposed the guerrilla.  More interestingly, it also differs from the 
memory of surviving Mayans who were former leaders of the guerrilla movement—many 
of whom had since fled.  I was able to speak to one such leader on his annual visit back to 
the township from Mexico on a hot Day of the Dead.  As several other local formers 
leaders had done, he discussed Raul’s role as a local leader of the guerrilla movement.  
Like others, he spoke fondly and nostalgically of their work together.  He told me how 
Raul would visit the remote villages to talk to leaders and garner support for the guerrilla. 
Concepción, like so many other Guatemalan war widows, was incredibly brave.  
She publicly and stridently denounced the killing.  She openly advanced her moral 
criticism of her husband’s death, even reported his death to the authorities, all to no avail.  
Central to her claim was the fact that the state had no evidence and Raul had no trial.  She 
also sought compensation from the state.  At first she was denied his teacher’s insurance 
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policy, but eventually received it.  She has tried repeatedly to get a resarcimiento 
(retribution) payment, even asking if I could help by taking her case to an institution.  She 
was not sure which one.  She is disgusted with the state’s failure to make good on its 
promise to make retribution payments and appalled at the way the resarcimiento process 
has been politicized.  Her hatred for the army and the government is obvious in her 
speech.   I said that I could not help her.  
Although it is not my place to speculate on the truth or falsity of this narrative, 
there were reasons why Concepción might want to deny Raul’s revolutionary past, if that 
is indeed what she did.  My sense is that her story was shaped by a certain conception of 
legitimate victim-hood that formed in the period after the intense violence and was 
therefore over-determined by the threat of violence and the postwar associations sutured 
to the idea of the guerrilla.  These meanings required the deceased be understood as 
innocent when killed to be legitimate or worthy of mourning. By showing the state’s 
negligence of its own standards of evidence, it points to an internal hypocrisy in state 
logic. Conceding this logic enabled family members to speak of the injustice of their 
spouses’ deaths. The discourse of innocent victim-hood allowed public criticisms of the 
military but avoided state reprisals; it also avoided recrimination for local excesses on the 
part of the guerrilla; and it allowed for the possibility of material benefits for the family 
members. The insistence on innocence performed a subtle operation that balanced the 
peculiar needs of this situation. Denying participation allowed Concepción to remember 
Raul as a martyr for indigenous rights, a hero, and not a pathetic criminal, or murderer, 
who ‘deserved’ to die.  
Widows are particularly encumbered with gendered expectations of comportment.  
Her responsibility is to take care of the reputation of her husband. It was of course her 
obligation as wife to grieve.  It is also expected that she defend the legacy of her husband.  
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This caretaking needs to be done according to her estimations of the climate in which that 
memory is produced.  It must conform to her understanding of community expectations 
about what is and is not proper behavior.  It is not simply his memory at stake.  Her 
identity and honor is deeply entangled in the reputation accorded to her deceased 
husband.    
Regardless of whether or not Concepción is “telling the truth,” were one were to 
believe the denials of most of those whose family members were killed by the military, 
one would have to believe that no indigenous leaders in the 1970s supported the guerrilla 
movement.  This would make it difficult to explain the widespread support for the 
guerrilla in the township prior to the arrival of the violence, a fact that, as I describe in the 
first chapter, became increasingly unavoidable through fieldwork. Although many 
individuals know very well how widespread participation in the guerrilla movement was 
during the late seventies, few admit this publicly.   
Human Rights Discourses and Moral Equivalence 
Human rights discourses have criticized military violence.  In the past, violence 
against the guerrilla was completely justified.  Since the Peace Accords, however, human 
rights workers and institutions, especially the Truth Commission Reports and the REHMI 
project done by the Catholic Church, to criticize the state’s use of violence.  This 
emergence of this discourse gives weight to the criticism of the state leveled by family 
members of war victims.   But human rights discourses cut both ways, helping to 
reinforce the perspective of two armies.  There is a new tendency in human rights 
discourses to denounce both sides of the violence on the grounds that both sides were 
human rights abusers.  There is a leveling tendency in this discourse, at least in the 
manner in which it is popularly understood, which is less clear about making distinction 
between different human rights abusers: all of them are bad.  It is certainly fruitless to 
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compare human rights abuse to another, or advocate one over another.  But with the 
recognition that at some level, a human rights violation is as bad as any other, there is an 
evacuation of the investigation of the differences in the ethical grounding of the different 
producers of human rights abuse—what was each side fighting for?—as well as the 
extent of the abuses committed, and the number of rights abuses committed by each 
group.  This is the conception of human rights that dominates public discourse in San 
Pedro. Furthermore, the notion of human rights is not incompatible with military 
conceptions of criminality. This notion was made clear to be by Arnulfo, a community 
leader and ex-candidate for mayor, in response to my question as to whether or not he 
thought the violence was justified, and who, or what, he thought was responsible for the 
violence.   In these interviews, most Mayans said that both groups were guilty, and 
several blamed the military directly. Arnulfo elaborated on the first position, suggesting 
that human rights style verification would have been necessary to legitimate military 
violence against guerrillas: 
[the violence] was not justified.  Because the people they killed, some of them had 
not committed a crime.  One time in Chemiche [a local aldea] there was a man 
from Santiago Atitlan.  He was mentally ill.  He would go house to house asking 
for food, clothes, somewhere to sleep.  Who knows how the army found him.  
They said he was a guerrilla and hung him under the bridge.  He wasn’t a 
guerrilla, and that was unjust.  Neither the government nor the guerrilla is 
responsible for the violence.  Neither were justified.  Figure out who are the 
people involved in the guerrilla.  They should have done it like that.  Make a 
diagnostic.  Who are those who are most involved with the guerrilla.  Look 
closely; justify it well.  In the same way that they do it in Derechos Humanos 
(human rights).  Look clearly at the individuals who are the most guilty and pull 
them up by the roots.  But they [the army] grabbed whoever.  Those who had 
committed crimes, those that didn’t—the same. 
He is referring here to the practice of the local representatives of human rights who 
defend people accused of criminal acts.  Instead of assuming their guilt, there needs to be 
a trial and a process of gathering evidence, until incontrovertible proof is found. This 
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criticism of the overreach of military violence is also applicable to the guerrilla, as he 
explains: 
How great it would have been if [the guerrilla] had gone directly to the 
government to debate in order to improve the situation.  […] No one worried to 
say, “Look, men, let’s not kill anymore.  It would be better if we quit.  
Whether or not this solution would have worked—indeed the military state brooked no 
dissent—is irrelevant.   What is important is the way that new standards of legality merge 
with military definitions of illegality to produce a new narrative of history. 
Capacidad 
There is one additional factor that amplifies the argument that I have developed 
thus far I will only briefly mention here because I discuss it in much more length in 
chapters 5 and 7.  I suggest that the notion of capacidad has helped to effect a retroactive 
reframing of the decision by many Mayans to participate in the revolution.  My friend 
cited ignorance as the main factor that led Mayans to believe the stories of reform.  Level 
headed people with capacidad would know better that hopes for political reform are 
naive and unrealistic.   This relies on reading the history backward, as if state violence 
was an inevitable result of revolutionary attempts to capture the state.  On a related notes, 
I have heard many Mayans criticize the guerrilla practice of knocking down posts that 
hold up electricity lines, as well as bridges.  These complaints appeared to be heartfelt 
criticisms of what they saw as pointless protests, the costs of which were really only 
borne by the population itself, and had no real effect on the government.   
Evangelical Historicity 
The evangelical church’s stance on violence, similar to the human rights stance, 
denounces all violence equally.  Evangelical religions espouse a very different view of 
history, removing historical agency from the actors and placing it in the hands of God.  
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Such an interpretation has been brought to bear on public attitudes of some evangelical 
followers of Ríos Montt.   While in San Pedro, I befriended an indigenous evangelical 
preacher, Ernesto, a lay preacher who led Sunday worship services at a small new church 
in Los Altenses.  Ernesto was a very intelligent man, who had studied the Bible.  He 
always had a smug, self-assured attitude about his belief, completely certain that he was 
smarter or better informed than those around him.  His historical narrative drew from the 
same authoritative sensibility: 
“Doesn’t the Bible say that there is going to be war, nation against nation, 
neighbor against neighbor? The only thing that people can do in times of war is to 
try not to get involved and to pray to God for it to end. Ríos Montt is not 
responsible.  It was his job.  He had no choice.  This is going to happen.  He 
should not be judged.  They can’t do anything to him any way.  Ríos Montt is 
fuerte.  This case is political[ly motivated].  The only reason they want to bring 
this case against him is because he is a presidential candidate and they don’t want 
him to win.”  
Some evangelical churches promote a perspective of divine history to converts, outside of 
human design or influence.  Everything is a part of God’s plan.  Becoming involved in 
making political value judgments is futile, and rooted in a lack of appreciation for the 
absolute agency of God in determining the outcome of individual lives.  There is no space 
in this conception for individual responsibility for the ethical implications of political 
processes happening in one’s own community, much less in the country at large.  
People’s responsibility is to obey and to worship God, and that is the extent of their 
responsibility.  From this perspective, remembering the violence is a senseless endeavor.  
However, this is an extreme position, and not voiced by the majority of evangelicals who 
I met, most of whom were concerned much more with the ethics of politics. 
Political Opportunism 
Today, Sampedranos have other personal interests in circulating these and related 
conceptions of history.  When an individual takes an active role in supporting a political 
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party, especially the FRG, it is necessary that they adopt a conception of history that 
makes this decision seem rational.  The FRG launched an official version of history that 
whitewashes Ríos Montt’s implication in the violence of the past.  One prominent FRG 
supporter, an older man who once upon a time was an avid supporter of the guerrilla 
movement told me that, “The massacres were Lucas Garcia.  Ríos Montt came in and 
formed the patrols.  Things calmed down. And now, Ríos Montt had the idea to pay the 
patrols.”  In this view, Ríos Montt was the savior who ended the violence, instead of the 
general who gave the order to attack civilians by the thousands.  This chronology is not 
accurate.   The most intense wave of military violence in the highlands took place after 
Ríos Montt took power by military coup in 1981.  Another FRG supporter, a much 
younger man, repeated a similar version: 
In that time there was war.  The military and the guerrilla.  When Ríos Montt was 
governing Guatemala, the thing was calming down.  When he made the law that 
the people patrolled, so that they took care of themselves, of each other. And that 
is where the war went calming down. But the people say that that was by Ríos 
Montt’s doing when many were killed.  I had a very young age in that time. But I 
have learned many things, that it wasn’t Ríos Montt, it was Lucas Garcia.  But 
when Ríos Montt came in the thing calmed down.  Perhaps some people were 
killed in this time but it wasn’t his doing. Rather sometimes between themselves.  
There are times they sell us out in another municipio and from there they come 
and grab us.  They say it was Ríos Montt but I don’t believe it, with the little 
opportunity that I have.  The other thing is that I didn’t see it.  The one who 
knows the most is our God. I could perhaps easily say that it was him.  But I 
didn’t see anything.  We don’t have any proof.  How are we going to judge our 
neighbor?  
When I asked the first FRG supporter why he thought that the patrols were a good thing 
now, when at the time he opposed them, he had no answer, but he held to this clearly 
contradictory version of the facts.  All of those who support the party easily denounce the 
allegations against Ríos Montt as political opportunism of those from other parties who 
want to gain power.   One version of history, the logic seems to be, is just as valid as 
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another: all stem from political interest in one form or another. Those who felt no 
allegiance to the guerrilla movement, or who were not alive during the time have less 
trouble in adopting this party-specific version of history.  I detected cognitive dissonance, 
or, more accurately, embarrassment, in my conversations with those who had supported 
the revolution, and now align with the FRG. Accepting whatever benefits might be 
associated with their current political participation requires the negation of a strongly 
held past identity.  This is no small loss.  It requires the identification with the army and a 
denial of revolutionary desire.   Such denial is perhaps aided by a sense that these desires 
are unrealistic, a theme I will explore in depth in the next chapter.  Nevertheless, in 
addition to the alternative version of history, these individuals tended to want to avoid 
direct examination of the subject.  On the other hand, FRG supporters who were too 
young in the early 1980s to have formed an opinion based on their own memories are less 
apt to feel uneasy with the exculpatory historical narrative.  They have no proof.  
Interestingly, both men would agree publicly that participation in the mass killing of 
Mayans would discredit Ríos Montt if it were true.  No one in the villages that I spoke to, 
even FRG party higher ups, would ever say that the violence in the early 1980s was 
justified, even those who blame the guerrilla for provoking it, they still say that it was 
unwarranted, a grave violation of human dignity.  
Political Disorientation 
That certain periods of time are unavailable to the collective consciousness for a 
long while has resulted in a public amnesia on the part of the general public, especially 
members of the younger generation.  This amnesia extends to many politicians, especially 
the younger generation.  However, it seemed very exaggerated and acute in the newly 
elected FRG alcalde, Mariano Díaz.  The man was an impressive public speaker, and an 
accomplished comedian, but he made some amazing gaffes about national history.  One 
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day, I was in attendance when Mariano had been asked to speak at the inauguration of a 
new Mayan-oriented development organization in the town.  In his somewhat rambling, 
yet forcefully delivered, comments, his lack of knowledge about the armed conflict 
became painfully clear to a large audience of people, none of whom reacted as if there 
was anything wrong: 
For thirty five years there was war.  We ruined this country.  And why?...I don’t 
know. But now we are at peace.  How do we achieve peace?  Being at home, with 
the family.  As parents we give good educations to our children and they go 
developing in the future. San Pedro Necta has a hospital, it has a bank, it has 
various development associations—now it has one more—there will be a road 
with asphalt.  Everything is going to bring more money, more business to San 
Pedro. 
Mariano has no idea why the war started and, apparently does not care.  It, whatever it 
was, is irrelevant.  Why? Because now there is development.  Mariano’s version of peace 
entails individual, private acts of familial bonding and education.  Collective struggle has 
no place in this narrative.  The revolution is of trivial importance.  I was not the only 
person who was dizzied by this non-sequitor display of ignorance regarding the most 
significant period in town history.   
Later that day, I met with a Mayan woman in her early 50’s, Paola, who was 
visiting town from Mexico, where she had lived as a refugee since 1982, when the army 
had kidnapped and murdered her two oldest brothers.  Her entire family fled.  Paola was 
visiting for a month, and had come for the Day of the Dead. Paola’s brother and husband 
were both prominent indigenous activists.  Although many of my trusted informants 
insisted on it, Paola refused to admit any relationship between them, or anyone that they 
knew, and the guerrilla movement.  She even said that she never knew anything about 
‘those groups’.  Here was an exile, just as steeped as the family members she was coming 
back to see in the “two armies” narrative.  I had not noticed that she had attended the 
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meeting where Mariano spoke that day.  While I was asking her questions about town 
history in the late 1970s, she started talking about her job in the church.  She worked 
there together with her best friend, a young, educated and beautiful Mayan woman from 
the town who was killed by the army: 
My friend.  She worked with the nuns. […] We went to school together. She was 
from here in the town center.  She got married, and I did not.  She was very 
beautiful.  They killed her.  Why? I don’t know… as Mariano Díaz says!   
Paola was disgusted when she remembered Marino’s comment, involuntarily in the 
course of her memory.  For her, he was stealing the significance of her friend’s death.  It 
showed that Marino did not know who he was or where he had come from.  “And why 
are you here, an indigenous man as Mayor!  Why are people paid a decent wage now on 
the finca if you don’t know?”  She was almost yelling.  Calming down, she said:  
“I was very mad that day [that Mariano spoke].  They didn’t give people who 
wanted to talk the chance to speak.  We went on to something else.  Some of [the 
people there] don’t know why.  ‘I know why’ I would have said.  I would have 
stood up.  Cae mal (it makes me mad). 
It might be reasonable to think that the public speech I described was a performance.  
Perhaps it is just political opportunism, having to say something, so saying something 
vague.  After meeting and knowing Mariano Díaz, however, I realized that he had little 
conceptions of the stakes of past political struggles.  I was unable to interview him at 
length.  He was suspicious of me, and everyone around him, and for good reason, when 
he first came to power (CEH 1999, casos 5529, 5500). More than half of the town hated 
him. He had probably received death threats from defeated members of other political 
parties or from the leaders of the ex-PAC who did not receive their payments. His 
malapropisms are famous throughout the town.  Jokes about stupid things the alcalde 
said, or is said to have stolen, are regular fodder for the powerful town rumor mill.  
Simply put, Mariano was not at all knowledgeable about politics.  This was probably 
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what he was most embarrassed about and afraid that I would find out if he let me 
interview him.   He had to be taught some very basic things.   I had several conversations 
with Juan, a man who had worked as a political advisor to Mariano, a young, professional 
Mayan.  One of these conversations came at the end of my fieldwork.  I was pretty savvy 
about local politics, and had adopted a jaded perspective, in hopes that it would make 
people I was talking to cut past the party lines and tell me what they were really thinking.  
I began to press him about Mariano, pointing to his obvious incompetence.  He admitted 
that:   
He’s pretty bad. It’s true.  During the campaign he would say some very stupid 
things.  Once he told a town of people that he knew he was going to be mayor 
when he was in his mothers’ womb.  I heard that and felt embarrassed. We told 
him later ‘better just talk about development.  That’s what the people need.  But 
Mariano isn’t any worse than anyone else’. 
Juan is correct, almost.  Lots of people are confused about history, even people 
who have studied.  Jeremias is a young Mayan man who was graduating high school 
when I lived in Los Altenses.  Jeremias is fairly serious, and a good student.  He was very 
curious about my study, and also wanted to talk with my about what it was like to live in 
the US.  Like most people his age, he had thought about going after graduation.  The day 
we spoke was September 15, 2004, national Independence Day in Guatemala.  All 
morning there had been parades in the town, all the schoolchildren marching and carrying 
images of the national flag, the quetzal (the nearly extinct national bird, for which the 
national currency derives its name), singing songs and reading poems.   Curious, I asked 
him what Independence Day meant to him.  He told me a story about school.  He said in 
his last year he had taken a class on Guatemalan history when he was reading a book he 
found out that indigenous people had lived through: 
500 years of exploitation and slavery!?  When I read this it was like the mountain 
fell on top of me.  500 years?  Why hadn’t anyone ever told me? We never 
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studied anything like that in primera or basica (elementary and middle schools). I 
was so angry.  I think they should teach these things at a younger age.  And then 
we have to read poems about Guatemala Linda (nationalist poem).  We don’t even 
know what Guatemala is. It’s terrible.  
Seeing someone as mild-mannered as him so incensed, I was taken aback.  But his 
feelings were understandable.  We didn’t talk about the war in that conversation.  No 
doubt this is a part of his memory he would be surprised to learn about as well.  
 
POSTWAR THAW OF MILITARY IMPOSED MEMORIES 
For the reasons discussed, vehement refusals to admit any relationship between 
Mayans and the revolutionary movement remained the norm from 1982 until 1996.  This 
“public amnesia” is an important part of the conditions under which neo-authoritarian 
populism becomes thinkable for many Mayans.  But something very distinct seems to be 
placing these understandings in question today.  New spaces opened by the Peace 
Accords and the absence of a military presence have led to substantial challenges in these 
common sense understandings of politics and history. The main reason for this is 
democratization. There is no permanent military presence in communities; the patrols are 
disbanded; and leftist parties and social movements exist without retribution.   In this 
context, fear is not the factor in shaping public and private memory that is once was.  As 
a result, public versions of the truth, long calcified, began to shift, if not reverting to 
previous forms of thought, the loosening of previously unquestioned truths on public 
discourse has been nonetheless impressive.  
The re-emergence of revolutionary parties in town politics also has introduced 
new interpretations of the past and present into public discourse.  The URNG is a 
significant political force in San Pedro now, as evidenced by their third place finish in the 
2003 elections. An oppositional version of history is the mainstay of this party’s success.  
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They champion the goals of the revolutionary movement past and present; criticize the 
fundamental injustice of the state in creating poverty; denounce and seek retribution for 
past state violence; and oppose mining concessions and the Free Trade Amendment.  
They also speak openly about past participation in the guerrilla movement, denying that 
the guerrilla movement was responsible for the violence, especially the massacres which 
they see as genocidal.   
Human rights has also emerged and taken on a completely new significance.  
There is an office of human rights in the township.   Asociación CEIBA’s discourses on 
human rights and politics are a strong reinforcement to this leftist discourse.  Many 
Sampedranos, especially since the Peace Accords, openly question the brutality of the 
army’s through the highlands.  Many hate Ríos Montt, and call him an asesino and a 
genocidio.  This was prevalent during the last electoral campaign, when Ríos Montt 
launched his by all counts illegal candidacy for president.  
The Catholic Church is another powerful participant in a forming a new 
conception of history.  In 2003, they launched a campaign against Ríos Montt on the 
basis of his role in the scorched earth campaign. The Church advocated no party in 
particular, but stridently denounced Ríos Montt.  Catequistas and local animadores 
received courses that helped orient their vote.   I met several people who, as part of the 
curriculum in their high school, took a course that discussed the findings of the Catholic 
Church’s historical memory reports. Another sign that these alternative voices is the 
emergence of a relatively widespread historical understanding about the guerrilla’s role in 
the recent political history of the country.  
A large number of people who were opposed to the guerilla movement now 
believe that the guerrilla was integral to the signing of the Peace Accords, something that 
almost everyone in the town saw as a good thing. The advent of the Peace Accords has 
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cleared space for a rethinking of the guerrilla movement. Almost all of the scores of 
people that I asked said that when they found out about the Accords said that they were 
happy and relieved because the war was finally over and because, many added, “There 
would be an end to discrimination.” Mayan opposition to human rights did exist, but it 
was not a complete dismissal, based in a fear that this would “bring back the army,” but 
rather a concern that overzealous application of human rights in criminal cases would let 
criminals go free and leave the population vulnerable to common crime, which has 
become an increasingly scourge in Mayan villages in recent years.  I even heard of cases 
where thieves were stealing masa from women on their way home from village mill.   
This rethinking of the guerrilla movement was expressed to me succinctly by an 
evangelical man a former village leader of the civil patrols who was steadfastly opposed 
to the guerrilla in the 1980s, and whose father he believed had been killed for criticizing 
them.  He stopped short of saying that the guerrilla themselves were good, but he did feel 
strongly that the effect that they had had on the country was positive.  He said, “Today 
we can see that the guerrilla did something good.  Everything is backward. Today things 
are better for indigenous people.  There is space for us.  Before there was a lot of 
discrimination.  Now there is more respect.”  I was surprised to hear him say this, 
especially given his past.  But he was not the only person to express this view.  While 
most people do not see the guerrilla movement or revolutionary ideology as a viable 
political position in the present, and do not necessarily declare their support of the 
movement, there is a growing appreciation of the gains for indigenous people that their 
efforts made.  Many expressed the opinion that the guerrilla movement made Ladinos 
have more respect for indigenous, even if it was for fear of what might happen to them.  
This was not lost on Mayan residents, most of whom, even after the defeat of the 
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guerrilla, would never go back to the “way things were before” in their relations with 
Ladinos.  
More evidence of the significance of recent political events in creating new 
understandings is provided by the change in expressed attitudes among Ladinos.  Ladino 
leaders from the casco urbano, once opposed to human rights and democracy, now claim 
these discourses.  When I interviewed the head of the civil patrols in the township, he was 
quick to defensively insist that:  
There were no abuses of human rights among the civil patrollers in San Pedro.   
Here they were all voluntary.  People wanted to patrol.  Here the patrols did 
development projects, roads in the communities and bridges and trained people to 
read.  We did good works.  Only the literacy classes were obligatory. 
When I commented to a community member that the ex-head of the patrols claimed they 
were voluntary, he scoffed “Donde!”(where) and began to recount the various abuses of 
the civil patrols.  Many told me that during the war, Laparra was outspoken in his 
condemnation of human rights and democracy.  This is consistent with Hale’s (2006) 
argument about the shifting racial ideologies among Ladinos.  Ladinos embrace anti-
racist ideology, but continue to think of themselves as superior to Mayans, and fight to 
maintain their class and racial privileges.  In San Pedro, it seemed that many Ladinos 
espoused a color-blind ideology for the benefit of my ears, while holding very distinct 
feelings privately.  It appeared that they were appropriating anti-racism to appear modern.  
This is ironic in that their claim to superiority to Mayans is now based on the Ladino 
monopoly on modern status.  
Some individuals who are not participants in the URNG, including those who had 
vehemently denied guerrilla activities previously, later, after having developed a level of 
respect for me, and a feeling of comfort, admitted, privately, and often proudly, their 
participation in the guerrilla movement.  It might be that little of this has made it to the 
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public sphere for reasons presented in this chapter.  It is possible, however, that as people 
from a variety of political positions come to understand the stakes of the guerrilla 
movement, despite the devastation that followed the period of social mobilization, there 
will be more open discussions of the past.  Several conversations made me hopeful that a 
less military-determined understanding of Mayan agency in the political processes of the 
1970s might come to pass in San Pedro, and possibly in many other towns like it.   
One interview with a Mayan man, Victoriano, who was former head of a village 
development committee, illustrated this point.  Victoriano had actively participated in 
politics, never as a candidate, but in village-level organizing parties he was allied with.  
Our interview was not specifically about his participation, but about his memory of past 
events.  In response to my question about why there was a war, without hesitation, he 
answered:  
Because there was organization.  Maybe not only indigenous folks but also 
Ladinos were involved in that.  There was a lot of corruption.  We were very 
marginalized.  They would not attend to the rural people [in the aldeas], only in 
the town. That’s where the people started to organize themselves.  
This statement reiterates the way that Mayans saw the revolution as an extension of their 
struggles against racial marginalization.  It also emphasizes the intercultural character of 
the revolution.  I then asked him if he thought the massacres, used by the army, were 
justified.  This was his response: 
With those massacres…the government did not want indigenous people to rise up, 
to ask for what they wanted.  That’s why they sent the army to terminate all of 
that.  But they still were not able.  Because the majority of the people were 
already organized.  The massacres were very hard.  There were a lot of people, 
many of them who were prepared to help the guerrilla, but when the massacres 
came they didn’t go with one side or the other.  The people stayed like that, 
neutral.  If you help the guerrilla, the army will massacre [people].  If you help the 
army, there goes the guerrilla to do damage to that person.  So we had a time 
when we were not with either side because there was a sword in front and behind.  
That’s how we stayed.  That’s right.   
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In this narrative, the majority of the Mayan villagers were with the guerrilla.  The 
guerrilla movement was viewed as a rising up of indigenous power. This changed when it 
became obvious that the army came to kill.  Villagers then stayed neutral.  This was a 
difficult space because each group was adamant that the villagers take sides; but it was 
the safest alternative. Villagers were now really between two armies.  Victoriano is 
critical of guerrilla tactics after the violence, which he sees as very insensitive to the fear 
of the people, for whom the consequences were now all too clear and much too high.  
Still, his criticism of the guerrilla does not cause him to blame the guerrilla for the 
massacres themselves, shifting local enthusiasm onto them for the violence.  Nor does it 
cause him to re-think local support for guerrilla objectives.  In this narrative, the two 
armies was a reality, but it was only a reality after the political situation was radically 
transformed by violence.  It is doubtful that this narrative is VIctoriano’s alone.  It was 
probably one that informed the later thinking of the Mayan political movement led by 
Antulio Morales, as Victoriano was a close associate of Antulio’s, and a self-described 
follower of his political movement.  
 
CONCLUSION: THE POSSIBILITIES AND DANGERS COUNTER MEMORIES 
The two armies discourse was not entirely created by the army, even if it was 
official army discourse. The two armies narrative was the Mayan act of resistance par 
excellance.  The army had to shift its official discourse in response to meet local 
criticisms of the violence and to establish legitimacy among the traumatized population.  
It was based on real experiences.  It would be foolish to dispute the fact that many of 
those killed during decades of counter-insurgency violence were indeed innocents.  It 
may very well be that many of the indigenous leaders in San Pedro were unfairly 
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denounced to the military by town Ladinos anxious about the very real possibility of 
losing power in their town to the new organizations led by Mayan activists from the 
town, groups that had existed before the guerrilla movement. Moreover, the guerrillas 
made many errors and many Mayans dissented from their methods and goals. Mayan 
criticisms were never absent, and grew as the war went on.  Most Mayans were especially 
critical of the decision to continue the war after state reprisals reached critical levels.  
After the initial period of support, most Mayans did feel caught between two armies. The 
two armies discourse was a real experience for the majority of Mayans during the war.  
But it seems unlikely it was their entire experience: it was a reduced, cut down, modified, 
version of their experience.  It left out the crucial moment before the arrival of the army 
when the guerrilla was seen as the answer to Mayan desires for economic and racial 
justice.  The army picked up on this popular sentiment, this resistance strategy, then re-
packaged it for their own needs and expediencies for their postwar governing strategy. 
The efficacy of the “two armies” discourses lies precisely in its ability to draw on real 
experiences and ambivalences and then make these previously more marginal and less 
salient and determinative feelings central. But now state power operates through the 
legitimation of explicit Mayan partial criticisms of state violence.   
The two armies discourse created a safe space for Mayans eager to avoid military 
reprisals, but with a high cost for community solidarity and for the autonomy of local 
interpretations of reality and history. Denial of leftist politics allowed criticisms of the 
military in dangerous times, and were crucial to the reconstitution of valorized 
subjectivities among war victims.   But healing under imperfect conditions had additional 
costs: the breakdown of community relations and the loss of a more complicated 
understanding of the relationship between Mayan politics and revolutionary politics.  
Having once conceded that guerrillas are criminals and that no one participated in their 
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movement, now coming up with a political alternative that involves the hallmark 
revolutionary political demands.  By conceding the military’s definition of guerrillas as 
criminals, discourses of innocence impede public reflection on the more complicated 
relationship that appears to have existed between Sampedranos and the revolution. It 
allows for the formation of a resistant identity, but within a narrative framework that 
erases the hope for a better future and national political change, so prevalent in the recent 
past.  This contributes to the contemporary conceptual separation of Mayan and 
revolutionary struggles, fulfilling state strategies that aim to divide and contain both 
movements.  
The dominant conception of Mayan politics in San Pedro bears the mark of this 
conceptual separation.  The two forms of politics are assumed to have nothing to do with 
one another.  Problems with the guerrilla movement, and the fact of Mayan ambivalence 
has created a situation in which the fundamental assumption common to a wide array of 
political parties is that Mayan politics is and should be completely independent of leftist 
politics.  Leftist criticisms are of a completely different set of concerns.  There is a 
division between material issues, such as resources, and cultural issues, such as the 
sphere of cultural representations: traditional dances, clothing, marimba (a musical 
instrument), and language.  The only place where this material concerns, and class 
concerns become linked to Mayan specific needs is the new politics of development.  
Here, a history of Mayan specific exclusion is used to justify the focus of development 
resources on communities at a far remove from the town center. 
These public memories shape the contemporary field of political alternatives 
naturally associated with Mayan politics.  One way it accomplishes this is through 
impeding inquiries that a new generation of Mayan leaders might make in regards to their 
own history.  Instead of attempting to recover a revolutionary politics once made 
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impossible by violence, Sampedranos publicly follow the “two army” discourse, 
heroizing indigenous leaders’ local politics of anti-discrimination while denying the 
existence of revolutionary desire. This is of no small consequence, because, as was the 
case in the 1970s, class politics remains a necessary component of any dream of 
substantial indigenous political advancement in the Guatemalan nation state.  Today, all 
the discourses that explicitly link Mayan desires for well-being to a necessary change in 
national politics are marginalized in discussions of politics in San Pedro. 
Perhaps it would be fitting to describe the “two army” discourse, and the denial of 
past revolutionary politics as a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 1985), as one strategy of 
avoiding reprisals and winning small victories employed by the relatively powerless. But 
these forms of resistance rarely occur under ideal conditions.  Certain contradictions 
inherent in situations in multiple overlaying realities place people in situations that are 
literally impossible.  This particular memory opens a space for agency at one level, but 
denies another form of agency. Alternatively, along with De Certeau’s (1984), we can 
imagine small acts rebellion not as ultimately failures, always contained within the 
structure of power that they resist, but rather as pointing to the possibility of the 
transformation of a power structure.   In this view, each act of resistance reiterates the 
possibility of a fundamental reorganization of the social structure.  
Here the important thing to remember is that the state must respond to dominant 
Mayan memories.  It attempts to align its activities and identity with what it presents as 
an image of Mayan popular will.  But the state cannot decide how Mayans narrate the 
past: only Mayans can.  This does not mean that the state will not try to continue to 
influence these memories, and can succeed for long periods of time, but they are always 
running a few steps behind Mayan consciousness.  It will be interesting to see what 
 147 
official response emerges when political common sense in Mayan villages shifts towards 
an acknowledgement of a more complicated political past.    
The dominant construction treats the past as univocal.  It does not admit that there 
are differences of opinion regarding the past.  It assumes that the past is fixed, knowable. 
I want to replace this with a different version of the truth, one that does not simply 
happen, but that we consciously construct in the present. I want this chapter to be a 
gesture towards the possibility of thinking otherwise about the past.   It is a history that 
tries to instill an attention towards the multiple possibilities from the present.  It wants to 
show that the past could have been done differently and therefore could still be re-
organized and rethought. Truth is not simply out there to be found.  Different facts need 
to be woven into a narrative.  These frames allow us to see the past in different ways, in 
particular stories.  Stories about history matter a great deal; these are the base material 
that all of us use to shape our identities, to locate ourselves in relationship to others in the 
world and to make sense out of our lives.   This process is always partial, but does not 
gain its importance from its transparent access to the truth, but from the inevitable role of 
power in construction of narratives of the past, and their relevance for our ethics today. I 
believe that understanding how the conflict occurred, especially the forms of agency that 
shaped the local articulation of the violence, is important to the processes of national 
reconstruction in Guatemala.  There might exist other ways to form a progressive 
collective politics in Mayan communities.  It is not a question of whether to adopt a 
perspective on the past, but a question of which perspective will come to dominate in the 
reconstruction of a new society in the wake of conflict.  Understanding the way that local 
past opens space for dialogue about accountability among local actors regarding their 
roles in the violence.  It is a form of taking responsibility and the only way to re-establish 
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the bounds of trust and community that must exist for a political culture to aspire towards 
democracy.  
 
                                                
NOTES 
1 In all of the reports of state propaganda, no one has mentioned that the state did not 
include a criticism of guerrilla racism in their smear campaign against the guerrilla.  
2 Stoll’s penchant for a sensationalist, ‘expose’ approach to anthropology, and his 
contrarian analysis has been very effective in grabbing headlines and, unfortunately, 
shaping public debate about Guatemala, in Guatemala and internationally.  His narrative 
has been instrumental in the dismissal of the moral force of criticisms of military violence 
tout court by way of focusing on inconsistencies in one story.  As Sanford (2003) notes, 
and hers and the work of many other scholars demonstrates, his own work does not stand 
up to the close scrutiny he applies to Menchu.  
3 On the one hand, Sanford professes to take no position on whether or not people from 
Acul supported the guerrilla.   On the next page, however, she professes their innocence, 
asking: “When and how did it come to pass that Ixiles felt drained, and, later, used and/or 
abused by army and guerrilla demands for ‘hospitality’.”   
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Chapter Three: ¡Que se Vaya MOSCAMED! Revolutionary Pessimism 
and the Limits of Democracy 
 
If, as I argued in the last chapter, most politically active Mayans today tend to 
deny, or know little about, Mayan participation in the revolutionary movement, and 
distinguish Mayan politics from the political aspirations of the revolutionary left, one 
might think that their commonsense understandings and deeply embedded and shared 
political narratives would reflect these tendencies. That is, that they would manifest a 
transformation of Mayan political consciousness from earlier times.  One might assume 
that the moral repudiation of the guerrilla movement—so commonly voiced in public 
discussions of the guerrilla—would find correlates in everyday talk, shared conceptual 
frameworks and affective dispositions, and popular cultural references.  But instead there 
was disjuncture.  I found something very different during my time in San Pedro, and in 
other towns in Huehuetenango.  In fact, I discovered that most Mayan-identified 
Huehuetecos—regardless of past or present political affiliation—share a deep, taken for 
granted investment in Marxist narratives and commonsense, creatively combined with 
anti-racist, and, increasingly, Mayan nationalist sensibilities.  Interviews and 
conversations with politically active Sampedranos of all stripes—including those who 
previously sympathized with or even actively participated in leftist movements, and who 
have since the Peace Accords affiliated themselves with right wing parties—reveal that 
they generally still endorse the political goals of the left.  
My fieldnotes are filled with examples of Mayan political and community leaders 
from all political affiliations who would espouse beliefs that echoed the discourses of the 
revolutionary movement.  They frequently bemoaned that the country is run by a small 
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group of “ricos,” and corrupt businessmen who keep poor Mayans “under their boots.” 
Another example happened one day as I was sharing a Gallo cerveza with a few male 
members of a family who ardently supported the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco 
(FRG) in the recent elections, but who had just as ardently supported the guerrilla in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  As we swapped stories, they instructed me to peel the label 
off of the beer.  I asked why, and one explained that, “it gives a chance to the poor 
people.”  Beyond such small rituals of class solidarity, in San Pedro there is widespread 
support for the Peace Accords, most1 conceptions of human rights, democracy, and even 
standard revolutionary goals like land reform. And, as was obvious in the last chapter on 
memory, Sampedranos have been highly critical of military violence.  The strong sense 
that payment in compensation for participation in the civil patrols was justified stemmed 
not only from the still painful memories of patrol duty, but the sense that the patrols were 
obligatory.  Moreover, these standard reformist, anti-army, and at times outwardly 
Marxist, sentiments were frequently refracted through the anti-racist idea that Mayans are 
poor because they are indigenous.  These elements of Mayan political culture today are 
continuous with the political imaginary that led many Sampedrano Mayans to support 
revolutionary forces in the late 1970s.   What are we to make of this disjuncture?   What 
does this mean about widespread participation in neo-authoritarian parties?   Can this be 
explained simply by reference to their populist discourses?  
This chapter further explores this breach between espoused political affiliation 
and deeply held worldviews by way of examining a “Mayan” conspiracy theory about 
MOSCAMED—the US Department of Agriculture’s institution in charge of eradicating 
the Mediterranean fruit fly and preventing its spread to the US, working in cooperation 
with the Mexican and Guatemalan governments. By examining the appeal of the 
MOSCAMED conspiracy and comparing it to data gained through interviews and 
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participant observation in San Pedro, I revise current understandings of Mayan neo-
authoritarianism. 
The MOSCAMED conspiracy is a tale of political corruption and exploitation that 
holds the status of truth for an overwhelming majority of rural Mayans—regardless of 
party affiliation—in Huehuetenango, an indigenous-majority department in the northern 
part of Guatemala’s western highlands. Much to the dismay of MOSCAMED’s 
employees, most Mayan smallholding farmers hate MOSCAMED.  They reject their fly 
control activities and also hold the program responsible for a good measure of their 
contemporary agricultural misfortune.  They contend that there is a sinister, true purpose 
hidden behind the MOSCAMED’s official image.  With much venom and sadness, these 
farmers insist that MOSCAMED has for decades purposefully unleashed a variety of new 
pests into their fields, obligating them to buy chemical pesticides.  Mayans in this region 
view MOSCAMED as a cleverly disguised front operation for agribusinesses and their 
government cronies.  For them, the MOSCAMED conspiracy symbolizes the tragic plight 
of the rural farmer, the hapless victim of pernicious forces outside of their control.  By 
using the term conspiracy, I do not mean to imply that it is necessarily false—definitive 
evidence is lacking—only that it posits behind the scenes decision-making (West and 
Sanders 2003).2  
MOSCAMED, obviously, rejects the conspiracy, as do nearly all non-Mayan 
Ladinos in Huehuetenango.  Despite pressure to accept alternative explanations, most 
Mayans believe the conspiracy.  Why?  Rather than embracing the exclusive truth claims 
of dominant interpretations and their assumptions of Mayan ignorance, I view the 
MOSCAMED conspiracy as a culturally constituted interpretive strategy and embodied 
expressive practice through which many Mayans imagine and experience the agrarian 
crisis, the state, and their own political agency.  It bears mention that rumors about 
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MOSCAMED’s dirty secret formed in the wake of genocidal violence and militarization.  
It is a post-revolutionary conspiracy.   
I examine the conspiracy’s appeal by comparing it to the discourses circulated by 
MOSCAMED in its own self-defense and then to agronomists’ explanations for the 
decline in rural agriculture.  After reviewing anthropological perspectives on how to read 
conspiracy politically, I compare the plots, symbolism, and emotions normalized in the 
MOSCAMED conspiracy to those of the revolutionary imaginary of the late 1970s.  
Finally, I compare these results to data collective through interviews with Mayans who 
participate in neo-authoritarian parties. This analysis suggests a perverse reconfiguration 
of the Mayan revolutionary imaginary.  Most Mayans share revolutionary desires and 
emotions and revolutionary commonsense.  Instead of prescribing revolutionary or 
reformist action, however, blaming and hating MOSCAMED articulates the correct 
meanings of conspiracy and victimhood to the appropriate emotional responses of anger, 
frustration and cynicism.  This provides crucial insight into widespread Mayan political 
alignment with neo-authoritarian politics, which goes far beyond these parties’ adoption 
of populist rhetoric. Why do so many Mayans think and feel ‘left’ but vote ‘right’?  I 
contend that the understandings and feelings embedded within the conspiracy index the 
continued effects of state violence on many Mayan’s conceptions and experiences of the 
state, on their sense of collective agency, and, therefore, on the viability of emerging 
political spaces. The same perceptions and emotions that shape the conspiracy also 
inform local political commonsense and political affect, forming what I call 
‘revolutionary pessimism’. This indicates the limits of Guatemalan democracy.  
Revolutionary pessimism constitutes a crucial relay in maintaining neo-authoritarian and 
neoliberal regimes of power, each of which must, still, disfigure the political participation 
of rural Mayans in order to guarantee their reproduction. 
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MAYAN HATRED OF MOSCAMED  
MOSCAMED began work in 1975 in the northern border departments of 
Huehuetenango and the Petén in Guatemala, and in Chiapas, Mexico. Since their arrival, 
MOSCAMED carried out strange and unpleasant activities that were quite visible, and 
quite annoying, to rural Mayans. Mayans saw planes flying over villages and the 
surrounding cropland spraying pesticides and herbicides, in many cases directly on their 
crops and homes.  They saw agents place traps in villager’s cornfields.  MOSCAMED 
also set up quarantine posts along the major highways, stopping buses and searching and 
seizing untreated and thus potentially contaminated fruit.  Worst of all were the sprays.  
Spraying did not happen everywhere, but word soon spread of how awful it was.  
Children exposed to sprays would often begin to cough or vomit.  Beehives would wither 
and die.  And the pesticide damaged various crops, sometimes killing them.  In addition 
to being harmful, the sprays smelled terribly. MOSCAMED does not solicit local opinion 
on their activities, but instead deals directly with the Guatemalan government, who 
officially endorses the program. 
I first heard the suspicious rumors about MOSCAMED on my first trip to work in 
a cornfield.  My friend, a middle class Mayan farmer in his early 60s, told me how, 
“MOSCAMED’s planes flew over the fields, throwing worms everywhere […] Now I 
have to put veneno (poison) in my milpa.”  He instructed me to carefully place three 
granules of the white, strong smelling poison into each shoot of the young corn plant.  “If 
I don’t use poison,” he explained, “the worm eats the roots and the corn falls over.”  
Two years later when I went to do fieldwork on agrarian modernization programs I heard 
the MOSCAMED story repeatedly.  A high school educated young man explained his 
conviction to me, saying, “I know that people think that it is wrong; but I know it is true.  
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One time I saw one of their [MOSCAMED’s] bags lying open in a field; it was full of 
snakes.” His sad expression, lowered shoulders and serious eyes urged me to believe 
him.  MOSCAMED’s arrival coincided with the arrival of new types of agricultural pests.  
Over time, several eyewitness reports surfaced blaming MOSCAMED for bringing them.  
Eventually the truth of these accounts gained widespread acceptance among Mayan 
farmers.  As I began fieldwork in other rural towns, I found that the rumor was something 
agreed upon by the vast majority of Mayans, even most who had been educated.  A 
young farmer explained to me this commonly held knowledge: 
These rats [now] are not like the ones before.  Those were larger, slower—not like 
these.  These ones can walk upside down, or straight up a wall.  I saw them once 
in the coast [coffee plantation], now they are here.  They brought them here to 
make us buy poison.   
The accusations start with infestations of agricultural pests, but do not stop there. 
Although the MOSCAMED story focuses on the spread of pestilence to sell pesticides, 
MOSCAMED’s obvious mis-dealings are read as evidence of the existence of a dense 
nexus of power and profit in which spreading pests and then peddling the cure is simply 
one scam among many.  One farmer told me how “Fertilizers used to work well, but now 
they are expensive and they don’t do anything.  I think that they make them weaker.”  
Farmers also blame chemical companies for the hikes in prices.  Another told me that 
now, “One quintal (100 lb bag) of fertilizer already costs nearly 150 quetzales (about US 
$13), and every year it goes up.  We need the fertilizers, so they keep raising the price.” 
Most farmers also think that pesticide and herbicide producers dilute their products.  “El 
gramoxone” (paraquat), the most commonly used chemical herbicide, “used to leave 
only black soil afterwards.  Now it barely kills the weeds.  They grow taller and stronger 
every year. We have to use more and it works just a little.” Pesticides are also more 
expensive, and are often ineffective against new pests.  Another aspect of the conspiracy 
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holds that seizing fruit is a ploy to benefit the large fruit interests. The people transporting 
fruit on public buses are small farmers, on their way to sell in local markets. Confiscating 
their wares seems like a double standard, too, because, as far as they know, this never 
happens to the large fruit ranches. This leads some to conclude that absconding with 
produce raised by small farmers helps large plantations monopolize the domestic market. 
It is obvious to proponents of this discourse that the government is involved, benefiting 
from it if not running it, and at the very least turning a blind eye. 
The overwhelming majority of rural Mayans I spoke with in Huehuetenango 
believe strongly in the conspiracy, which is most commonly retold by male farmers and 
circulates in an almost unchanged form throughout the region.  Most who believe the 
conspiracy are fully aware of the other explanations, and encounter frequent pressure to 
accept them.  Rural Ladinos by and large find the conspiracy laughable; they see it as 
another example of native superstition.  These divergent perspectives often lead to verbal 
confrontations between exasperated Ladinos and unconvinced Mayans.  Not all Mayans 
subscribe the conspiracy.  Some even work for MOSCAMED.  Non-believing Mayans 
tend to be more formally educated, and sometimes mock the gullibility of believers.  But 
many who believe are high school and even college educated. At least one Mayan who 
works for MOSCAMED claimed to do so primarily as a way to travel to other villages 
and warn them about the consequences of the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA).  The same friend who told me about him also recounted a story about a 
development council meeting where a young Mayan man working for MOSCAMED 
confronted the village representatives, admonishing them to get over their unjustified 
fears about MOSCAMED.  He was interrupted by an older farmer from a remote village 
who told him that he was, “very young to be talking like that,” adding that he was, “like 
a Ladino taking the side of the rich against the indigenous.” 3 
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The conspiracy is knotted up with strong feelings.  Farmers are furious with 
MOSCAMED. When program agents arrived to answer criticisms in the township of San 
Juan, one villager, speaking for the group, said angrily, “We are sick of MOSCAMED!  
We don’t want to know anything about MOSCAMED!  Get out MOSCAMED!  Que se 
vaya MOSCAMED!” Alongside this anger is an ample dose of frustration and 
desperation.  In the primary contexts of its retelling—among community members, 
between community members and outsiders like me—the MOSCAMED conspiracy is a 
sad and serious story about how large corporations defraud defenseless farmers with 
governmental support, and the daily sense of insecurity that this creates. Recounting the 
story typically leads to an awkward silence in which it seemed the teller had left me to 
ponder the staggering injustice of their lives.  I always felt at least a little uncomfortable, 
because there was little to do or say.  Almost inevitably, talk about MOSCAMED’s secret 
mission creates a solemn occasion for reflection on pervasive economic hardships caused 
by the collapse of subsistence farming, the life support of rural communities, a lifestyle 
made increasingly untenable by the shortage in land, the rising cost and decreased 
effectiveness of chemical inputs, and the drop in coffee prices.  MOSCAMED’s activities 
are understood as a central part of a process that has made their economic lives 
increasingly precarious.  
 
MOSCAMED’S OFFICIAL POSTURE 
Of all the governmental programs in Guatemala, MOSCAMED is the least 
popular among rural Mayans.  It is also the most embattled.  Retaliation against it has 
taken various forms.  Last July, dozens of farmers armed with rocks, shovels and 
machetes burned a MOSCAMED control post in the Petén—for the second time.4  Many 
 157 
farmers proudly recounted to me stories of people from nearby townships who had shot 
down several of MOSCAMED’s crop dusting planes.5 Several environmentalist and 
human rights NGOs have produced documents criticizing the program (Tropico Verde 
2004). Recently, a group of 40 border zone townships in Chiapas, Mexico and in 
Huehuetenango formed an organization to oppose MOSCAMED (Soto 2005). 
Indefatigable, MOSCAMED wages public relations warfare, tenaciously insisting 
that it simply and safely combats the fly and that it has never introduced any kind of pest 
into the environment.  Program officials boast that their medfly control efforts are safe, 
getting safer and economically crucial not only for US farmers, but also for Guatemalans 
who want to export to the United States.  MOSCAMED points to their “integrated control 
method,” which combines sterile release, cultural controls, and pesticides, including, until 
at least 2001, a malathion-poisoned bait (USDA-APHIS 1996).  Previously, they 
defended malathion use, saying the health effects were negligible if administered 
correctly and in small concentrations.  Recently, MOSCAMED has emphasized non-
malathion techniques—particularly the release of sterilized medflies and new and safer 
pesticides (USDA-APHIS 2001).  
But MOSCAMED’s defense is obfuscatory.  Previously, MOSCAMED admitted 
to side effects of malathion for plants and certain bee species, but claimed that there were 
no health effects on humans.  The US Center for Disease Control, however, cites serious 
health risks, and recommends taking extensive precautions to avoid contamination, 
including that people not enter fields sprayed with malathion for twelve hours after a 
spraying, and six days if they are going to work (Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease 2003). MOSCAMED was notoriously noncompliant with these safety standards. 
For over twenty years, MOSCAMED sprayed malathion almost indiscriminately, in 
many cases directly on people’s homes, which, in rural villages are often located within 
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sprayed fields, and without informing the inhabitants of the safety risks or necessary 
precautions.  Although they publicly claim to no longer use malathion, nowhere in their 
official publications does MOSCAMED indicate when, and how much the new 
techniques or insecticides have replaced the chemical (USAID-APHIS 1996).6  And, if 
new chemicals truly offer risk free alternatives to malathion, why is malathion still used 
in the US and in Mexico (by MOSCAMED) for fruitfly control?7  Although 
MOSCAMED shifts the blame, Mayan farmers continue to complain about sicknesses 
caused by sprays, whatever they may contain (USDA-APHIS 2002).8  Regardless, 
MOSCAMED calculates that some negative health and environmental consequences are 
acceptable because of the potential repercussions for the US fruit industry, which would 
lose a projected $1.5 billion annually if the medfly became established in the US (USDA-
APHIS 2002). 
Their position on malathion aside, the claim that farmers receive economic 
benefits from the program seems only to apply to large farmers who can afford to treat 
their crops, and thus export them, while small farmers cannot, and often have their fruit 
confiscated when they try to transport it to regional markets.  It seems likely that small 
producers would be able to export more fruit if the US ended the MOSCAMED program 
and lifted import restrictions on untreated fruit—both of which (with the program costing 
$35 million in tax dollars annually) create an artificial competitive advantage for US fruit 
producers.    It seems reasonable to call for an independent study of the long-term health, 
economic, and environmental effects of MOSCAMED’s current and past medfly control 
practices on rural Mayan farmers, as well as of their safety procedures.  So does the idea 
of a popular referendum on their program, following the mandate of International Labor 
Organization Treaty 169, which recognizes the right of indigenous populations to be 
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consulted regarding activities that affect the environment. MOSCAMED officials 
staunchly oppose both of these measures.9 
 
EXPERT DISCOURSES ON THE AGRARIAN CRISIS 
The dominant explanation for the crisis in rural agriculture comes from agrarian 
and development experts.  Agronomists include both Ladinos and Mayans, who are most 
often male and middle class.  They describe the current problems as the combined effect 
of unsustainable farming practices combined with green revolution technologies gone 
miserably awry. This explanation focuses on the history of land use, population growth, 
and the introduction of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.10 In the early days there was 
plenty of land, and that farmers used slash and burn techniques.  After a few years, 
farmers would simply switch plots, letting the first one recuperate. When there were 
enough people to fill all the land, farmers could no longer leave land fallow long enough 
for it to regain its nutrients.  As the land slowly lost its strength to intensive cropping, the 
population rose, and the confluence of these factors led to food shortages in the dry 
summer months (Falla 1972). These experts also point out that un-terraced land on steep 
inclines—common in the highlands—is more likely to lose soil nutrients during the hard 
downpours of the rainy season.   
In what is now a frequent refrain, agronomists describe the diminishing 
effectiveness of the new agricultural inputs.  They especially oppose the substitution of 
chemical for organic fertilizers.  Over time, they explain, as farmers used chemicals 
exclusively, the soil lost micro-elements necessary for plant growth.  Herbicides, they 
note, also substituted for hoeing nitrogen rich weeds into the soil.  They also fault 
individual farmers for not diversifying their crops, or using organic methods, and for 
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continuing counterproductive “traditional” practices, such as burning their fields before 
planting, which removes more nutrients from the soil.  New pests are understood to be a 
result of adaptive resistance to pesticides, or an effect of the depletion of soil nutrients 
(cfa Morales and Perfecto 2000). If mentioned at all, agronomists attribute the steady 
increase in the price of inputs to economic laws of supply and demand. In this 
perspective, population growth caused land shortage that created the food security 
problems that required the introduction of new technologies, whose long-term effects 
were unknown.  Agricultural changes required new adjustments, which the farmers, for 
whatever reason (usually assumed to be cultural), refuse to make.  Never do agronomists 
mention accusations of MOSCAMED, or of any sabotage.  Agronomists often present 
this explanation as an alternative to the conspiracy.  
 
RUMOR, CONSPIRACY AND POLITICAL IMAGINARIES 
Anthropologists treat conspiracy theories as culturally constructed expressive 
practices used to process concerns and anxieties. Many read the proliferation of 
conspiracy, political rumor and the transformation of supernatural belief in postcolonial 
societies as responses to contradictions of capitalist globalization and neo-colonial 
victimization (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Masquelier 2000, 2001; Weiss 1996; 
Hoskins 2002; White 1993, 1997). Among the most common recurring themes and 
images in rumors and conspiracies in postcolonial societies are of vampiric, murderous 
and cannibalistic states and the victimized bodies of their citizens (Gescheire 1993, Shaw 
1993, Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, White 1993, 1997, Masquelier 2001, Weiss 1996, 
Kroeger 2003, Butt 2005).  Butt observes that “In almost all cases [ ] the assaulted, 
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dismembered, or decapitated human body comes to stand for the inchoate forces that 
threaten the wider body politic” (417). 
Stories of cannibalism, AIDS infection, suckers of human blood and fat, 
beheadings, demonic technologies—these potent and suggestive symbols, anthropologists 
argue, are typically seen as condensed expressions of local worldviews, commentaries on 
victimization and expressions of powerlessness, cynicism and mystification (Silverstein 
2003).  Recent work sees these theories as evidence of local agency, in the form of the 
ability to see through complex power relations (Butt 2005).   However, this perspective 
would have difficulty explaining the circulation of the MOSCAMED conspiracy, in 
which suspicion coexists with political support for neo-authoritarian regimes.  Regardless 
of whether they confirm or deny agency to their adherents, or see rumors and 
conspiracies as either true or false, most political readings of conspiracy and rumor 
reduce questions of politics and political agency to ideology or discourse.  Such 
conceptions miss the fact that the body, and not just the mind, has been the target of 
power—attempts to limit and regulate and invest its conduct (Foucault 1979). Several 
investigations examine rumor, conspiracy and supernatural belief systems for traces of 
the intertwined shifts of the affective as well as conceptual landscape generated at 
particular historical moments in relation to regimes of power (Kroeger 2003, Stewart and 
Harding 2003, Sigel 2006). In this essay I show that analysis of conspiracy along these 
lines can complement other ethnographic and historiographic methods deepen existing 
understandings of national political movements.   
 
GUATEMALAN POLITICAL CULTURE: GROUNDS FOR SUSPICION 
Rural Mayans have many reasons to suspect and mistrust collusions between the 
Guatemalan state and big business.  Guatemalan Mayans’ historical experience of 
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victimization is exceptional.  As in most Latin American countries, independence gave 
way to the internal colonization of indigenous groups, processes intensified by the 
creation of modern capitalist economies in the 19th century.  In addition to forced labor, 
low wages, and inhuman living conditions that led to sickness, Mayan and poor Ladino 
laborers were regularly subjected to pesticide intoxication on large plantations (Melville 
and Melville 1971, 195-5; 262-3).11 Today most Mayans live in poverty or extreme 
poverty, and are regularly subjected to humiliating discrimination. The twentieth century 
promised change, but brought more devastation.  Optimism among many Mayans for the 
revolutionary movement was crushed when the now-infamous genocidal scorched earth 
campaign and subsequent militarization made death, fear and insecurity nearly inevitable 
facts of their daily lives.  Economic devastation that followed compounded the effects of 
the counterinsurgency, as have the privatization of state services, inflation, and the 
collapse of the world coffee market. Postwar Guatemalan governments promise reform, 
but ignore the Accords, protect war criminals, fund death squads, and indulge in 
corruption while the rural sector plunges into chaos. While poverty and crime have 
increased, the government takes little action to help, as was evidenced by the 
government’s completely ineffective response to Hurricane Stan.12  
This nauseating mix of exploitation, marginalization, and humiliation parallels a 
growing turmoil in Mayan communities. Thousands must migrate northward to find 
work. Violent crime is commonplace and witchcraft accusations are on the rise, as is mob 
justice for suspected witches and thieves.  Increases in alcoholism and a rash of farmer 
suicides index a rise in individual suffering.  In this context, it is understandable that rural 
Mayan farmers feel vulnerable and seek reasonable explanations for the agrarian crisis. 
Additionally, the questions left unanswered by MOSCAMED’s confusing and 
contradictory activities raise more doubts.  Why did new worms arrive not long after 
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MOSCAMED planes began to fly over their fields?  Why are the children getting sick 
and why are plants dying if MOSCAMED’s sprays are safe?  That these are simply 
coincidences is unbelievable. MOSCAMED’s record of dissimulation further fuels 
Mayan distrust. The agronomists’ discourse provides a compelling explanation for the 
mechanics of the crisis, but does not satisfy the concerns expressed by the conspiracy.  
Can it really just be bad luck that every chemical input works less than it was supposed to 
and now costs up to twenty times as much as it did when it was first introduced?  
Establishing the reasonability of distrust, however, does not explain the specific 
elements of the MOSCAMED conspiracy.  First, the conspiracy is rife with highly 
suggestive images: disgusting worms, dead crops and livestock, children’s wasted bodies, 
airplanes flying overhead, executing schemes hatched in secret back room deals between 
elites, executing a highly sophisticated scheme with state-of-the-art technology.   Mayans 
are figured as victims “in the know,” fully aware, yet simply, frustratingly, unable to end 
the assault.  Second, examining the questions the MOSCAMED conspiracy explicitly and 
implicitly puts to the other explanations brings to light a consistent set of interpretive 
preoccupations.  MOSCAMED does not explain the agrarian decline, but simply claims 
to have nothing to do with it.  The agronomists’ explanation only tells how the science 
behind the process works. Their skepticism clarifies what many Mayans feel strongly is 
missing in the other explanations: an accounting for the occulted activities of big 
corporations and the state as well as the human motivations that have made the agrarian 
crisis possible. Mayans see selfish motives at the root of the crisis. They want to know 
who is responsible and who benefits. Finding these motivations organizes and makes 
sense of their experiences in a convincing way, telling why things are the way that they 
are.   
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The conspiracy fills in what Mayans see as blank spaces in the other versions. 
Mayans I spoke with do not necessarily or completely reject the other explanations; 
rather they oppose to them to the extent that they attempt to substitute for the recognition 
of underhanded profit motives. Third, the conspiracy prescribes a very different type of 
emotional response than the competing explanations. Where MOSCAMED’s public 
relations campaign prescribes calm, trust, and acceptance, the conspiracy incites worry, 
fear of violation, and anger.   
The interpretive maneuvers and emotional tone of the MOSCAMED conspiracy 
reproduce key elements of the revolutionary imaginary—the most powerful and 
explosive conceptual frame through which many rural Mayans interpreted their political 
reality and formulated revolutionary political identities over the past six decades. This 
association seems warranted due to striking similarities in content between the two 
discourses and the emotions that they prescribe.  First, they share similar plot structures, 
characters, themes and symbols.  They also both normalize certain understandings of the 
possibilities inherent in Mayans in conflict with state power.  Furthermore, both enact 
and prescribe similar affective responses and types of feelings in conjunction with these 
encounters. These similarities, and the fact that MOSCAMED emerged in the post-
revolutionary, post-genocidal moment make conspiracy an ideal vantage point from 
which to evaluate changes in Mayan political common sense over the last several 
decades.  This line of argument raises an obvious question: if the MOSCAMED rumor 
reveals that Mayans are still invested in revolutionary commonsense and desire, why do 
so many now support neo-authoritarian regimes at the very moment when their political 
opinions and actions seem—at least when viewed from the outside—to make a 
difference?  
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As described in the first chapter, by late 1980, revolutionary dreams had 
captivated many highland Mayans.  Thousands of communities formed alliances with the 
guerrilla; plantation-owning Ladinos feared for their lives; newspapers and other means 
of communication were temporarily hijacked and filled with revolutionary manifestos; 
guerrilla factions were at odds over who would lead the country after the victory.  The 
government’s days seemed numbered.  Right at that moment, the army descended on the 
countryside, engulfing it in violence.  
During the war, massive state violence dramatically symbolized the state’s ability 
and willingness to destroy the bodies, lives and communities of hundreds of thousands of 
rural Guatemalans—mostly Mayans.  The creation of unprecedented surveillance 
structures maximized the effects of ultra-violent public spectacles of torture and 
indiscriminate mass-murder, bringing the threat of this brand of barbarity directly into the 
most intimate spaces of family and community.  The establishment of military barracks in 
each town and the creation of the civil patrol—which forced every adult male in rural 
communities to patrol for the guerrilla or be killed themselves by the army for abetting 
subversives—turned Guatemala into a large prison, one where the guards were also the 
prisoners, drawing the civilian population deeper into the conflict (Smith 1990). It soon 
became universally known among the population that the state was more than willing and 
capable of killing everyone.  Retribution was an undeniable certainty. By demonstrating 
their power, the violence and separated the guerrilla from their village bases.  La 
violencia created a deep sense of powerlessness and overwhelming despair, convincing 
the population that political alternatives were impossible (REHMI 1998, CEH 1999). 
Words inadequately hint at the suffering and misery that this strategy created. The aim of 
state violence was to convince people that their resistance was futile, to make them 
accept the constant suffering and humiliation of every day life in poverty and social 
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exclusion, a daily torture that is the flipside of the dominant social order of racial and 
class privilege.  From this perspective, la violencia was a resounding success. 
There is a need to think through the role of violence in Guatemalan political 
culture, and in shaping rural Mayan politics specifically, outside the frame of the “culture 
of terror” hypothesis.  Although this is a vital corrective to conservative discourses that 
ignore the role of violence in society, it leaves Mayans in the victim role and does not 
acknowledge substantial, if limited, changes in Guatemalan political culture since the 
Peace Accords. This nuanced analysis is necessary if these criticisms of Guatemalan 
democracy wish to be taken seriously in public debates about Guatemala. Understanding 
contemporary Mayan political identities requires examining how current selective 
violence against social movements in the context of general impunity to affect a political 
imaginary that was interrupted by counterinsurgent repression, and how this nexus shapes 
evolving Mayan perceptions of and feelings about the possibilities for efficacious 
political agency in Guatemala’s newly opened democratic spaces.  
In what follows, I analyze the symbolic content of and emotional investments in 
the MOSCAMED conspiracy and situate it alongside other ethnographic data as a way of 
read transformations in the commonsense understandings, narratives and related 
emotional states central to Mayan political subjectivity in Huehuetenango. I pay 
particular attention to the manner in which Mayans imagine and feel the state and their 
own political agency.  
 
REVOLUTIONARY PESSIMISM 
Analyzing shifts in political subjectivity requires careful attention to the ways in 
which widely held state fantasies arising from particular patterns of state activity re-work 
crucial narratives of political identity and affective dispositions surrounding politics, 
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crucial in the sense that these delineate—at least temporarily—the politically possible. As 
Aretxaga (2000) explains, understanding the politics of imagining the state requires more 
than pointing to a particular imaginary, but showing “how the state as a phantasmatic 
reality operates within a political imaginary to constitute political reality and political 
experience and to produce concrete effects.  Aretxaga emphasizes that states exist, 
“through a world of fantasy thoroughly narrativized and imbued with affect, fear, and 
desire, that make it, in fact, a plausible reality” (52).   
I argue that the MOSCAMED conspiracy indexes how past and present forms of 
state violence have shaped Mayan conceptions and feelings about the meaning of 
democracy.  It embodies Mayan understandings of social power—in this case the nexus 
of capitalism and the state—as well as their estimates of their ability to act politically in 
relationship to these imagined entities. However, central differences distinguish the 
MOSCAMED conspiracy theory from the revolutionary narrative.  Much like the 
revolutionary narrative, the MOSCAMED conspiracy expresses a deep-seated distrust for 
the state and for the rich, a mistrust that seems to be shared by a great majority of Mayans 
in the region.  It caricatures them as self-interested liars, without scruples or limitations 
on their ability or willingness to sacrifice poor Mayans to increase their wealth.  
Significantly, Mayans appear in the conspiracy as an oppressed collectivity, recognizable 
by a shared victim status.  For Mayans, political economic injustice is inseparable from 
racial injustice.  However, instead of positing injustice as an impetus for a reversal of 
power relations through confronting powerful companies or the state, as is done in the 
revolutionary narrative, the MOSCAMED conspiracy does not discuss alternatives.  Of 
central importance is the power attributed to the state and to popular movements in each 
narrative, as well as the affective dispositions that they articulate.  The state, and the 
social order it maintains, is imagined as an all encompassing and insuperable force, 
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always ready to step in and humiliate social movements and their participants—the 
people.  The subject position of the enraged and rebellious “insurgent” is replaced with 
the subject position of “victim,” who is also enraged, but at the same time helpless, 
frustrated, and passive in relation to the powerful state.  
Reading the MOSCAMED conspiracy as evidence of a pessimistic poetic helps 
make sense of somewhat contradictory ethnographic data.  Oddly, interviews with and 
observations of politically active Sampedranos who previously sympathized with or even 
actively participated in leftist movements, and who have since the Peace Accords 
affiliated themselves with right wing parties, reveal that they generally still endorse the 
political goals of the left.  When I asked community leaders what they think about 
agrarian reform, they all say that it is a good idea, “But,” one was quick to add, “It can’t 
be done.  We tried for years.  The finqueros are too strong.”  I was surprised during my 
research at the number of times that political leaders on the right or non-politically 
involved community leaders would espouse revolutionary discourses, often bemoaning 
that the country is run by a small group of rich, and corrupt businessmen who keep 
Mayans “under their boots.”  At the same time as these revolutionary desires boil under 
the surface they are smothered under a heavy cloud of pessimism. A Mayan mayoral 
candidate for a right wing party in the 2003 elections explained his perspective on politics 
like this: 
They want to fix Guatemala, but with each attempt, it is sinking deeper.  When a 
child is born, they already owe money to the United States.  They are never going 
to be able to pay that debt.  Have you heard of the Bishop Juan Gerardi? (pause) 
He published a book about the violence. We studied this in my class.  It’s called 
Nunca Mas [REHMI].  Never Again.  What does that mean?  It means that 
Guatemala is never, never, never going to change.  The diputados (legislators) 
want to raise their salaries and what do they do?  They don’t do anything.  And 
then they killed Gerardi, for being in favor of the poor.  There’s never a 
government that worries about the people.  Here there’s a hospital but there isn’t 
any medicine.  They prescribe [medicine] but you have to go buy it and there’s no 
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money.  And there are many towns where there isn’t even a hospital.  Only the 
church helps with the hospital here.  That’s why the government in Guatemala is 
atrasado [backwards, behind]. 
Nunca mas means never again.  The title Nunca Mas was originally intended to be a 
renunciation of la violencia, an unequivocal resolution to never permit what happened in 
Guatemala to happen again, in Guatemala or anywhere else.  Hearing the intended 
meaning twisted by a Mayan who had taken a course on the subject into a definitive 
statement of the inevitability of oppressive government left me speechless. Although 
every Mayan I spoke to supported the Peace Accords, regardless of party affiliation, few 
of them thought the government had made any effort to comply with them.  When I asked 
the same man what he thought about the Peace Accords, he was equally pessimistic.  
Peace, he said: 
Was just on paper with the signing of the government and the URNG.  The armed 
conflict ended, but true peace… it doesn’t exist.  There’s already violence, and 
other things, massacres after the Accords.  There’s still racism and a lot of gangs.   
 
Another interview with a different community leader reiterated this sentiment when I 
asked him if he thought the government had upheld its side of the bargain in 
implementing the Peace Accords: 
A: Well, since the signing of the peace the government has not made good on 
them.  They take almost a part and the majority of it they only maybe do 50%.  
Q: do you think they want to comply, but are unable or that they simply don’t 
want to? 
A: In part it’s how they are.  What I mean is that everything is in their hands.  If 
they want to, they do it.  If they don’t, well, they don’t do it.  They do whatever 
they want.  Just like in the period [FRG regime] that just passed.  Instead of 
working they were more corrupt.  That is where they don’t make good on the 
Peace Accords, very little. 
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Political power is in the hands of the powerful.  They act on reforms at their whim.  They 
do what they want. This pessimistic political outlook was best encapsulated in an 
interaction with a former guerrilla sympathizer, now an active supporter of the FRG:    
Q: Do you think that there are political parties that are in favor of the people?  
A: Yes, the party URNG.  That’s the guerrilla party.   
Q: Then why are you in a different party? 
A. I have always worked for the parties for the poor.  But they never win.  Even 
good guerrilla leaders change parties, it’s always for personal interest.  
Q:  So you were struggling before, but now you want to win?  
A: Look, I’m illiterate.  Ever since my childhood I have never known regular pay.  
I worked from 7 am to 5pm for 40 centavos every day.  Really suffering! When I 
got married, I worked for two months in the coast in a finca.  In two months I 
barely saved 20 quetzales.  I was malnourished, my shirt was ripped and my pants 
were ruined.  That is the life of an indio, of a peasant. Now I am saving the money 
I make helping the party.  If God gives me health, I can make money the entire 
four years.   
Q:  What changes do you think would be necessary in the government of 
Guatemala?   
A:  To change the government?  That’s difficult.  He is in his power. Now there 
are a lot of organizations.  Many go to protest in front of the president’s house.  
But he, what pain does it give him?  He is there in his power, just listening.  He 
never makes good.   
Q: So, you don’t think that changing the government is possible? 
A: It’s impossible. 
 
Again, power is in the hands of the few, rich people and rulers who oppose 
reform.  These are not exceptional sentiments.  Almost no one I met—including many 
party higher-ups—explained their support for right wing parties in terms of agreeing with 
their ideologies or their plans for national development.  Instead, they cited concrete 
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immediate, often personal, benefits.  In fact, most were quite critical of all these parties, 
including their own, with corruption being their primary concern.  Even though people 
say they vote for projects, and see a great increase in projects since the signing of the 
Accords, most village leaders see the real number of projects as minimal.  The man who 
provided a novel interpretation of Nunca Mas related a locally held truth about what 
happens to the money earmarked for projects: They have agreements between big 
businessmen and there, between a few people, they take advantage of the goods of the 
state.  When I asked if he thought the projects that came from the state were sufficient, he 
said that: 
They are few.  Really, the projects do benefit the population, but in the first place, 
what they do there, I realized that they change the budgets, with all the people that 
work in the institution.  The money stays in the middle.  For example, the asphalt 
here in San Pedro [on the road connecting the town to the highway], they’ve 
inaugurated the project twice but there still is no asphalt.  
 
As for their feelings about the left, they do not unilaterally blame the guerrilla for 
failing and endangering them during the war, and do not view it as a fundamentally racist 
institution to be avoided.  Neither are they afraid to join leftist organizations.  They 
simply do not see the point anymore.  In their perspective, the guerrilla is now just 
another political party, with nice ideas, perhaps, but unlikely to win, and even less likely 
to change the country.  They lost, and that is that.  For many, it is so basic a fact it is 
hardly worth discussing.  Twenty-five years ago, political desire hit a wall, and then was 
forced to choose between obviously flawed alternatives, each aimed at short-term gains.  
This sheds a different light on the oft-heard refrain, popular among leftist groups, that 
people blindly sell their votes in return for projects, personal favors, or cash.  It seems 
more likely that this choice is made not out of ignorance, but based on the knowledge that 
all parties are crooked and that reform is a dream.  One might as well get oneself 
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whatever one can out of the situation.  To do otherwise is to lose out on the only benefits 
that politics brings.  
These testimonials, which echo the emotions and narrative structure encapsulated 
in the MOSCAMED conspiracy, articulate an implicit understanding between the state 
and the populace regarding the limits to democracy.  This understanding generates an 
affective force field marking the line beyond which democracy must not tread.  It also 
registers the futility many Mayans feel regarding their power to change the situation. 
These built in limits are perhaps the most important, if almost completely invisible, 
feature of the imagination of democracy by among many rural Mayans in the post war 
period, influencing, to a large degree, the way that they engage in politics.  The 
ethnographic data presented in this chapter suggests that what is different now is how 
contemporary revolutionary sentiments of mistrust and anger articulate pervasive 
pessimism and a profound sense of impotence, foreclosing in the popular imagination the 
possibility of revolutionary political change. These interpretive inclinations and affective 
dispositions suggest that supposedly neutral attempts to enforce the law have the 
additional effect of reproducing the specter of state as an immovable force in the 
imaginations of many rural Guatemalans.  Many Mayans imagine a vampiric, predatory 
state with a fixed intentionality and unmatchable strength whose violence goes 
unchecked.  This predatory state is the narrative backdrop against which current state 
violence is interpreted, allowing the re-inscription of previously understood limits in the 
evolving political context of the post Accords period.  Contemporary political cynicism is 
the vestige of past state violence, its continued effects. 
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CONCLUSION: RE-IMAGINING MAYAN AGENCY 
Mayan political imaginaries are fundamentally thwarted. Most Mayans share 
revolutionary worldviews and a deep desire to end what they see as racially coded 
exploitation and exclusion driven by a ruthless capitalism.  Yet for most Mayans, these 
desires are accompanied by an unshaking belief in an omnipotent and sinister state.  
These persistent state fantasies are not “false,” they constitue reality, endowing the social 
order with an aura of inevitability.  The knowledge that these issues are still off of the 
political agenda undermines gestures towards peace and social reform.  These effects are 
reinforced by targeted violence against social movements, which triggers memory of past 
violence for those old enough to remember the war, convincing many rural Mayan 
leaders that pursuing radical reform is much more dangerous than staying inside the lines.  
Such attempts would eventually go nowhere, at best; and obedience might even bring 
some rewards.  Violence today no longer aims to incite mass panic, but to remind people 
that meaningful political change is just an idle fantasy in contradistinction from the 
unquestionable power of the state.  Few Mayans believe—even remotely—in the power 
of the vote.  What I mean is that they believe that they could vote however they like, but 
that, in the end, it will not matter.  Of course, this limit defies the spirit of democracy, 
whose only acceptable limit is, supposedly, the ability for human beings to imagine a 
version of a brighter political future that at least a plurality of the population can agree 
upon.  This is not to say that past errors and existing racism on the left do not serve as 
obstacles for Mayans who are otherwise reform-minded, only that they are insufficient, 
taken together, to explain the contemporary Mayan conservatism. 
Ernesto Laclau (1979) argues that ability of populist discourses to absorb 
opposition relies on including oppositional discourses and demands in a social movement 
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that defends ‘the people’ and the power bloc (172).  Attempts to articulate “democratic 
interpellations”—by which he means popular political desires and ideologies—to the 
dominant class project, he suggests, must constrain these same impulses, which are 
inherently threatening to existing hierarchies.  But how does this constraint work?  Laclau 
mentions state repressive measures, but does not describe how this renders one populist 
interpellation more effective than another for particularly situated actors at a given 
historical moment (184).  This would require situating populist policies within a broader 
genealogy of attempts by a colonial regime of power to reshape subaltern political 
behaviors and imaginaries.  In Guatemala, populist rhetoric accompanies continued 
repression.  In this context, oppositional commonsense articulates not to political 
obedience, alongside a pervasive sense of political defeat.  These conditions draw our 
attention to the ways that state power in postcolonial societies often depends on their 
ability to generate the disempowered political affect of their citizenry. Affect, in this case 
more than ideology, must be seen as the decisive terrain of political struggle.   
Feelings of powerlessness such as those embedded in the MOSCAMED 
conspiracy and expressed in explicit discussions of politics, while durable and effective, 
cannot be frozen in place forever; they require constant reinforcement, restatements of 
the law that pre-empt or respond desire that exceeds the dominant order.  When I first 
heard about the national police and military’s violent response to free trade protesters last 
March, I thought that the response was far exaggerated, a careless, and potentially 
counterproductive, exercise of power.  But it also seems possible that, among certain 
circles of military and government officials, there is an understanding that the 
Guatemalan state needs to violently overreact from time to time; it needs to show that it is 
still as ruthless and capable as before in order to reinforce the commonly known fact that 
openly opposing governmental policies leads nowhere.  This common-sense logic is an 
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important piece of background knowledge that helps maintain politics as usual in 
Guatemala.  It is a key nexus in a vicious circle:  It is the lack of opposition that allows 
selective repression of social movements to continue.  
The concern now is that in the new neoliberal world order, where the market is 
the only valid measure, abysmal standards for human rights, and the daily suffering that 
these low standards help maintain, have become cemented as the new normal.  “Good 
enough” human rights records—read rife with abuses, but on the “right” side of the war 
on terror and trade issues—are becoming increasingly commonplace.  Not only have 
countries outside of the Middle East left the radar screen, but the US’s renewed tolerance 
for human rights abuses (especially those made in the name of protecting US interests) 
has substantially eroded its credibility as a champion of human rights.  Where does this 
leave countries like Guatemala?  Guatemalan elites—both military and neoliberal—
perceive postwar social movements as threatening much more than an abstract legality.  
The values that these groups promote, and, more importantly, the desires for a different 
life that their discourses connect to at the grassroots, are fundamentally incompatible with 
the neocolonial and neoliberal social order.  That rural Mayans would begin to clamor for 
meaningful democracy is unacceptable to most Guatemalan elites.  The Guatemalan 
government is currently experimenting with selective use of violence against social 
movements in hopes of establishing a precedent for the legitimate use of force, using the 
tortured logic in which terror is seen as defending rule based democracy, and civilization 
itself.  But lest we lapse into hopelessness, we should consider the following.   
Violence is one lynchpin of Guatemalan society; but it is also a source of 
tensions.  On the one hand, violence is necessary to reproduce the Guatemalan social 
order, reaffirming both the “state’s” totality and brutality in the minds of the rural poor 
who might otherwise oppose it.  On the other, each use of violence generates refusals of 
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previously acceptable uses of force. Unlike the past, news about state violence causes 
reproach from solidarity networks and influential donor nations. Changes in Guatemalan 
political culture, part of larger shifts in global governance, make the wholesale return to 
counterinsurgent tactics against peaceful movements improbable.  Even as they advocate 
low intensity warfare against social movements throughout Latin America and around the 
world, it seems unlikely that the US would condone or support the genocidal policies of 
the past.  Although the Guatemalan social order would be more vulnerable than ever to a 
widely supported non-violent political movement, or an electoral coup, many rural 
Mayans remain convinced of its impossibility.  
 
 
                                                
NOTES 
1 While many Mayans conflate human rights with the office of human rights in their 
village, and specifically oppose the office of human rights’ efforts to let local criminals 
free, the other ideas about human rights are not controversial, although public discourses 
on these matters, as discussed in the chapter on historical memory, are limited.  
2 These authors make the additional distinction between conspiracy theory and “occult 
cosmology” by which they mean a local conception of how the world works, with a 
conspiracy theory explainin¡g perhaps only a small part of this world.  They also contend 
that conspiracy theories can contain or reveal occult cosmologies, which I hold is the case 
in the MOSCAMED conspiracy, which reveals changes in a revolutionary poetic.    
3I am thankful to Ajb’ee Jimenez for sharing these ethnographic details.  
4 Lopez, Rigoberto Escobar. Prensa Libre. July 31, 2004.  “Queman Puesto de Control de 
MOSCAMED” 
5 This occurs every so often.  See Julio Lara. Prensa Libre.  July 27, 2005. “Avioneta se 
estrella en cerro en Huehuetenango”. 
6 Their environmental analysis in 2001 claims that Spinosad will be integrated in to their 
previous integrated control method as described in 1996 EA, which includes malathion.    
7 Some groups still have doubts regarding the environmental effects of the new 
insecticides, and points to discrepancies between the Guatemalan Environmental 
Ministry’s report and the actual practices of the program.  Available online at 
www.tropicoverde.org/BoletinMoscamed/efectos_del_programa_moscamed.htm 
8 With regards to its health effects, MOSCAMED admits that, “hypersensitive humans 
experience toxicological symptoms and signs at dosage levels much lower than those that 
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are required to produce the same symptoms in the majority of the population,” but adds 
that they “constitute only a small portion of the total population,’ and that they are “not 
aware of any listing of hypersensitive individuals located in the program areas.” Not only 
does the report refuse to consider that children and elderly or ill persons might qualify as 
“hypersensitive,” it also reassures the reader that these people do not exist, by saying that 
there are none on record.  However as MOSCAMED is well aware, comprehensive 
health data about the population—where medical itself attention is notoriously scarce—is 
non-existent and not organized in a central database to be supposedly checked by the 
supposedly concerned MOSCAMED. 
9 Their arrogance also leads to attempts to silence independent commentary on their 
program.  After a presentation of this paper in Huehuetenango led to a heated discussion 
with MOSCAMED agents regarding malathion use, the regional director of the program, 
Gordon Tween, wrote the following letter to my dean at the University of Texas at 
Austin:  
Dear Mr John Dollard- 
  Recently a gentleman by the name of Nicholas Copeland, allegedly from 
the University of Austin, gave a presentation on the Medfly Program (eradication 
and control of the Mediterranean fruit fly) being conducted by the US 
Government and foreign cooperators in Central America and Mexico (you will 
note the title and other information above).   Needless to say, he was poorly 
informed and even worse, ill prepared to report anything about the subject matter. 
My desire, although it is perhaps not directed to the correct person, is to seek 
some additional information regarding this person and determine if he is really 
affiliated with your university.  If I have sent this to you in error could you please 
refer me to someone who could help. 
My concern is twofold but I am curious to see if this person is a graduate of 
Austin University.   We are planning to move within the next year or so to the 
Austin area.  Our children, who are high achievers will need to think about a 
college and university in the area.   They are studying in a private school right 
now that demands a great deal and they have also learned much from our many 
travels.  They are studying their fourth language, focus intensely on music (cello, 
violin and drums) Adrian is attending Interlochen Music Camp this summer, both 
have started flying lessons, and both do very well academically.  Neither one has 
decided what they would like to pursue but there is an interest in science and 
architecture.  On our minds is where should they consider going to college?  So 
you see my curiosity also has a personal component. 
 Why do I care about the presentation?  I am the Regional Director for this 
program and responsible to you, as a taxpayer, my department, and the US 
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Congress for the judicial use of 35 million dollars annually.  We have a technical 
program that would stagger even the most conservative biologist or academic.  
Our major efforts go into sterile insects as an eradication tool for these kinds of 
pests.   Producing 3 billion sterile insects a week we pride ourselves in what we 
do.   So, if in fact there is a Copeland who has graced your halls he did not profit 
from the experience.  This kind of input only misleads people by providing a lot 
of misinformation we have to correct later on. However, if there is a real interest 
in our program I can provide you a unique and interesting seminar that 
demonstrates how our government protects agriculture while insuring we are good 
stewards of the environment no matter where we find ourselves. 
I would appreciate your assistance and perhaps your department of entomology or 
biology would like to hear first hand about where pest control could be destined to 
go in the future.  Thank you. 
Gordon TweenRegional DirectorUSDA APHIS IS 
U S Embassy-Guatemala 
Luckily, after I explained the situation and presented a copy of the paper I had presented, 
the Dean relaxed and told that he had no intention of stopping my research. 
10 Unlike most historians who write about Guatemala, the agronomists I spoke with—
mostly Ladinos--including leaders of local development institutions, do not usually 
discuss the roots of the land shortage.  For a discussion of changes in the effects of the 
creation of the coffee economy on land tenure in the highlands, see: Handy, Jim. 1984. 
Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala. Boston: South End.; McCreery, David. 1994.  
Rural Guatemala: 1760-1940. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Cambranes, Julio.  
1985. Coffee and Peasants in Guatemala, 1880-1920.  Guatemala City: University of San 
Carlos. 
11 Historical examples abound.  The Melville’s provide an infuriating discussion of 
systematic government complicity with insecticide poisonings on cotton plantations in 
the late 1960s.  There is little reason to assume that these practices have changed or that 
these are limited to Guatemala.  See also Wright, Angus (1990) The Death of Ramon 
Gonzales: the Modern Agricultural Dilemma. Austin: University of Texas Press 
12For a discussion of the insufficiency of the official response to the Stan, a common 





Chapter Four: Greening the Counterrevolution: Rural Cooperative and 
Credit Programs in the 1970s 
 
All these activities aim at awakening the campesinos (peasants) to the possibilities 
of economic, social, and eventually political organization and action.  Our 
expanded cooperatives program goes further, establishing mechanisms for 
organization and action on a large scale. (United States Agency for International 
Development 1970, 8) 
 
This chapter examines the Rural Cooperative Development Program, the 
centerpiece to the agrarian modernization component of the Rural Development Program 
of 1970 and 1975.  In this chapter, and the next three, I examine how this program 
emerged and operated within a regime of colonial governmentality, by which I mean I 
examine how this modern technology of power was deployed to secure spatial and 
ideological control over Mayans in the rural highlands.  The first section reviews state 
agrarian policy after the Counterrevolution.  The second section examines the planning of 
the Rural Credit and Cooperative Program (RCCP) by members of US Agency for 
International Development USAID, the US State Department, members of the 
International Development Foundation, other assembled “experts”, (including 
anthropologists), and, of course, officials from the US and Guatemalan governments.   
Using official documents, some of which are de-classified, I draw attention to the 
fundamental assumptions of the key narratives that surrounded the program, and the fears 
and optimism that these programs generated among policymakers.  Then, using the 
terminal report of the USAID regional director and the director of the cooperative 
program, I describe the fate of the program.  In the conclusion, I argue that one of the 
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primary effects of the cooperative program was to extend the counterinsurgency by 
generating optimism among state and military planners that there was a technological 
way of resolving the problem of peasant revolt without redistributionist policies.  This 
naïve inflexibility helped justify the continuation of violent repression of between 
guerrilla forces, which led to increased participation in the guerrilla movement and ended 
in genocide.  
 
AGRARIAN POLITICS UNDER THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP 1954-1969 
Without a doubt, Guatemala’s rural Mayan population felt the sting of the 
Counterrevolution. The new president Castillo Armas went about undoing every aspect of 
the legacy of his defeated predecessor, Jacobo Arbenz.  He illegalized both labor and 
peasant unions, branding them both as ‘communist’ while making communism itself a 
crime. Campesinos that had settled on expropriated land were evicted (Melville and 
Melville 1971, 122). 1   Cooperatives founded under the Arbenz regime were banned.  
The National Agrarian Bank, which gave loans to small farmers, was also closed. 
Agricultural production went down dramatically (123).2  It would almost seem that the 
Castillo Armas government was almost going out of its way to prove to the planter class 
that it had no concern for the peasantry, such was its anti-communist zeal.  But such a 
stance was untenable in practice.  The state had to make some gesture made towards the 
agrarian question, or so it seemed to appear.  Sidestepping the entire question of agrarian 
reform, Castillo Armas started a colonization program in the Petén, focused on two 
agrarian zones in currently unoccupied territories.3 Participants were sought from the 
rural poor.  The lands, cut out of pure jungle, were very poor, with only a small layer of 
topsoil.  They were also quite isolated from the rest of Guatemalan society, making 
market access difficult; and they were not large enough to meet the huge demand.  And, 
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due to the fact that the Guatemalan elite were not willing to pay enough taxes to fund the 
rural development programs for the poor, preferring spending on security, these programs 
were systematically underfunded, despite the fact that the US gave $2,400,000 (134). The 
zones were a failure. Alongside the agrarian zones there was some governmental land 
redistribution; but these levels were small, and nothing compared to the ongoing rates of 
evictions.  In all, these attempts seemed little more than a diversion, designed to create 
plausible deniability, than a comprehensive agrarian policy.   
When Ydígoras Fuentes took over the presidency after the assassination of 
Castillo Armas in 1957, little about this general pattern of neglect seemed likely to 
change.  He was hand-selected by the US, mainly for his willingness to let the US use 
Guatemala as a launching pad for an invasion of Cuba.4 There proposed agrarian policy 
was heavily criticized by congressmen from the DC, for lack of attention to the “social 
function of the land.”  Nevertheless, in 1960, a four-fold plan was announced, the most 
significant part of which was the establishment of the National Institute for Agrarian 
Transformation (INTA).  INTA’s job was to administer the distribution of idle lands, but 
defined these lands in such a way as to render the operation meaningless.  There was little 
change from the agrarian laws of Armas, under the General Directory of Agrarian 
Affairs, (DGAA) (148). The Minister of Agriculture under Ydígoras, Peralta Azurdia, 
took charge of the DGAA and the National Fincas, which had been expropriated under 
Arbenz, and that Castillo Armas had returned to their previous owners. Instead of 
partitioning the remaining 123 fincas to needy peasants, Ydígoras gave wealthy 
businessmen and ranchers the task of managing the lands.  They distributed about 10% of 
the lands to peasants, and the rest went to finance government debt, most of which was 
owed to the US for an initial loan made by the Eisenhower administration to the Armas 
government (150). DC and PR opposition to these decisions was ignored, as were 
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peasant’s heartfelt petition to purchase the lands.  When Crisostomo Castillo took over 
the DGAA, he pushed the sale of national lands to the middle class because, “Native 
peasants lack sufficient preparation, laboriousness, and the spirit of initiative” to merit 
them or work them effectively (150). The result was favoritism in sales at ridiculously 
low rates.   Even when corn was in scarce supply in 1959 and 1961 the only step the 
Ydígoras government took to help peasants was to ask plantation owners to lease their 
fallow lands (150-153). While not helping the peasantry, this circus with national lands 
helped pay back debts and gave an appearance of land reform, fulfilling the priorities of 
that regime.       
Alongside this “agrarian program” were continuous evictions of poor peasants—
the vast majority of whom were Mayans—from lands that they either occupied legally, or 
had squatted, sometimes for generations, without titles.  People remaining on UFCo lands 
were forced off; and even more were forced off coffee plantation land.  As evictions 
showed a propensity to turn violent, the military became involved—the perfect marriage 
of capital and the state.  In 1959, hundreds of dispossessed families marched on the 
National Palace, demanding land, but were mostly ignored.  Anger at this harsh treatment 
led to a “barracks revolt” led by young officers in the military, which was summarily put 
down and, although only Guatemalans were involved, denounced by Ydígoras as part of 
a planned Cuban invasion (161). Eisenhower agreed, and sent an aircraft carrier to patrol 
the coastline.   
In fact, the revolt did have a high level of support from the peasants in Zacapa.  
Hundreds arrived asking for arms, despite the fact that, “This was not in the program, nor 
was it even anticipated by the rebels, who could not make up their minds whether to arm 
the peasants” (162).5  In hopes of preempting future outbreaks, Eisenhower set up a 
counter-insurgency headquarters in Izabal in 1962, complete with artillery, planes, and 
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troops (163). They went to work almost immediately with civilian programs, giving 
wells, clinics and food to peasants in the northern department.  At the same time, land 
expulsions continued; and now some were led by right wing paramilitary groups, 
supposedly dedicated to fighting communist threats, but probably more interested in 
defending property claims of the plantation owners who funded these supposedly 
autonomous organizations. While Ydígoras distributed more land than Armas, his 
dedication to the cause was more rhetoric than real.  
After the Bay of Pigs debacle, President Kennedy established the Alliance for 
Progress.  The Alliance was a direct challenge to communism in all of Latin America, a 
symbol of the US commitment to share the fruits of freedom by spreading the reach of 
capitalist prosperity.6  Responding to these initiatives, Peralta Azurdia, the next 
Guatemalan president, announced an incremental program to “raise the standard of 
living” of the peasantry, not through land expropriations, but with absolute respect for 
private property rights (176). The Alliance charter called for a substantial agrarian reform 
with the recognition of the social function of land.  But predictably these themes caused a 
furor among Guatemalan elites, who immediately kicked back against what they 
considered “vague” notions of social justice, which reminded them of the hated decree 
900 (181). In response to this call for substantial redistribution of land, and therefore 
power, throughout the continent, Peralta, unwilling to contemplate substantial reform, 
focused once again on colonization in the Petén.  Like before, there was simply too little 
land, of too poor quality to meet the demand (187).7  Still, more official rhetoric cynically 
predicted colonization as the solution to national poverty.  Nevertheless, the US signed 
on.   Even when USAID gave another $2 million loan to Guatemala for resettlement, the 
results were predictably deplorable (190-191).8  
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High demand for land, massive social inequality, and government unwillingness 
to do anything but reinforce this dynamic aptly summarizes decades of agrarian policy 
under the military dictatorship. Yet, as Kennedy had warned, this system was not stable.  
By the mid 1960s, the situation had worsened. The land problem was becoming more 
acute and labor conditions were still appalling.  The army was called in to force workers 
onto cotton plantations, notorious for low pay and exposing workers to dangerous 
insecticides (196). All of this gave moral weight to the new guerrilla movement in 
Eastern Guatemala, and the FAR in Guatemala City, both of which were making great 
headway with their calls for land reform and violent insurrection.9  By 1965 they were 
regularly engaged in skirmishes with the army, and showing determination.  The 
government responded by intensifying repression.  On March 6, 1966, the army captured 
28 labor leaders from the PGT in Guatemala City, including Victor Manuel Guiterrez and 
Leonardo Castillo Flores, both labor leaders under Arbenz. Two days later a police raid 
abducted every adult male—over100 peasants from Rio Hondo, Zacapa, holding them for 
questioning (198-199).10  In response to the kidnapping of the 28, the guerrilla kidnapped 
the Secretary of Information, the Head of the Supreme Court, and the President of 
Congress, hoping for a prisoner exchange. But the 28 had already been murdered.  
Even before these events, the US government was not pleased that Peralta had 
taken a “go it alone” policy on both military and development strategy.  The planter elite 
was also unsettled, fearful as always of peasant organizing getting out of hand.  With US 
approval, Julio César Mendez Montenegro, a civilian and, representing the reformist PR 
won the 1966 elections.  Putatively democratic elections were a further qualification for 
increased US aid. Not a politician—he was ex-Dean of the University Law School—
Mendez decided to run after his brother, Mario Montenegro, an ex-labor leader under 
Arbenz and a revolutionary leader in subsequent years, was found shot in his home, most 
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likely assassinated, in 1965.  Although Mendez won the election, he had only a plurality 
and so congress had to decide the winner.  A subsequent show of support for the US for 
his victory was the only thing that allowed a reformist candidate to take power amidst 
accusations of communism from the MLN (209). Mendez had no real power base, and 
needed to prove to the army and the US government that he would govern within the 
lines.  This meant defending private property, ignoring the demands of peasantry and 
labor, and cracking down on guerrilla. He capitulated by helping to cover up the massacre 
of the 28, denouncing peasant land invasions, accepting US counterinsurgency assistance, 
and supporting the army as they stepped up repression of unions in the city and peasant 
organizations in the countryside (213-214; 264-270). Angry that Mendez’ response was 
not sufficiently repressive, MLN leaders attempted two coups against Mendez and 
formed paramilitaries.  
Mendez’ new agrarian policy, “included the distribution of the remaining 
National Finca lands to the workers; the restructuring of the existing agrarian zones; and 
the use of the unexploited government lands in Izabal, Quiche, Petén, Alta Verapaz and 
Huehuetenango” (217).11 Most of this plan was rehashed—limited redistribution and 
more colonization.  One new law established a cooperative federation on the recently 
distributed land to be overseen by INTA. Like previous attempts at agrarian policy 
without land reform, these programs were insufficient for a rural population that was 
growing rapidly and were systematically underfunded.  Petén lands were even being 
distributed to latifundistas (large plantation owners), making colonization another welfare 
program for the wealthy. This hollow populist rhetoric could little to convince the 
peasantry not to join guerrilla organizations; the latter continued to gain ground (219-
234). Violent land expulsions were increasing as the planters moved to expand their 
holdings.  Backing up their land claims with the military and their own private armies, 
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this exacerbated the already acute problem of land scarcity (253-260). Counterinsurgency 
operations picked up in the east under Arana Osorio. Thousands of peasants were killed 
in the space of the three years 1966-1970 (270-271). Mendez pleaded for plantation 
owners to respect the right to organize, but lost whatever small measure of control he 
had. 
One bright spot for campesinos during the otherwise dismal Mendez regime for 
was the space opened, mostly by USAID and Military Mission pressure for social 
development, for cooperatives. Peasant groups were seeking alternatives.  In 1965, five 
delegates from independent cooperatives in the western highlands established the 
National Federation of Cooperatives of Savings and Credit, FENACOAC.  FENACOAC, 
organized in 1965, was dedicated to lifting rural Mayans and poor campesinos out of 
poverty. Cooperative strength is measured in numbers and FENACOAC was growing 
significantly. As mentioned in the first chapter, this was largely driven by the 
development activities of the Catholic Church through Acción Católica.  By 1972 it had 
79 affiliated cooperatives in the country, whose representatives met in a general 
assembly.  Size allowed them a large amount of collective purchasing power.  In addition 
to the economy of scale that this allowed, FENACOAC cooperatives were integrated 
together through a system of representatives.  This made them into an increasingly 
significant political voice, reflective of the needs of their members, who were among the 
most invisible and marginalized sectors of Guatemalan society, the rural, mostly Mayan, 
peasantry.  FENACOAC cooperatives flourished these years (Gaitan 1972).12  
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THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF 1970 
 In1970, the Guatemalan government in coordination with The United States 
Agency for International Development implemented what was heralded as an aggressive 
new approach to poverty reduction in the western highlands.  Through the Rural 
Development Plan the Guatemalan government directed an initial $143 million to 
agrarian development, including a $23 million in a rural sector loan from the US (USAID 
1975). This was the first time since the Arbenz administration that the Guatemalan state 
made a concerted effort to promote the well being of the predominantly Mayan 
highlands.  After several years of dialogue, study and planning in coordination with 
international development agencies, the Guatemalan government reorganized the 
Ministry of Agriculture, re-dedicating it to bringing the fruits of modernity to within 
reach of the most remote rural communities. Collectively responsible for fomenting 
Guatemala’s “green revolution,” the rural agrarian programs did more to define the 
meaning of development for highland Mayans more than any other initiative at the time.   
The agrarian component of the Rural Development Plan was officially 
inaugurated when USAID reorganized the Guatemalan Agriculture Ministry MAGA, 
creating several new agencies including: BANDESA, the rural development bank who 
would channel the loan money from USAID into loans to small farmers; DIGESA the 
General Directory of Agricultural Services, to provide extension services to small 
farmers, and also to manage the delivery of credit and inputs, mainly chemical fertilizer; 
INDECA, for marketing and price stabilization; and ICTA, for agricultural research.  
These would be run through INTA, which would continue to handle land reform and 
resettlement.  This coordinated set of institutions was known as the Sector Publico 
Agrario (Public Agrarian Sector).   There were five elements to the Rural Development 
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Program: “basic grains production and marketing; 2) diversified crops production, 
research and technical assistance; 3) development of the handicrafts industry; 4) 
Infrastructural development; and 5) Cooperative development.” (Davidson 1976, 3). 
The centerpiece of the agrarian component of the Rural Development Plan was 
the creation of agricultural cooperatives.   Since 1964, USAID had undertaken several 
activities in the cooperative sector, including: supporting the National Credit Union 
Association, CUNA, whose role was to start local initiatives; forming a cooperative 
training school; and, contracting with the International Development Fund, IDF on a 
“pre-cooperative” training project (5). According to USAID, existing cooperative efforts 
were failing.   CUNA credit unions had not proved a “viable, self-sustaining, effective, 
institution” and had lost its largest affiliate; the training school was not producing 
“effective cooperative leaders”;  and IDF had since refused to work with the Guatemalan 
government (5). FECOAR cooperatives and DIGESA were intended to “complement” 
FENACOAC cooperatives. A 1969 AID evaluation of “concluded that […] FENACOAC 
was receiving just enough assistance to stay alive, but not enough to become viable”(6).  
Davidson’s report claims that USAID decided to provide financial assistance to 
FENACOAC to help them become independent of CUNA while at the same time as 
starting an additional cooperative initiative.  
For the 1970 program, two parallel and similar cooperative programs were 
created: the General Directory of Agricultural Services, DIGESA, run by the Guatemalan 
government with funding and technical assistance from USAID; and the Rural 
Cooperative Development Project, funded and independently run by USAID.  In addition, 
USAID coordinated with FENACOAC, helping fund some of their operations. In 1970, 
FENACOAC split a $2million loan package with a new cooperative system founded 
under the Rural Development Plan of 1970 and run by USAID.  These programs had the 
 189 
shared purpose of channeling credit, extension services, technical training and new 
agricultural inputs to rural farmers previously between rural highland communities and 
state agents and institutions.  Each program had a very different conception of the 
problem that they were trying to address, program aims, and the means necessary to 
achieve their respective missions.   
 
NARRATING THE SPACE OF COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Development agencies are in the business of trying to “sell” these packages, 
trying to locate and justify potential applications for them. […] Their problem is 
to find the right kind of problem; the kind of “problem” that requires the 
“solution” they are there to provide.  This is the institutional context within which 
“development” discourse is located. (Ferguson 1991).  
No single person, group, institution or government was solely responsible for 
creating a comprehensive agrarian development policy for the rural highlands.  It was a 
product of the labors of a number of different groups, individuals and government 
representatives—each with at least a slightly different perspective on why development 
was needed and how it would work.  The final policy took shape over several years.  
There were major differences in strategy and desired outcome between USAID and the 
Guatemalan government, which I will describe later.  Along the way there were 
numerous debates regarding feasibility, tactics, and overall strategy, many of which, as I 
describe later, lasted as long as the program.  Above and beyond—or perhaps 
underneath—these differences was a core set of, mostly shared, assumptions and 
interpretive tendencies, the combination of which created the narrative space of 
development—the imaginary constitution of the Guatemalan highlands as in need of a 
particular kind of development intervention, namely agrarian modernization. This 
narrative was inseparable from the programs themselves; it provided their conditions of 
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its intelligibility and desirability for development and government officials, who looked 
to these programs with promise.   
Official statements describing the need for the program highlighted the following 
conditions: intense population pressures; extreme poverty; widespread illiteracy; and 
indigenous culture; seasonal migration; and suspicious, distrustful attitudes among the 
peasantry towards the outside world (Fledderjohn 1976, 3-4). Massive inequality was 
viewed as a cause for instability. It was a pre-emptive strategy, designed to stop 
revolutions before they start.  Guatemala was a special case.  Not only was it one of the 
most unequal countries in the hemisphere, but it had already had a popular revolution that 
was only able to be put down with extreme violence.  The US government and USAID 
attributed these problems to the fact that “virtually no priority was given to providing 
services to help the traditional subsistence farmer increase his output” (USAID 1975, 47). 
The cooperative program was a concession to grassroots efforts for reform, emblematized 
by the autonomous cooperative movement.  
This was not a transparent representation of a non-discursive highlands—no such 
thing exists—but instead constituted the rural highlands as a certain kind of reality.   
Rather than simply presenting ‘facts,’ development planners constituted facts and objects 
by employing certain concepts, elements they then wove into story.  It was never 
inevitable, or even obvious, that the problem of underdevelopment would be diagnosed in 
the way that it was, neither was the kind of development that was prescribed as the 
solution. The crisis in rural agriculture was figured quite differently in the consciousness 
of rural Mayans who were the main protagonists of the autonomous cooperative 
movement and who development planners and state officials hoped would be the subjects 
of the USAID cooperative initiative. 
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The discourses constituting the RCCP borrowed heavily from existing tropes and 
narratives about indigenous culture, discourses of development, and a loose assortment of 
notions about third world countries.  These discourses demonstrate a more or less shared 
set of rules and rules and conventions for talking about the problem which was to be 
addressed: the problem of poverty in rural Guatemala, and the larger problem of political 
instability, and, therefore notions of risk, to which it had for so long been intimately 
connected. These shared understandings and ways of constructing the problem were 
integral to the construction and final outcome of the program.  This story, as much as any 
other technology or practice, was a part of what the program was spreading in the 
highlands.  
The components of this imagined space I find most important were: a de-
historicized understanding of rural poverty, specifically regarding the shortage of 
productive land in the highlands; an evolutionary model of culture; the naturalization of 
the Guatemalan economic and political structure and of the government’s sovereignty 
over rural Mayans; a perception that poverty increased the likelihood of revolutionary 
organizing and the converse notion that poverty alleviation programs could diminish this 
threat.  In distinct ways, these assumptions, often mutually reinforcing, exerted a 
powerful influence in the ultimate determination of the objectives, targets and trajectories 
of the agrarian development program. 
** 
The first aspect of the program I want to discuss is the tendency towards the 
naturalization of the prevailing socio-political order.  Most specifically, the idea of real 
land reform is relegated to the realm of fantasy.  Official discourses were highly 
ambivalent in the way that they danced around the subject, much in the way that one 
might around an 800 lb gorilla.  Speaking out of both sides of the mouth was a central 
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part of the “New Directions of Development” initiatives of USAID.   New Directions was 
a supposedly souped up successor to the Alliance for Progress.  Apparently, it was born 
with a credibility problem.  On the very first page of their report to the 94th Congress on 
their missions in Bolivia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, they start a section 
with the heading: “COMMITTEE PLEDGE TO FOLLOW UP ON REFORMS.”  After 
which it reads “ Sensitive to the contentions that the ND reforms were only superficial 
and would affect no greater changes in AID’s operations the committee declared: The 
changes are not cosmetic, but real.  We intend change—drastic change—in the planning 
and operation of our US bilateral economic assistance programs” (USAID 1975, 1).  
Was it a bold new approach or just a new marketing scheme?  The fine print 
reveals one overwhelming similarity with past approaches.  On the one hand, USAID 
viewed “sweeping” land reform as necessary, but, on the other, they believed that it “was 
unlikely to be undertaken soon in most Latin American countries.”  What is new is the 
apology for not doing land reform.  This fact that land reform is off the agenda makes it 
“imperative […] that agricultural productivity and new income per-acre be increased” 
(USAID 1975, 7). Instead of a political variable, the “land shortage” is taken as 
immutable fact, background information irrelevant to development policy.  In fact, the 
real challenge for development is how to include the rural masses, and, thereby, avert a 
communist uprising, without changing the country in any meaningful way.  This was 
precisely the way that the problem was presented to a panel of so called “experts” on 
Guatemala, development, insurgency, counterinsurgency and international affairs who 
were convened by the International Development Fund to discuss rural strategy in 
Guatemala under the military dictatorship.  
The minutes of this meeting, the results of which were recently declassified, 
provide fresh insight into how these policymakers understood the goals of the Rural 
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Cooperative Development Program.  After describing the extent of land and wealth 
inequality they state that the: 
IDF’s objective is to assist the small farmers […] to crash this exclusive circle and 
become members in good standing through the medium of their own 
representative organizations.   
Naturally, the integration of the small landholder implies a shift in power and a 
redistribution of available goods and services. Therefore, if the motor for change 
has to come from within the internal dynamics of the country, a methodology has 
to be developed that would accomplish the integration of the small landholder 
without a corresponding loss to the other sectors; as well as to help the traditional 
sectors reappraise their interests in terms of such integration. (IDF 1968, 5-6) 
At the same time that the development narrative constructs the inequality of Guatemalan 
society as problematically unequal, it naturalizes the existing Guatemalan social 
structure.  Development is seen as facilitating the integration of rural Mayans into 
“national life,” which is treated as both inevitable and benign.   Inequality is a problem, 
yes, but it is the Mayans who must develop to make up for this discrepancy, not the 
sociopolitical order itself.  The “national life” of the country, the brokers of “national 
power,” and its “socioeconomic process” are all taken for granted as unchangeable 
realities.   This is the spirit in which Ann Brownell, director of the IDF in 1968 asks: 
“How can the small farmer be integrated in a manner acceptable to himself and to the 
present power structure?” The direction of the integration is predetermined: Mayans will 
integrate into the national structure; the national structure does not have to adjust itself to 
take the needs of the rural Mayan population into account. Whatever changes happen 
occur from, “within the internal dynamics of the country.”  However, it is hoped that 
eventually the “traditional sectors reappraise their interests.”  Supporting reforms led by 
autonomous social movements was outside of the realm of acceptable policy options.  
That was too much democracy. What exactly “internal dynamics” means is obvious, if 
perplexing.  Oddly, it seems to refer to the very structure of wealth and privilege that 
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USAID discourses since the Alliance for Progress have criticized as a source for 
instability.  Unfortunately, as history has seen, up until the threat of communism in the 
region, the interests of the US government were completely in line with the lavish 
privilege of Guatemalan planters. And, given the national origins of companies like 
UFCo, there was no clear division between internal and external dynamics.  Now a sort 
of compromise was necessary.  But this change is really no change at all.  Just as it was 
during the Alliance for Progress, when the US had attempted to use “soft power” to 
change state policy in Latin America and were ignored, they lowered their expectations 
and met those governments wherever they were willing to go, with few objections and 
sometimes full financing.  
With talk of historic land inequalities a taboo subject in development circles, 
development discourses were forced to get more creative in their official characterization 
of the problem of poverty and social marginalization in the highlands.  Unfortunately, 
creativity meant recycling some very well worn themes.  The first was to render the 
problem in primarily demographic terms, to see it as the “classic” Malthusian problem of 
too many people competing for too few resources.  Scarcity is the human condition (at 
least according to this discourse).  These notions permeated the development world.  
USAID regional director John Davidson warned that, “over the last two decades, the 
growth of the agricultural sector has averaged about 5%, barely keeping pace with 
population growth.  Increases in production have resulted from expanding the area under 
cultivation rather than changes in its productive methods” (4). Similarly, when USAID 
project manager David Fledderjohn describes the Rural Cooperative Project in an article 
for the International Journal of Cooperative Development in 1974, he described the 
location as the “densely-populated highland areas of Guatemala” (Fledderjohn 1974, 1). 
In this framework, the sheer quantity of humans outstrips the objective productive 
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capacity of the natural environment; geometrical trends for population growth ensure 
disaster.  Grimly, it predicts a future catastrophe of unknown proportions.  One imagines 
chaos, anarchy.  The persuasive power of this rhetorical strategy lies in its directness and 
its appeal to cold reason.  But while the Malthusian framework foregrounds a 
mathematical dilemma, it renders invisible the non-inevitability of the main determinant 
of overpopulation: land inequalities rooted in the lack of a land reform.13  Malthusian 
logics function here as a rhetorical ethical straightjacket: take these measures to increase 
carrying capacity…or suffer the consequences!   
This enforced ignorance regarding the role of Guatemalan inequalities on 
generating poverty had other enabling effects for development discourse.  To run a 
development program, like any other intervention, it is necessary to have things that are 
wrong that can be fixed within the framework one operates.  With agrarian reform off the 
table, USAID planners looked elsewhere for something that they could manipulate to 
achieve their objectives.  One of the first stops was the vast repertory of stereotypes about 
rural Mayans.  Instead of political and historical factors, development documents reveal 
that planners focused on the “cultural and economic isolation of the Indian.”  
“Disproportionate participation based on racial origin” was viewed as a “usual 
complication” in “the Latin context” (USAID 1973). A New Directions report to 
Congress blamed poverty on the fact that  “Forty percent of the population descend from 
the Mayan Indian and still speak their own native Indian languages rather than Spanish.  
This complicates instruction and contributes to an illiteracy rate of 62%, one of the 
highest in the hemisphere.  The cultural and economic isolation of the Indian is the most 
dramatic problem facing the nation” (USAID 1975).  In a tortured logic, Mayans, whose 
illiteracy has been legally mandated and economically prohibited for generations, are 
somehow responsible for their own illiteracy, and, by extension, their own poverty.   
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In this discourse, Mayans were backward and simple, and development would 
focus on different ways of alleviating these traits.  Development would replace 
“tradition” with “modernity.”  Instead of internally complex and externally linked, 
Mayan culture is seen as a discrete and bounded unity.  Present here is a notion of empty 
calendrical time, which stages an inexorable march of “cultural evolution” in which 
modern cultures outcompete primitive cultures in the survival of the fittest.  Mayans are 
“living fossils” survivals from a past age (Fabian 1983).  Not only is indigenous culture 
represented as a bounded and known thing, it is also seen as objectively lower on the 
scale of human evolution than “modern” culture—whatever that means.  An interesting 
variation on this theme was present in the early days of debating the types of programs 
necessary to solve Guatemala’s dilemma, ie. how to avert a civil war without agrarian 
reform.  One of the key speakers at that meeting, still a noted expert on ‘cultural 
difference’, was the famous Harvard political scientist, Samuel Huntington:   
I don’t have any particular definition of political development.  I don’t think it 
would be worthwhile defining that term.  It is an umbrella term.  Everybody 
identifies what he likes with political development, which he assumes is 
something that everybody likes.  
The issue is what priority you give to developing organizations and organizational 
capabilities in a society, and in most societies which we think of as being 
underdeveloped, this is the one thing that is in very scarce supply.  Consequently, 
we are building organizations and building the capacity to build organizations is 
not just the substance but the crucial essence.  It may not be the only thing that 
counts but this is the thing that enables some societies, some cultures, to function 
in ways that what we generally consider very superior ways to other societies and 
cultures (IDF 1968, 97). 
Dr. Huntington is convinced that he has identified the elusive kernel of modernity—the 
special thing missing in all societies where development is lacking and present in all 
developed societies: the “capacity to build organizations.” These remarks obviously 
predate multiculturalism.  Cultural difference is bad, period.  Worse, they banalize the 
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racial terror that accompanied the construction of a modern economy in Guatemala.  This 
framework implies that the violence of conquest was part of an inevitable broad historical 
process through which so-called “primitive” cultures are selected against in favor of the 
more fit, “modern” cultures.  Or, alternatively, it erases the violence of conquest in 
shaping the forms of underdevelopment in the “cultures” that we see today.  More 
recently, this representation erases the history of Mayan participation in national politics.   
Is it not possible that the political “disorganization” being described here in a very 
sweeping manner could be a inability on the part of the observer to recognize, or 
positively value, the forms of social organizations that did exist, or a failure to appreciate 
the historical reasons why they were lacking?  Almost certainly it is both.  Political 
organizing had not only been present in the highlands decades before, but it was still 
present in 1968.  There was an incessant cry for land reform, if not always an organized 
movement!  What is more, most Mayans towns had their own cooperatives! Why 
organizations were weak by the late 1960s had nothing to do with inherent backwardness, 
but systematic repression.  Nevertheless, in this representation an entire cultural shift is 
necessary to implant “modern” forms of political organizing in the communities.  This 
‘lack’ is the impediment to development and it is purely negative.  Pathological Indian 
culture will inevitably and naturally give way to idealized modern culture in which the 
participants will “live fuller, more productive lives” (USAID 1973). Nothing of value 
will be lost.  Here, Guatemala becomes grouped as just another third world 
“underdeveloped,” a common cultural pathology, the cure for which is a de-
culturation/inculturation process, enabled by development.  
Both the erasure of social inequalities, the vilification of Mayan culture, and the 
Malthusian logic were present in another feature of the discourses surrounding the RCCP 
the disparagement of subsistence agriculture as a means of economic provisioning.  In 
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what seems to be a massive guilt transference, development discourses blamed traditional 
agricultural practices for the food shortage:   
In the last decade, agricultural growth has been restricted by various factors 
including overspecialization of crops, poor land use and distribution, lack of 
emphasis on internally consumed products, poor marketing systems and an 
inadequate institutional framework for accelerating agricultural development 
(USAID 1973). 
Poor land distribution is mentioned third in a long list, and given no priority as a primary 
cause of poverty and underdevelopment.  Presumably, each of these factors are equally 
responsible for the current condition.  In any case, all of the other problems mentioned 
will be addressed (although not solved as we shall see later) by the development program, 
but not that one.  Another role fulfilled by this construction of the problem is that it 
enumerates specific problems that can be fixed (Ferguson 1991). It identifies small and 
technical problems that a development agency can sink its teeth into.  Instead of 
generating anger that rural Guatemalans have had their land stolen, are enslaved on huge 
ranches, are recruited for labor at the end of a bayonet, and are malnourished, 
development documents express alarm that “small farmers do not use modern production 
methods, achieve low yields, and have little access to the institutional credit system.”  
John Davidson, USAID program coordinator, found that “Fertilizers use is low in 
Guatemala” (4). The seemingly impassioned moral plea made by David Fledderjohn, 
director of the USAID cooperative program, rings quite hollow indeed when understood 
in the context of Guatemalan’s apartheid-like political economy: More than anything 
else, there are simply not enough resources available to assist the hundreds and thousands 
of small and medium sized farmers of the country in making the transition from 
subsistence farming to a point at which they may participate in agricultural commerce 
and contribute to the national economy (1974, 5).  What is needed is what the 
development agency can offer: technology, fertilizer, training and credit—nothing else is 
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relevant. Quite visible here is a faith in scientific progress to enhance the human 
condition.  New technologies are material manifestations of modernity and are 
transparently good.  The reason agricultural production is lagging behind is the failure to 
make use of technological advances in agriculture.  In addition, there is the blanket 
assumption that what is best for all Mayans, indeed all small farmers everywhere, is a 
transition to capitalist economics.  These were all measures that many Mayans were 
taking to lift themselves up out of the abyss of poverty, not all of them. Now the state, 
saying that they lacked it, was going to provide these things for them, and nothing else.  
Here we see a trend, one that will be discussed more in the future: states and governing 
agencies latching onto grassroots practices of resistance to form governmental programs, 
gutted of their original political orientations and objectives.  
 
CIVIL ACTION DEVELOPMENT AND COUNTERINSURGENCY TACTICS 
The above descriptions suggest a high measure of cynicism and banality in the 
formation of the RCCP. Instead of having as its primary goal to alleviate the suffering of 
the rural Mayans, USAID cooperative development made a certain form of poverty 
alleviation and refashioning of Mayan political culture one part in a larger strategy to 
safeguard the dominant Guatemalan political and social order.  But there was another 
element that was just as important as their banality: their naïveté.   Examination of policy 
and planning documents reveals an innocent hopefulness.  This affective state was 
generated by the cooperative technology, which was idealized as a delivery mechanism 
that would allow for a surgical reorganization of Guatemalan society in its entirety. The 
following passage from Ann Brownell, the acting president of the IDF, while 
enumerating the miracles the RCCP was imagined to make possible, exudes this faith: 
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To create a mechanism to constructively employ the popular energies in their own 
self-improvement thereby reducing the pressure from frustration which often 
leads to radical change.  Truitt, in his paper “To turn the alliance for progress over 
to the People” makes a good case for measuring development in terms relative to 
popular aspirations.  
Develop a leadership at the national level sympathetic with rural problems and 
which can bring about change through the established legal structures and in 
accordance with the dynamics of the system.  
Develop linkages between the various sectors to facilitate the flow of 
communication to allay suspicion.  
Promote between the sectors a relationship of mutual dependence so that an 
improvement in the relative position of the small landholders will also benefit the 
other sectors. (IDF 1968, 7-8) 
Development programs to reach deeply into the hearts of communities, and to be able to 
make a precise alteration of the social and political behaviors.  Present here is the 
ideology of popular hard work: people will make the program work.  The program’s 
function will be “tapping unexploited potential and latent energies of the population”(6).  
The result would also persuade the elites, by creating a manageable form of Mayan 
politics one that eschewed communist ideology.   This was seen as the same as “turning 
the Alliance over to the people”—a mirror of popular desires.  The IDF thought 
cooperatives could break down barriers of conflict and distrust by opening smooth 
channels of productive communication.  The utopian solution would be acceptable to 
both sides.   
This vision was debated at length by the members of the IDF committee.  Some of 
them were not so optimistic.  One person, Mr. Brian Buen of the newly founded Adlai 
Stevenson Institute for International Affairs (later the University of Chicago School for 
International Affairs) agreed with him: 
Mr Buen: Sooner or later, if we face the fundamental fact that what is required in 
many of these societies is a redistribution of economic, social and political power, 
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it may be that this counter-revolutionary method, this civic action approach, 
which deals with the symptoms will have to be rejected and that instead of trying 
to suppress threats we have threats to order in certain circumstances we will just 
have to recognize that in the given system we really can’t solve the problem and 
we may have to acquiesce in more radical solutions. 
 The evolutionary means just may not work, and I think Brazil is a very 
good example.  The real question for us is whether in certain circumstances we 
can acquiesce in and tolerate that.  At the present time, at least in the US 
Government, we are going on one track with greater emphasis on political and 
social development which encourages one type of approach and one result, and at 
the same time we cling to this outmoded theory which has gotten us into great 
troubles in Vietnam.  (95) 
He sees this as a symptoms-based approach that will not resolve the central contradiction 
of land reform.  He argues that solutions might be impossible within the system.  In fact, 
they might be playing with fire, inviting the same disaster brought by these programs in 
Vietnam.  Without a doubt, Vietnam was the specter hanging over discussions of civic-
action development in Guatemala.  Guatemala was the secret Vietnam in the western 
hemisphere, followed by Nicaragua and El Salvador, the other “dominos” poised to fall if 
Guatemala went red.  At the time of this meeting, the Tet offensive had just changed the 
tide of the war, raising the number of US casualties and breaking the moral perception of 
the war in the American public. The US Empire was in serious crisis.  Mr John P. Clark, 
an Inter American Development Bank representative, agrees with Buen, pointing out the 
foundational ambivalence in the approach:      
I assume that what IDF is doing is creating a social irritant.  American foreign 
policy can take all kinds of ambivalent courses.  If it backs this type of activity 
vigorously, it is buying itself a lot of trouble unless it is prepared to move to the 
left (97).  
He worries that if we incite social conflict, we have to be willing to support the groups 
that we attempt to incite in case their attempts at political integration are met with 
violence.  Perhaps he knows something about recent Guatemalan history, in which 
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peasant claims have been met with outright refusal and even basic attempts at 
organization have been criminalized as communist.  He is pointing to the existence of a 
division between what USAID the US State Department want for the country, and what 
the Guatemalan Government wants for itself. Project skeptics thought that attempting to 
“awaken” social pressures would be leading people to slaughter because US development 
agencies will be unable to persuade the Guatemalan government to accept the eventual 
implications of the project, namely opening up their societies to democratic participation 
from the grassroots, and that this would lead to violence.  The critics were prophetic. 
Other “experts” disputed Mr. Clark and Mr. Buen’s concerns, seeing them as a 
misguided underestimation of the power of civil action development.  Mr Robert 
Culbertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Social and Civic Development at the 
US State Department in the Johnson Administration, made a strong case for their 
USAID’s ability to fulfill the goal of social integration by rerouting social resources:   
 [Aid] is unimportant unless it is utilized in order to loosen major domestic 
resources and that is precisely its role. We are trying now to refine our technique 
so that we do use foreign aid skillfully enough, so that we have some influence on 
the allocation of domestic resources in the right places. (97) 
Mr. Culbertson, one of the leading military strategies of international development at the 
end of the 1960s, sees aid as a precise tool, a finesse operation directed by skillful hands.  
One senses a certain arrogance or overconfidence.  Is there any room for error?  Who 
would pay the price for a miscalculation?  These questions are irrelevant because, 
supposedly, the techniques have been practiced and are ready to be deployed.   His ally in 
the conversation, John Wasson, IDF director from Honduras, objects to the use of the 
term “social irritant” by project skeptics:  
The idea that what we are doing is creating social irritants strikes me as being 
somehow wrong.  We are doing exactly the opposite.  We are creating 
mechanisms for solving problems which reduces irritation, but they are basically 
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designed to solve problems at a lower explosion level, a lower level of irritation, 
than would be the case if these things build up until the whole thing blows up into 
a revolutionary coup. (101) 
He sees the irritant in Guatemala as pre-existing.   Although he is a bit vague, the irritant 
he sees is the revolutionary movement.  This is the process he wants to stop.  These 
statements indicate the extent to which it was believed that a lessening of economic and 
social inequalities would short-circuit the grassroots appeal of communist ideologies. 
Culbertson and Wasson seem convinced that aid can arrive quickly, effect massive 
changes and do so with such a precision to release latent social pressure that could 
explode if left unattended. Advocates saw conflict as inevitable in the current situation.  
They worried that the violence between the Guatemalan Government and the insurgency 
forces would inevitably escalate in the absence of such a program.    Advocates of the 
civic action approach viewed it as a slow acting, but sure vaccine, necessary to isolate 
revolutionary movements and prevent further violence.  It is unlikely, however, that civic 
action supporters thought that it would completely eliminate the need for state violence 
against counterinsurgency groups did not see it as a replacement for violence.  In a letter 
sent to Assistant US Secretary of State Oliver, by Ambassador to Guatemala Gordon 
Mein, Mein said that we should accept that “It is a fact of life, therefore, that terrorism 
will continue to be a part of the Guatemalan scene, at least for the immediate future.”  
And for that reason, he did not understand people who were criticizing the Guatemalan 
counter-insurgency, taking as “gospel” the grumblings of “a couple of frustrated priests” 
(Mein 1968). 14  
 
THE RURAL COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
Understanding the naïve enthusiasm regarding the capabilities of rural 
development requires a close examination of the technologies at the disposal of these 
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groups, and the kinds of fantasies of control and visions of progress and corresponding 
excitement that they generated in policymaking circles.  Since the mid 1960s, USAID 
had been experimenting with cooperative organizations as development implementation 
mechanisms.  Cooperatives were selected for the Guatemalan program because they fit 
the desires to have an effect on the detailed aspects of everyday life of Mayan farmers.  
They also fit the way that the program was imagined as an ambitious experiment in 
“direct” democracy.  Conjuring images of collective grassroots enthusiasm, cooperatives 
were also emblematic of the philosophical shift in USAID concerning targeting the 
poorest, neglected sectors of the population, whose poverty was conceived of as an 
unfortunate, but understandable, outcome of their isolation from government services.  A 
regional federation of independent cooperatives seemed perfect for the kind of detailed, 
finesse operation that was imagined.  David Fledderjohn, recalls how:  
It was decided that the organization of the new, direct-membership regional or 
area-oriented agricultural cooperatives represented the best alternative for the 
project.  A network of local groups also conceived as a way to reach 
concentrations of farmers in outlying areas and to preserve elements of 
communication and democratic process in an informal setting (1976, 4).   
Cooperativization was seen as breaking the prevailing inertia assumed by development 
agents to paralyze the rural sector.  Through cooperative formation, agents thought that 
they were planting the seeds for a movement would, once rooted, would flourish and 
have a long-lasting impact on the form and quality of life in the rural communities.  In his 
final report, Fledderjohn reminisces about how the two Guatemalan field operatives in 
charge of “sounding out interest in organization” expressed their excitement about the 
cooperative project by nicknaming themselves “the flamethrowers”(5).  This term 
indicates that agents thought of their role in the highlands as a sort of Promethian quest, 
giving light to the culturally benighted and inert provinces. 
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Versatility was also a quality associated with the cooperative structure.  The 
cooperative system was viewed as a delivery mechanism for a laundry list of ideas, 
inputs, services, marketing strategies, technologies, and coordination:   
In addition to providing credit for inputs such as fertilizer and seeds, the 
cooperatives also perform a number of ancillary services.  Bulk purchases and 
duty free imports make prices lower.  Cooperatives provide marketing 
information and sometimes arrange for group marketing.  They provide technical 
and financial advice.  They help to transport commodities.  They maintain farm 
equipment for use by members.  They provide extension services. (USAID 1973) 
After “local,” “independent” was a project key word.  After an initial loan injection, 
USAID expected cooperatives becoming self-sustaining institutions, using income gained 
by members’ shares to pay for their own operations (Fledderjohn 1976, 51). 
But what was wrong the existing cooperative movement?  Why were these 
activities insufficient to achieve the same goals as the RCCP and FECOAR?  Was 
USAID not trying to work coordinate with them and also to provide them financial 
support?  USAID had loaned money to some of these cooperatives in the onset, but 
quickly abandoned the idea of trying to rescue them because they saw them as inefficient 
managers, especially as the organization grew larger and the tasks more complex (2-3).15 
USAID and FECOAR agents constantly asserted the failure of FENACOAC 
cooperatives.  David Fledderjohn writes that “more than 100 farmer cooperatives were 
organized during […] the sixties by persons and programs seeking an answer to the 
predicament of these rural farmers.”  However, “the vast majority have failed as business 
institutions.  Accounting records are hopelessley garbled; credits to members have gone 
uncollected; operating losses have wiped out member equity; controls and auditing have 
been deficient, to name a few of the problems encountered”(1974, 7).  Fledderjohn 
attributes this problem to several factors about rural Guatemala that made it difficult to 
apply cooperative principles there: “farms are extremely small […]; farmers have widely 
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scattered settlements […]; farmers are representatives of an ancient Indian race and 
culture, they have strong ties of family and community but their contacts with the world 
of commerce and government are few” (7). Looking for a “solution to the organization 
and operational dilemmas, Fledderjohn had constructed “new innovation,” a “hybrid 
cooperative institution has been devised to combine the requirements of volume and 
management of an efficient enterprise, with the flexibility to reach many farmers in 
scattered small communities in which they live.”  USAID, with the assistance of 
Association of Cooperative Development International, hired on as a special consultant 
for this project, designed their cooperatives strategically to avoid the problems that 
plagued the previous cooperative systems.  Central to this was the establishment of a 
regional cooperative system with rigorous accountability and management systems, as 
well as village level organizations (3).16 Six regional centers were created in Guatemala 
to organize the USAID led program, one in the east and the rest concentrated in the 
central highlands. Village level groups would have from 20-40 members.  Every couple 
of weeks, extension agents would work with the groups to teach small workshops and 
oversee group activities.  Groups appointed village representatives, gave themselves 
names, and met weekly.  
 
“APOLITICAL” DEVELOPMENT 
Both USAID/FECOAR and FENACOAC/DC cooperatives wanted to create local 
organizations of peasants and introduce them to modern techniques of agriculture.  More 
than organization structure, what USAID thought was wrong with existing cooperatives 
was their political ideology and the type of relationship that they would encourage 
between local farmers and the state.   Beyond high-tech managerial experience, the 
central difference between the approach of the USAID cooperatives and the existing 
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autonomous cooperative federation was that David Fledderjohn believed strongly in 
“apolitical development” (Davidson 1976).17  One rationale behind this was to “balance 
[USAID’s] support of those identified with the Christian Democrats” who “opposed the 
government” (Davidson 1976, 14).  But “apolitical” development was also central to 
ACDI’s precepts.  Fledderjohn saw discussions of development as distinct from politics.  
This guiding ideology, as well as problems of competition, caused conflict with the 
existing DC cooperative movement, which saw these as the state’s attempt to create its 
own cooperative movement in order to squeeze out the independents (Brockett 1988, 
110). Fledderjohn attempted to avoid conflict by starting cooperatives in areas not 
already occupied by the DC coops. 
Thinking of this program as simply apolitical misses how it intended to instill a 
certain political norm.  It would be more appropriate to focus on the kinds of political 
thought and behavior it advocated, as opposed to treating it as if it was a political 
vacuum. The doctrine of apolitical development corresponded to a non-confrontational 
norm for citizenship.  In place of confrontation with the state, the norm was constructive 
engagement with the state over issues of well-being.  Perhaps this can be best described 
as a move from political “demands” to political “requests.”  In this vision of apolitical 
development, the cooperative would function as “A forum or communications system 
through which information could flow from and to the outside world of commerce and 
government” (Fledderjohn 1976, 4).   This dialogue focused on communicating local 
desires for development projects to state institutions. Communities would be able to 
appoint representatives that would communicate their needs directly to government 
agencies and officials.  This program followed a logic of increased visibility.   Local 
desires and concerns, once opaque to community planners, would now be presented in a 
recognizable form.  Agricultural extension agents and local program directors would 
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instruct community members on how to plan community development projects, such as 
schools or potable water projects and how to present these plans to state development 
institutions.  Communities were trained how to translate their desires for well-being into 
concrete development projects, things that the state could, at its own pace, provide. The 
idea was that increased governmental responsiveness to the needs of rural Mayans would 
encourage Mayans to opt for non-confrontational relationship with the state.  
As much as this is a political opening, it is a limiting mechanism. Apolitical 
development offers citizenship makes citizenship contingent on specific forms of 
obedience and subjective transformation.  The move to market economics, for example, 
was openly conceived by policymakers as a kind of “de-indianization” or mestizaje.  
Instead of formulating one’s own demands regarding needs and political desires, one 
should always adjust these according to governmentally provided standards of acceptable 
economic and political behavior. Mayans who did not adopt these changes were 
presumably excluded from entry into the nation; or rather, the exclusion of Mayans 
would then be justified through reference to their refusal to develop themselves.  In the 
end, highly limited and rigorously regulated participation in the national economy and in 
national politics was conditioned on the adoption of ‘modern’ economic behaviors and 
prescribed political behaviors.  The flipside of establishing a way of entering into the 
nation, it created the conditions under which continued forms of exclusion was to be seen 
as necessary.  Stepping outside of this space for legitimate political discourse meant that 
one had decided to be confrontational, and, thus was ineligible for care from the state, 
and, worse, eligible for disciplinary intervention.    
** 
These institutional documents exude great confidence. Policymakers expected 
these programs to have profound effects on Mayan political subjectivity. New 
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technologies sparked the imagination of policy-makers concerned with how to balance 
the goals of social stability and continuity with decreased inequality, poverty, and 
marginalization.  The advent of new seeds, chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides 
were seen as immediate solutions for the food crisis.   High yield seeds and fertilizers 
could triple output.  Pesticides would decrease losses.  Herbicides would eliminate the 
difficult work of hoeing weeds, enabling farmers to work more land.  Small parcels 
which were previously insufficient to provide food for the growing rural population, 
would now be ample. The goal of the cooperative program was to facilitate a massive 
shift to market agriculture by providing rural farmers access to training, credit, and 
markets for their crops. Alongside the new technologies, markets and credit technicians 
trained Mayans how to calculate costs and benefits, and plan and save towards their 
economic lives and futures. The central themes of sustainability and individual self-
sufficiency fit policymaker aspirations for an alternative to social conflict generated by 
poverty. Solving the problem of famine and land shortage in the highlands would take the 
major issue away from the guerrilla. Cooperatives were selected as the mechanisms 
because they mimicked the collective survival strategies rural Guatemalans, mostly 
Mayans, had adopted to improve their lives under almost impossible conditions.  
Cooperatives were also selected Guatemalan program because they fit the desires 
to penetrate the wild, distant zones of Mayan villages, to be able to exercise a level of 
control over detailed aspects of everyday life of Mayan farmers. Conjuring images of 
collective grassroots enthusiasm, open communication, and governmental benevolence, 
cooperatives were taken as concrete proof of a new, more economical and progressive 
approach to counterinsurgency management.  All the feel of democracy, and all centrally 
controlled. Cooperative development, they imagined, would allow Mayans to feel, for the 
first time, like they had a stake in the nation, and were benefiting from progress.   New 
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contacts with political organizations would allow the state to become popularly 
understood as committed to the wellbeing of the rural Mayan. Policymakers hoped that 
this new more productive relationship to the state would stem the tide of guerrilla 
movements that, since the mid 1970s, had begun making inroads among rural Mayans on 
the issue of land reform.  
 
PROJECT OUTCOMES 
Fledderjohn was shocked by his own discovery that the impact of the program on 
the well-being of cooperative participants was nil, or even counterproductive 
(Fledderjohn 1976, 25-26). The economic benefits of the program for farmers, while 
obvious to everyone participating, were invisible in a midway study carried out by 
USAID, which compared participating to non-participating farmers.  This report deflated 
USAID representatives.  Admittedly, it had been difficult to find a stable and lucrative 
cash crop that could be grown on small plots of land with minimal investment. Wheat 
was the only one that made any sense, but was not a viable product for most farmers. And 
this study was consistent with an earlier one by USAID Fledderjohn re-examines his 
methodology and speculates reasons for an inaccurate finding, but he still cannot make 
sense of it.  It also concurs with Warren’s assessment of the USAID-ACDI cooperative in 
San Andrés (Warren 1978, 141-2). 
In addition to their dubious effects, their economic insustainability complicated 
problems with the Guatemalan government that had plagued the program since the 
beginning, ultimately limiting the ability for the program to attain the goals imagined by 
USAID and ACDI.  Despite the Guatemalan government’s role in planning the program, 
Fledderjohn reports that the government of Guatemala debated whether or not to grant a 
charter to FECOAR for some time, stalling a year before issuing the permit. He recalled 
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that there must have been some concern, more than “fumbling paperwork,” and he and 
Chinchilla, the other project director, feared for project’s survival, certain that there were 
“doubts at some levels” in the government (1976; 37). It was finally proved after a 
government sent two agents to investigate the regional office. 
Once legalized, independence was an elusive goal.  The Guatemalan government 
never allowed the cooperatives to function as autonomous organizations. Economic 
independence, the main factor in autonomy, proved elusive.  It was hard to make money 
on services and further problems with the supply of fertilizers, and the desire to provide 
them at low cost, jeopardized the economic independence of the cooperatives (38-39). 
Another factor interfering with the cooperatives was BANDESA.  All cooperatives—
FECOAR and FECOAC—were undermined because BANDESA was offering loans at 
subsidized rates far more competitive than cooperative loans, and therefore depriving 
them of a central source of revenue (Davidson 1976, 41).18 Fledderjohn laments the final 
situation: 
There is no denying the fact, however, that the cooperatives operate at the will of 
the government.  They (not only the FECOAR system) are dependent upon 
BANDESA for debt capital, their operations take place in markets affected by 
public policy and the cooperatives have for the first time in the history of 
Guatemala, become instruments of public programs.  It is difficult to predict what 
the future may bring, but obviously the concept of the development of self-
sufficient cooperative institutions operating independently and autonomously in a 
relative free market has been altered considerably from the time the ACDI effort 
was begun. (Fledderjohn 1976, 34)  
Because BANDESA controlled all of the money, the state controlled both cooperatives.   
It is hard to imagine that this was an accident.   The government “mismanaged” 
BANDESA in such a way as decapitalize the other cooperatives.  Fledderjohn recalls 
that:  
[FECOAR] had an experience in 1973-4 of selling products to members obtained 
from BANDESA at nearly twice their cost.  In 1975, the government agreed to 
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subsidize the cooperatives for losses incurred largely as a result of oversupply and 
sharply declining prices caused in large part by BANDESA imports (37).   
In addition to price gouging, in 1974-75, BANDESA overpurchased fertilizers, then 
dumped them in the FECOAR coops, who had to sell them at a fixed low price, depriving 
them of their main source of income for capitalization.  When the government promised 
to repay them with subsidies, they were given more excess to sell.  Therefore, both 
FENACOAC and FECOAR exist at the whim of the government. The program was now 
a tool for state policy.  These adverse conditions must have been more devastating for the 
FENACOAC coops, which did not have financing from the state.  Whether by accident or 
design, hobbling autonomous and USAID cooperatives opened space for DIGESA, the 
state run cooperative program.   
Despite these many misgivings, Fledderjohn’s end of program assessment was 
most hopeful about the emergent forums for political communication and organization.  
In particular, he was reassured by what he saw as the apolitical idea taking hold among 
the cooperative participants: 
There are some signs of increased inconformity and aggressiveness in some 
leaders which is the product of their increased awareness and maturity as 
representatives of a less privileged constituency.  It is difficult to imagine, 
however, that FECOAR leadership which is predominantly of Indian origin, 
would opt for a hard-line confrontation with the Guatemalan government, 
jeopardizing the possibilities for productive dialogue which have been developed 
in the early years of the institution.  If this prediction is valid, it would appear that 
the FECOAR cooperative network can expect not only a harmonious relationship 
with the government but also expect assistance which will be needed for survival 
and growth. (Fledderjohn 1976, 45) 
Fledderjohn makes the ethnographic observation of a decrease in anger, or at least its 
productive rechanneling.  He even predicts a “harmonious relationship” will emerge in 
the near future.  The important thing to notice here is what counts for Fledderjohn as 
“political” and therefore “confrontational.”   What is specifically prohibited from the 
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realm of proper, modern political behavior is the alignment with any movement that 
challenges the legitimacy or the power of the existing government and social order.  One 
can legitimately organize and enter into dialogue with this government, but one can never 
organize against it, nor can one push for demands that this government has declared fall 
outside of the realm of possibility.  
As neutered as this political vision seems, it was apparently too much for the 
security obsessed and democracy paranoid Guatemalan government to countenance.  
When the Guatemalan government took control of the program in 1976 they had already 
undercut the autonomy of many of these organizations. The state felt that the focus on 
economic integration and advancement for Mayans via autonomous political 
organizations was seen as too volatile of a message.   this became all too obvious in the 
early 1980s. By 1984, 100,000 rural Guatemalans were members of cooperatives (Handy 
1983).  In a macabre twist, the military targeted many cooperative leaders and members 
in the wave of counterinsurgency violence in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Brockett 
1988).  In addition to being “apolitical” like USAID cooperatives, DIGESA, as will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, did away with any notions of autonomy that 
still pertained to cooperative organizing. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The programs actual outcomes deviated sharply from this powerful vision.  
Studies of productivity and income levels for the participating farmers showed no real 
variation with non-participating farmers, much to the dismay of the USAID program 
operatives.  Also, they were too little too late to stop the revolutionary movement, which 
was already underway.  As this became evident, the Guatemalan military became more 
skeptical about the autonomous local organizations, which had gained thousands of 
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members in a short time.  These programs, with all their limitations, were deemed too 
revolutionary by the paranoid Guatemalan government. In the end, violence and 
militarization—and not development—ended the Mayan-guerrilla relationship.  Their 
failure in their central mission, however, did not exhaust the programs’ significance.  For 
Guatemalan and US policymakers, the cooperative program operated as a kind of 
transference.  It told Guatemalan and US policymakers that the major reforms they either 
did not want or already believed were impossible, were now unnecessary.  Guatemalan 
government officials, if not as enthusiastic as USAID programs about the autonomous 
political organizations, were at least exempted from external pressure for agrarian reform.  
Oddly, the program’s founding assumption—that the Guatemalan government would not 
implement agrarian reform and therefore other solutions must be sought—became a key 
part of the reason why the Guatemalan government should not have to accept reform, and 
also why the US would never have to pressure them to do it.  As is clear, the absence of 
political reform from the conceptual field of possible alternatives led to a direct encounter 
between the military and guerrilla organizations and the Mayan communities where they 
were integrated. It is hard to speculate, but it seems possible that, absent the existence of 
these programs and the optimism they generated about non-reformist politics, the 
counterinsurgency program could have taken a different turn.  I suggest that these 
programs might have played an important role in committing US and Guatemalan 
government policy away from reformist options earlier on, making the conditions ripe for 
extreme violence of the early 1980s. 
Optimism is a powerful, tangible, political force.  In this chapter, I have attempted 
to show how the optimism generated by new technologies shaped counterinsurgency 
strategy.  By closing off discussions of land reform, they normalized the system, and 
became part of the conditions under which genocide became seen as the necessary 
 215 
alternative to confront the guerrilla threat.  In conclusion, I want to draw a connection 
between the forms of optimism then, and the present day.  We must pause to reflect on 
the political alternatives rendered invisible by the optimistic discourses that see neoliberal 
reforms to property law and trade restrictions as effecting economic security and to the 
consolidation of Guatemalan democracy.    
                                                
NOTES 
1 The official justifications for the reversal of the agrarian reform were the following:  
politicized the peasant against the oligarchy; disregard for institution of private property 
which threatened the loss of foreign investment; the decline in agricultural production, 
the desire of the peasants to enter the wage economy, and sparking rural discontent. 
(Melville and Melville 1971, 110) 
2 Melville and Melville write instead that: 
In 1950, the Guatemalan harvest yielded 8,217,000 quintals of corn; in 1952 it 
increased to 10,711,000; in 1953 it descended to 9,400,000 quintals and then in 
1954 to just under 9,000,000 quintals, but still far above the 1950 yield.  
However, in 1955 the total dropped almost one million quintals from what it had 
been in 1954, and continued to drop further in 1956.  
3 Arevalo’s attempt at colonization had shown that it was incredibly costly and yielded 
few results.   
4 This same event led to the revolt of a handful of military officers on the November 13th 
of that year, who decried the agreement as a violation of Guatemalan sovereignty and an 
act of US Imperialism in Latin America. 
5 The Melville’s take this quote from Adolfo Gilly, an Argentinian writer.   
6 Kennedy spoke about the Alliance for Progress for the first time in his inaugural address 
in 1961: 
To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress. Our 
Alliance for Progress is an alliance of free governments – and it must work to 
eliminate tyranny from a hemisphere in which it has no rightful place. Therefore 
let us express our special friendship to the people of Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic – and the hope they will soon rejoin the society of free men, uniting with 
us in our common effort. 
7 They write that, “Dr. James Walker, from the University of North Carolina, a leading 
expert in the field, predicted that the lands would be swamps within five years if they 
were given over to agriculture.”  
8 They say that:  
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Just as had happened in Nueva Concepcion and in La Maquina [the previous 
colonies], as soon as people heard that lands were to be given out they began 
moving into the area so as to receive preference.  In July 1964, INTA warned that 
those who, without INTA’s authorization, moved onto the lands to be distributed, 
would be considered invaders and never receive lands.  INTA claimed that 
unscrupulous people were organizing landless peasants to invade the area.  In 
1965 a UN report on the colonization zone Fray Bartolome de las Casas stated 
that there were already 475 single-room houses of rustic poles and palm roofs 
with dam dirt-floors, housing approximately 3,000 people.  The majority of the 
homes had no latrines or baths and all were getting their water from an open 
stream.  Control of malaria was most difficult.  
9 The guerrilla movement included the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces, 
FAR), a Leninist organization aligned with the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabjadores 
(Guatemalan Worker’s Party PGT), and the Trotskyist MR-13.   
10 For a more detailed description of these events, see also Grandin, Greg. (2004)  
11 For more information about the colonization program in the Ixcan, see Manz, Beatriz, 
2004 and Garst, Rachel 1993. Ixcan: colonizacion, desarriago, y condiciones del retorno. 
Guatemala: Consejo de Instituciones del Desarrollo. 
12 In 1956, credit cooperatives were legalized in 5 towns in Huehuetenango: Santa 
Eulalia; San Pedro Soloma; San Andres Cuilco; Huehuetenango; and San Idelfonso 
Ixtahuacan.  By 1972, there were new cooperatives in Sta. Cruz Barillas; La Democracia; 
San Pedro Necta; Nenton; San Miguel Acatan; Chiantla; Aguacatan; San Rafael La 
Independencia; Jacaltenango; San Juan Ixcoy; San Mateo Ixtatan; La Libertad; San 
Sebastian; and Coatan.  
13 Obviously, this is not unique to Guatemala.  Akhil Gupta (1998) notes this as a feature 
of development discourses in India during the same period.  For a thorough and 
provokative discussion of the way that Malthusian ideas have worked their way into 
international regimes of governance as well as notions of modernity, see Ronald Greene, 
1999. Malthusian Worlds: US Leadership and the Governing of the Population Crisis. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
14 In the letter Mein applauds the Guatemalan military on their effective 
counterinsurgency efforts and warns against a change in US policy: 
There is little the Guatemalan Government or its security forces can do to prevent 
terrorist actions, and since it is well nigh impossible to know when and where the 
terrorists will strike, it is extremely difficult to take measures to prevent or meet 
such strikes. The only remedy, therefore, seems to be constant vigilance and to 
handle each incident as it occurs, while at the same time searching out the 
terrorists in the hope of eventually eliminating the problem. This is what the 
Guatemalan security forces are attempting to do. It is a very difficult problem 
which requires unpleasant, and at times unpalatable, remedies, and which cannot 
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be just wished away.” He also specifically questions the US support for 
counterinsurgency in the countryside and reluctance in Guatemala City.  In favor 
of widespread counterinsurgency, writing that, “I frankly fail to see the 
difference.”  
15 Fledderjohn describes the problem with existing cooperative in the following way:  
These organizations, although promoted by people and programs of high 
intentions and unquestionable faith in cooperative principles, were having serious 
problems and the incidence of failure was high enough to cause farmers serious 
doubts about the real value of cooperative organization.  The experience of these 
small, informally run, and feeble cooperatives gave ACDI plenty of evidence that, 
even with the advantage of resources from AID to “patch up” the ailments of 
existing cooperatives, this sort of assistance would have only short run affect.   
The cooperatives were ill conceived to deal with problems of administration, 
complex service demands of members and requirements of institutional survival 
such as capital formation, growth, economies of scale and ability to deal with 
competition. 
16 Fledderjohn describes the organization goals as the following:  
1) Sufficient area coverage to provide access by some 3,000 to 5,000 farmers.  
This meant that the cooperative would serve several communities within a radius 
of 20 miles of the administrative center.  2) With a member base this large, a 
volume of operations sufficient to achieve economies of scale in administrative 
features, purchasing and distribution would be possible. 3) Professional hired 
management, strict standards of control, accounting and handling of money would 
be absolutely essential. 4) Although the regionals were to be direct (individual) 
membership societies, the organization of farmers at the village (aldea) level 
would be essential for communications and the delivery of services.  Following 
these guidelines, ACDI conceived the regional, multi-service agricultural 
cooperatives as the primary institution within which a capacity to provide 
essential services to farmer-members would be built.  Six of these regional 
cooperatives were planned to eventually serve about 30,000 individual farmer 
members.  
17 Also see Brockett 1988, p. 110 
18 Davidson elaborates that, “BANDESA competes with the cooperatives by offering 






Chapter Five: Beholding DIGESA: Agrarian Modernization in Two 
Conceptual Systems  
 
The last chapter discussed the reasons behind the Guatemalan government’s 
decision to implement agrarian modernization programs and to introduce green 
revolution technologies in the western highlands. Its aim was to build an entirely new 
“way of life,” part of which was a new way of seeing the political and a new attitude 
towards reality in general.  Specifically, it wanted to construct a new kind of 
‘enterprising’, calculating, self-disciplined and market-oriented individual, capable of 
wresting a living from the meager opportunities in a forgotten corner of the national 
economy.  It wanted to penetrate into the everyday economic and subsistence activities of 
Mayans to create a productive relationship to the nation state.  It promised a new form of 
prosperity on the open market.  I hope I was able to convey the vast differences—both 
ethical and material—between this representation of a utopian political alternative and 
the desire for political reform at the grassroots.   
This chapter explores the way that one state agrarian modernization program—
The General Directory of Agricultural Services, (DIGESA)—was implemented locally, 
as well as the immediate responses of rural Mayans to these programs.  DIGESA, the first 
state-agrarian modernization cooperative development program in San Pedro, arrived in 
1978.  This was much later than in other parts of the highlands.  The DIGESA program 
had the widest coverage in the highlands and was the main disseminator of green 
revolution technologies, credit and discourses, and practices of development.  Prior 
cooperatives had emphasized these new technologies and credit, but had a limited reach.  
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My ethnographic research focused on the DIGESA program by asking the following 
questions: What pedagogical techniques were used?  What central narratives 
accompanied the implementation of the programs?  How did these normalize a particular 
notion of the self, society and politics along with new agricultural practices?  What were 
some of the ways Mayans responded to different aspects of program pedagogy?  Did they 
like some parts more than others?  Did different groups respond differently?  Why?  How 
did Mayans who participated eagerly in DIGESA’s programs view their participation in 
relationship to existing political struggles?  
In this chapter I examine the arrival the DIGESA program to Los Altenses, a rural 
Mayan village in San Pedro where I lived for seven months in 2004. The first part of the 
chapter presents data from several interviews with the local program director, a local 
Ladino, to describe DIGESA’s activities, pedagogical practices, and narratives.  Next I 
examine how different aspects of the program were understood and responded to by 
Mayan villagers, and how this view shifted in relationship to changes in the chaotic and 
divisive political situation around the time of its introduction.  For this part, I rely 
primarily on data from a Mayan man who participated in the program since it’s inception 
and worked for many years as village representative.  This comparison draws attention to 
similarities and differences between the frame through which the need for development 
was conceptualized by the program director and by Mayan farmers.  
The program director related of the need for development to a deficiency intrinsic 
to Mayan culture, which he sees as a bounded unity of backward superstitions and 
disempowering habits.  The goal of development was to replace these backward elements 
with modern, enlightened behaviors.  The village representative’s narrative shows how 
these same discourses of development appealed to local desires to counteract the 
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perceived effects of colonial domination and social exclusion, and made no recourse to a 
notion of cultural inferiority.   
This chapter provides the basis for the next two chapters.  Chapter six examines 
the longer-term effects of these discourses of development on local notions and practices 
of self and well-being.  Chapter seven examines how these notions of development 
infused Mayan political organization during the late 1980s and 1990s.  Chapter eight 
focuses on how these notions created new forms of discrimination and new norms for 
leadership that reorganized existing village hierarchies.  Chapter eight also shows how 
these new hierarchies figure into political divisions, and how these divisions played a 
central role in the ascendancy of the FRG in the village, and in the San Pedro more 
generally.  
 
AGRARIAN MODERNIZATION ARRIVES IN SAN PEDRO 
DIGESA was not the last development institution to operate in Mayan villages, 
even if it was the most significant. The most wide-ranging subsequent program was the 
National Coffee Association, (ANACAFE), a state-funded institution similar to DIGESA, 
but run primarily by large planters and whose efforts (credit, agronomical skills training, 
market pedagogy) focused strictly on coffee production.  DIGESA’s operations ended 
completely in 1996, when President Arzú privatized the sector public agraria along with 
other state institutions in accordance with neoliberal economic policies.  This work had 
subsequently been taken up, unevenly (and many say haphazardly), by NGOs operating 
with Guatemalan government or international funds.  In San Pedro, the most prominent 
development institution, and source of discourses about capacidad was ASODESI, the 
Asociación por Desarrollo Integral.  There were also a host of national and international 
NGOs such as the Spanish based Intervida, whose yellow and blue backpacks were worn 
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by children in most of the aldeas and in even among Ladino children in the town center.  
Asociación CEIBA, the development organization associated with the newly legalized 
left also has regular workshops in several villages.  Nevertheless, more than any other 
group, DIGESA’s operations, which ran the longest and had the widest coverage, 
consolidated local meanings of development, especially notions of individual capacity 
building, capacidad.  
I learned a great deal about how DIGESA’s programs were implemented locally 
from the former director, Ruben Vasquez.  Vasquez, a Ladino from an aldea in San Pedro 
not too far away from the town center and known for its excellent coffee, is the eldest of 
three brothers, each of whom are considered authorities on the discourses and practice of 
development in San Pedro.  Both of his younger brothers run successful development 
institution. One implements health and food aid programs, while the other directs an 
association of coffee farmers.  Hence the Vasquez name is synonymous with 
development. On these credentials his brother who heads up the largest development 
institution in the town, ran a campaign for alcalde in the past election, entering late but 
gaining a substantial following.  Ruben, who was self taught as an agronomist, was 
chosen as the local coordinator of DIGESA in 1978, and stayed on until it was dismantled 
by the privatization policies of the Arzu regime in 1996. Although now retired, Ruben is 
considered the ‘don’ of development in San Pedro.  Most Mayan villagers hold him in 
high regard and see him as a friend to indigenous people and an ally in the struggle for 
economic security.  As such, he is regularly invited to speak at public meetings where the 
key theme is development as well as advise different development programs.  In the last 
decade, he has become a very vocal proponent of ‘organic’ agricultural practices, despite 
the fact that he spent over a decade introducing chemical fertilizers and pesticides to local 
farmers, a role that he actively downplayed in our meetings.  Ruben is very easy to 
 222 
interview.  He is accustomed to presenting his messages in a dynamic, accessible way 
with a sense of excitement.  In addition to his work in development, he was an animador, 
or a lay preacher, in the Catholic Church for years.   
Each time we met for a scheduled interview, Rivas spoke at length, using the 
well-practiced tone of a teacher.  He described the overarching goal of the DIGESA 
program as that of “Making the campesino the creator of his own development.” To 
achieve this, agrarian modernization programs were to shore up the shortfalls in 
subsistence agriculture and to encourage farmers to shift to market agriculture. Trained in 
Xela as a guia agricola (agricultural guide), Ruben described his role as a “bridge 
between the agronomists and the entire community.”  He thought of his work as not 
simply introducing people to new agricultural technologies, but to spark a profound 
change self-perception and behavior.   He wanted to teach, “all the values of a human 
being,” values he perceived to be lacking in the communities where he had grown up. He 
explains: 
Look, we are superior to everything that there is in the world.  Of all that exists, 
every animal, we are superior to them.  Because we have intelligence.  You have 
free will to make decisions.  Those are the values of a person, what is called 
dignity.  In the Guatemalan law, it says that a person cannot be submitted to trials 
that violate this.  We cannot be humiliated, no one can oblige us by force.  I 
would teach them about their liberty.   
His first assignment was as director of the 4S club, which was similar to the 4H club in 
the US.  The four S’s were, Saber (knowledge), sentir (feeling), servicio (service) and 
salud (health).  He enjoyed being among and teaching the youth, and recounts the effect 
of these programs on creating a generation of leaders. “Some were alcaldes, others were 
in corporaciones, others were great community leaders, others are in the associations.” 
Afterwards, he moved on to be the director of programs for the older men as well.  When 
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I asked him why it there was a particular need for this message about values in these 
communities, he was quick to answer: 
What happens is that here in our culture—which is now getting better— there are 
those sayings, those phrases: ‘I can’t’, ‘I’m not capable’  ‘He can because he is 
smart.’  ‘The gringos look down on us.’  This mythology exists in the culture.  It 
still exists.  If that bird the pixcoy (a type of bird) is going to sing, there’s going to 
be bad luck.  For a Mayan this is bad luck.  This is a false belief.  There’s a lot of 
mythology.  I was trying to get rid of that, to improve it.  An animal is not 
superior to a person.  A person is superior.  I wanted to teach: ‘You are capable in 
your own life.  These mythologies do not help a person to develop as they should.  
In his view, the presence of the very form of self-respect and thought that he saw was 
lacking in the local population exactly the quality that made the USA great:   
In another part of the conscientización (consciousness raising), we talked about 
the gringos.  What do they do?  They go with their own values, they have done so 
many things, we now know that they went to the moon.  And us?  What have we 
done?  And you can, because you also have intelligence.  We have to make use 
our values.  That’s how a person creates a love toward their own development, 
because they now feel like a person.  But this is what is now being lost.   
Ruben wove this message in with biblical passages in Genesis where God describes how 
he made man in his own image, which he recounts as coming as a shock to villagers.  
Despite this shock, he recalls that DIGESA’s programs were quite interesting to the 
people in the villages.   
Observant readers will notice right away that Rivas’ descriptions prominently 
feature several key themes, narratives and metaphors and tropes of development 
discourse. A teleological narrative of progress, measured by technological 
accomplishment, places the US at the forefront of development and Guatemala at the end 
of an inevitable and staged theory of cultural evolution. Mayans are perceived to exist in 
a pre-conscious state, waiting to be awakened to human values by the pedagogical 
urgings of the development agent.  No positive value is assigned to Mayan culture; it is 
defined in negative terms, according to what it lacks, which is always development. 
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Intelligence can only be gained through interaction with these pedagogies.  The 
unquestioned goal of this development is to fashion an Enlightenment-style human 
subject, capable of using reason to extend their mastery of all matter and creature in the 
exterior world.  Mayan ‘culture’ is cast as feminine, dominated by ignorance, fear and 
pessimism—an obstacle to development; it is precisely when these are expunged, and 
replaced with new forms of subjectivity will Mayans become masculine, or free.  
Freedom is defined simultaneously as an absence of restraint on individual action made 
possible by an increase in technical knowledge and as a choice that individuals can make: 
to be free or to remain enslaved.  Interstingly, no mention is made of the prior 
participation of villagers in the autonomous cooperatives.  
These themes are consistent with the way that state planners imagined the 
programs.  However, his pedagogy is distinct from the one that was imagined by the 
state.  In order to make the program narratives about progress and development 
meaningful to his indigenous neighbors, with whom he has lived his entire life, he makes 
use of local understandings of Mayan culture common among Ladinos at that time.  
Mayans are culturally inferior.  They are conformists, who need to be awakened to 
understand that they are equal.  Because he is Catholic, Vasquez is a strong advocate of 
the equality of persons in Christ.  For him, however, Mayans have not yet realized their 
own formation in the image of God.  He needs to teach them.  For Vasquez, agrarian 
modernization was one aspect of a larger process of coming to Jesus through rational 
thought.  This is similar to the ideologies of the Catholic Action development programs, 
of which he was no doubt aware and approving.  Some of the rhetorical strategies in his 
repertoire come from the Santa Teresita, the local FENACOAC cooperative operating at 
the time.  His borrowings from cooperativist discourses will become more evident 
shortly. 
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Furthermore, notice that Ruben has little idea of the larger strategic plan being put 
into operation.  For him, nothing could be less about ‘politics’ than development.  Ruben 
was not politicized by the guerrilla.  Most likely this was due to the fact that he is Ladino, 
and from a heavily Ladino-populated village known for its political conservatism.1 This 
common sense relegation of the political to national elections and similar public 
spectacles makes him the ideal figure, perhaps, to implement the “apolitical” form of 
development idealized by Fledderjohn and others at USAID and in the Guatemalan 
government.   
Vasquez described how the DIGESA program was organized by village.  In order 
to participate, in DIGESA, interested villagers would form groups of around 20-30 
people each. All members, in the adult groups, were men with land. Some villages had up 
to three groups of this size.  Each group had a leader, or representative. Members, or 
socios would attend weekly, or bi-weekly meetings, where they would receive specific 
training.  Most important in the drive to make farmers independent was the adoption of 
new agricultural inputs, namely chemical fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and high yield 
variety seeds.  Several of DIGESA’s programs were tailored specifically for rural 
women.  DIGESA’s women’s programs focused on food preparation, nutrition, and 
hygiene.  They even appointed women’s coordinators in the villages, who would also 
receive a salary in exchange for their organizing activities.   
Practically speaking, becoming the “creator of one’s own development” meant 
two things: first, staying at home and farming ones own crops; second, raising marketable 
crops.  Each is an important part of the teleology of progress narrated by Ruben.  Prior to 
DIGESA, Ruben recalls sadly, Mayans had immigrated to the fincas (plantations) on the 
south coast every year to harvest fruit and coffee on the large plantations.  This work paid 
little, was physically demanding and damaging, and took valuable time away from 
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farmers’ attention to their own crops, which would suffer for various reasons in their 
absence.  
The Santa Teresita cooperative existed alongside DIGESA in San Pedro, but did 
not have as extensive of coverage in the villages and did not offer the same array of 
agricultural services or technologies nor as much credit or at the same rate.  DIGESA 
brought the latest in scientific agricultural technologies, including nitrogen based 
fertilizers, poisons, and herbicides, and high yield seed varieties of corn and beans, 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides were previously introduced on a much smaller scale.  
These new inputs could triple the output of most subsistence crops.  DIGESA technicians 
also showed farmers how to best use the fertilizers and how to select the seeds that would 
produce the largest ears of corn.   
Previous cooperatives operating in many areas throughout the highlands bought 
large amounts of fertilizers to lowered the price for their members, brought them to the 
communities, and also showed farmers how much to use and how to apply it for the best 
results.  DIGESA did the same, but went one step further to provide fertilizers free of 
charge on many occasions.  DIGESA thereby sped up the generalization of fertilizer use.  
Like the experimental USAID cooperatives, DIGESA also brought—again en masse and 
free of charge—high-yield seed varieties developed in US laboratories, and trained 
farmers in their use.  Many farmers also used these, but, as Vasquez and others pointed 
out, their penetration was much less than the fertilizers because there were many places, 
especially high-altitudes, where the new seeds would not grow. It might seem ironic that 
these kinds of self-sufficient agricultural approaches, what we might now call 
“sustainable agriculture” were implemented alongside the introduction of chemical 
fertilizers, products who have famously led to the dependence among rural farmers on the 
cash economy (cfa Green 1999).  
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Another important part of DIGESA’s plan to help farmers focus on their home 
farms was crop diversification, which would enable them to grow non-traditional crops 
that they could sell at a profit.  Before DIGESA, Vasquez recalls, most residents 
practiced monoculture—another example of their backwardness.  Instead of the 
traditional corn, beans, herbs and squash, DIGESA brought farmers seeds for vegetables 
that would grow in the local climate, taught them how to plant and care for them, and told 
them how to market them in different regional centers.  DIGESA agronomists planted 
community vegetable gardens, both to experiment with different crop types, and to show 
non-participating community members the fruits of working with the organization.  With 
much pride, Vasquez recounts his efforts to bring different kinds of marketable produce 
to San Pedro from all around the country, each time trying to find ones that would grow 
in the diverse climates in San Pedro.  Apples and plums worked the best.  
In addition to these emphases, DIGESA representatives stressed conservation and 
what they referred to as “appropriate technology.” Group members worked together on 
soil conservation projects, cutting terraces into steep plots of land so that the heavy rains 
would not wash away the topsoil. Group members shared the hard work of terracing the 
plots of individual group members.  DIGESA paid local associates for their work on the 
terracing projects.  Appropriate technology meant making the best use of what was 
available in the local environs.  They taught farmers how to make and use organic 
fertilizers out of compost.  Community members were instructed to collect any animal 
dung, fallen branches and leaves and food scraps to add them to shared bins or individual 
trenches.  In this way, the discourses of development distinguished themselves from pre-
existing practices, which are associated with a wasteful ignorance of local resources.   
Alongside group work projects were also a range of classes, inputs and services 
aimed to shift farmers towards market agriculture. The program provided low-cost 
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transportation to take products raised by group members to regional markets.  Equally 
important to the shift to market agriculture was credit.  Credit had been available 
previously through BANDESA, but the bank’s coverage was limited and loans went 
primary to larger or medium sized farmers. Technicians encouraged people to borrow 
money as part of a larger process of investment in the future.  These programs 
encouraged Mayans to become risk taking subjects, individuals capable of providing for 
their own well-being by calculating and taking risks, borrowing money against future 
profits.  Program agents encouraged a long-range world-view based in the empty 
homogenous time of capital.   
Practical agricultural techniques were accompanied by training in a number of 
specific techniques and suggestions regarding ideal ways of organizing and managing 
money and personal affairs—a new kind of home economics. The central themes of 
sustainability and individual self-sufficiency were foremost in the pedagogy of market 
agriculture used by agronomists. These were defined as modern and intelligent behaviors.  
These themes were presented according to a narrative of self-improvement through 
capacitación training and superación (economic advancement) through careful discipline 
and the calculation of risk.  Extension agents showed people how to tabulate their costs 
and expenses on a monthly basis, to be able to keep track of and manage their 
expenditures.  Investment was taught as an ongoing cycle of wealth accumulation.  
Money made through selling marketed goods should go to pay back loans, and then 
should be reinvested to bring greater rewards in the future.  Farmers were urged to buy 
more land to grow more crops for sale.   This kind of reinvestment was explained as a 
way to raise oneself out of poverty.  If someone made their own money, and lived off 
their own land, it was argued, then they would not have to go to the fincas and work for 
the patrons anymore.  Ideas of economic advancement were couched in terms of the 
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economic well-being of future generations, and farmers were encouraged to take their 
interests into account.  Agents told fathers to save their money to educate their children, 
so that they would become professionals and not have to live off the land.  Visions of a 
brighter, economically self-sustaining and slowly progressive future were a trope of the 
discussions of market agriculture.  
An additional core assumption running through these themes was the value of 
individual responsibility.  The subject of both capacitación and superación was the 
individual: people improved themselves and fought to ensure their own future financial 
success.   At first credit was given to all the members of the group, but was done so on an 
individual basis; and individuals were responsible for making good on these loans. If 
someone wanted to have enough food, and to be able to break out of poverty, they had 
nowhere to look beyond themselves and their own willingness to “be responsible” or 
“intelligent” by undergoing the personal discipline of self-training, savings, and 
calculation of risks. In fact, individual capacitación was promoted as the only track for 
economic advancement and well-being.   I expressed my curiosity to Ruben about what 
he, as DIGESA representative, told the farmers about the land crisis, given the presence 
of the revolutionary movement throughout the region at the time.  This is an excerpt from 
our conversation:  
NC: Were talking about an agrarian reform, or was that not one of your themes? 
JR: It wasn’t one of ours, but it was an important theme.  I’m going to give you an 
example.   
(He begins to pretend he were speaking to a farmer in a village) 
Marcos Gabriel Ruiz.  Ok.  And how many children do you have? 
“I have eight” 
OK. In how many pieces are you going to divide your land? 
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“I don’t know. Nine?” 
 Have you thought about this? Where are your children going to live in nine 
years? 
“I don’t know” 
What are we going to do in 20 years?   
(now speaking to me) 
It wasn’t saying to them “we’re going to take the land from him” but to think. If 
your land is small, you’ve got to estimar (calculate) it.  You can’t burn it.  Better 
production.  More sustainable. This was one of my strategies to talk about 
agrarian reform.  Think about the land.  Better work and more production.  More 
estimación towards the land.   
In this narrative, revolutionary change is not necessary for social well-being.  It is a 
question of individual farmers, using scientific methods, finding the best way to calculate 
the most beneficial combination of inputs and crops to produce their own livelihood from 
their individual plot of land.  Individual farmers were encouraged to critically examine 
their own choices and the relationship between these choices with future outcomes.   
The program’s pedagogy conceptualized development as an individual’s choice to 
submit to a process of “capacitación,” seen as the progressive abandonment of behaviors 
and attitudes seen as backward survivals of an inferior Mayan culture.  Here again, 
explicit and implicit comparisons were made between responsible and intelligent 
behaviors associated with capacitación and “Mayan superstition.” In each case, the 
program agent’s pedagogy invited rural Mayan farmers to choose to change their 
“defective” and “backward” selves, and to opt to align themselves with the modern, to 
join the forward march of history. The contrast was often expressed with reference to the 
metaphor of human life cycle, a move from childlike ignorance to responsible and 
intelligent adulthood.  And this was a gendered narrative, with mature modernity 
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achievable through individual discipline and the formation of a modern subjectivity—
each coded as masculine in relation to the ‘feminine’ of Mayan culture.   
In addition to the programs for men, added a few years later, were a variety of 
programs for women.  These were substantially different in their emphasis, which, 
instead of agriculture focused on hygiene, cooking and, occasionally, marketing locally 
produced foodstuffs and textiles.   Sometimes women would be given chickens to raise, 
either for food or for egg production.   At one point, women in Los Altenses formed a 
weaving cooperative, where they would put their money together to buy thread at a 
reduced price.  The women’s leader, Concepción, told me that one time she and another 
member of the group made a trip to Antigua in the late 1980s to sell huipiles.  
Unfortunately, after all of that traveling, no one bought anything.  “Sometimes there just 
isn’t any luck,” she told me. 
Working as a leader for DIGESA’s coordinator was a deeply ethical endeavor for 
Vasquez, who takes great pride in his role in bringing development to San Pedro.  When I 
worked with Asociación CEIBA, and living in San Pedro, I became familiar with the 
heroic role of agronomists and development agents, seen as involved in the important 
work of improving the life conditions of the people.  This demonstrates the “prevalent 
attitude that development experts understand the problems of target populations in an 
objective fashion, while the latter fail to see themselves how they ‘really are’ and 
therefore lacks the capacity and know-how to exit the cycle of poverty in which they are 
immersed” (Shepherd 2006, 36).  The dominant discourse on development in San Pedro 
is found throughout the highlands.  Especially among Ladinos living in rural towns, and 
among many prominent indigenous, these conceptions are inescapable—regardless of the 
political affiliation of the person that you speak to, right or left. Many Mayan farmers 
participated in DIGESA. Many other institutions followed, focused on similar themes. 
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APPROPRIATING DEVELOPMENT FOR SUBALTERN STRUGGLE 
Prevailing poststructuralist approaches to development would condemn 
DIGESA’s programs.  Poststructuralists would highlight the fact that these programs 
made essentializing assumptions about rural farmers, embraced uni-linear narratives of 
progress and attempted to “civilize” rural farmers and root out ‘cultural’ traits seen as 
pathological (Escobar 1995).  They would also criticize the way these programs intended 
to depoliticize poverty, replacing systematic political economic analysis with progress 
narrative and a work ethic (Ferguson 1990).  But each of these critical interpretations 
rests on a reduction of farmers’ decisions to participate in these programs as effective 
governmentality, and by extension, as a form of false consciousness.  These hasty, broad-
based assessments make the assumption that participation in these programs involves a 
form of ‘culture loss’, a notion that has been thoroughly critiqued by recent ethnographies 
for oversimplifying processes of social change, that often involve continuity and re-
articulation (Hale 1994, Warren 1998, Gould 1999, Garcia 2005).  Furthermore, such 
dismal conclusions, while helpful for alerting us to potentially insidious effects of 
development, also reduce program effects to their stated goals.  Programs are seen to 
have a unilateral functionality: we know the outcomes before we start (Moore 1999).   
Watts (2003) warns that embracing “anti-development”, the alternative proposed by 
poststructuralists such as Escobar, can lead to the uncritical embrace of some incredibly 
problematic movements, including radical Islam, whose message is predicated on a 
rejection of western development. The most strident criticism of the poststructuralist 
approach to development comes from Marc Edelman (1999).   He decries the fact that 
“flesh and blood human beings […] are conspicuously absent in most of the writing by 
postmodernist critics about ‘development’” (8).  As such, he argues, these criticisms 
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ignore specific cases, as well as the forms of inequality that inform local desires for 
development: 
It is not necessary to favor the conventional indicators employed by the major aid 
or lending institutions (per capita, GDP, etc) or even to adopt the increasingly 
problematical “Third” or “First” world categories at all to recognize that hundreds 
of millions of people are not meeting their basic needs for food, clothing, or 
shelter (or that alternative measures of this fundamental problem exist […] But 
what is striking about the postmodernist critics of ‘development’ is how 
frequently they exclude from view both the affected people and the relevant 
macroeconomic and social indicators.  They thus end up trivializing the day-to-
day experiences and aspirations of those who suffer by either ignoring their 
grinding poverty, by carping about the bureaucrats and social scientists who 
attempt to measure it, or by locating it and all efforts to reverse it at the level of an 
elite discourse. […] a discourse centered approach to power can lead to blanket 
cynicism about even innovative efforts for change.” (9) 
Edelman argues for an approach to development that gives priority to material 
inequalities and less to the problematic discourses through which these inequalities are 
often expressed and understood by development institutions.  He wants to retain the 
important insights of postmodern critics of development, but with more attentiveness to 
the desires of real people.  Yet, although Edelman’s criticism is helpful in understanding 
the limitations of the way that discourse-centered approaches have been applied to the 
study of development, he leaves some important questions unanswered.  It is unclear how 
we can focus on macroeconomic material inequalities at the same time as taking cultural 
difference into account. For Edelman, it is either one or the other. We should ignore the 
problematics of discursive constructions and focus on local needs.  People, regardless of 
their background, support development; therefore the criticisms of development discourse 
need to be placed to one side.  But is it not possible that marginalized populations have 
more than simply a positive or negative reaction to development?  Desire for 
development is never as simple as a ‘yes’ or ‘no’; and participation in development 
programs is often attenuated with severe misgivings. My ethnographic fieldwork in the 
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village of Los Altenses show a variegated response to programs which were desperately 
needed.   
His insight is that we do not ignore the reality of these desires, and not to think of 
them as ‘invented’ by the discourse itself. At times, however, Edelman seems to rely on a 
distinction between discursive and material impacts, and downplays the material impacts 
of discourse. More importantly, his valorization of popular desire and need does not 
address the question of governmentality: In what ways can development programs 
operate within regimes of governmentality that attempt to reformulate popular desires 
and channels them into approved and governable spaces?  Under what terms and 
conditions can short term transfers of resources and skills training be used within larger 
regimes of power that maintain the general inequalities that Edelman so importantly 
brings back onto the agenda?  To answer these questions, it is very important that we pay 
close attention to even subtle differences between the solutions offered in the name of 
development, and the desires for development to which these programs are formulated to 
respond.  Often there is a misfit, and one with serious consequences, including many that 
may not be evident in the immediate context of the development encounter.  Here the 
problem is that forms of resistance and desire for development are idealized as political 
alternatives, as opposed to thinking of them as context-driven and potentially 
counterproductive expressions of agency.  
 
RENARRATING DIGESA 
The villager in Los Altenses most closely associated with the discourses and 
practices of capacidad, and with the DIGESA program, is Arturo Bravo.  Arturo Bravo is 
in his early 40s, the son of AC activists in the village. Arturo Bravo has served for the 
better part of a decade as the head of the community development committee, now 
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known as the COMUDE community development council pace the COCODES part of 
the new law of decentralization.   Arturo Bravo is also very politically active, and has 
consistently played a key role in the political movement led by José Antulio Morales.  He 
has never had an elected position of his own, and claims not to want one, but takes great 
pride in his role in garnering votes for Chepe in the villages.  His recent re-assumption of 
the position as community development leader as well as his role local electoral 
processes will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter on development and 
community autonomy.    
Arturo Bravo’s first contact with DIGESA’s was through their youth program, 
club 4S.  Because most of DIGESA’s programs, such as terraces and new crops, required 
the participants to own their own land, DIGESA started this organization for young men. 
Already at the age of 18, Arturo was eager, bright and charismatic and could already read 
and write, qualities which led him to be named group representative for the 4S group of 
15 young men.   He also worked for two years, 1985 and 1986, as the community 
representative for Los Altenses to DIGESA, a young age to take on this role.  Arturo’s 
assumption of the role of village representative was controversial for another reason.  
Humberto Ruíz, Arturo’s great-uncle and about 20 year his senior, was the representative 
before Arturo when word came from DIGESA that local representatives were to be paid a 
salary.  It would be small, 300 quetzales a month, but even that was a quite a significant 
considering the price of land at that time was much less at the time and that most people 
in the village never received a salary of any kind. Arturo says that he was chosen for 
these abilities, and also that Humberto was a lazy leader, who often didn’t show up to 
meetings, or would show up late, and only wanted to take whatever small material 
benefits he could from being the local representative, and was not as committed to the 
mission of the program.    In Humberto’s version of the story, Arturo ambitiously and 
 236 
selfishly seized on the opportunity to steal the salary.  He went to the office in the town 
center to petition to be named representative instead of his uncle on the grounds that he, 
unlike his uncle, had gone to school and could read and write, and that these skills made 
it more reasonable for him to be the leader. Whatever the validity of either version, the 
position was awarded to Arturo who also received the salary.  As we will see shortly, this 
shift in program leadership during the period beginning in 1984-1985 would turn out to 
be crucial years for training of leaders in the DIGESA program.  
Arturo Bravo describes his experience with and impressions of DIGESA in terms 
very similar to those outlined by Vasquez.  Like Vasquez, Arturo Bravo recollection 
divides the time before and after the arrival of DIGESA as the difference between 
knowledge and ignorance.  Yet his narrative is different however; and these differences 
seem to stem out of a different perception of “development” rooted in a critical analysis 
of the circumstances in which, he, like other rural Mayans in San Pedro, confronted in the 
1970s:  
Because a person doesn’t know anything.  Before wasn’t the same as it is now.  
There is more capacidad of what one can do, that someone knows something.  
Before, there was no way of becoming capacitado.  And also at that time [when 
DIGESA arrived], we were very enclosed, we didn’t have very much liberty.   
The problem we had—problems always arise!—is that they didn’t allow groups to 
organize.  Before the same people begin to criticize, that you’re, whatever, like 
guerrillas. 
Arturo views capacidad as knowledge that imparts the knower with the ability to act, 
knowledge that previously did not exist. DIGESA represented the possibility of becoming 
a different kind of person, more free, more capable. He sees a net increase in freedom. 
The phrasing “because one doesn’t know anything” is the phrase Arturo uses to refer to 
the time before the arrival of the DIGESA program. Arturo views development as a way 
to undo, at least in part, the effects of a colonial regime of power on local ways of life.  
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Arturo speaks directly to the forms of enclosure mandated by the fact of the armed 
conflict. Like Ruben’s narrative, Bravo’s links knowledge with power. Yet Bravo’s 
conception of the need for capacidad, the sense of lack that motivated him and other 
villagers to continue participating in the program, differs substantially from Rivas’ in one 
important respect: their conceptions, at least at this time, of this prior lack were not based 
on something intrinsic to Mayan culture.  The critical assessment of Mayan cultural 
backwardness—so prevalent and pronounced in Vasquez’ telling—is absent in Bravo’s 
version.  This will, as we will see, change over time. When DIGESA arrived, however, 
villagers perceived their needs as generated in the first instance by the social exclusion of 
indigenous peoples; their lack of access is a symptom and a mechanism of their social 
exclusion.  This is similar to the AC discourse on development. 
In addition to countering these forms of imposed ignorance, and elaborating on 
his point about the military imposed enclosure, Arturo recounts villagers’ perception of 
DIGESA as a clearly antagonistic, but safer, alternative to militarism:  
There were groups of people in favor of the army, against the guerrilla, and others 
with the guerrilla.  We were threatened in the group, by the military 
commissioners.  They carried me off to the zone.  But the institution DIGESA 
helped us to avoid that.  For being leader they demanded that I go to the zona 
(regional military base).  But DIGESA helped me.  I was a minor.  It was always 
like that.  I defended myself.  It has to be born in myself because I am a minor.  
We went with the coordinator of DIGESA.  They gave me a notification so that 
they authorities would know. There was a conflict between DIGESA and the 
other part of the state, militarism. 
Arturo is speaking here, of course, of the years directly after the most brutal wave of 
military assaults.  DIGESA representatives even helped advocate on Arturo’s behalf in 
front of the military. It is a testimony to the strength of villagers’ convictions that so 
many opted to participate in these programs despite the fact that they risked 
confrontations with the military as a result (confrontations often brought on by the 
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actions of their own neighbors!).  Nevertheless, perceptions that DIGESA was linked to 
the guerrilla led many villagers, already opposed to the guerrilla, to oppose the program 
on the same grounds.  In Los Altenses, opposition to DIGESA, like opposition to the 
guerrilla movement, was most pronounced among villagers whose leading male family 
members were involved in contracting labor for plantations on the south coast and were 
military commissioners (spies for the army).  That these individuals were also 
evangelicals did not seem to be important for the decision of whether or not to participate 
in DIGESA as were the political distinction, especially as these same opponents became 
interested in themes of development after the war. The elements of the program that led 
some villagers to associate the program with the guerrilla, and to oppose them, were the 
same elements that led other villagers to have such an enduring interest in them.  This 
was not because they thought they perceived these two to be the same—they laughed at 
the naiveté of such associations—but because there was a similarity, in their eyes, in 
terms of their own goals and struggles.  It was, after all, engagement in a pre-existing  
struggles for development that informed Mayan villagers’ positive perceptions of the 
guerrilla movement, not the other way around. 
Beyond ideological opposition and fear, I discovered several other reasons why 
villagers decided not to participate in DIGESA programs.  Many thought that the group’s 
activities—at least in the beginning—were a waste of time, a distraction from other work.  
Others simply did not like to work in groups, and were accustomed to doing their own 
farming.  Distrust of the state—even among many of those opposed to DIGESA’s 
politics—was also a factor.  Rumors spread throughout the villages in San Pedro about 
the land terracing, soil conservation programs. After improving the value of the land by 
terracing, many villagers feared that Ladinos or the government would then come in and 
steal their land.   
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Despite these different reactions to the DIGESA program among villagers—a 
reaction heavily over-determined by the presence of the military—those who did 
participate did so eagerly.  The DIGESA program was able to keep their curiosity peaked 
by offering courses on a number of topics of interest, each one focused on improving a 
small aspect of economic life.  After listing the range of technical skills imparted to 
DIGESA associates, Bravo exclaimed: They trained us in so many things!  Bravo further 
recalls that in the early sages of the program the most popular aspect of the program by 
far was credit:   
Vasquez would come by weekly.  When he realized that we were well organized 
we began to look for credit.  We went to FEDECOCA.  We wanted to ampliar 
(make it bigger) but we had to no resources for seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, and 
fungicides.  We had the luck of getting a credit.  Vasquez did everything.  We all 
had a credit of Q100, the same as today would be about Q2000.   
They always helped us.  After we had been organized for 15 months, every 
person, they gave us an individual credit.  Me personally, after 15 months, I had 
Q300.  Three times.  I bought all the fertilizers and seeds.  My mother sold them 
in the plaza.  Q200 of profit, pure money.  We grew little by little, each one.  […]  
They began to get credit guaranteed.  They would take out a loan.  Before this was 
BANDESA.  Now it’s BANRURAL.  The people got organized, took out a loan.  
Two people put up the titles to their land.   If you didn’t pay your credit, the bank 
would take it over.   
Arturo’s estimation of the current value of the money offered in loans at that time shows 
how significant of funds these were.  They did not simply allow villagers to generate 
revenue from new crops; they were especially valuable given the lower price of 
productive land.  Whereas in 1984, a cuerda of coffee land cost approximately Q300, 
today the same plot would go for Q5000!  This provides contextualization why so many 
villagers saw the form of development offered by DIGESA as an important part of their 
struggle for advancement.  In those days, the risks associated with credit, while 
acknowledged and feared by those who did not participate, had never become a reality.  
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The immediate benefits of credit far overshadowed the potential risks.  What leaps out in 
Arturo’s narrative, the most important thing, was not the fact of credit itself, nor the 
possibility of planting and using scientific technologies.  Nor was it the desire to 
reconstruct a failed self out of a primitive, inferior Mayan culture.  Rather, most 
impressive is the way that participating villagers imagined DIGESA as a possible way 
out of poverty, and to combat the effects of their conditions of social marginalization.  It 
was not a perfect solution, but a slow process whereby individuals could eke out a more 
stable existence, one that gave them a little more freedom than was previously available.  
It gave them skills, little tips that, if practiced together, would allow them spaces to be 
independent, to be “responsible.”  
There is other evidence in Arturo’s narrative that local lack of development was 
seen as an effect of poverty and political exclusion, not as an intrinsic condition, 
regardless of what these discourses meant to policy planners or local representatives.  
One point of divergence regards the way that Arturo characterizes the fact that few 
Mayans received educations in the previous generation: 
Before like I said our fathers didn’t let us go to school.  It was for lack of money.  
And because before our fathers thought that going to school is a waste of time, 
one that was going to bring more poverty.  Through [DIGESA], the technical 
agents that came and capacitated the people and counseled them to keep studying.   
While the attitude towards the previous generations’ non-interest in capacitación through 
schooling is sympathetic: there is notably less tolerance in his narrative for people who 
decided not to follow this new path. I think it is significant. Arturo Bravo sees the prior 
generations’ economic fears as well founded.  Previously, with little opportunities outside 
of farming and going to the coast, farmers had no reason to believe that there were 
reasonable alternatives.   
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Arturo’s narrative of the need for development among Mayan villagers makes 
complete sense when considered in relationship to the Guatemalan state’s development 
policy towards rural Mayan communities.  The Guatemalan state did not promote 
schooling for rural Mayans, or any other kind of skills training, because of the pervasive 
fear of what would happen if Mayans become educated or economically self-sufficient. 
(Taracena 2005).  Guatemalan state, despite rhetoric of mestizaje, actually promoted a 
dual track of development that left Mayans out of state resources. The goal was, 
ostensibly, to keep a class of Mayans as Indians as productive labor for the plantations.  
This seriously calls into question blanket criticisms of development as governmentality.  
Even if development caused mestizaje, a point which has little empirical proof; wouldn’t 
mestizaje be better than colonial domination, especially if those were the only two 
options?   
Arturo’s narrative indicates that villagers in Los Altenses felt like they were being 
presented with two options: become capacitated or remain in poverty.   Possibilities for 
change, for the alleviation of poverty through DIGESA were now a concrete reality, 
proven by profits made through credit, through the ability to market new crops, through 
simply knowing more.   This was viewed as a collective effort to end poverty.  But the 
manner of participating in the struggle was in an important way different from previous 
struggles: each person had to internalize new norms and learn how to work in a new way. 
Accumulation of knowledge was crucial.  It was not the amount of land that one started 
with, but their ability to calculate it, to take advantage of it in the most efficient, scientific 
way that would lead to success.  
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SUPERACIÓN AS A LIVED REALITY 
State-led agrarian modernization programs, combined with Mayans’ desire to 
change their life conditions, paid off visibly, and did so in a relatively short period of 
time.  Arturo remembers this process clearly, making it clear that this was a defining 
moment in his life.  He narrates it with great pride:  
What they did was to begin to criticize the people who were organized. [They 
would say that the participants] didn’t know anything, that they were wasting 
time, and, what’s more, they don’t want to work.  [group members] were 
mistreated. They were shameless.  What they had in their minds […] they already 
had the custom of going to the coast to work with the people to gain their 
centavitos (pennies).  But they don’t think of the future.  They thought that just 
how they were they had to go on being all the time, but it was not so.  Now the 
people that were working directly in the group already had their vegetable 
gardens.  Maybe something always happens, there’s a sickness.  But there are 
your centavitos.  Now there are savings.  They [non-participants] were sad 
afterwards.  Sometimes a sickness hit them and they didn’t have anywhere to get 
money to the point that they had to sell their own lands.  This is the cause that 
there was.  Now the people were organized and they are the ones who have 
children who are professionals.  Those that did not continued the way that they 
were.   
Over a period of a several years, the opportunities for development presented by 
DIGESA proved to be a viable escape route from a longstanding form of predatory 
market exploitation.  Arturo explained: 
The goal of this is development.  Before no one knew anything about a family 
vegetable patch.  Afterwards, we saw the result.  It helped us.  Wherever one 
seeks development, with the little that one has, there goes ones little pennies.  
Before, all the people went to the coast, to the finca.  In this time, when the group 
formed, this [trend] went down.  Everyone would do their work and would sell 
there [he gestures towards the market] and the money would come.   
There was no need to go to the coast.  Only the people who didn’t like to work in 
a group continued to go to the coast.  But those that got organized saw another 
reality.  A person analyzed well what is development.  There was development in 
the community.  We all know what a vegetables are.  There was advancement 
superación.  DIGESA helped a lot.  Not to get out from under poverty all at once 
but they helped us a lot.  
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He continues: 
Everyone said that through this, a person is now responsible.  They begin to work.  
Something is achieved, like this in group.  According to what we realized, in the 
group.  The tecnico helped the people get out of poverty.  Even if we have just a 
little land, we can still have something.  Maybe not a big quantity, but more or 
less something to maintain our families.  So that our families don’t keep suffering.  
That we’re not having to put up with hunger.  That we don’t walk around without 
clothing.  Little by little the people learn how to work.   […] 
The economic effects of these programs on farmers’ lives were not immediately visible, 
but were probably fairly positive (Annis 1986, 33; Green 1999; Smith 1990).2  The 
success of these changes was only one factor in a small, but significant and noticed 
economic boom for many villagers that took place after the war ended.   The most 
important was coffee prices.  International coffee markets were stable since the end of the 
1970s in Guatemala; and production slowed dramatically during the violence in 1981 and 
1982.  From 1983 to 1987, however, coffee prices soared, almost doubling in 1985.  The 
second factor was credit.  Farmers who were given increased access to credit through 
DIGESA and similar programs, especially ANACAFE, were able to purchase land and 
covert it to coffee, or buy land already planted with mature coffee plants. Third, land 
prices were still low, about 100 quetzales per cuerda fully planted with coffee.  These 
low prices reflected the relatively small population size in villages at that time—almost 
half of what they are today.   They also reflect a time when 1 quetzal was equal to the 
value of 1 dollar.  Today the same land would cost Q5000, more cash than most farmers 
see in three years of coffee sales, especially when input costs are subtracted.  The fourth 
factor was chemical fertilizers, which, especially when applied with the help of technical 
expertise, increased production of coffee significantly, up to three times.  The 
effectiveness of these inputs had not yet slowed by this time.   Fertilizer prices went up 
steadily, but increased output meant that these costs were still acceptable.  Even if these 
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factors were more significant, it must have seemed that these programs were responsible 
for the results.   Indeed, in Arturo’s memory, many villagers saw their efforts at 
superación pay off in a substantial improvement in their lived conditions.  Even without 
taking into considerations whatever gains villagers might have made in those years from 
growing vegetables for local markets, coffee itself provided ample reasons to believe in 
the promise of prosperity from market development.  Of course, as Arturo reminds us, 
not everyone caught this train.  Only those who were willing to internalize certain norms 
regarding agricultural technique, economic risk taking associated with borrowing and 
investing, and the various forms of personal discipline necessary to see a crop from 
planting to harvest and sale.  
The passage of the worst of the violence and the establishment of the civil patrols 
brought, after a couple of years, a reversal in some villagers’ willingness to participate in 
DIGESA’s programs.  Arturo Bravo describes how members from the families who had 
previously not participated in DIGESA’s programs due to fear about their political 
orientation began to show great interest in capacitación after the Peace Accords:  
[the Lopez] realized that the people that were with DIGESA were doing better 
things.  It’s not in vain that they organized.  We were always looking for 
development.  It is worth the trouble to work with them.  They began to work with 
DIGESA.  The program ended. [the Lopez] began to teach each other.  They 
asked the Ruiz.  They did not want to teach each other.  I can’t understand.  On 
the other hand, the Bravo family, we had more confidence with the Lopez, even 
though they were critical [of DIGESA].  They changed their minds and formed an 
alliance.  When the [political parties] leaders came, well, we were organized, and 
that’s how we learned all that.  Alright, well, we’re going to sign our names.  
Between them, when the national reconstruction came I asked for a form to fill 
out all the requirements and they delivered it to me.  That’s when the Lopez got 
organized.  They also received their viveres (food assistance).  Because we gave 
the mano de obra (community labor) to make the road.  We worked.  We sent a 
solicitation to DIGESA so that they would give us viveres.  There [the Lopez] saw 
that DIGESA could work.  That is where the Lopez saw that the Bravo family had 
all the capacidad to gestionar negotiate whatever project, to find whatever kind of 
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help.  It’s worth it to unite with them.  In that way, we joined hands.  There was 
unification.  We the family, we didn’t say here, apart, are the Bravo, the Ruiz.  
The Catholic Action participants were the first to get involved with DIGESA and the 
most enthusiastically, just as they were more likely to participate in the DC cooperative.  
But they were not alone.  They were joined by other Catholics, from families that were 
later converts to the Catholic Action movement.  Many of them were less active in the 
church activities at the village level.  None of them played in the Church band or had 
been animadores.  They also had less land than the other families.  Their interest in 
DIGESA was more closely related to their political convictions, shaped by the revolution, 
than the new Catholicism.  Evangelicals were not interested because they saw the 
programs as associated with the guerrilla and therefore dangerous.  Later on however, the 
Catholic Action villagers formed a religious alliance with the evangelicals.  
 
A SILENT NORM: DEPENDENCY 
There was an additional aspect of DIGESA that did not fit within the narratives of 
self-reliance and capacidad, yet was nonetheless crucial to Mayan villagers attraction for 
the program.   In what came to be a regular practice, DIGESA provided basic resources, 
mostly foodstuffs like cooking oil, rice, and cereal—all free of charge.  These were 
known as viveres.  This had been a governmental policy before, but never on such a large 
scale.3  Strangely, DIGESA, despite its rhetoric of self-reliance and individual prosperity 
through hard work and the application of modern scientific techniques to farming was 
also involved in providing direct transfers of resources to community members.  Program 
participants were given many free inputs related to the community plots, from fertilizers, 
pesticides.  “There were a lot of gifts for the farmers,” Vasquez remembered.  Vasquez 
never knew why there was so much free, and surmised that perhaps it was a way of the 
 246 
US backers of creating a market for their products. After the harvest of the communally 
held plots villagers would divide the food itself, three to five different crops, most of 
which would be sold, but some of which they would eat immediately, together.  
Sometimes, there was in excess of 30 quintales (1 quintal = 100 lbs) per participant, 
which was a lot for community members.  All the participants would provide is the mano 
de obra Vasquez recalls that the men would call their wives, who would come and make 
a meal for all of the program participants.  Villagers referred to this as these harvest 
celebrations as pleasant affairs, which the villagers came to refer to as the “day of 
accomplishments.” In Arturo Bravo’s memory, “Everyone was happy.”  
Well, almost everyone.  On most occasions, viveres were made available only to 
program participants.  Over time, these were distributed to all villagers.  When only 
participants received them, others often became jealous.  Participants saw those who 
missed out as only having themselves to blame, given that participation was open to all 
interested villagers. It is now common for villagers to receive direct assistance from the 
government, mostly food assistance.  Chapter nine will elaborate on some of the longer-
term political effects of these programs.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Mayans in Los Altenses used program resources and narratives that were 
understood to further their existing struggles for economic security and equality, and, at 
least initially, ignored elements that did not match their interests.  Mayans selectively 
appropriated these discourses based on their own perception of needs, their own 
estimation of possible risks and rewards and their own understandings of history.  That 
not all Mayans responded in the same way indicates internal debates about goals and 
methods; but these debates also reveal shared goals beyond disagreements. 
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This close examination of DIGESA’s implementation further disrupts rationalist 
conceptions of policymaking as fiat by showing the vast distinction between ways that 
programs are imagined, and ways that they are put into practice on the ground.  Ladino 
local program representatives drew upon a body of racial folklore, as well as religious 
understandings, in their explanations of program objectives to rural Mayans.  It also 
provides additional insight regarding why and through what processes developmentalist 
discourses became dominant among rural Mayans. By calling attention to the conceptual 
sieve and forms of desire for improved living conditions shaping Mayan responses to 
DIGESA’s programs, this chapter revises current anti-developmentalist perspectives that 
equate development with governmentality, despite what the stated aims these programs 
might be.   Mayans who responded well to DIGESA’s programs did so because they saw 
their goals as consistent with their political struggles.  I also attempt to read Mayan 
responses to DIGESA serve as a sort of diagnostic of their political understandings and 
desires in that period, as well as to understand the implications of development in relation 
to existing forms of community authority.  One element that stood out in this story, and 
that seems to run counter to our expectations, is that Catholics, and not evangelicals, were 
more amenable to modernization and development, if only for the political meanings that 
were attached to it when it arrived.  
                                                
NOTES 
1 Several people I spoke with described his aldea as one where the least amount of 
guerrilla activity took place during the war.  They were also the most pro-PAC. 
2 Annis cites AID studies of cash cropping with chemical fertilizers that indicated a 
fourfold increase in farmer incomes (Annis 1986, 33). However, David Fledderjohn 
(1976) writes that these same studies indicated no overall economic improvement in the 
farmers.  Is it possible that AID published a doctored version of their study in order to 
maintain support for the cooperative program?  Carol Smith (1990) and Green (1999, 46-
47) describe the green revolution as a period of economic boom.  At the beginning, there 
was low input cost and high yield.  Later outputs dwindled and prices for inputs rose, as 
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did parasitic infestations.  But this decline did not happen sharply until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, when fertilizer prices went through the roof.  Farmers, whose land needed 
the fertilizers to be even marginally productive, were forced to keep buying in.  By this 
time, many farmers had achieved a relative level of economic security.   
3 In the late 1960s, the government created INDECA, which was part of ICTA.  INDECA 
was in charge of food supplies, mostly basic grains.  They would store basic grains, 
which they bought when prices were low, to distribute to the people in times of crisis—
either when there was a shortage or when inflation made food too expensive for poor 
peasants to purchase.  DIGESA regularized this practice. 
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Chapter Six: Nos falta capacidad: Developing New Values and New 
Selves 
 
Indeed the very idea, the very possibility of a theory of a discrete and enveloped 
body inhabited and animated by its own soul—the subject, the individual, the 
person—is part of what is to be explained, the very horizon of thought that one 
can hope to see beyond.[…]Our inquires would pursue the lines of formation and 
functioning of an array of historically contingent ‘practices of subjectification’, in 
which humans are capacitated through coming to relate to themselves in particular 
ways: understand themselves, speak themselves, enact themselves, judge 
themselves in virtue of the ways in which their forces, energies, properties, and 
ontologies are constituted and shaped by being linked into, utilized, inscribed, 
incised by various assemblages.  
Nikolas Rose. Inventing Our Selves.  (1996, 172) 
 
The last chapter described the way that some rural Mayans responded to state 
cooperative development programs, specifically program pedagogy and the central 
organizing narratives.  In this chapter, I examine how discourses and practices of 
capacidad, individual capacity development, have taken hold, calcified, and reorganized 
the conditions of possibility for subjectivity in Los Altenses.  More than any other 
program before or since, DIGESA consolidated notions of capacidad for Mayan 
Sampedranos.  This chapter explores what capacidad consists in for rural Mayans.  How 
do these new values, narratives, conceptions and practices suffuse the social and political 
lives of Mayan villagers? How do differently positioned Mayans appropriate, internalize 
or resist these discourses?  What spaces for possible forms of being human do they open 
and close?  How are these spaces gendered and racialized? How do they articulate to 
desire?  What is at stake in referring to these new selves as “modern”?   By living for an 
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extended period of time in one village, I became aware of a multiplicity of ways that 
villagers incorporated notions of development and capacidad into the warp and weft of 
their everyday lives.  Capacidad has become an important way for people to think about 
who they are and to create and inhabit a meaningful social world. Instead of attempting to 
deconstruct capacidad, to show how it is based on a notion of absolute difference that 
collapses in on itself, I want to examine its poetics, the more or less shared rules that 
govern how the term, and its correlates, operate to mark certain kinds of subjects as 
possessing, or lacking, a particular kind of quality or status (Clifford and Marcus 1986).   
Discourses of capacidad have generated a new poetics of self-making by 
rearranging the central narratives and practices through which people construct their 
experience of the self and the world. In speaking about sense of self, I am concerned with 
how one identifies socially, how one conceives of who one really is, personal habits and 
beliefs, including their notions of intelligent, moral or normal behaviors and the forms of 
ethical relationships that one cultivates with ones’ self and with others. Deeply related to 
the self is a notion of well being.  By well-being, I refer to conceptions of the material 
goods one needs to survive and be comfortable.  It also includes the practices through 
which these means are procured. I am particularly interested in describing the emergence 
of a new kind of self-awareness, a new kind of attentiveness to self that takes the 
improvement of capabilities of that self as an ongoing life project.  After capacidad, 
development now entails a subject-making component, a set of practices of self mastery 
and related forms of knowledge based in these aims. I argue that these discourses and 
practices of self-fashioning and self-management, despite their uneven adoption, fostered 
a new norm for self and a new way of establishing the relative value of persons.   
This is something new. In the traditional community hierarchy, status was granted 
to certain men based on age.  Many have described increasing economic stratification 
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among Mayans, in some cases beginning in the late 19th century (Grandin 1999, 
McCreery 1994).  Others have discussed the intensification of class divisions with the 
advent of cash cropping, which ultimately led individuals to challenge community 
hierarchies and cargos, in large part because of the extent to which these structures 
inhibited the accumulation of personal wealth and maintained Ladino dominance (Falla 
1978, Brintnall 1979). Grandin (1999) argues that urban K’iché sided with the 
counterrevolution in 1954, helping to consolidate power for the Castillo Armas regime. 
Yet there is no evidence to suggest that people thought of themselves as being 
substantially different types of persons, possessing different personal qualities and status, 
based on the extent of individual subjective transformations and forms of self-mastery 
offered by institutions (Anagnost 2004).  Ricardo Falla offers extensive observations of 
the traits and characteristics of a new merchant class in San Antonio Ilotenango, Quiche, 
many of them leaders of Catholic Action. He describes new patterns of consumption 
including increased interest in leisure items, luxury goods, especially associated with 
dress and personal hygiene.  His descriptions are organized on class strata, based on 
levels of available capital.  Nowhere in his extensive categorizations does Falla mention 
the term capacidad.  This was not part of the lexicon at the time he was working as a 
priest in the town, and taking ethnographic fieldnotes.  Fifty years later, this term is one 
of the most common ways that Mayans distinguish between people and identify.   
As was foreshadowed in the last chapter, discourses of capacidad appeal so 
widely among rural Mayans today because they have generated new possibilities for 
economic advancement and new forms of pleasure based on self-consumption.  They 
have also to increased the status of Mayans vis a vis town Ladinos.  Instead of replacing 
prior discourses and conceptions of agriculture or self, I show how villagers blend 
development discourses and practices with supernatural or non-scientific explanatory 
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framework, as well as alternative forms of identification.  It is not necessary to give up 
being Mayan to become capacitado; but this does not mean that nothing changes. My 
analysis suggests that state discourses of capacidad have transformed prior conceptions 
of development that existed in Mayan communities and that, in many cases, animated 
collective political struggles in the 1960s. At the outset, I want to make clear that I have 
no pretensions that this is universal for all Mayans—although I suspect it is widespread in 
the highlands—or that I have done a ‘complete’ job of describing realities for Mayans in 
San Pedro, or that such a description is either possible or desirable. This chapter will also 
serve as background for my analysis in subsequent chapters of how these notions fit into 
local political processes. 
 
NEW WAYS OF THINKING THE ‘SELF’ 
Today Mayans use a wide variety of ‘development’ categories to talk about 
themselves and about other villagers, and other Mayans in general.  These are a 
problematic that is being worked through, a way of “making sense of things” (Stewart 
1996).  Most significant perhaps is a clear distinction between villagers who were 
‘capacitated’ and those who were not.  Some people were labeled as “not wanting to 
develop.”  Along with these were the superados—people who had “already made it” 
economically.  In what follows, I will provide ethnographic examples of people who 
either identify as or are identified by others, each of these categories.  Ethnographic 
descriptions of these “figures” exemplify the salience of these capacidad-generated 
categories in people’s lives.  These representations are “social facts,” malleable and 
culturally constituted, but which cannot be simply wished away.  These descriptions 
demonstrate that these are categories are not bounded and self-identical, but highly 
interrelated and mutually dependent.  They constitute one another in a relay, helping to 
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form a complete and coherent reality.  Since its emergence, this reality was tangled up 
with constantly regenerating affective formations, narrative structures, ingrained habits, 




Capacidad, which translates roughly to capacity or ability, is a blanket term 
commonly used by rural Guatemalans—both Mayans and Ladinos—to refer to a person’s 
level of development. There are two major senses in which the term is used. In the first, 
the term refers to an individual’s schooling: the ability to read, write and do basic math.  
A second sense of capacidad connotes the skills and knowledge about particular 
technical tasks received through involvement with institutions and technical experts. The 
difference between capacitated and less capacitated as an farmer, for example, is based, 
roughly, in the extent to which one is seen and sees one’s self as a fluent practitioner of 
modern agricultural practices, as defined by DIGESA, or by some other institution staffed 
by agronomical experts. The notion existed before DIGESA.  It was part of the assumed 
biological difference between Mayans and Ladinos—Ladinos had it, Mayans did not. 
Versions of the term were probably introduced along with AC programs and in many of 
Guatemala’s evangelical religious groups.1 But I think DIGESA, along with other 
cooperative development and agrarian modernization programs, added to its meaning, 
and consolidated an authoritative understanding of the term, which they made available 
to a large number of people, regardless of religion.  Less often the term is used to refer, 
less specifically, to a particular outlook on the world and a way of carrying and managing 
one’s person. The ways of being capacitado are mutually independent: a person does not 
have to be educated in a school to be considered capacitado, although it might help you.  
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And, obviously, they are not exclusive terms because one can be capacitated in all three 
ways at once. In every usage, but especially in the second (capacitaded vs. uncapacitated) 
it is a relative term in that each person can be located on a particular location on a neutral 
scale, with, supposedly, infinite gradations.  It is important that the scale applies to all 
people: Ladinos and Mayans alike.  This universality is an important part of why it was 
interesting to Mayans in the first place: attaining capacidad meant being equal to Ladinos. 
Gringos—not an unimportant figure in narratives of capacidad!—are universally 
assumed to possess even more capacidad than Ladinos. I am particularly concerned here 
with the first two—capacitated and un-capacitated; but will discuss all three meanings of 
the term in these examples.  
Yet despite the prevalence of these discourses of development and capacidad, 
only a small number of individuals—small as a percentage of the entire village—became 
seen as having truly attained a high level of capacidad.  To be considered capacitado 
(past tense) a complete high school education was not a requirement, as this had been 
unavailable to most men of the previous generation.  But literacy—the ability to speak, 
read and write in Spanish at a basic level or better—was almost always necessary. Those 
that have attained a high level of capacidad are usually well-known, as they occupy 
leadership positions. Capacidad is—as is obvious from in most senses I’ve just 
described—deeply wrapped up in what it means to be a man, or, should I say, with 
dominant notions of masculinity and femininity. This grows out of and reinforces the 
tendency in rural Guatemala for parents to favor the education of their male children over 
the female, especially given the financial inability to do educate all children. There is a 
sense in which capacidad is a route to gender equality.  Being capacitada allows a 
woman to speak and act with authority in spaces and on matters that have historically 
been reserved only for men. Yet, all other things being equal, the capacidad of 
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capacitated women is never considered equal to that of capacitated men. And even in 
these cases when women are more capacitated than men, women’s ability to lead was 
limited to other women in the village.  Only men were considered viable leaders for the 
entire community. To expand our knowledge of what it means to be capacitado, I will 
provide an ethnographic sketch of another man I came to know in Los Altenses who 
embodied these norms: Juan Jiménez. 
 
JUAN JIMÉNEZ 
Juan is a good friend and neighbor of Arturo Bravo. He was present in the front 
row when I asked permission from a village meeting to come and live and research there.  
He looked me straight in the eye with a knowing expression.  Juan is relaxed, and not at 
all timid to speak to people from outside the community, as is often the way that Mayans 
approach with outsiders.  At the time of my fieldwork, Juan was the head of the Padres 
de familia (parents) committee, whose job it was to facilitate communication between the 
villagers and the director and staff of the village school, who were almost all Ladinos 
from the town center or from Huehuetenango.  Juan, in his late 30s, was originally from 
another aldea, but had married a woman older than himself from Los Altenses and settled 
there in the house of her father, who possessed a great deal of land and was now quite 
elderly. Juan has inherited a great deal of land for coffee and corn from his father-in-law, 
a man who had himself participated in the earliest village development committees.  In 
the years prior to my arrival, Juan had worked on several committees, and was currently 
involved in the most prominent development institution in the town ASODESI. 
Juan and I spoke on several occasions, many formal and others informally.  I 
enjoyed his quick wit and somewhat irreverent attitude, and he seemed to like to listen to 
my perspectives.  With these ingredients, we became friends.  One of the first things he 
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told me when I met him was that he had taken several courses with ASODESI and 
currently worked for them as a health promoter.  He also mentioned on several occasions 
that he travels a lot in different municipios because of his work as a health promoter.  
Speaking about content learned in specific courses with development institutions in hopes 
of gaining particular titles was standard fare in my conversations with community 
members who had earned such credentials.  Most of the people who had been trained in 
such a manner, Juan especially, were more keen to speak to me than most, and befriend 
me.  They wanted to be associated with someone who they immediately assumed to 
possess a demonstrably high level of capacidad.  Still, at times Juan, and many others, 
would be too busy to humor me, as I was a very low priority. 
When I met Juan at his house on one morning for a scheduled meeting, his wife 
told me that he was around back in a field behind the house.  I went down the trail not far 
to find him.  He was there, expecting me, in what appeared to be a recently tilled empty 
field. One friend he met grows papaya, and told him how to make money from it.  Juan 
wants to grow Hawaiian papaya because they are smaller and sweeter tasting and also 
because, hopefully, they will grow in Los Altenses. “I cut all the coffee plants down.  My 
neighbors, the people here, they thought it was crazy.  But they do not understand. Now I 
don’t want anything to do with coffee.” Juan is gambling, in an educated and informed 
way, that papaya sales will allow him to make much more than he would have made 
simply growing coffee.   Earlier last year, Juan sat down and did the math.  Calculating 
days worked, fertilizers, and transportation costs, Juan reasoned that he was losing money 
to the tune of Q150/quintal, growing coffee. “Coffee doesn’t pay” Juan informed me 
decidedly.  Now that the prices have recovered, some people profited, he explained, but 
little enough to where the promise of diversification is sounding better all the time, 
especially because “coffee requires so much work.”  Juan already keeps bees and sells 
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their honey, through ASODESI, which exports it.  When I mentioned the idea of 
exporting some of the local varieties of wild mushrooms, he said that he had already 
discussed it with an ingeniero.  He proudly informed me that he knew so many 
ingieneros because he meets them in his travels to other towns, where he seeks out 
contacts with experts.  The same man “ya se supero” (already made it) selling papaya, 
and Juan clearly intends to do the same.  A week before we met, Juan had invested Q425 
on papaya seeds.  As he took me around the plot he had cleared for them, he told me he 
had paid a discounted price he arranged through an agronomist friend. He can get 80 
trees/cuerda, each of which fruits every six months.   He figured he will sell the papaya 
for Q5/each, regardless of their somewhat small sizes.  “The problem,” he said with a 
grin, “is that no-one knows what they are yet.”  I suggested that he slice one open and 
offer samples so that the people learn.  Juan nodded and laughed.  Later in our 
conversation, Juan talked about the type of production in the large coffee fincas.  He said 
that they used tools to level the rows to make sure that no water escaped.  “Perfectly 
even!” he exclaimed.  They also use two applications of chemical fertilizers, and another 
organic fertilization every two or three years, he noted.  Juan harbors a great admiration 
of the craft of the large farms. 
Juan shows how the ideals and practices of capacidad have been picked up by 
rural Mayans and integrated into the construction of new sense of self and well-being.  
Juan takes calculated risks, experiments with new crops, thinking of how to use scientific 
knowledge to take the most advantage of his area.  He is not limited to the “safe” cash 
crop of coffee, which he clearly sees as a thing of the past.  Juan always looks for new 
opportunities to learn new things.  Each of these traits, new aspects of his persona, work 
together to give him an elevated status in the community, as most members regard him as 
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a highly intelligent person, one of the most capacitado in the entire village.  Juan clearly 
enjoys this identity and is greatly invested in it. 
While some aspects of the new agriculture have caught on, others are less 
popular.  While chemical fertilizers caught on for good, and are now almost necessary, I 
spoke to few farmers who still use organic fertilizers, at least to supplement the use of 
chemicals.  And almost nobody grows vegetables for anything other than their own 
consumption. Juan is the exception.  Coffee is almost the only export crop, and probably 
for good reason, given the climate of the town.  Furthermore, existing agronomical 
knowledge did not disappear with scientific agriculture.  These reveal a mixing of 
scientific discourses and practices of agriculture with local explanatory models (cfa 
Gupta 1998).  Scientific explanations for soil quality and yield depend exclusively on 
measurable aspects of chemical processes, amounts of nitrogen, nutrients in the soil, seed 
variety, and the like.  Most Mayans are familiar with these scientific terminologies, at 
least at the basic level, and tend to use them.  At the same time that they use these 
discourses, many Mayans discuss these processes in terms of the sufficiency of 
insufficiency of fuerza (force).  Fuerza is the basic life energy shared by both the soil and 
the fertilizer; it is what gives them their generative potential.  When I asked, for example, 
why yields were low in these areas, or why they had been lowered over the last 30 years, 
and why more fertilizer was necessary, one farmer replied that the corn today didn’t have 
any fuerza. As I discussed in chapter 3, most attribute this lack of force, at least in part, to 
a governmental and multinational capitalist conspiracy regarding chemical fertilizers—
another example of blending explanatory frameworks.  Although this could be seen as 
shorthand for complicated scientific processes that require intensive studying to 
understand, this would miss the important fact that Mayans maintain, independently of 
these explanations, a theory of life force, which transcends the scientific reductive 
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notions of why crops grow.  Thinking in terms of fuerza is of more than anecdotal 
importance: it directly influences how farmers think about farming and farm.    
There are more examples. Quite perplexing to Guatemalan agronomists is Mayan 
farmers’ persistence in growing corn.  It would make more economic sense, and be much 
less work, the experts argue, to grow only non-traditional crops for export, or, at least 
marketable crops.  This is consistent with the neoliberal discourses of development 
nationally that see individual production as the key to economic prosperity for rural 
Guatemalans.  However, all Mayan farmers in Los Altenses—even Juan Jiménez and 
Arturo Bravo—grew corn for their own consumption.  Aware of the justifications offered 
by agronomists, farmers want to grow their own corn because they love the taste of fresh 
corn, which figures into literally dozens of local dishes.  They especially love roasted or 
boiled elotes corn on the cob, with a generous amount of salt, lime and chile.  The 
villagers I lived with looked forward with great gastronomical anticipation to the corn 
harvest; and when this would happen (it’s exact date of arrival depended mostly on the 
amount of rain) was the topic of many an informal conversation.  In addition to taste, 
many told me that they feared what would happen if they found themselves without 
money and out of food as well.  Having their own supply of corn they at least had 
something, even if they had to supplement it later. Although I do not have sufficient 
evidence for this point, an additional reason why farmers worry about being without corn 
might be related to many peoples’ understanding of the fuerza that fresh corn, grown 
from their own land and sweat, gives to the people who consume it.  At risk of going out 
on a far limb, this link is possible given the association many Mayans share regarding 
their own level of respectfulness and their agricultural production. 
Finally, like others have mentioned in regards to the Q’eq’chi Mayans in Alta 
Verapaz, many Mayan farmers in San Pedro continue to observe traditional practices of 
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personal discipline before planting corn, including abstaining from sex, consumption of 
alcohol, and other polluting activities for up to thirty days before planting (Wilson 1999).  
Asking permission from the lord of the mountain, or witz, is also required.  One farmer 
told me that it was vital that one have a serious attitude, not to be joking around, the day 
that one goes to plant.  It is a solemn occasion.  Farmers see these practices as respect to 
the supernatural power of the witz, a being that can, depending on their disposition, affect 
the fuerza of a crop.  Another friend of mine from Los Altenses suggests that these 
practices are not widely observed like they used to be.  Perhaps this is because Los 
Altenses, due to its location near the town center and, therefore, nearer discourses and 
practices of development. Of course, how different systems of agrarian knowledge 
combine with scientific forms must vary throughout the region.  The extent to which this 
is the case falls outside of the concerns of the present 
Another indicator of the reticence of Mayans to fully internalize the dictates of 
development experts is that the vast majority of farmers who consider themselves 
acolytes of high-tech agriculture have still not made the move to organic coffee.  
ASASAPNE’s director regularly expounds that foreign purchases want organic, shade-
grown coffee, and will pay more for it.  Agronomists like Ruben Vasquez decry the use 
of chemical inputs and insist that only organic agriculture, while it produces less output, 
is sustainable. But villagers doubt that their poor fields will produce without chemicals, 
even though some of their neighbors have made it work.  “The soil is accustomed” many 
told me, using another phrasing that does not necessarily contradict the scientific 
understanding of the problem, but that nonetheless personalizes land in a way that seems 
to most of us to be quite unscientific. Others concede that it might be possible to make 
the switch, but think it would just be too much work for it to be worth it.  I spoke to 
several who switched to organic production, and then switched back, discouraged by all 
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of the extra labor hours and rigorous organic standards required for such a small 
difference in price per quintal.  Given the lowered production, and the marginal 
difference, most villagers are content to continue suffering through the yearly inflation of 
chemical fertilizers.  Some would prefer not even to farm coffee. 
Capacidad is also important outside the realm of agriculture.  One Sunday 
afternoon after the market had died down, I ran into Juan at a local cantina where I would 
often go on Sunday afternoons in hopes of finding people I knew when they had some 
free time to talk, and also to enjoy a few cold beers of my own. Juan was drinking beer 
with two young men from the village.  The youths were not drinking as much as Juan, 
despite his prodding and invitations, but were listening patiently to his advice.  Juan was 
telling them about the importance of having “vision” and a “mission,” arguing that both 
were necessary for a person to be successful.   Vision was the goal, and the mission were 
the concrete, everyday steps one would need to take to get there.  These were lessons he 
had learned—perhaps overheard—while working for ASODESI.  As the young men—
both high school graduates—listened, it appeared they were humoring him by sitting 
quietly, slowly sipping their drinks and nodding at appropriate intervals to the important 
points in his rant.  I got the distinct impression that this was a lecture they had heard 
before, but nonetheless enjoyed listening to, or at least tolerated.  He continued talking, 
somewhat repetitively, for several minutes, making sure to mention how much he has 
learned by traveling about to different municipios, making friends with professionals, and 
constantly remaining open to learning new things.  Juan exudes confidence, often to the 
point of being arrogant.  He enjoys being the one giving advice, mostly about what it 
means to be intelligent and to lead a smart life. This confidence is clearly born out of his 
conviction that he most closely approximates intelligence, as defined by capacidad. 
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Some villagers have evidently grown a bit tired of Juan’s self-importance, which 
had definitely made me uncomfortable on several occasions.  One evening I was sitting 
down on a log with one of Juan’s neighbors who lives by the side of the road that runs 
through the village.  Juan and the man did not talk, but exchanged a harsh stare with one 
another.  Juan was clearly angry.  I later found that the basis of the hostility was that the 
man I was with had been teasing Juan, saying he was from the neighboring town of San 
Juan.  Juan is actually from Rio Ocho, the most remote aldea in San Pedro.  The joke is 
about the name Juan, and also Juan’s mustache, which is typical among Mayan men from 
San Juan, who still retain their native dress.  This seemed to me to be a way to take Juan 
down a notch in his pride.  Juan’s difficulty in taking the joke seemed to me a sign of the 
strength of his investment in his persona as a person who should be taken seriously.  
 
ARTURO BRAVO 
Arturo, present in the last chapter as the village representative to DIGESA in Los 
Altenses, exemplifies similar characteristics. He and Juan are close friends, and often can 
be found having drinks together on Sunday afternoons.  Both show their status through 
their consumption of food as well.  Arturo, one of only two men in the village who can 
said to be anything close to ‘fat,’ has earned the nickname “gordo” for his soft, round 
belly that is visible through his shirt, which was always tucked in beneath his belt.  Both 
men work with a local Ladino-led development organization. When I first met the 
community development committee in Los Altenses, Arturo spoke the most.  More 
importantly, both have a deep investment in their status as village leaders.  Arturo 
proudly described on several occasions how this was his second time to serve as president 
of the committee, and that the community had recently asked him back because the other 
committee had failed in their duties.  Although it was a lot of work, Arturo says he 
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agreed, in hopes of promoting development in the community and to continue with the 
accomplishments that he had made in the past.  He recounted with pride that during his 
term as president, they were able to get the school building we were in, as well as the 
road, a potable water project in one zone, and other improvements.  Other committee 
members, two women and another man, the young alcalde auxiliar, were quiet, mostly 
nodding.  At the meeting where I presented my plan to research to the village, it was 
Arturo who spoke on my behalf, arguing that my research would be good for community 
development.  Arturo is an active and capable participant in village and church meetings 
and even at town level meetings with Ladinos present.  He has no fear of giving his 
opinion in front of groups; in fact he appears to enjoy this immensely.  Like Juan, he has 
a tendency to brag about his level of capacidad and of the projects that he has attained for 
the village.  One evening, months after my arrival, and after a few drinks, Arturo 
reminded me to me that, “If it were not for me, you wouldn’t be here.”  This assertion of 
dominance and status led into of a larger discussion of his leadership skills and 
credentials, traits that mark him as a true leader.   
 
CONCEPCIÓN BRAVO 
Concepción Bravo is a woman who is considered highly capacitated.  She is a 
single and in her early 40s.  Until last year, when she adopted a child, she had no 
children. Concepción lives with her sister, who is also single, but has two daughters, each 
from different men.  The sisters share the responsibility of caring for their aging parents, 
who would not be able to live on their own.  Concepción has a sixth grade education, and 
says she didn’t want to do more than that.  Most important to her identity as a capacitated 
person was her employment as the local representative for DIGESA’s women’s programs 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  Both her and her sister worked closely with a Peace Corps 
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volunteer when he worked in the village, and still remember him fondly.  When I asked 
her why she was chosen to be the local coordinator for the DIGESA’s women’s 
programs, she said that she could speak Spanish, and was not afraid of strangers, 
particularly foreigners. Concepción is active in local development, almost every form. 
There are very few women, especially from her generation, like Concepción in Los 
Altenses.  Concepción associates with a fairly close-knit group of women leaders in the 
village, the majority of whom are also from the Bravo family.  They, like their husbands, 
are considered the most capacitada in the village.  One day I met a young woman while 
walking home from the town.  She was a recent high-school graduate who stood out to 
me by being both curious and outgoing enough to not be afraid to strike up a serious 
conversation with an outsider, and a male outsider.  I later found out that she was a leader 
among her peers (men and women)—one of the best athletes and academics of the young 
women in the entire town (Mayan or Ladino).  When she found out that I lived near the 
Bravo family, she remarked about how much she admired Concepción, describing her as 
“muy creativa.” very creative.  It was true: Concepción had a very distinct way of 
carrying herself, a sharp sense of humor, and brought creative, positive energy to many 
situations.  
Now that DIGESA is closed, Concepción stays active.  She serves as one of the 
two women on the new COMUDE, headed up by Arturo Morales.  The other is an elderly 
evangelical woman.  Whenever there is an announcement from some institution or other 
about a project for women in the village, Concepción, tells others, arrives and signs up 
herself.  She attends a number of meetings that are not for projects, but for 
capacitaciónes, sometimes walking to the town center, or taking the long bus trip to 
Huehuetenango.  She is active in the Foro de Mujeres Huehuetecas,2 a government 
sponsored women’s organization, and also goes to talk given by the Defensoria Mayan, 
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Asociación CEIBA, and I remember when she went to a presentation given by 
CONAVIGUA. Often, she serves as the translator between development organizations 
and women in the community, many of who cannot speak well in Spanish. Concepción is 
a devout Catholic, and is active in church organizations.  She is a member of the 
women’s church organization Maria Auxiliadora, and attends weekly meetings. When 
talking about DIGESA’s programs, Concepción often mentions how she learned how to 
bake a cake on top of her comal.  I asked her how long it had been since she did that, and 
she told me she did it a lot for a while, but that it had been years.  It reminded me of 
talking to my mother about learning how to make macramé plant hangars. 
Economically, Concepción is fairly comfortable relative to her neighbors.  She 
has already inherited from her aged parents some productive coffee land, and does her 
best to keep it up. Sometimes she works it herself, but often she hires help.  She has a 
substantial cash income, and always has cash for emergencies.  Her decision to adopt, in 
addition to being unusual, was a very expensive decision.  Because she cannot breastfeed, 
she had to pay nearly Q50 a week for formula. Like most women in the village, 
Concepción many spends her days weaving, mostly guipiles (blouses), cortes (skirts), or 
morales (handbags).  Some of these are for sale, but most of them are for one of her many 
nieces, for whom Concepción and her sister are parental figures. This does not make 
much money, but Concepción enjoys it. She is talented and takes pride in her work. 
Concepción has also tried enterprising with her weavings before. Years ago there was a 
cooperative system for buying thread for weaving, and Concepción would like to start 
another one.  But she complains that local women too are distrustful of group leaders who 
hold their money.  There are always accusations of theft.  Therefore it was not worth the 
trouble.  
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I first met Concepción at the meeting with the COMUDE before I asked the 
village permission to do my research there.  When I started doing oral history interviews 
in the village, I offered her a job as a translator.  Arturo suggested that I ask her to help 
me.  He told me that she spoke Spanish well, and had worked for outside organizations 
before.  “Ella no tiene miedo.” (She is not afraid) he said.  That would not be the last 
time I heard that said about her.  He mentioned her employment with DIGESA, which 
also made me eager to meet her.  Beyond those qualifications, most men were far too 
busy with their own work during the day to help with such a task, as were most married 
women.  When we began interviews, she was very helpful.  Although she was not 
particularly interested in the interviews themselves, or overly curious about my research, 
she easily grasped the kind of information that I was trying to find out and was a quick 
translator.  Disinterest aside, she struck me immediately as an intelligent, insightful 
person, and also good humored and irreverent. I got to know her much better when, a few 
days after she found out that I was looking for a place to live in the village, she offered to 
fix up an abandoned home in the same cluster of houses and hers and her brothers.  The 
house had previously belonged to her sister and brother in law, who had since moved 
down to the Interamerican highway, where they operated a rather large tienda.  Having 
hoped for a room in a house at best, I was very happy to have a larger space, which 
would give me privacy that I had never quite grown accustomed to losing on my previous 
stints of fieldwork.  I offered a mildly inflated sum for rent, and moved in at the end of 
the week.  Over time, I became close with all of the Bravo family, and one unrelated 
neighbor family, a young couple with two young children who lived next door.  As 
fieldwork responsibilities became more and more pressing, I would accept more 
invitations for meals with the Bravo family, always pitching in on food purchases and, 
whenever I could, on the cooking duties. The latter was hard.  My efforts at making 
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tortillas would evoke as much laughter as finished tortillas. After we were friends and 
neighbors, we would spend many evenings around the fire with the family processing the 
days’ events.  Luckily for me, Concepción was a willing and good translator on most 
evenings. 
It struck me as odd that someone as well-off, fun, capacitada and attractive as 
Concepción never married.  It was not for lack of opportunities; and she has had several 
boyfriends.  She told me that she was thinking about getting married one time, but that 
her boyfriend went to the United States, and the relationship ended. She had turned down 
proposals from at least two upstanding men in the village.  One of these proposals came 
while she was working for DIGESA, and she told him to wait until that was over, and 
then just never got back to him.  The man, a young widower, got angry and still does not 
talk to her.  It occurred to me that it would take a special man not to be intimidated by 
Concepción’s level of capacidad, and her reputation as a formidable intellect and 
assertive personality.  Nevertheless, I began to think that maybe the reason she doesn’t 
want to marry is because she is acutely aware of the freedom she would lose if she had a 
husband.  One time I asked her if there was any truth to my theory. She laughed and told 
me that it was probably correct.  Over time I noticed that an overwhelming notion of 
women who were highly capacitated and independent were single.   
Concepción pays the price for her relative sexual freedom. One of the incessant 
jokes in the pueblo that circulated soon after I moved into the house behind Concepción 
was that we were a couple, or at least that we were having sex.  Rumors soon spread 
throughout the village that we were bathing together in the chuj (steam bath. temascal in 
Spanish).  It was even said that there were pictures of this entirely fictitious event.  These 
jokes never seemed to stop being funny for the peole, men and women, who would ask, 
and then giggle. “Ella sabe noviar” one told me, bad Spanish that translates roughly into 
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“she knows how to have boyfriends.” I learned over time these were not the first rumors 
about her sexuality. Apparently, neighbors have long used the social weapon of gossip to 
control her, and other women’s behavior.  Although women can be capacitadas, this only 
increases their liklihood of being targeted for gendered criticisms and ridicule.  This 
social pressure makes sure that she and other women keep in their proper place. 
Comparing the figure of Concepción to those of Juan and Arturo further elucidate 
the gendering of notions of capacidad.  Women, like Concepción, can speak publicly in 
groups, due to her recognized level of knowledge and understanding.  Men in general, 
regardless of level of capacidad, have the presumed right to speak, although men with 
more capacidad—as shown in the male-male conflicts fought in the idiom of 
capacidad—claim more.  Concepción, due mostly to her role in DIGESA, is recognized 
as possessing certain forms of expertise, and is seen as a trustworthy conveyor of 
information.  Still, following the gendering of the routes to capacitación laid down by 
DIGESA, and subsequent programs, the capacidad of women was never equal to that of 
capacitated men.  If present, a capacitated man would always assume a leadership role in 
a community meeting.  Concepción and other women might speak to address a particular 
point, but then cede control to the male leader.  Even in cases where a woman was seen to 
be more capacitada than many men, their leadership role was limited to women in the 
village.  Only men are considered viable as leaders for the entire community.  Despite the 
limitations of capacidad to undo the gendered structure of power in the village, or, in the 
case of Concepción’s limitations on marriage-- it definitely makes inroads into these 
structures in ways that open spaces for women’s agency.  This promise of freedom and 
empowerment through increased practical knowledge and skill—in addition to whatever 
immediate material benefits—no doubt explains the attraction that capacitación has for 




One of the ways that I came to appreciate what discourses of capacidad had 
meant for the subjectivities of the rural villagers in Los Altenses was spending time with 
people who did not embody these norms. Most people, while not necessarily taking an 
over stand against it, do not jump at the chance of receiving a capacitación, or taking the 
responsibilities that come with it, such as a village cargo.  These were in fact the majority 
of the residents in Los Altenses, and especially among the generation of men who had 
never attended school and who had only participated in a minimal way in the programs of 
DIGESA as well as subsequent development programs.   I was able to catalogue a series 
of characteristics of the ‘less capacitated’ type that I will explore through another 
ethnographic profile.  At the outset I would like to clarify that in making this comparison, 
I do not intend to reproduce the contours of a discourse that makes one into the norm and 
constitutes the other as somehow “lacking”—although this is exactly what Many 
villagers express.  My point is not to reproduce a linear progression between the two 
individuals, but to bring into view the changes in forms of subjectivity  
One of these individuals that I came to know best who falls into the category of 
“less capacitated” was Pedro Bravo.  Pedro’s sense of self and well-being makes an 
interesting comparison because he is Arturo Bravo’s older brother. He is ten years older, 
but his manner of carrying himself and of acting quite different. There are many 
similarities, of course.  Pedro is an upstanding community member, and is always present 
in communal celebrations or in communal work projects.  He rarely misses a church 
service in the village, and usually attends the Mass in the town.  Several times, he has 
participated actively in political campaigns. But it was the differences that stood out so 
clearly.  Pedro never went to school and his Spanish is somewhat sparse, although he 
 270 
does understand enough to have basic conversations when given sufficient time.  Because 
of this situation, Pedro has received little direct training in agricultural program, and he 
relies instead on his siblings to fill him in on whatever key points they have learned.  He 
is very easygoing and secure interpersonally, and does not attempt to manage the 
impressions that he makes according to what he perceives as my expectations of 
‘capacitated’ behavior to be.  These image-managing practices were common, to the 
point of overcompensation, among the capacitated villagers, especially Mario Jiménez, 
who was always worried that others perceive him as an intelligent leader.  Beyond this, 
Pedro does not engage in the type of long-term calculation and preoccupation about 
agricultural production.  Pedro informed me that he has never considered diversifying his 
crop.  Nor has he given thought to the oft-repeated warning given by agronomists 
regarding about what will happen to his corn crop fifteen years down the line.  When I 
asked what he would do if his milpa production reduced entirely due to the diminishing 
returns of chemical fertilizers, he replied simply that if his land “is burnt by chemicals, I 
will apply a remedy.”  He assumes that the problem must have an easy solution, without 
being aware of what that solution might be.  Pedro is not interested in learning to read or 
write, and the little Spanish that he knows seems quite enough for him.  When I asked 
one of Pedro’s cousins about his intelligence, he replied that, “of course Pedro is less 
intelligent.  But he has learned.  We taught him certain things, about planning and taking 
care of his money.”   
 
LOS SUPERADOS 
 Most rural Mayans I talked to expressed a desire to superarse “to get ahead” 
economically.  Kay Warren identified this as a goal expressed by Mayan movement 
activists (1998).  This category existed before capacidad, with the advent of cash 
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cropping and merchant activities among Mayans.  Today, it has also become the 
preeminent end goal of capacitación, through technical skills or education.  Participants 
in DIGESA were assumed to be following a path to “superación” through economic 
practices of savings, investment and credit.  For the vast majority of individuals who are 
capacitated, this is an ever-receding horizon.  Few actually reach the end point of 
superación People who have already made it, however are called superados.  These 
people are commonly imagined to be economically “set” for life.  Many people who are 
superado stop being farmers and instead own small businesses, like a larger tienda 
(store), a comedor (restaurant), or a pharmacy.  They buy houses, always with the newest 
in construction materials, sometimes in villages, but often as near as possible to the town 
center, and on rare occasions in Huehuetenango.  Some buy trucks and give rides to 
people for money (although being a truck driver in and of itself is not enough to qualify 
someone as superado).  Others that continue to farm are more likely to hire the manual 
part of the work to someone else.   
The archetypical figure of Mayan superación in San Pedro is José Martín.  He is 
not only the richest Mayan in the town, but he is wealthier than any Ladino.  He owns the 
transportes Sampedranos, a three bus line that makes the 90 kilometer round trip trek to 
Huehuetenango twice daily.  Many villagers told me repeatedly the Cinderella story of 
his success: when he was young, José came to San Pedro from another town, he sold 
dried fish for pennies, walking village to village.  He then upgraded his stock to include 
kitchen-ware, and, little by little, saving his pennies, always investing, his wealth 
multiplied.  Being superado is most often seen as an irreversible condition. It is 
something that one does once, and then is set for life. To achieve this status is almost to 
become legendary. Only in extreme cases can people fall from grace.  The ex-mayor, 
Natanael, was one example of someone prominent who had fallen.  When he was mayor 
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he lived in Huehuetenango, but years later he had to go back to his village to farm coffee. 
Another of the most famous examples of Mayan superación in San Pedro Necta is the late 
José Antulio Morales, who I will describe in more detail in the next chapter.   A new 
entry into this class are people who have come back from several years of living in the 
US, although their status can end after a few years of hard luck upon return to San Pedro. 
The superados are distinguished and distinguish themselves through their 
consumption patterns, which can seem quite ostentatious, especially relative to the 
threadbare conditions in which so many Mayan-Samedranos live.   Of course, like the 
capacitados, nearly all superados send their children to high school, and when possible, to 
college.  All of them purchase trucks, which they then use to either generate more wealth, 
or simply for personal transportation.  Like the capacitados again, another major 
investment is usually made in houses.   But their houses tend to be of terraza (terrace) a 
flat, cement ceiling.  The most famously wealthy among the Mayans live in houses in the 
town center, many of multiple levels.  Some even own houses in Huehuetenango.   Most 
invest in some form of business beyond traditional agriculture.  Many for example own 
pharmacies, hardware stores, and larger tiendas.  They also engage in a large amount of 
luxury and leisure consumption, such as: eating in comedores; taking frequent trips to 
Huehuetenango; buying expensive new clothing; drinking beer and whiskey (and 
regularly and inviting friends to drinks); and throwing extravagant birthday parties for 
their family members. Capacitados, and many no-capacitados also throw extravagant 
parties where they feed many neighbors, sometimes cooking upwards of 50lbs of 
chicken—a huge expense.  This seems to be local custom, probably rooted to the potlatch 
system of traditional Mayan authority systems, the cofradía (cfa Smith 1984, Warren 
1978, Watanabe 1992).  Parties thrown by superados, however, tend to be on a much 




In the most basic sense, to be a professional is to have earned a degree.  These are 
people who have earned a high-school diploma. At the pinnacle of this category are the 
licenciados, individuals with an advanced college degree.  This subset of the term 
capacidad refers to a person who works primarily with their mind.  The most common 
example is an elementary school teacher.  In each case, it denotes someone who is 
qualified, even if temporarily unemployed, to have a job with a salary, and not work as a 
farmer. The term licenciado commands a great deal of respect. The vast majority of the 
professionals among Mayans, from the villages especially but in the town as well, are 
young, although in the town, as discussed in chapter one, had a politically decisive class 
of professionals arise in the late 1960s.  Most are below the age of 35.  This is the first 
generation of children whose parents had made it enough economically to be able to 
afford to send them all the way through school, and, in a very few cases, into college.  
There are currently no indigenous attorney’s in San Pedro, for example; and there is only 
one indigenous doctor in the town.  So far all of these professionals have come from 
families in the town center.  The house that I lived in Los Altenses used to he the home to 
a young man who, if he graduates, (at the time of this writing he has one year left) will be 
the first indigenous male lawyer in the town.  
Not working as a farmer is the mark of distinction shared by the professionals and 
the superados.  Parents complain regularly that their high-school educated children are no 
longer accustomed to agricultural work, and feel like they are too good to do it.  They 
prefer “trabajo suave” (soft work).  Although they complain, parents commonly recount 
how they worked hard and sweat to make sure that their children got an education so that 
they would not be farmers.  Being a farmer is like being stuck.  Consumption practices 
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among this group vary, depending on the job that one attains.  Elementary and high 
school teachers earn a monthly salary of about Q1000-Q1500, much more than the 
average farmer, but not enough to buy car without a few years of savings.  But first and 
second year teachers regularly build new homes; and nicer, more expensive, clothing is a 
hallmark.  One growing problem for young high school graduates trained as teachers is 
that there are now too many teachers for the positions available.  Those who work as 
teachers complain of having to live in remote villages far from their own to get a 
contract.  Contract employment for one year or one semester, as opposed to guaranteed 
work, is becoming more prevalent, leading to a rise in economic insecurity among this 
group. The fate of this group is a looming question.  Many have so far opted to search for 
work in the US, but this option seems to be closing due to increasingly restrictive border 
enforcement policies in the US, which have made the trip more expensive and more 
dangerous. 
 
NO QUIEREN DESARROLLAR 
I became acquainted with another, much more distressing, form of categorization 
with origins in the new discourses of development during my first week in Los Altenses.  
A subset of people who are non-developed, these are the people about whom it is said 
that they do not wish to develop. I was first made aware of the existence of this category 
when I went to interview a somewhat elderly couple, each in their late 60s who lived 
among the Ruíz family. Although the husband, Paulo was himself a Ruíz he immediately 
began to decry the way that the rest of the people in his zone lived, mostly his cousins’ 
families.  Bristling with exasperation he described the way his neighbors lived as follows: 
They are barely surviving. But with their clothes you wouldn’t know it—better 
than other people’s!  There is no corn in the house.  The family is sad. They just 
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drink.  This is not a good life. They always want to borrow money from me, but 
they won’t pay me back.  And I don’t have enough for everyone!  There is money 
[to be made].  But they just spend and spend and they don’t want to work.  They 
just come at night when they’re hungry to steal hens.  
Paulo’s children in the United States, he has three, send them money regularly, 
essentially maintaining their household, the finances of which are perpetually devastated 
due to Paulo’s—a self described fallen evangelical—debilitating alcoholism.  Despite the 
irony or hypocrisy of Paulo’s tirade, I encountered expressions of moral outrage towards 
their neighbors, even their own (extended) family members, on many other occasions in 
the time I spent among rural Mayan farmers in San Pedro.   
Like many other anthropologists and social workers who take up residence in 
Mayan villages, I had heard similar attitudes to the ones just described many times 
expressed by town Ladinos, even Ladinos who live in remote aldeas.  When I told town 
Ladinos of my intention to live in the aldeas, many were astonished and expressed 
concern.  Unable to comprehend my decision, they would almost beg me to change my 
mind, saying, with a pained look on their faces, “You’re not going to live there, Nick! 
Their houses are ugly.  Their food is ugly.  They live with hens in the house.  It’s dirty!” 
and so forth.   These age-old stereotypes of “dirty Indians” were commonplace among 
local Ladinos, who, even if they think of themselves as sympathetic with the indigenous, 
still pity them and condescend to them without thinking it possible otherwise.  My 
response was always the same: That is where the people live, and I will live with them.  
This was usually enough to silence the critics, many of whom felt obviously uneasy 
especially when their own racist biases were pointed out by someone they thought of as 
“more modern” than themselves.  This anxiety exemplifies what Hale (2006) describes as 
the “racial ambivalence” among Ladinos in Guatemala: Having abandoned the overt 
racism of the past, they readily embrace and espouse an ideology of equality; yet most 
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hold tightly to their superior to Mayans.  In rural towns like San Pedro, I would suggest, 
belief in a pure biological racism is still deep seeded; but the anxiety is still present.  
As seen in the case of Pedro Bravo, despite the universal acceptance of the value 
of development itself, and recognition of the power in capacidad, not everyone is as 
excited as everyone else about achieving it. Still another category of people live, as it 
were, in violation of the norms of development. One of these people who fit into this 
category was Felipe Ruíz.  Felipe lives on the edge of the village furthest up the 
mountainside.  His house is small, one room with no kitchen, as is the local preference.   
He unapologetically claimed these traits when I met him at his house the first time I 
arrived for an interview:   
There is no money.  After the coffee harvest then there’s money. We are barely 
eating. Yo se chupar. (I’m a drinker.) I can drink 15 beers.  When I’ve got money. 
I won’t come back home to the house on Sunday, not until Monday. I’ll sleep on 
the floor of the cantina. Sometimes I spend Q200 on beer.  That’s why there isn’t 
any money.  
Another way that Felipe ‘fit’ this type was evidenced in his behavior towards other 
people’s property.  One day I went to help him gather gravel.  Felipe had been promised a 
light connection, for which a large post must be installed.  The alcalde said he would pay 
for the post and cement, if Felipe dug the hole, and supplied the sand and gravel used to 
stretch and strengthen the cement.  When I met him on another occasion, he wanted to 
enlist me in gathering some gravel.  He handed me a costal a large costal (nylon sack 
used for 100lbs of dried corn or coffee) and a mecapal (tump line).  Grabbing a small 
pick, he led me out the door and down the steep slipperly slope to the pena (rock 
outcropping) on a neighbors land.  While filling the bag, with rock that he chipped off the 
pena, he told me that he didn’t have permission to gather gravel, but that he was doing it 
anyway.  With veins in my neck popping out as I strained against the weight of the 
mecapal, and my boots slipped on the thin footholds in the steep muddy trail, I pondered 
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not only the difficulties of everyday peasant labor, but also the humor if I—the gringo—
were to die by having my face smashed into the rock by the 80lb bag of stolen gravel that 
teetered precariously on my back.  Always eager to live down such stereotypes, I trudged 
on out of sheer embarrassment for how difficult the task was for me, 165 lbs (at the time), 
and how much easier it was for Felipe, who couldn’t have weighed more than 120 
pounds.   
Felipe is not an active participant in development, or in community social life in 
general.  He has never been on a village committee neither does he care for the idea.  On 
occasions he will help in community work projects, like cutting the grass on the side of 
the road with a machete, “cleaning” the road.  He even showed up one time to help build 
the foundation for the new Catholic Church house being built in the village.  But these 
were rare occasions.  I never saw him in a church service.  When I asked him why he 
helped work on the church, he replied: “I don’t have a religion.  I only went to help with 
the church in case one of my children wants to hear the word of God. Yes, I believe in 
God. [….]  Yes, but I don’t go to church.” Felipe’s non-participatory leaning evidenced 
in his lack of care for his soul is evident as well in his attitude towards politics.  Felipe 
does not attend community meetings to discuss development projects.   He does vote, but 
he did not actively participate in the campaign for any given party.  In addition, Felipe 
lived in a village zone, or subsector, occupied exclusively by members of a large 
extended family, almost all of who voted for the FRG.  Curious about why, I asked him. 
Felipe’s attitude towards politics was similarly astounding, this time for its brazenly 
disengaged fatalism:  
NC: Why do you vote for the FRG? Many people say that Ríos Montt killed a lot 
of people.  What do you think? 
Felipe: Yes, he is an asesino (murderer).  I only went to vote for Mariano Díaz 
(the FRG candidate for alcalde).  I don’t participate in politics.  I just mark an ‘X’ 
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and go back home.  I voted for the FRG because they said they would pay the 
patrollers and they also gave me a job. But the job is over already.  I don’t have a 
political party; there isn’t one of them in favor of the people. 
These traits, including this final crime against “good citizenship” does not resemble a 
denial of his neighbors’ normalizing value judgment, but immersion in it.  This is not 
exactly resistance. Felipe does not resist development as a result of some sort of 
primordial fear or loathing, but with full understanding of the stakes.  He is just not 
interested in doing what it takes for his life to resemble the norm. There are a lot of 
people like Felipe who refuse to live by the rules.  In some sense, they seem to like to 
break the rules, publicly and audaciously, trying to make a scene.  Most of then this 
happens when they’re drunk; and drunkenness is the classic habit of someone who does 
not want to develop.  In some contexts, being drunk is like a crime against capacidad.  It 
undoes it, puts it on hold.  Being drunk is publicly understood as a time when someone 
might let go of all the demands of being responsible, all of the guilty that it brings.  One 
of the great appeals of evangelicism is their renunciation of alcohol consumption, to end 
with drunkenness and with the mindset. These lettings go are consummated by behavior 
that causes danger to oneself.  Drinking too much harms the body and the wallet, as much 
as it harms the soul. Felipe is creatively working some sort of counter-norm, staging what 
seem to be small, ultimately directionless inversions of his neighbors, and even his own, 
notions of acceptable, healthy, positive behavior, and especially anything resembling 
becoming ‘developed.’  It is as if, realizing that he cannot win the game, or stay in the 
game in a reasonable way from working, then he will simply not play.  This seems to be a 
shortcut to the masculine subject-hood attained by others through mastery of discourses 
and practices of capacidad.  Renouncing capacidad and superación can also be thought 
of as a type of masculine performance.  Spending money with abandon and drinking 
heroic amounts that can turn quickly into tragedies.  Even in pueblos where women 
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engage in drinking, excessive drinking is still largely a male way to show strength.  So 
are displays of wealth.  Mayan women do engage in shows of wealth, but more subtly 
and not usually in cantinas.  
 
CHANGING SELVES 
Even if discourses and practices of capacidad have attained hegemony within the 
community, no villager has completely assimilated to the norms of capacidad—
regardless of the degree to which they proclaim them. Some parts of the development 
programs caught on, while others did not.  The same processes of hybridization and 
selective evident in local manifestations of modern agricultural practice also pertain for 
the notions of the self.  Implicit in the discourses of capacidad is the centrality of one’s 
own modernity and level of training as a form of identification.  There is no explicit value 
placed on Mayan cultural attributes in discourses of capacidad.  Yet, in all but a very few 
cases, even the most capacitated Mayans continue to speak Mayan languages.  Even 
Mayan women who have held municipal positions of authority and who have been 
teachers for thirty years continue to wear their traditional dress in public occasions.  
Younger professional women are more likely to wear non-traditional clothing, but still 
prefer corte and guipil.  Most capacitados continue to live in villages, even if there is a 
trend for many younger professionals to build their new homes toward the town center. It 
is among the professionals that interest in the new Mayan movement has been the 
strongest.  Some have worked for as instructors bilingues, Mayan centered organizations, 
like the Academia de Lenguas Mayans, ALMG, and various other NGOs and government 
development programs that include a focus on Mayan culture  
Another example of cultural difference can be seen around the notions of 
individual self-reliance. The communal orientation, so evident in community struggles 
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for development in the 1960s and 1970s, has little place in contemporary understandings 
of development as capacidad.  The subject of discourses of capacidad is the individual, 
not the family or the village.  Personal well-being is the result of individual choice for 
personal development.   The benefits of development, supposedly, go to people who 
choose wisely.  Still, perhaps more interesting is the degree to which people maintain a 
non-individualistic focus in their development.  Immigrants send back large sums of 
money to support their families in Guatemala, even those who have been gone for 
decades and have no intention of ever coming back themselves, even in cases where it 
might be possible.  Young professionals continue to give money back to their parents, for 
emergencies and mundane expenses.  I spoke with many who help support their younger 
sibling’s education.  It is very common for a person to forgo an investment in their own 
future, such as more schooling, in order to meet family obligations. Many individuals 
with a large amount of capacidad use it to help their village, for example, coordinating 
with outside institutions and authorities or serving on development committees.  One of 
the major draws of being seen as capacitado is that it grants one authority as a leader of 
ones’ own village through giving a personal reputation as someone with the skills and 
disposition to help ones neighbors.  For their part, superados make a point of spreading 
wealth to their close friends and family members.  My point here is not simply to draw 
attention to, as others have done before, the persistence of “Mayan culture” or a distinctly 
Mayan “moral economy”, especially if either term intends to describe a bounded or 
discrete unity, shared by all Mayans in an equal way.  And these traits can be seen in 
many different parts of the world.  The important point here is that becoming capacitado 
does not entail a giving up cultural elements that mark people as part of Mayan culture.   
Although these examples are evocative, they do not clearly convey a sense of self 
outside of the boundaries of development.  Even Felipe, it seems, still constructs his self 
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in terms of discourses of capacidad, if only to invert them.  Is there something irreducible 
to these discourses, present in different ways in each of the categories of person that I 
describe, that can be seen as a ‘Mayan’ sense of self?  Thinking about these questions 
leads me to back Pedro, the non-developed person.  His unassuming manner can be, and 
is, coded as lack, simple backwardness; but a negative categorization can never capture a 
person’s identity.   What Pedro does not do, and what makes his difference stand out to a 
‘modern’ self is that he does not conceptualize of his person or self as a particular object 
which he is trying actively to fashion and improve through different subjectivating 
techniques throughout his life span, conceived in empty homogenous time.  He does not 
see his self as a “work in progress.” Nor is he investing and shaping and cultivating a self 
for public circulation and display.  Pedro is not a bragger, like his younger brother.  He is 
not arrogant; but nevertheless has pride in himself and his accomplishments.  This self is 
not a commodity, in the way that it can be for people who think of themselves in terms of 
discourses of development.   Instead, Pedro works hard to provide for his family and 
participates in village life.  He wants to be a good person; but being a good person does 
not require subjective transformations in institutions or “getting ahead.”  While he may 
participate in attributing status to people who have done this, he is not personally 
interested in attaining it.   
In thinking about Pedro, I am reminded of words of a friend of mine, Jacinto, a 
man in his early 40s and considered quite capacitado.  Jacinto is a catequista, and a 
careful thinker. While conversant and confident in Ladino culture, he insists on a 
difference between indigenous and Ladino.  He sees that,“la gente indigena son mas 
sencillos, son mas humildes.”  (Indigenous people are simpler; they are more humble.) 
Ignore for a minute that this statement seems to essentialize indigenous people in a noble 
savage kind of role.  Rather, it seems more important that, despite his personal and 
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political investment in capacidad, he withholds a value judgment.  Although he believes 
Mayans should develop to become capacitados, he values these qualities; they are 
meaningful differences.   
Rather than thinking of new elements in terms of replacements, I want to 
emphasize the existence of ways of conceptualizing the self and social world irreducible 
to dominant discourses on development.  Others have pointed to the smoothness with 
which subaltern populations smooth over or ignore contradictions between these forms of 
knowledge and scientific forms (Gupta 1998).  My research reveals that, although Mayan 
farmers often hold divergent conceptions simultaneously, at particular points when they 
come into conflict, many show a preference for ‘local’ understandings and practices.  
Adherence to these local explanatory systems and practices come despite criticisms 
leveled by agronomists, town Ladinos, and some Mayans who consider themselves ‘more 
capacitated.’  
 
REFLECTIONS ON CAPACIDAD 
These examples clarify some of the ways that capacidad has became an important 
way to think about one’s own self.  It provides a conceptual and narrative framework 
through which people can think of their own selves, as well as of others.  The common 
belief in the statement, “Before there was no development. But now that is changing.” is 
evidence of this reconfiguration.  The validity and naturalness of these categories and 
these narratives of teleological progress became embedded not through blind faith in 
development institutions, but as a result of the particular social changes these new forms 
of thought, new practices, and new technologies made possible.  Their reality ossifies 
through the ways that they became useful and desirable to people faced with the everyday 
task of apprehending their social world and formulating their selves. The process of 
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capacitación is almost universally invoked by Mayans, from all the categories mentioned 
here, as a narrative of progress, as a path out of racial subordination and towards personal 
advancement and freedom.  
Having capacidad means to be important.  It means not being afraid.  It means to 
be knowledgeable.  It connotes ones involvement, one’s seriousness as a person.  It gives 
one the right to speak.  It is the knowledge that is worth suffering to attain, and important 
to share. They know the game and the rules better. This is why people with capacidad get 
respect.  Everyone looks to them as leaders.  They are given power, authority, and have 
access to different sources of money.  They are secretly envied just as much as and at the 
same time that they are publicly respected.  
Capacidad is about racial dignity as much as personal dignity and status.  
Becoming capacitado at least in theory allowed Mayans to be considered equal to 
Ladinos.  More training and certificates proved that one is equal.  More practically, it 
meant that they no longer had to be fooled by them.  They now had the tools, the 
knowledge, to defend themselves. Now there was no longer a reason to humiliate 
themselves to Ladinos, or to fear them.  Being capacitado meant the end of supplicating 
behavior.    
A norm has emerged, and is reproduced, revoiced and re-inflected in everyday 
life.  To point to this norm’s emergence is not to suggest that everyone is the same, but in 
the sense that each person can be thought of as occupying a place in relationship to a 
certain ideal.  Juan and Arturo, among several others, are the “most capacitated” and 
Pedro is among the lesser capacitated.  The ethnographic evidence presented here of 
particular examples is an attempt, although necessarily an incomplete one, to be represent 
the range of inscription practices. Most villagers are more or less on a continuum 
between these different poles capacidad, no-capacitado, etc.   
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Capacidad is heavily value-laden concept.  A powerful indicator of this 
reorganization of value is that almost every villager that I spoke to equated the level of 
capacidad with level of intelligence. No one thought that someone who had not been to 
school could never be as intelligent as a person without schooling.  This indicates a 
corresponding devaluation—at least discursively—of forms of knowledge that do not 
come from outside institutions.  This way of making distinctions between people did not 
exist in the village in the same way three decades before; it emerged with the advent of 
development. Everyone was encouraged to evaluate themselves—literally “their self” — 
according to this new standard, presumed to exist independently of this process of 
marking and disciplining bodies.  In general this was true given that anyone in the 
community would concede, as I have mentioned, that Ladinos were more capacitated 
than Mayans.  During my time in Los Altenses, I was able to see how villagers 
constituted this new norm by labeling those who did not quite fit the standard.  
                                                
 
 
1 I thank Virginia Garrard-Burnett for stressing this point. 
2 The FORO de Mujer, as it is known, is led by Ladinos from Huehuetenango.  When 
created after the Peace Accords, which were its legal charter, the FORO had indigenous 
women’s representatives on the junta directiva.  Early on FORO leadership was taken by 
ladinas. It is an apolitical association that intermittently has small ‘projects’ or offers 
workshops for local women, usually about women’s rights. 
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Chapter Seven: Re-Imagining Mayan Politics Through Capacidad 
 
The last chapter examined how discourses of capacidad, consolidated by 
DIGESA, have reshaped the self-conceptions of many Mayans, and created a new way of 
thinking about and acting upon the self and social world and of distinguishing between 
and valuing persons.  By promoting institutions like DIGESA, the state opened a 
sanctioned route for Mayan advancement.  This chapter explores how this space was 
occupied and reshaped by rural Mayans, and the impact of discourses and practices of 
capacidad on the internal dynamics of Mayan politics in San Pedro Necta.1 By politics, I 
mean the ways that Mayans conceptualize their own political agency, make political 
demands to the state and to the town government, their conceptions of the need for 
political reforms, and their strategies for gaining a following.  In particular, I am 
concerned with two related issues: the way that villagers understand the origins and 
solutions for poverty; and how notions of capacidad shaped the thinking of Mayan 
political actors in post-genocidal political movements regarding political alternatives.  
When compared to the evidence provided about Mayan responses to DIGESA in chapter 
5, the descriptions in this chapter reveal a shift in Mayan receptivity to discourses of 
capacidad, as well as an evolution in their political effects.  I argue that although notions 
of capacidad provided the moral authority and the belief in the efficacy of a challenge to 
Ladino authority in town politics, it is also limited by these politics in significant ways.  
This chapter wants to aid in this rethinking by identifying some of these problems and 
proposing alternatives.  
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CAPACIDAD AND GRASSROOTS MAYAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE  
Practices and notions of capacidad and superación were crucial aspects of the 
conditions surrounding Mayan leaders’ entry into the arena of electoral politics in the 
mid-1980s.  In a short period of time, several processes made capacidad a necessity for 
holding positions of community leadership. As alluded to in the chapter about DIGESA, 
leaders of the programs received specialized training that would prove incredibly 
important in coming years: how to petition for infrastructural development projects 
through state institutions.   I asked Arturo if DIGESA ever provided infrastructure. He 
said they did not, “DIGESA didn’t have [potable water], but they always oriented us in 
other meetings.  How to get them. [they would tell us] “This institution helps with such 
and such,” and the people always listened.  We learned how to gain projects. 
Negotiating development projects with the state gave Mayans faith in this 
generation of political leaders (whose status as “bringers of development projects” I 
discuss in subsequent chapters). The stakes were high because now development money 
was coming in from different state institutions; and most of this money was heading 
directly for the Ladino dominated town center. Certain individuals gained reputations for 
being able to successfully navigate these institutions and bring projects to the villages. 
The few leaders of DIGESA trained to seek projects from major state institutions gained 
a particular advantage in this regard. As a result, men from both the Bravo family, and 
their friends in the Lopez family were consistently chosen to be leaders of the community 
development committees.  People like these have political possibilities.  In other words, 
after DIGESA made access to state resources dependent on the attainment of a certain 
level of capacidad, Mayan villagers made political leadership dependent on the same 
training. 
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When political parties began to search out indigenous candidates, they looked for 
the best-organized, most capacitated among them.  These were identified as the most 
viable candidates.  Pedro Ramírez was the first indigenous candidate for alcalde after the 
war.  He ran for office in 1988 with the PAN.  I describe his campaign, and the smear 
campaign against him in chapter 1.   Pedro Ramírez currently works as a municipal 
policeman, performing maintenance duties, like sweeping the basketball court after 
market is over, for a small monthly salary.  He has had this position since his friend 
Chepe was alcalde.   Before this job, Pedro worked for FONDAMAYAN, the Mayan 
Foundation, doing interviews with locals about costumbre and local folklore.  In one of 
our interviews, told me that none of the other more trained leaders in the group (he 
mentioned Chepe and Natanael specifically) had the nerve to be candidate.  At that time, 
both thought that they still had too little capacidad for the job.  When the political parties 
came to talk to the group, Pedro volunteered.  “It was not because he had the most 
capacidad,” Antulio felt the need to point out, “but because he was not afraid.”  After 
Pedro was defeated the group chose as their second candidate Natanael.  He was an 
elementary school teacher and the group thought that he could win a campaign because 
he was smart.  Because he was a professional and indigenous, they hoped that the people 
would trust him.  They were right.  After Natanael served two terms, José Antulio 
Morales displaced him as the leader of the political group. The political group had agreed 
prior to Natanael’s candidacy, that after two terms Natanael would step down and make 
room for another person to be alcalde.  Chepe, his first councilor for both terms, and who 
had finished his high school degree while in the post, was the natural choice.  Chepe had 
been in charge of most of the work anyway, especially of attending people in the 
municipal building, because Natanael spent most of his time in Huehuetenango.  Chepe 
had a lot of support in the communities and the political organization itself as a result of 
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undertaking this work.  When he challenged Natanael, the PAN party also backed him 
and Natanael had to look for a different party.  Chepe won the election easily.    
The personage of José Antulio Morales illustrates the political significance of 
discourses of capacidad. José Antulio, Chep Tul in Mam, or simply “Chepe” to his 
friends and family—was the most prominent Mayan leaders of the past two decades in 
San Pedro, the second Mayan to serve as mayor since the 1960 and the first to run for 
diputado.  Even before he entered the alcaldia, Antulio was considered, without question, 
the most capacitado men in Granadillo—his home village.  José worked in the DIGESA 
organization in the 4S program in his village.  As a young adult, he got a sixth grade 
education.  At the prompting of Arturo Ramírez when he was in his mid twenties, he 
trained as a promotor sociale from Rafael Landivar University in Huehuetenango.  Later, 
he went back and finished a high-school degree.  Despite this training, José Antulio 
Morales’ true talent was politics. This stood out early on.  People remember him as astuto 
(astute), and he was an excellent and moving public speaker. While working with 
Natanael during two terms as first councilor, Chepe finished his high school degree.   
José Antulio Morales had a knack for figuring out what was important for a 
certain person, to be able to promise it to them to get their support.  A widow of a 
prominent Mayan political leader in the 1970s told me one time he promised her a statue 
of her deceased husband in the park.  She was honored and promised to support him in 
the upcoming elections, and to convince others to follow suit.  Chepe never delivered.  
Someone who worked for José on prior campaigns, but who has since left politics, said 
that José  never had any intention of keeping that promise because “the Ladinos would 
never permit a statue made to an ex-guerrillero.”  Juan Jiménez told me how Chepe, 
while courting Juan’s political support, told him to “Forget about coffee.  Get coffee out 
of your head” because if he won, he would send a agricultural technician to the village to 
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figure out what export crops could be grown at the elevation with the soil type in his 
village.  The agronomist never materialized, a fact for which Juan was still perturbed 
when I spoke to him about it several months afterwards. 
Discourses and practices of capacidad and the narratives of superación they 
support also permeated local conceptions of political alternatives for a new generation of 
Mayan leaders.  When José Antulio died, the entire village, even some of his sworn 
political enemies, mourned him.  “There was no one else like Chepe,” everyone said.  On 
the day before Chepe’s funeral, I had made a plan to speak with one of his closest friends, 
Mateo, a resident of Los Altenses who had come from another village, but had settled 
here after marriage.  Mateo had spent two years in the US, where he had made a 
reasonable sum of money and then had recently returned.  On that evening, we had a very 
interesting conversation, ranging from his thoughts about a return trip to the US, and to 
the impossibilities of Mayan-Ladino relationships, we were able to discuss Chepe’s 
vision of Mayan politics, a vision that Chepe had shared many times, with a great deal of 
passion, with Mateo:  
Chepe worried a lot about education.  ‘Let there be more Mayan professionals!’ 
[pretending to be Antulio] That was his goal.  He would speak of the year 2010, 
when there would be more professionals than there are now. His people were, for 
the majority, gente campesina, but with experience, with preparation—the entire 
group was superado!—and they also had professionals participating. […]  His 
goal was that there was superación in San Pedro Necta and in all of 
Huehuetenango.  
Mateo’s touching recounting convinced me of Antulio’s deep investment in these terms, 
far beyond their obvious power as political rhetoric, and however opportunistically 
employed on occasion.  Chepe felt strongly about these issues, which he saw as the route 
to the advancement of the Mayan people.  He believed in superación, a value that forty 
years ago did not exist in a recognizable way among most Mayans in San Pedro, and that 
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today has the status of an unquestionable goal.  For Chepe, as I would imagine is the case 
among many other politically engaged Mayan professionals of his generation, personal 
development overshadowed prior interest in revolutionary politics.  Especially after state 
violence, superación through capacitación made more sense.  
 
REVOICING CAPACIDAD 
Capacidad’s suggestion of a neutral scale of evaluation gave moral resonance to 
the decision to support a Mayan candidate for alcalde. Municipal politics is imagined by 
Mayans as much as by politically active Ladinos as a competition between two groups for 
control of town resources and institutions.  Capacidad is the central weapon in this 
contestation.  This point was clearly made by Gerardo, a family member of Antulio 
Morales’ and a fledgling politician in his own right.  When I asked why indigenous 
people have less ‘capacidad’ than Ladinos, Gerardo’s answer immediately turned to the 
subject of politics:  
Before there wasn’t a lot of capacitación. Before, indigenous people were more 
discriminated against.  Before in San Pedro, there were only Ladinos.  Natanael 
was the first indigenous person. Afterwards José Antulio, then Mariano, so the 
people are preparing themselves.  Now, the majority of indigenous people have 
studied.  There are doctors.  There are more educated people.  Year after year 
there are more people who have studied.  I have analyzed this.  Ladinos have 
another form, another culture to live.  Ladinos, they are, well, now not so much, 
but it still exists…they think that they are more able…that they are the ones 
that…but it’s not that way.  They always think they are better than the rest.  But 
it’s not true.   
One of the greatest examples of Mayan re-appropriation was the move to use capacidad 
as leverage in local political struggles.  After the defeat of the guerrilla, Mayans wanted 
to appropriate this term, which was previously used to justify their marginalization, and 
expand it into a legitimate platform from which to launch political opposition to Ladino 
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control in town politics.  Notions of capacidad gave both moral legitimacy and credibility 
to Mayan politics.  The moral legitimacy of this movement was that Mayans who had 
undergone a level of personal transformation deserved power, the same as a Ladino, 
especially given that Ladinos have almost always controlled town politics, even when 
indigenous men had rightly won the elections.  It could not simply be any indigenous 
person.  Not all indigenous people have the capacidad.  Not unimportantly, these 
discourses of equality through development resonated with religious discourses at the 
time—both Catholic and different evangelical strands—that increasingly insisted on the 
common humanity of Mayans and Ladinos.  The best-qualified candidate, regardless of 
race should be able to govern.  Capacidad provided a seemingly color-blind method of 
measuring who deserves power.  The more capacitación they received, the more 
emboldened Mayan political leaders were to challenge Ladino authority.  
There is an important difference in the way that Mayan activists defined 
capacidad and the way that it was defined by Ladinos.  During a long, thoughtful 
interview with Gerardo, I asked why he thought it was important for an indigenous 
person to be mayor.   He offered that:  
For me it is important, because he dominates two languages.  They give their 
speeches in Spanish and then in Mam.  The people understand.  Indigenous 
people are simpler, they are more humble.  More…how can I say it?  They have 
more patience to work with the people. 
Interestingly, Gerardo redefines capacidad as including the ability to speak a Mayan 
language and possession of an inter-ethnic sensitivity to an almost inarticulable 
difference.  The alcalde has to be able to speak to and serve two cultures on their own 
terms, which requires a special understanding, one that Gerardo is at a loss to put into 
words.  He needs patience to work with indigenous who are “simpler and more humble.”  
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Yet one needs to know how to deal with Ladinos, who are, by extension, more clever and 
arrogant.   
One has a clear sense that simple and humble do not do justice to the qualities that 
Gerardo is attempting to evoke.  It defies reduction to a neat, summary definition as a list 
of things.  It cannot be easily represented.  Valuing these traits in a public official is an 
example of a Mayan redefinition of the meaning of the requirements for how they want to 
be governed. I do not think that this should be taken as an example of Francisco’s 
conviction that he is saying that only indigenous people can hold political office.  A 
Ladino could be alcalde, if he possesses these abilities.  Francisco is pointing to the 
reality that, in the current situation, there are no Ladinos that he can think of active in San 
Pedro politics that meets this alternative standard of ethical authority. It is not impossible 
for a Ladino, only difficult and certainly uncommon.  This ability to move between 
groups was still viewed as a neutral capacity—anyone could do it—but was a 
requirement that gives a considerable advantage in this regard. This revised norm 
recognizes and satisfies demands for both equality—anyone can be alcalde—and 
difference—an alcalde has to recognize the needs for populations whose differences are 
meaningful.  The other important difference, as you will recall from the chapter on San 
Pedro history, was the basis of the desire of a Mayan mayor: their disproportionate need 
for town resources.  Mayan families disproportionately lack shelter, clothing, food, 
medicine, and money for education.  Villages also are far underdeveloped, vis a vis the 
pueblo, and not to mention the city of Huehuetenango, in terms of basic infrastructure.  
A poststructuralist critic might suggest that the one problem with discourses like 
capacidad is that they posit a gap between “developed” and “underdeveloped” can never 
be breached.  By defining development as whatever the West is doing means that the 
subaltern will always be seen as “underdeveloped” because it will always be seen as 
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trying to “catch up.” Ladinos will always be on top, no matter what forms of training 
Mayans undertake.  But this is not how things played out in San Pedro.  Mayans quickly 
immediately seized on the notion of capacidad as an equalizer to advance their collective 
struggles for political and cultural equality with Ladinos and economic well-being.   
 
GENDERING THE SUPPOSEDLY ‘NEUTRAL’ STANDARD 
However, one category of people that this standard for governance seems to 
exclude, if not explicitly, then by omission, is women. 2  When I asked the question above 
about the importance of having an indigenous alcalde, Francisco immediately assumed 
this was a man, at least that is what it appears when he began to describe what made him 
different from a Ladino.  Competition on the scale of capacidad is an unmarked 
competition between men for authority.  Even for those who would argue publicly that 
capacidad trumps gender as a standard for municipal authority, in practice operate under 
the assumption that political authority is by definition male domain.   There has only been 
one woman to occupy space in the alcaldia in San Pedro Necta: Petrona Lazaro.  Petrona 
is from a respected indigenous family from the town center. She is college educated.  Her 
older sister is a retired school-teacher.  She was appointed third consejal under José 
Antulio Morales.  She told me that giving women a space was important to José Antulio.  
Indeed, when I spoke with him, he emphasized that several women were present in the 
early days of organizing in the mid 1980s, and still play an important role in community 
politics and development.   
When I first spoke to Petrona Lazaro, she expressed an eventual desire to be 
alcaldesa.  I was impressed.  Then she recounted the story of how she had begun to 
campaign as first advisor for a man in the last (2003) election. Midway through the 
campaign she dropped out.  Men in the organization continually criticized her, saying that 
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a “woman couldn’t win.” Men argued vehemently that the other men would never vote 
for a woman.  Noting the self-serving circularity of this argument, Petrona said that she 
could win, but that the other men were so jealous of her because of her high level of 
capacidad, which was greater than theirs.  But she quit when the criticisms would not 
stop.  Months later when I asked if she still hoped to be alcaldesa one day, she said 
“Why? so the people could call me ‘ladrona’ (thief),” which rhymes with “Petrona.” 
 
THE HIGH PRICE OF NEUTRAL STANDARDS: RE-ENVISIONING POVERTY 
The overwhelming majority of Mayan Sampedranos live in poverty.  About a 
third live in extreme poverty.  Even in a village as ‘developed’ as Los Altenses, a village 
fairly close to the town center and home to several well to do families, the level of 
poverty in the village was striking to me, accustomed in a deep bodily way to North 
American overabundance. Many lack necessary shelter, food and clothing.  Many 
families are unable to educate their children.  Child labor is common necessity to make 
ends meet. Many children are hungry and undernourished, and many parents as well.  
Even better-off families eat meat as little as twice a week—except in the case of a 
celebration, even if individuals (mostly men) eat meat on additional occasions.  Both men 
and women are often overworked.  Existence is precarious for a good number of 
villagers.  Savings are so small compared to the cost of medicine that a severe illness can 
wipe out a family’s savings almost instantaneously.  Many go without.  Many high school 
educated children who want to continue to study cannot, and are forced to work to 
support their parents and brothers and sisters, or their own children.  Most young 
children, especially men, have migrated to work in Mexico for slightly higher wages.  
Most young men and women whose families can help finance the trip, a notoriously risky 
venture which costs upwards of Q20,000, have seriously considered leaving for the 
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United States, or have already made one trip. The majority who do not have the money to 
migrate, or who cannot for some reason or the other, dream of it.  Almost every day you 
can hear frustration expressed over the low wages paid to people for a day of physical 
labor—Q25 (approximately $2.75 USD).  Not only are these conditions deplorable, there 
is a great deal of inequality.  The standard of living among town Ladinos is usually much 
higher.   
A high degree of economic stratification within Mayan communities has been 
well-documented. Annis (1986) traces Protestant conversion to a desire to forego the 
wealth destruction mechanisms central to traditional religious hierarchies, as well as 
social subordination by Ladinos.  It was correlated to a desire to participate in market 
economics. In San Pedro, where at least one-third of villagers are Protestant, and 
traditional community hierarchies have been replaced by new Catholics, this process 
seems not to have a strong correlation to religion.  Many of the wealthier and more 
market oriented Mayans I met were Catholics, equally unbound by traditional 
mechanisms.  As described in the last chapter, members of both religious groups 
embraced developmentalist ideas.   
One of the most significant effects of the emergence and dominance of discourses 
of capacitación and superación was a change in the way that villagers conceptualize 
these stratifications, and understand the causes and the solutions to poverty.   James 
Ferguson (1991) defines “depoliticization” as the erasure of the political and historical 
roots of the creation of poverty, a process he argues is one of the most important 
“implementation effects” of development discourses, regardless of whatever other effects 
it might produce in a given historical context. As shocking and unacceptable as these 
socio-economic realities might seem to someone from the first world, they are natural and 
even normal to many of the people who live them.  While living in the San Pedro Necta, I 
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encountered over a dozen ways that notions of development, and especially capacidad, 
was used by Mayans to explain this poverty away, to make it seem natural, normal, 
acceptable and for it to seem, above all else, as the responsibility of the individual.  Some 
of these I have mentioned already, or play a role in these stories, others do not.  These are 
all explanations that I have heard from Mayans speaking about other Mayans.  I even 
heard more than one Mayan blame his own irresponsible behavior, especially alcoholism, 
for his own poverty. This includes, in no particular order, the following: failure to 
diversify their crops; plant too much corn, instead of a cash crop, especially coffee; 
failure to save, or spending money unwisely, especially on alcohol; too many children; 
failure to send their now adult children to study when they were younger; aversion to 
taking loans from the bank to make a personal investment; failure to take advantage of 
development programs, or failure to sign up for projects; burning their milpa (as a 
technique of fertilizing them); failure to apply new scientific technologies to their crops, 
for whatever reason; people who do not want to work, or laziness; people who, for 
whatever reason, “do not want to develop”; failure to plan their economic future; jealousy 
of those who succeed; and adherence to ‘Mayan’ culture.  In public discourse, impromptu 
conversations, and interviews, the explanations for poverty that blame individuals 
themselves are the most prevalent.  They indicate an acceptable level of “social 
abandonment” for certain individuals (Biehl 2005). These attitudes often resemble the 
racializing ideologies held by many Ladinos about indigenous people as ‘backward’ 
(Hale 2006).  Despite these continuities, these explanations appear to have the most 
persuasive power.  There are few acceptable answers to its logic, as the following 
ethnographic examples seem to demonstrate.  
One sunny afternoon, I stopped to talk to a man who was a brother of man I knew 
from Los Altenses.  Pedro waved me to sit with him for a moment as he took a break 
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from building his house, which was on the road from Los Altenses into the main town.  It 
was a nice home, made of cinder blocks, and was of high value because it was close to 
the town.  This being our first real conversation, and unplanned, I was slightly taken 
aback when he asked me, out of nowhere, What science, what advice, do you have? What 
should we do to improve life here?”  As I had been striving not to put words in the 
mouths of my interviewees, I replied that I was interested in how he would answer the 
same question.  Having obviously given this a great deal of thought, he responded: 
 
They say that it’s possible to grow 8 quintales of coffee per cuerda, con ciencia 
(with science), taking good care, but the people here only [get] one.  They don’t 
want to work, they only do their work, planting corn the same way.  They only 
toss out seeds and throw dirt on top.  They’re not going to grow like that.  You 
can get 4 quintales per cuerda if you take care of it well.  We don’t use science. 
That’s what the tecnico told me before. 
His reference to “they” is obviously to agronomical scientists, an expert, who, in some 
form of another had been a presence in village life since the arrival of DIGESA.  At this 
point in the conversation, another man, a friend of mine, Arturo, from a distant and very 
poor aldea in the township.  Arturo had been visiting his son’s family in Los Altenses but 
was now on his way to the market.  He stopped, shook our hands in the customary and 
requisite show of respect, and began to listen and participate in the conversation, offering 
up support for Arturo’s claim, “Yes, it’s true.”   Then Pedro continued:  
The people before knew how to work, now they do not.  But if there is food, ‘let’s 
go!’, they’re ready.  But if you sit in the house all day, or only work half a day.  
The children study now and don’t want to work in the fields. But there is money!  
The other thing is that the people get to drinking, and spend their money like that.  
Also, if a person works well, and achieves something, if they buy a pickup truck 
or something, others say that that person is a thief. That’s why the people are 
divided.  
Arturo: Yes, it’s true. 
NC:  [laughing] is there jealously here?  
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PEDRO: [laughing] of course there is! 
NC: I’m not sure.  It depends on the land, how much fertilizer they’re using.  If 
there is no land for coffee […] Many people have told me that there is no time to 
learn…they’re working every day and they can’t go see an agronomist. 
Arturo: Yes, sometimes it is hard, and now there is no agronomist like before. 
PEDRO: Even if there are only 4 cuerdas, you’ve got to plant half of it in coffee, 
and the other half corn, but well cared for.  If there’s no coffee, you can plant 
vegetables, potatoes, pacaya, something to sell. 
NC: Like the work that DIGESA was doing? 
PEDRO: Yes. 
NC: But potatoes don’t sell much, now that so many people have them in the 
market.  The people from [an aldea where they plant a lot of potatoes] tells me 
that they don’t bring a good price.   
Arturo: Yes, it’s only to eat.  You can sell one quintal maybe but not all.   
PEDRO: [to me] What do you think about all that? 
Me: It’s true, there is a shortage of land, and working for only a jornal (25Q/day) 
is not enough to get ahead.  It’s important to develop, but you’ve also got to see 
its limits.  Many people now don’t have land, or maybe just one cuerda and the 
science doesn’t even matter.  
Arturo: Yes, that’s the other thing we have thought.  If there’s no land, you can’t 
do anything.  
PEDRO: But now you’re bringing the people down, you’ve got to lift their spirits.  
ARTURO:  Yes, that’s the other thing that we thought.  If there’s no land you 
can’t do anything.  
In Pedro’s narrative about capacidad and development, the problem of poverty, as a 
structural issue, become invisible.  Science and technology can bring people out of 
poverty.  They hold the solution.  The only thing missing is individual initiative.  Factors 
like the low quality of land, low wages, inflation, high costs of medicines, the decline of 
the price of coffee—or any of the score of other social and historical factors that have 
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combined to create the extreme poverty in which most of the villagers live—are 
irrelevant in this narrative. Instead, it implores us to scrutinize individual behavior.  What 
scientific techniques do they (not) use?  What do they do (or not do) with their money?  
How do they live (or not live)?  Through this filter, these questions reveal the reasons 
why people are poor.  
Examples of this kind of thinking are abundant, penetrating to interpersonal 
relationships between villagers, many of which are now experienced as relations of 
domination and subordination.  Discourses of development play a large part in mediating 
these relationships in ways that render them normal, natural and inevitable.  One event 
that clarified this to me during my fieldwork was witnessing a conflict between Raul and 
his mozo (peon) Esteban.  Santos is a member of the Morales family, a young man about 
33, the youngest of 5 brothers and a father of two.  I knew Santos through because they 
were close friends of the family who had agreed to rent me the abandoned house near 
their lot.  In response to my desires for an interview, Santos invited me with his wife to 
visit their coffee land in a nearby aldea.  Santos was very well to do by community 
standards.  He was the owner of one of only four trucks in the village and would make 
good money running fletes or cargo runs of firewood, coffee and other materials long 
distances for other villagers.   He is also active in the community, participating in the 
cargo as director of the committee for potable water.  Santos also plays keyboards in the 
Catholic Church band.  In addition to this, and very important in terms of understanding 
Santos’s status position, is the fact that his eldest brother had held a high political office 
for several years.  He had a large, but modest home where he took care of his parents and 
lived together with his sister.  This young, attractive and happy couple took my interest in 
an interview as an opportunity to go and have a day of fun, an opportunity to pasear.  As 
we walked, we stopped along the way to grab handfuls of sweet nance fruit from another 
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villagers’ field, a common and accepted practice, as long as you do not take very much, 
along the way. After walking for a little less than one hour, down the valley and then up 
again, we came to their land.  Santos proudly showed me his coffee plants, saying that he 
had nearly 13 cuerdas of coffee—nearly ten times the community median.  It was all 
chemical coffee, he told me, and he was able to get between 2-3 quintales/ cuerda 
annually, a sizable amount more than the local average.  “This is good land” he assured 
me.  
While he was showing me, his pride gave way to disquiet.  Apparently, the person 
who had been in charge of taking care of the coffee had not done a very good job of 
pruning the dead branches.  And there were a great many weeds in between the plants.  
Santos went to knock of the house where this person was staying, only to find that it was 
still locked.  He broke in, the door only being wedged with a hoe on the inside.  When he 
discovered that the person had indeed been around recently, evidenced by a still 
smoldering fire, he grew more upset, and spoke angrily to his wife Elvira in Mam.  I 
determined that he did not want me to know why he was angry.  We left the house and 
began to pick fruit—which, instead of the interview that I had hoped to get, was the point 
of the trip for Santos and Elvira.  There would be no interview today.  Nevertheless, it 
was fun, and we gathered nearly 20lbs of limones mandarinas from the tree, often 
climbing up them quite a distance to shake a branch or knocking them out of the tree with 
a long pole.  Then, from behind some trees nearby, we heard an angry voice asking “who 
gave the order to pick fruit?”  Santos jumped out of the tree, and identified himself as the 
owner of the land.  The man was Esteban, the person that Santos hired to live in the 
house.  Esteban had approached us with an angry voice, it appeared, defending Santos’s 
fruit crop from what he feared might be another person.  Esteban was a man of about 
forty, with very few teeth, whose clothes were in tatters and absolutely filthy.  He was 
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small and very thin.  The contrast was even starker when compared to the well-kempt and 
healthy Santos.  As soon as the fact of their identities was clarified, Santos began to 
lecture Esteban in Mam.  The only thing that I understood from the conversation at that 
time was that Santos was quite angry with Esteban.  This was obvious from his body 
posture, the contrite look in Esteban’s eyes and downwardly turned head, and the way 
that Santos repeatedly said “No me gusta.” (I don’t like it) and “at puac” (There is 
money).  Esteban did not conceded easily however.  He repeated the phrase “Min ti 
puac” (there is no money) several times, along with, in Spanish,  “no me alcanza” (It’s 
not enough to last me). Their awkward interaction lasted for nearly fifteen minutes. 
During Santos and Esteban’s conversation, Santos did listen, for a long time, to Esteban’s 
concerns.  He didn’t cut him off.  Nevertheless, he never wavered from his position, and 
eventually was able to get Esteban to accept that this point of view was correct.  He was 
somewhat sympathetic, it seems, as he has put up with this problem with Esteban for 
some time.  Santos would accept nothing less than an apology, and indeed got one.   
Later that evening, I asked Santos if he would please tell me what had transpired 
during that conversation.  Santos said that the person, Esteban, who had been living there 
was a drunk, and that he was supposed to work for him, but did not do very much.  They 
also let him live in the house because he was poor and a known drunk and they felt sorry 
for his wife and child.  Santos wanted to ask him to leave today because work was not 
getting done.  Also, Esteban, when drunk, yells insulting things to Santos and Santos’s 
parents, foul words, and also says he doesn’t pay him.   The next week, I ran into Esteban 
in the town center.  I asked him what had happened that day.  His version was different 
from Santos’s in several key elements: 
Santos got angry because when he got there, I hadn’t done all the work.  But 
Santos only pays me Q10 a day and he wants me to work every day.   He only 
pays ten because he I live in his house.  But the money is not enough for me.  
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Corn is expensive.  Sugar is expensive.  There is no food for my family.  I don’t 
have any milpa. I don’t have any other place to live. Santos says that there’s 
money but there is not.  I don’t know what to do.  There is no work here.  And 
how am I going to work elsewhere when he wants me to work for him every day? 
It’s hard. [long pause].  Is there work in the US? I’m thinking about going 
because here there is no chanca [opportunity].  
Esteban’s stance varies sharply from the founding assumption of the common discourse 
on superación through hard work.  It does not matter if you work hard, even if Esteban 
worked a bit harder than he does, he would still be very poor.  Knowing this gives him 
very little incentive to follow Santos’s advice.  It leaves him bitter; and he expresses his 
anger when he is drunk.  Still, Santos has power over him, as landlord, power that 
Esteban acknowledges.   
 
ERODING THE REVOLUTIONARY NARRATIVE 
This represents a marked departure from the thinking that animated indigenous 
politics in the 1970s, when inequalities were seen as an effect of foundational inequalities 
and ongoing exploitation.  In one conversation with Juan Jiménez, he told me that he 
thought people were poor because the country was so unequal, because “the rich want it 
that way.” As much as this was something he believed, it seemed to me to be the answer 
that he thought that I thought was right, the answer that would bolster his identity as an 
insightful social analyst.  But, soon after, in what seemed like a reflex, he added with a 
self-satisfied smirk “they don’t know how to work.” Such sentiments were quite common 
among Mayan farmers. 
Over time, perceptions of and feelings regarding local participation in the 
guerrilla have also been re-sifted through the lens of capacitación. Gerardo, community 
leader politically active in the political movement headed up by José Antulio Morales, 
explained the decision of some community members (he did not suggest that he might 
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have been one of them) had sympathized with or supported the guerrilla due to a lack of 
capacidad, a lack that led them to be tricked easily into joining a cause that a more 
educated person, like himself, did not or would not have supported.   After suggesting 
that they were obligated by both sides to participate, he entered into this explanation:  
Including also the ignorance of the people.  Because the people were not learned.  
For example we, in our family, we analized it thoroughly.  Because it is not 
simply deciding on a thing.  For example, if someone comes right now, I can 
listen, but I’m going to ask for their identification, where they come from, what 
institution, what it is that they want.   
Likewise, when the guerrilla visits a family and start telling them ‘Look señores, 
we’re the guerrilla army of the poor.  We are going to give you land. We’re going 
to take it away from the rich and give it to you as a gift.  Don’t you want that? We 
want you to help us, to give us food, clothes, or a place to stay.’ It sounds nice, 
right?  It’s the same if someone comes who wants to give a capacitación to the 
people.  A coffee expert for example.  The people say, ‘We don’t want 
capacitación.’ But if he says, I come on behalf of a bank, or a company, or a 
business and there’s money for loans, credit, then the people come.  Worse if 
there’s no guarantee [of repayment].  The people come quickly. They don’t 
analize… we don’t analize.  That’s how it happened before.  I have analized it 
thoroughly.  The people listened to the guerrilla out of ignorance.  They offered 
and offered.  It’s the same as a candidate.  I’m going to give you something, a 
lamina [corrugated tin roofing].  And then nothing comes.  The army had a 
political objective, so did the guerrilla.  They were offering.  And for that reason 
the people went to them.  Then when the army came, the situation changed.  
There was war.   So, more for ignorance, they didn’t understand how it was, how 
it is, what results will follow.  
It sounds good.  A person gets to talking with his wife, between friends “Hey, 
let’s go with them.  They’re going to give us land.  They’re going to take it from 
the finqueros and they’re going to give it to us.  This was the main part of the 
problem. The people aligned with the guerrilla to help, but they didn’t know what 
would happen afterwards. 
This is clearly at odds with the two armies discourse, providing some additional evidence 
for the re-thinking of the two armies narrative by members of this political movement, 
even though Gerardo oscillates between both narratives.  Yet, instead of affirming Mayan 
agency in the revolutionary movement as a way to recuperate those political demands as 
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Mayan, he suggest that belief in those demands were a symptom of Mayan 
backwardness, or even ‘Indianness’.  Given that this is based in reasoning performed 
among his family members, including the former Mayan mayor of San Pedro, I think this 
represents the closest to his actual thinking on the matter.  It is not so much that the 
guerrilla forced people to participate, but they convinced them.  People were convinced 
out of their own ignorance of how politics really work.  One similarity to the other 
discourses is that this disparaging judgment of past political participation is based on 
hindsight—reading the violence as an inevitable result of the guerrilla movement.  This 
narrative therefore shares in the foreclosure of historical possibilities in the other 
dominant public narratives.  Embarrassment for having been these same ignorant Mayans 
was, I think, what leads him to hesitate between the pronouns ‘they’ and ‘we’ when he is 
discussing the failure of Mayans to analyze the (inevitable) consequences of their 
decision.  Participating in the revolutionary movement seems to be a moment of infantile 
naiveté.  Respect for that decision is non-existent.  Gerardo wants to place himself, and 
his family, in a different category, but then, out of a sense of honesty perhaps, decides 
that he is talking about himself and his own family’s ignorance as well.  Although not 
quite a confession of guerrilla involvement, the embarrassment expressed here regarding 
could be additional evidence as to why two army narratives came to dominate.   
In the one interview that I did with Chepe Antulio while in San Pedro he went so 
far as to use the idea of capacitación to explain his decision, after the Peace Accords, to 
not participate in the newly legalized party of the URNG.  He said that he didn’t want to 
work with the URNG because they did not offer him a post as a mayoral candidate or, 
later, as a diputado (legislator).  He says this was because they URNG does not 
recognize, or appreciate the capacidad that he had, especially the experiences that he had 
accrued during numerous years of public service in the alcaldia of San Pedro Necta. 
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I found other evidence that notions of capacidad, again with the help of violence, 
have eclipsed ideas of political struggle.  Going back to the conversation that I had with 
Pedro, who had pulled me aside to talk about politics while he worked on his new house.  
After he espoused the virtues of studying scientific agriculture, I asked him what he 
thought about the URNG, and their attempts, in the past at least, to win a land reform.  
His initial response was typical to what I described in the previous chapter on state 
violence: 
You can’t do it.  It’s as if someone wants to take your moral (woven shoulder 
bag). It’s yours.  They struggled for the land here, but they didn’t win.  And look 
at this government that came in now [President Berger], you saw what they did at 
Nueva Linda…[…]  And those groups have their faults as well.  They just want to 
grab land, they don’t want to work.  Why do I want to go to a reunion [a political 
meeting] just to talk? I’m just going to waste my time.  It’s better to do something 
real, to look for development. 
Unlike revolutionary alternatives, which will only end in violence, development is 
something real.  Revolution is a fantasy, just idle talk, not a serious option.   
Despite these ways in which notions of capacidad seem to shift contemporary 
thinking about political alternatives away from reform, Gerardo sees untapped 
possibilities for using the notion of capacidad as an alternative to current patterns in 
Mayan politics.  Coming on the heels of an overwhelmingly pessimistic assessment of the 
outlook for political reform in Guatemala, Gerardo added that, “for God nothing is 
impossible,” and then proceeded to lay out the following vision through which “political 
reform” (he is unclear about what this would be) could be achieved:  
If the people think it through.  If the government were to worry about the people, 
and trained them in what it is to vote.  Perhaps things could be fixed.  It would be 
great if the government came in to explain what voting is.  If the Tribuno 
Supremo Electoral put more people to work, then yes.  But what happens?  They 
send a few, in the months just before the elections.  Only in the closest areas.  And 
so the people always vote for personal interest.  
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Another man, more educated than Gerardo, told me that he dropped out of the the 
campaign, ceding his post to Gerardo, because he was unwilling to continue lying to 
people about projects that would never come. Gerardo made outlandish promises in his 
campaign, only to lose.  When I arrived in Los Altenses, Gerardo seemed to be in a 
period of reflection on his own political process, even his own participation.  As an 
alternative to the lies, Gerardo suggests that people should vote for a candidate who has a 
plan and who is also capacidato. It is interesting that most of their neighbors describe the 
Morales’ political participation as motivated by personal interest.  Gerardo appears to be 
criticizing Mayans who vote for the FRG (he himself recently lost a campaign to the 
FRG); but he might be criticizing behavior in general.  
This is the same point of view shared by many international NGOs and the NGOs 
of the Guatemalan left.  Before the last two elections, Asociación CEIBA led a voto 
consciente (conscious or informed vote) campaign, which emphasized that the vote 
should remain secret, is an individual decision, should not be sold, and should be cast for 
the ‘good of the country’.  Much like Gerardo suggests (indeed Gerardo might be 
paraphrasing from a reunion he attended sponsored by CEIBA) they say that votes are not 
for sale, that they are private, individual decisions, and that they need to be cast based on 
who a person thinks might be the best leader.  This perspective on voting seems a crucial 
element for the strengthening of democratic institutions in a country where the idea that 
people select their own leaders been non-existent, and among a people who have always 
been excluded from narratives of equal citizenship, however hollow they might have 
been for their supposed subjects.  The problem with his interpretation, for me, is that it 
makes the assumption of false consciousness and ignorance.  They assume that the people 
voting now have little idea what they are doing when they vote, and that is why they vote 
the way that they do, that people vote the way they do because they don’t understand the 
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rules of voting. While there is undoubtedly some truth to this, it certainly belies the logic 
that Gerardo himself describes (he is one of the people I quoted in chapter 3), the same 
logic that drove his own participation in the previous campaign: the political fatalism 
generated and regenerated by state violence.   It is not so much that many Mayan’s fail to 
understand what voting is “supposed to be” in the abstract, but that their vote are 
informed by their own interpretation of the grim prospects of what voting can bring them.  
And, as I describe in chapter 2, many people who understand perfectly well the general 
principle behind voting, nonetheless have only a vague sense of historical political 
behavior of their own parents’ generation.      
 
ENSHRINING DEPOLITICIZATION 
Central to this reconceptualization in terms of the individual is the notion of 
choice. Each of these is seen as some sort of personal failure or deficiency.  Discourses of 
development focus exclusively on things that individuals can do differently to, 
supposedly, change their life conditions. Choice is central to the narrative of development 
introduced by DIGESA.   Choice is also a central element in Arturo Bravo’s narrative 
about those who did and those who did not participate.  People choose to develop, and 
hence reap the rewards.  Who is to blame? Only themselves.  This account, very common 
among the ‘capacitated’ villagers I spoke to, reveals legitimate reasons why some people 
shied away from, or openly opposed the program.  Given the context, however, villagers 
had little reason to trust the state and little precedence for believing in stories about 
superación through capacidad, especially when the attainment of these goals entailed 
serious financial risks, like losing land.  Many were also unfamiliar with the kind of long-
range planning these programs required, and getting involved meant a lot of effort, and a 
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trade off with other work.  At the same time as he acknowledged the legitimacy of these 
factors, Arturo focuses more on their criticisms of the program.  He also criticizes their 
negativism as short sighted.  Of course, Arturo is reading history backward: having 
already seen that these programs were economically beneficial to those who participated, 
it is easy to stand in judgment of people who did not get involved early on.  Nevertheless, 
these discourses emphasize individual choice ignore these factors.   
In these discoures, choice is individualized.  All solutions valorized by state 
programs focus on individual well being.  There is no legitimate language recognized in 
these discourses for talking about collective action against poverty.  In discourses of 
superación through capacidad, collective change results from individual transformations. 
A key theme of the prior struggles for development was a unified political struggle 
against Ladino oppression.  The guerrilla narrative located revolutionary agency in 
collective armed confrontation with the state.   Today, discussions of collective, unified 
political struggle have receded into the background.  Unity is unimportant.  Everyone 
develops for themselves and their families. One generation is tired of helping. One 
formerly active leader says that if he will do work as a community leader now, it will 
have to be for a salary.  
Another element of these discourses is faith in scientific technology. 
Development discourses disseminate a veritable laundry list of options for enterprising 
individuals to find the route to success.  Each of these describes a long-term path, usually 
involving some form of individual training and/or personal discipline (like savings, 
taking out credit, and strategic investment).  By focusing on the fact that people have not 
followed these options, these discourses have shifted many a private conversation and 
many a public discussion away from themes of gross historic socio-economic inequality. 
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Although the state has officially withdrawn from many of the activities of 
development, the state continues to similar to the visions of “apolitical” development that 
informed DIGESA’s programs on their affiliated NGOs.  A source close to the Ladino 
leader of the most prominent local development organization in San Pedro told me that, 
in order for NGOs like that one to receive money from the state (they also look for 
international funding) they must submit to certain regulations regarding the kind of 
discourses they can engage it.  For example, none of these groups can criticize the 
government, nor can they talk about systemic social inequalities outside of the terms laid 
out by notions of capacidad.  Depoliticization through capacidad is the continued legacy 
of “apolitical” development, as political as ever.  Furthermore, these notions of 
capacidad and discourses of superación provide the main conceptual tools that 
individuals, especially Ladinos, use to understand the causes of poverty, and the solutions 
that are sought.  That these notions are commonsense—even articles of faith—among 
Ladinos Sampedranos is consistent with the analysis of the new cultural racism in 
Guatemala described by Hale (2006).   
 
Depoliticization and Personal Status  
Ferguson (1991) does not describe the role of individual agency in the 
perpetuation of these normalizing re-narrations of poverty, seeing it as the work of the 
“development machine.”  I think that the case of Los Altenses, especially the examples I 
have provided above, clarify that one of the reasons that depoliticizing discourses 
circulate is that they endow individuals who are less poor with a positive identity.  Some 
individuals become invested in narratives that attribute their relative success to their 
innate intelligence, which explains their achievements. It appears that there emerged over 
time a politically decisive class of people invested in individualistic narratives of success.  
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Narratives focusing on individual intelligence and qualities were essential to their high 
status. Further evidence that depoliticizing discourses are tied to individual status claims 
can be seen in the behavior of Juan Jiménez.  His regular assertions that other people do 
not know how to work, or are too lazy is a way for him to define himself through them in 
the negative.  He is their opposite, a smart person.  His identity as intelligent needs their 
failure to be a case of personal irresponsibility and backwardness.  They fail for the same 
reason that he has succeeded. 
The nature of this investment in discourses of becomes clearer the more closely 
we examine the different contexts in which they are used, and the different privileges that 
their utterances give to those who circulate them. Even if they retain notions of 
superación and discipline as abstract goals or ideals, many farmers who have not attained 
a high level of economic success, or who have had only fleeting success, regularly 
circulate narratives that discount the extent to which they themselves are responsible for 
their own poverty.  Alfredo, in the interview with Pedro suggested that market agriculture 
means little to people with small amounts of land.  Esteban’s argument against Santos is 
another example.  His marginal existence is a potent complaint against them.  He accepts 
some responsibility, but not all.  But his pleas go unheard.  No one takes him seriously. In 
fact, he, like many others, is ridiculed. Neighbors are not totally unsympathetic. Santos 
offers him what he views as charity, but only on the condition of Esteban’s accepting of 
some fairly restrictive conditions.  Santos seems clearly to benefit from this arrangement.  
Offering Esteban an unused, and quite humble, house, costs him nothing.  In return he 
gets cheap labor and guardianship of his land.  Santos does not think for a second that 
Esteban has a point when he complains about money, or about the amount of work he has 
to do for Santos.   
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LACUNAE OF DEPOLITICIZING DISCOURSES 
As we discussed in the last chapter, superación was indeed possible for some 
villagers who engaged with development programs in the early 1980s.  Also, the 
narrative of DIGESA and subsequent modernization programs was vehemently anti-
political, and proposed a individualistic, technocratic approach to poverty.  But both of 
these important factors are still unable, alone, to explain the dominance among rural 
Mayans of explanation of poverty that focus on individual choice to the erasure of 
structural determinants.  How has it been able to gain such headway in a village that is 
still quite poor, and increasingly economically insecure, and that, for whatever other 
differences they had with the guerrilla movement, been so receptive to structural 
explanations for poverty advanced by the revolutionary narrative?  
The question of why people adhere to these discourses becomes more puzzling 
when compared to the unreliability and ephemerality of its promises.  It would be wrong 
to deny that the advent of capacitación has had no effect on local poverty. Individual 
capacity development has been integrally in sending many notable individuals on an 
upward economic trajectory.  For people who’ve made it far enough, their stories 
sometimes become legends, often repeated and held up as examples.  However, program 
rhetoric aside, the promise of prosperity through market agriculture has fallen far short. 
Almost no villager grows vegetables introduced by DIGESA for sale in local markets.  
The main reason for that being that so many people have these crops now that the prices 
received are too low.  One farmer pointed out that, in his village, non-traditional 
agriculture did not work for tomatoes—the cash crop deemed by agronomists to be best 
suited to the local climate and altitude— because there was no way to get irrigation.  The 
few families who do sell buy a vegetable in quantity from other vendors and sell in the 
market.  Two female heads of household, both married to men who are considered to be 
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among the most capacitado in the village sell small tamales in the market.  The long term 
situation in Los Altenses gives depth to the USAID self assessment, discussed in the 
previous chapter, that revealed that the actual affect on peasant production as a result of 
cooperative movement was negligible to the point of being immeasurable, or perhaps 
negative.  Regardless of whatever variables that might have led to these results that so 
perplexed program directors, the long-term effects diverge substantially from their 
original aims.  If one takes into account, as one must, that one of the main problems 
confronted by local farmers is dependency on overly expensive chemical inputs, none of 
which work in the way that they were originally intended and advertised—the outcomes 
must be seen as a net loss, a temporary solution at best.  
Another reason why the fact of superación itself does not explain the current 
dominance of depoliticizing conceptions of poverty is that there is no necessary 
relationship between superación and responsible behavior, as mandated by discourses of 
capacidad. Did people considered capacitado by themselves and others work harder, 
make smarter decisions, have more disciplined, save their money?  Not as far as I could 
tell.  They drink as much as many people who are not considered capacitado do, even if 
they are not ridiculed or condemned for it in the same manner.  In fact, from what I saw, 
they work less, and tend to hire cheap labor to maintain their larger fields.  (People with 
money who drink are made fun of, but not condemned in the same moral terms, or with 
as much disdain, as those who are poor and drink.  Although critics acknowledge that 
many poor people drink out of sadness.)  In fact, at least in the village where I lived, 
several of the men who are most associated with the term “capacidad” were the ones who 
drank the most, or the most often, in public cantinas.  The idea that this group’s success is 
related to their intelligence is likewise questionable.  Many do know more than the others 
regarding certain things, some of which can give them an income.  But these differences 
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do not account, in most cases, for an individuals’ wealth or poverty.  The largest factor 
determining individual wealth is not capacitación, but the luck of inheritance, namely 
productive land for corn and coffee.  One of the wealthiest Mayan man in Los Altenses 
cannot read or write, but does own upwards of 100 cuerdas of coffee.  They were able to 
buy land when it was cheap, and convert it slowly to coffee land.  He never even worked 
with DIGESA.  Another way that wealth is produced is from having a child in the US 
who sends money.   The next most common source of wealth in the villages is having 
some sort of job that pays a wage, either as a teacher, or in some other government 
position, especially in the municipal building.  Beneath that is driving people in a truck.   
Most villagers grow only coffee for the market. Alternative crops were incredibly rare. 
Only a few individuals had honey for sale and even Juan had yet to plant the papayas that 
sweetened his dreams of success.   
Moreover, following the recommendations of the discourses of capacidad does 
not guarantee economic well being.  This has become increasingly apparent to many 
exasperated and worried villagers.  On a hot afternoon in Los Altenses, I sat with Oscar 
Mejia, a 54 year old Protestant man, in the shade of the patio outside of his son’s home. 
With a lovely view of the valley below, including the road into the town on the other side 
of the valley, Oscar spoke to me at great length about his agricultural practices. At one 
point in our conversation, Oscar, clearly exasperated, and with more than a little 
embarrassment, began to recount to me about how he had taken out a loan that he was 
unable to pay.  In default, BANRURAL, the Rural Bank (formerly the Rural 
Development Bank BANDESA) reclaimed most of his productive acreage for coffee.  
This was eight years ago, he told me, stating that he would not use credit any longer for 
this reason.  At the same time, he reasoned that the rural farmers in San Pedro simply do 
not have the ciencia (science) necessary to grow crops, and if this is why they are poor.  
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He has heard that in the US, they really know how to grow big tomatoes, the kind that 
draw good prices in the market, and that they are smarter.  He asked my opinion about his 
coffee: are they not growing it correctly?  He is deeply concerned with the fact that there 
is not enough money to fertilize his coffee appropriately.  He also told me that “no one 
has any money anymore for fertilizer.”  His milpa does not give enough food for the 
entire family the whole year.  What is striking here is that, although the failure of 
scientific and market agriculture is apparent, Oscar, like many farmers, still hold onto the 
dream. Despite the abstract and somewhat unattainable qualities of both capacitación and 
superación, their existence as references to a dream that never came true, these dreams 
permeate life and are the shared stuff of everyday conversations between rural villagers. 
Nevertheless, new desperate economic realities are leading to widespread frustration, and 




There is some evidence to suggest that notions of capacidad and superación have 
shaped popular opinion regarding the desirability of neoliberal economic policies, 
specifically the Free Trade Agreement. In 2004, the Free Trade Agreement was under 
consideration, and it was obvious the government intended to ratify it.  The Prensa Libre 
was filled almost daily with articles in the business section and op-ed pieces proclaiming 
its benefits, with the occasional dissenting article.   As the debates became more intense, 
and as leftist organizations began to criticize them, even Nuestro Diario—a daily 
newspaper with lots of pictures aimed at the poor and working class—had a pullout 
feature, complete with cartoon drawings of farmers, bankers, factory owners and business 
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people, describing how Free Trade would benefit everyone as it made the Guatemalan 
economy grow.  
Gregorio, or ‘Goyo’ is a young Mayan professional, a new husband and father.  
He has worked as a school-teacher, and who in 2004 was working as a technician for a 
local development organization.  I would visit their office frequently, because their young 
office staff was knowledgeable about local politics, and gossip, and interested in 
answering my questions to further my the research, and always just as interested in 
whatever I might have learned, or information that I might have to share with them.  One 
day I asked Goyo what he thought about the TLC.  At the time, he was fairly unaware of 
my relationship to CEIBA, or my own convictions about the matter.  He said, matter of 
fact manner, that: “Mexico has a free trade agreement.  And Mexico is a developed 
country.  The United States has a free trade agreement.  And the United States is a 
developed country.  Guatemala also needs a free trade agreement.”  In order to be 
developed, you have to follow the example of the developed countries.  Guatemala must 
follow the basic pattern.  This was, for him, the only logical conclusion.  It was obvious 
he had given this some thought prior to our conversation, although he had probably not 
followed the debates as closely as many others in the town.  But he was not alone.   
Every market day, several men would sit and talk in front of a tienda that was on 
the edge of the bustling market, watching to see, as one man told me, “lo que caiga” 
(whatever happens, literally whatever ‘falls’).  Oftentimes, I would join them in their 
conversations, which many times were nothing but a series of jokes, many of them quite 
scandalous.   But many times the conversations would address, albeit in the same 
irreverent manner, serious political topics.  One of the participants, an outspoken 
iconoclast and former military supporter, Carlos Solis, a Mayan man in his late 60s was 
always interested in sharing his quite eccentric and improbable opinions on matters as 
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diverse as the science behind the spread of AIDS, the sexual behavior of gringas, to the 
economic impacts of buying ropa Americana (used clothing, ‘donated’ from the US, but 
sold in local markets).  He asked me one day what I thought about Free Trade.  Was it 
really so bad?  He thought it was probably for the best.   I told him that many people were 
afraid that it would undercut the local corn market by flooding Guatemala with 
genetically modified corn from government subsidized farms in the US—a fact as far as I 
knew.  He said that that would be fine with him.  He said he would just stop growing 
corn.  It was no problem. If corn was cheap, he might even save money. When I asked 
him if he was worried about the farmers who make their living selling corn.  He said he 
was not.  “They can do something else,” he explained, as unclear as I was about what that 
something else might be, if somewhat less concerned.   
 
LOSING FAITH IN SUPERACIÓN 
Despite the prevalence and moral authority of discourses of superación and 
capacidad in discussions of poverty, there is evidence to suggest that widespread dissent 
from these views is on the rise, as the promises of superación through development have 
left more and more people empty-handed.  The collapse of the coffee economy has been 
the greatest factor.  When I arrived to San Pedro, many farmers not even bother to 
fertilize their coffee—a move tantamount to giving up on coffee harvest for the year 
because the coffee will hardly produce anything without fertilizers.  Fertilizer costs were 
too high, and coffee required too much care to make it worth it.  Belts were tightened.  
The primary economic alternative at this point is immigration to the US or Mexico to 
work for higher wages.  But of course these are not available to everyone.  The result is 
widespread frustration and rising disillusionment with the idea of superacion as a route to 
social mobility. 
 317 
Indeed, the sense that economic failure is inevitable is nowhere more obvious 
than in the practice of migration. The collapse of subsistence agriculture, and the 
hopelessness of market agriculture combine to drive migration.  I did not talk to a single 
person between the ages of 18-40 who has not at one point seriously considered a trip to 
the United States.  The number of people that have actually attempted, or have done it, is 
astounding; the absence of young men and women in the village in those age ranges is 
quite visible in many of the villages.   
Desperation over economic conditions manifests in other ways.  The main one is 
alcohol use.  Most of the people I met who engaged in excessive, chronic alcohol 
consumption of the variety that others saw as risking personal health—the number one 
activity that people condemn as a individual bringing poverty down on their own heads—
told me that they drank as much as they did because of how sad they were about their 
poverty.  This sadness does not only result in alcoholism, although this and religion are 
the two most frequent means through which unhappiness and despair is palliated.  Farmer 
suicides, while not rampant in San Pedro, are too frequent to keep track of easily.  
Several villagers in Los Altenses had died after drinking gramoxone (paraquat)—the 
chemical herbicide.  Drinking gramoxone is almost always fatal, and is a horribly painful 
way to die.  Gramoxone consumption is always associated with drunkenness, but also 
always to misfortune.  These are individual acts of resistance, symptoms of a social order 
gone awry.  Some of them are literal cries for help.  Unfortunately, these are among the 
most disempowered forms that resistance can take.  We must see them as collective cries 
for help from the margins of the neoliberal economy. 
In a less dramatic form, villagers resist the individualist focus of discourses of 
capacidad through stealing.   Stealing is common in villages, and has been on the rise in 
recent years.  I am referring here to relatively small-scale theft of valuable household 
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goods. Most common is chickens from a family coop.  These take months to raise and are 
worth between Q75 and Q100.  When coffee is ready to harvest, one man told me, some 
villagers go and pick their neighbors’ coffee at night.  “People here are tremenda!” (have 
a lot of chutzpah).  Stealing fresh ripe corn off the stalk is common.  One man who has 
had this happen to him on a number of occasions complained, “And it’s not like they take 
the small ones, either!”  In one village, the problem was so bad that women on their way 
back from the gas run corn mill would have the masa stolen from their heads.  It is easy 
to understand why tempers flare; their neighbors are stealing food from their mouths.  
But what leaves one mouth certainly goes into another hungry one.  
Despite the failure of individual capacity development to lift Mayan villagers out 
of poverty, and the growing dissent from this model, no other alternative has emerged to 
take its place. This dissent has not, at least not in a fully articulated way, made itself into 
a political refusal of the failure of market economics, especially not one that resonates 
with a large number of Mayans.  Most Sampedrano Mayans remain distant from leftist 
movements. Few villagers attend protests, or even know the issues.   Resistance to 
capacidad has taken other forms, some of which have been discussed here, another of 
which will be discussed in the next chapter about political divisions, and support for the 
FRG.  
 
CRITICAL DISCOURSES ON FREE TRADE 
In their postwar manifestation, leftist organizations routinely predict disaster from 
neoliberal economic policies.  In many ways, their opposition to Free Trade has 
overtaken their emphasis on the Peace Accords They claim that transgenic corn will do 
damage to health and to local crops, and are just plain unnatural and wrong.  They say 
that this will make poor people poorer.  Many Sampedrano Mayans participated in 
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protests of the TLC in March 2005.  There, the National Police and the army opened fire 
on an unarmed crowd with live ammunition and teargas.  Their justification for the 
removal was that the group was breaking the law by blocking the highway.3 One Mayan 
man from Colotenango was shot and killed and over a dozen were gravely wounded.  
One man had his leg amputated. A schoolteacher from San Pedro, the son of an 
indigenous leader who was kidnapped, tortured and murdered during the war, was shot 
and still has a bullet lodged in his arm because it was too close to the artery for the 
doctors to remove.  Farmers that work with CEIBA are almost universally opposed to the 
TLC and transgenics.   
As a result, many Sampedranos are skeptical about free trade.  Despite the fact 
that they have maintained their distance from leftist political organizations, and know few 
specific details about international trade law, they do know the general outline of leftist 
criticisms.  Although they might object to their methods, they commonly listen to their 
discourses and generally believe them.  For things that are a clear threat to the 
community, and have not yet been marked in local consciousness as an issue that is “off 
limits” for democratic input.  Mining is the best, most current example of this.   Most 
people oppose mining.  San Pedro, like the rest of Huehuetenango, is heavily 
concessioned to mining companies.  For better or worse, attached to the Free Trade 
Agreement was to make and honor these concessions.  Villagers re-united en masse to 
block the roads that the mining companies   
 
CONCLUSION 
Discourses of capacidad caught on among rural Mayans for several reasons. In 
the 1970s, discourses of development provided a positive outlet for Mayan desires for 
well-being.  For many Mayan farmers, capacidad represented a slow but steady path out 
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of poverty and also of equality with Ladinos, whose superiority has increasingly been 
based on their possession of an objectively higher level of capacidad. They had the status 
as an alternative to militarism, but one that whose existence was allowed by military 
institutions.  Later, they became the moral underpinning for Mayan political challenges 
against Ladinos in the 1980s.  They also play an important part in maintaining 
individuals’ status as ‘capacitado’ ‘superado’ or ‘professional.’ Mayans were not passive 
recipients of capacidad.  They reimagined the term to make it consistent with their 
desires for political empowerment.  But elevating the quest for capacidad to the level of 
battle cry for a new politics has some severe limitations.  First, discourses of capacitación 
make full citizenship contingent on adopting certain set of normalized behaviors and 
practices.  These discourses blame poverty and political exclusion on individual choice to 
remain backward, and to not avail themselves to new technologies and forms of training.  
This framework justifies the grinding poverty that affects the vast majority of villagers.  
It places no importance on the fact that some people enjoy disproportionate access to the 
means of capacidad than others. Many Sampedranos, Ladinos and Mayans, but far more 
Mayans than Ladinos, cannot afford to educate themselves, or their children past middle 
school. These solutions do not address the fundamental contradictions of a social order 
that depends upon the racialized marginalization of indigenous populations.   This raises 
an important question: When Mayans struggle to be equal to a Ladino, to what extent, 
and in what moments, does that struggle include an attempt to lay claim to their 
conception of themselves as “mas que un indio”? This highlights a dilemma for Mayan 
politics:  In order to be legitimate, Mayans must frame their politics in terms of 
capacitación.  Yet, capacidad tends to legitimate the very inequalities of the social order 
that Mayans originally adopted it to combat.     
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Discourses of capacidad contradict some of the fundamental elements of the 
revolutionary narrative: the focus on collective struggle to overcome poverty that was 
generated by vast social inequalities.  Now, it is up to individuals to struggle to improve 
their life projects.  General social inequalities, while troubling, have no collective 
solution, and, moreover, people themselves are to blame for their own poverty. 
Capacidad provided a new set of narratives and explanations for economic failure that 
focused on what types of normalized behavior they do or do not engage it, what 
technologies they do or do not use.  These explanations became popular not because they 
describe an objective reality—the one where capacidad is available to everyone equally 
and anyone who pursues the path of capacidad can expect economic success—but 
because they provided positive identities for Mayans who were not poor, who could think 
of their relative good fortune as a result of their own hard work and inherent intelligence 
of wisdom.  It probably also shields them from having to face the staggering poverty that 
is all around them, and that indeed is growing.   
I am not arguing that these depoliticized explanations have completely replaced 
villagers’ understandings of political economy. As I tried to demonstrate in the chapter 
about the MOSCAMED conspiracy, these still hold broad sway.  However, these 
discourses no longer hold the monopoly on explaining poverty.  Development has carved 
out an important niche.  The relative status of these two discourses is in question. Perhaps 
it is because it appears that there is simply no way to act on national-level political 
inequalities, these problems have become, in a way, irrelevant to many villagers involved 
in the political processes.  As discussed in the previous chapter, if we take Arturo’s 
narrative to be indicative of villagers’ attitudes towards the DIGESA when it arrived, 
then types of depoliticizing mechanisms were not in operation at that time.  In this 
chapter, I am present evidence that indicates the developmentalist explanation has gained 
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substantial ground.  It was especially prevalent among the previous generation of Mayan 
leaders, a generation whose ascendance has possibly peaked. Many members of this 
group explain Mayan participation in the revolutionary movement as a result of their lack 
of capacidad, and hence their ignorance.  Moreover, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that this value shift could color widespread perception Neoliberal economic 
policies, which strongly emphasizes the possibilities for individual economic 
advancement represented by the free market. 
It is reasonable to assume that without the threat of state violence, would Mayans 
have taken their re-working of capacitación further.  One very large possibility is that 
Mayans might have demanded that notions of capacidad take into account the unequal 
access to capacidad. Mayans are well aware that there is a difference in the ability for 
Mayans and Ladinos to afford schooling.  But Mayans have not, as far as I know, used 
this disparity as an argument against the neutral application of the standard set by 
capacidad.  They have not argued, for example, for the rights of a lesser-capacitated 
Mayan to hold political office or a job before an equally or slightly more capacitated 
Ladino as a partial remedy for historic inequalities. Beyond state violence, the fact that 
the state curtails discourses of development from speaking about the wide-ranging 
political alternatives does not improve the possibilities that Mayans will imagine these 
alternatives.  It is at least probable that Mayan leaders would never have accepted it as a 
replacement for revolutionary politics if it were not for violence.  If they were not so 
socially marginalized, they would also probably be more critical of the western norms 
embedded within the term.  In the next chapter, we will discuss how some Mayans have 
criticized the forms of discrimination between Mayans legitimated by discourses of 
capacidad.  
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These arguments clarifies the ways in which notions of capacidad and superación 
reveal the deep ambiguities associated with the military state’s conception of the ‘Indio 
permitido’ (sanctioned Indian).  Their limitations show the inability of these bounded 
norms for behavior to contain Mayan desires for economic advancement and security.  
These are therefore extremely dangerous for Mayan goals of economic well-being and 
autonomy. Mayans, like subaltern populations around the world, have becoming jaded 
about the alternatives for prosperity offered by neoliberalism.  They recognize them as 
horribly incomplete. Yet they do not have the illusion that something will eventually 
work out.  The dream attached to neoliberalism seems to have clearly faded for many, 
although some still support CAFTA. For the moment, villagers are torn between two 
divergent ways of conceptualizing poverty and differentiation, and the contents of 
“Mayan” politics.  This is, in many ways, a moral conflict.  It concerns when a person’s 
exclusion is to be justified and ratified, and not a cause for alarm.  This debate is crucial; 
it is at the heart of the question of what direction Mayan politics could and should take.  
The primary participants in this discussion will be the new generation, the young 
professionals.  This dissertation is written with them in mind as the principal audience. 
 
                                                
NOTES 
1 This is distinct from work that explores market ideologies in the rural highlands.  
Goldin (1993) argues that uneven development in the western highlands results from 
differing market ideologies and occupational change and that it leads to political divisions 
within and between townships. Goldin examines only the developed core, near larger 
cities and market systems.  My research investigates the programs and techniques used to 
spread new economic ideas and create marketable skills and it explores the grassroots 
impact of these ideas and opportunities on the practices and conceptions characteristic of 
Mayan political organizations.  Additionally, by focusing on Huehuetenango, it reveals 
how these processes work in less-integrated areas more typical of the highlands. 
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2 For a recent study of women’s role in town governments, see Mujeres en gobiernos 
municipals en Guatemala: relaciones del genero y poder en las corporaciones 
municipales. Merida, Alba Cecilia. Antigua: Ediciones del Pensativo. 2005.  
3 Both police and military claimed they were fired on first, and only defended themselves.  





Chapter Eight: A Revolt Against Capacidad? 
 
At its core, capacidad is a form of discrimination, a way of making legitimate 
distinction between persons based on ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ criteria. The last chapter 
described how notions of capacidad formed an important part of the conditions of 
possibility for Mayan political resurgence and at the same time profoundly reshaped 
conceptions of social inequality and political alternatives that had informed previous 
struggles.  This chapter examines the effects of notions of capacidad on internal village 
politics.  I argue that understanding contemporary divisions in the village of Los 
Altenses, as well as support for the FRG by several key individuals, do not make sense 
without an appreciation of how discourses of capacidad have re-shaped local identities.  
Specifically, I show how discourses of capacidad fostered local forms of discrimination 
against Mayans considered ‘capacitados’ as well as a monopoly on village leadership 
positions for those with more experience and training.   
In the vacuum of authority and uncertainty generated by decades of turmoil, 
religious conversion, and economic transformation, development committees and 
political parties emerged as the center of authority in village life. Capacidad became a 
requirement for almost every position of community leadership.  It displaced other forms 
of authority. In Los Altenses, new norms for community leadership based on capacidad 
created conflicts for leadership status among people who ‘did’ and people who ‘did’ not 
meet this standard. Lesser-capacitated people, despite their weaknesses, still want to be 
seen as community leaders.  They also wanted to be treated with respect. This led several 
‘lesser capacitated’ and somewhat opportunistic village men who desired, but were 
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regularly denied, leadership positions, to join the FRG, where they were treated with 
respect and materially rewarded. These village-level divisions and intra-Mayan divisions 
dovetailed with an FRG strategy to recruit leaders whose relative lack of political 
training, experience, and ability to gestionar (negotiate) projects led them to be denied 
access to leadership roles and power in Mayan political organizations. The FRG will take 
anyone so long as he is an indigenous person with enough charisma to win the election.  
In the case of these leaders, FRG populism resonates with many rural Mayans not so 
much for their alliance with the people in opposition to the power bloc, but because it 
takes their side against their neighbors who have abused them in the past.  
 
SHIFTING POLITICAL ALLIANCES IN LOS ALTENSES 
Most residents of los Altenses belong to one of three extended families who have 
lived in the aldea since its founding at the end of the 19th century: the Ruíz, Morales and 
Lopez.   There are several other much smaller families, all but two of which have moved 
to the aldea in recent years.  Each of these three main extended family groups is 
comprised of several dozen households, many of which include members from far 
beyond the nuclear family.  Large family units live, roughly, in distinct geographical 
zones that have specific names.  All the families are Christian, and most members of the 
Bravo and Ruíz families are AC Catholics, or new Catholics.  Most of the Lopez are 
evangelicals. There are several Pentecostals in the village, as well as one family of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. In addition to being neighbors, the three central extended families 
are closely interrelated through various marriages.   
Internal governing structures of Mayan communities have been in flux for 
decades.  In the 1960s, cash cropping, schooling and economic stratification led to 
increasing frustration with both village level hierarchies and the Ladino power on which 
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these forms were dependent (Brintnall 1979).  Desire to be independent of the cult of 
ancestor worship led by village Elders, the responsibilities and economic expenditures 
associated with the cofradía, and town Ladinos led economically modernizing groups to 
convert to Catholicism or Protestantism.  By the mid-1960s, traditional forms of authority 
were all but gone, and most villagers had given up on costumbre and converted to 
‘religion’.  A new, younger group of leaders, committed to economic modernization and 
education displaced traditional hierarchies as the village authority.  Members of this 
group, especially the new Catholics, were more likely to participate in development 
projects, cash cropping, cooperatives, and political parties and also tended to be 
economically advanced above their neighbors.  Modernizing Catholics were also the 
same groups who were most responsive to the guerrilla’s message, and worked to gain 
followings in Mayan villages.   These complex processes have followed a general pattern 
and is described by several anthropologists (Brintnall 1979, Falla 1978, Warren 1978).   
Events in Los Altenses follow the general outlines of this story.  The Bravo 
family was the most active in Catholic Action.  The Lopez family was the first to convert 
to Protestantism, and did so en masse.  Members of the Ruíz family, along with a smaller 
family in the village, were the last to convert to Christianity.   The Bravo family had a 
greater amount of wealth, mostly in land, compared to other families in the village.  Due 
to their association with the Church, and their relative abundance of land, leaders of the 
Bravo family were the most active participants in the agricultural cooperatives in the 
1960s and 1970s.  They were the first to turn a substantial part of their milpa over to 
coffee, the first to use new chemical fertilizers and the first to take advantage of the 
favorable loans offered by the cooperatives.   This is consistent with Brintnall’s analysis 
in that that the reach of these early cooperatives was fairly small, and only the wealthiest 
villagers were able to take advantage of new technology and loans (p. 154-157).  These 
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processes were likely responsible for increasing their economic position relative to other 
families.  Whatever the specifics, it is clear that both capacidad and wealth were 
unequally distributed among community members by the early 1980s, heavily favoring 
the Bravo family.   
The main distinction between the processes in Los Altenses and the current 
understanding of Catholic Action is that while the Bravo family was involved with the 
Church and receptive to the guerrilla message, their response was more guarded.  It was 
the members of the Ruíz family, the ‘late’ converts to new Catholicism, who were the 
most enthusiastic about the revolution. Several trained as combatants.  Still, both families 
were united in their support for political reform.  The Bravo were more interested in 
development.  They were more active in the cooperative movement and also in DIGESA.  
As seen in chapter 5, the Ruíz family’s participation in DIGESA was motivated by their 
perception that the program was associated with political reform.  The Bravo were 
probably more interested in the guerrilla movement because of its association with their 
local struggles for development.  The Lopez family participated in neither the guerrilla 
nor DIGESA, leaving them out of this unity.    
During and after the years of guerrilla presence in the village, the Ruíz and the 
Lopez family were further divided because of the murder of Juan Lopez. Juan Lopez, one 
of the earliest converts to evangelicalism in the village, a contratista for the fincas, and a 
military commissioner was assassinated in his home in 1983.  He was killed at night one 
day after he had spoken out against community members, and the Ruíz family 
specifically, for participating with the guerrilla, citing the Romans verse 13 that says that 
the law of the land is established by God, and should not be opposed.  Members of the 
Lopez family with whom I spoke, including his sons and his grandsons, insist that 
members of the Ruíz family were responsible for the death, although there were no 
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witnesses.  Others who were friends of the deceased suggest that it might not have been 
for speaking out.  They suggest another motive for the murder might have been to get out 
of debts owed to Juan Lopez related to his work as a contratista (labor contractor) for the 
plantations.  For many of the reasons discussed in chapter 2, as well as to avoid 
implication in this killing, the Ruíz deny any involvement in Lopez’ death, and in the 
guerrilla movement in general.  They also voice a great deal of resentment at being called 
guerrillas.  
Despite their religious differences and ideological divisions during the war, the 
Bravo and Lopez families have been united politically for the last 23 years.  Much of this 
has to do with the fact that, after the violence, members of the Bravo family actively 
taught what they had learned from DIGESA, and ideas in general about superacion to 
members of the Lopez family who were willing to learn.  Since the war, religious 
differences are not politically inflected in Los Altenses.  Although there was a division 
between the Bravo and the Ruíz family over the displacement of Alfonso Ruíz by Arturo 
Bravo for the leader of DIGESA, this division seems to have relaxed, at least enough for 
the both families to be united to support the first candidacy of Natanael and José Antulio 
Morales in 1993. The division between the Ruíz and the Lopez over the killing of Juan 
Lopez likewise seems to have been resolved enough for the Ruíz and Lopez, despite 
some misgivings, to form a political union together with the Bravo family.   
Today, instead of united with the Bravo, the Ruíz are isolated from both the 
Lopez and Bravo.   Almost the entire Ruíz family, the small families, and members from 
all the other families voted for the FRG.   Why, given ideological unity during the war, 
and religious unity, did Ruíz and Bravo families divide in the years following the worst 
of the armed conflict?  How could a family with such deep identification with the lucha 
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de los pobres support the FRG? What does this have to do with the circulation of 
discourses of development?   
 
CAPACIDAD AND COMPETITION FOR LEADERSHIP  
Under the cofradía system, men in the village occupied leadership positions 
annually, and for a year term.  Individuals can serve twice, but almost everyone served at 
least one time in their lives.  Elders had a higher status than youth, and a council of elders 
made decisions that applied to the entire village.  Since the disruption of cofradía 
authority, and ancestor worship by the actions of the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 
60s, village leadership positions “depended neither on age nor on service in the village 
hierarchies” (Brintnall 1979, 147).  A much younger group of community members 
emerged as leaders.  The new major division was between Catholics and Protestants, the 
former being of a higher economic class.  Writing about Aguacatan, Brintnall was 
unclear what was to replace the hierarchies: 
The fall of the hierarchies, in short, represented more of a negative statement 
about the character of the new order than a positive one—the old will not 
dominate the young, nor the Ladinos the Indians, and the ethnic groups will not be 
united as in the past.  In retrospect, it is clear that the churches actualized this new 
order only partially, and other institutions were soon to take root among the 
Aguacatecs, creating a new public framework for Indian social life. (149) 
He focuses on schools, agricultural cooperatives, political parties, and peasant leagues as 
new sources of community authority.  Each outside institution had its own local 
correlative affiliate: the bilingual educator; the catecist; the labor organizer; and the party 
representative.  There is a diffusion of village authority, linked to outside groups and 
institutions.  The war soon shut down many of these spaces, targeting bilingual educators, 
catecists, labor organizers, and politically active Mayans.  This was certainly the pattern 
of violence in San Pedro Necta.  What remained active, and a form of authority 
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downplayed by Brintnall, is that of the development committee leader.   It was due to the 
bottleneck of community level village level authority onto development that DIGESA 
inserted a set of neutral standards for community leadership.  In addition tonew forms of 
training and practical expertise in the field of agriculture, local leaders of DIGESA 
programs received specialized training that was to prove incredibly important in coming 
years: how to petition for infrastructural development projects through state institutions.    
By this time, as discussed in the last chapter, capacidad had completely redefined 
the norms of leadership.   Community leadership depended on ones ability to gestionar 
projects from development projects from state institutions, and—at least by 1985 if not 
before—from political parties.  Even if there were not that many projects actually 
awarded until the Peace Accords, there were more than ever before and certainly seemed 
to be worth the effort to pursue for Mayan villagers.   
During the war, community development committees were all subordinated to the 
civil patrol system.  Village business became orchestrated by the civil patrols, who held 
regular meetings.  Participation was mandatory.  When I asked if he thought the civil 
patrol system was useful or necessary, Arturo Bravo explained:  
For a part. It was always necessary. There were always people who took 
advantage [of the situation] in that time.  Many people don’t want to help the 
community.  But when the patrollers were there, that’s when all of them people 
got together.  Whoever did not show up, commits a crime or gets punished.  All of 
the people got more organized. There was more respect in the entire community.  
Whatever happens, the people are there united.  But there was a bad side to the 
patrols too.  We always lost a lot of time.  Always, even to our crops.  All work 
was left abandoned.  
While villagers remember the suffering associated with the civil patrols, many recognized 
and appreciated this was a time of great, perhaps unheralded unity.  After the patrols had 
been established and villagers had stopped participating with the guerrilla, they were 
afraid of the army and the guerrilla both.   The civil patrol system represented their 
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protection from any risks associated with being with either side.  Of course, being in the 
middle was difficult as well, and participating in the patrol was technically on the side of 
the army, but being as it was a mandatory, and that villagers continued to protect their 
neighbors that were involved in the guerrilla movement, the civil patrollers helped them 
to achieve this aim.  Not all villagers liked it.  But anyone who did not comply with the 
patrols was beaten up by the villagers themselves or imprisoned in a makeshift cell, 
forced to sleep in the cold.  In addition to unity and relative protection, the patrols forced 
people to “help the community.” One of the major items of business at patroller meetings 
was development.  By 1984, the community had received its first project.  INFOM 
(National Institution of Development) potable water tubed in from a source in a distant 
village.  Other projects were in different state of planning and negotiation with state 
institutions.   
In Los Altenses, two families dominated the patrols: the modernizing Catholics 
and Evangelicals opposed to the guerrilla movement.  The evangelical Lopez identified 
most with the mission of the patrols. But the leaders of the Lopez family knew little about 
development.  Modernizing Catholics in the Bravo family moved quickly to take an 
active role in the patrols.  The Bravo disavowed the guerrilla movement, and claimed 
their neighbors, the Ruíz family, late converts to the new Catholicism and not heavily 
associated with modernization, were the ones who were more fully entregado (given 
over) to the guerrilla.  Because the business of the civil patrols was so closely associated 
with development, the Bravo soon established their leadership role in the community 
through the patrol system. In chapter 5, I discussed how the Bravo taught the Lopez how 
to negotiate development projects and also about modern agriculture. By the late 1980s, 
the community development committees were dominated by these two families.1  
Between these two families, it was the Bravo family that had the most authority, which 
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was no doubt reinforced by their relative wealth, which was steadily increasing in these 
years. It was these leaders that called meetings and who spoke at them.  They also served 
as liasons between political parties and the community members.  
At the time, it is unlikely that the members of the Ruíz family objected to their 
neighbors’ monopoly on community leadership.  When I discovered that most of the 
members of the Ruíz family were about to leave for the coast to work on the coffee 
harvest, I focused my efforts on this part of the community.   One of the first people that I 
spoke with at length was Diego Ruíz.  Diego is a young man, about 28 at the time of my 
fieldwork.  He has three young children, all under the age of 5.  He lives far north in the 
village, on a small plot of land.  He has 4 cuerdas of coffee, and when we met it was 
agreed that I would help him or cut limbs off the pine trees that were shading his plot. 
Diego is one of the few Ruíz who holds a cargo in the village.  As a health promoter, 
Diego coordinates with the local development agencies in their monthly clinical visits, in 
addition to providing health material and information to community members, and in 
some cases, first aid.  Accepting the position was not an easy decision for Diego, as he 
explained:  
How afraid I was, what fear! When they named me to the committee.  “Could I 
capable?” I asked myself. After the first workshop reunion of capacitación for 
promoters, again, what fear!  But little by little, the fear went away.  Now I’ve 
been the health promoter for the sector for five years. 
It seems a lack of capacidad led to reticence among many people with less capacidad and 
experience to participate in the development committees.  This general pattern still exists 
today.  More members of both Bravo and Lopez participate on development committees.  
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CAPACIDAD AND DISCRIMINATION 
At the same time that norms for capacidad were becoming crucial to village 
leadership, they were helping to create a form of discrimination against people who were 
not capacitados.  Rodrigo Ruíz, the leader of the Ruíz family, was routinely disrespected 
by Marcos Bravo, the political leader of the Bravo family and a close friend and political 
associate of José Antulio Morales.  I found out more about these when I spoke with 
Rodrigo’s oldest son, Carlos.  Carlos is a teacher who works for PRONADE on a contract 
basis.  He is 33, and has a wife and a young child. We met at his newly constructed 
house, built with money he made from teaching in a village that, luckily for him, was, 
although almost seven kilometers away, was still within walking distance of Los 
Altenses.  Unlike many teachers who must live in the schoolhouse or in some rented 
house with other teachers in the villages where work, Carlos is able to make the walk 
each day and spend the nights with his wife, the sharp witted and industrious Lucia.   He 
was proud of the new house, after living in cramped quarters with his parents.  Still, the 
house was a short walk to his parent’s home, which helped Lucia, who, whenever she 
needed a trip to town unencumbered with her newborn child, could leave them with her 
mother in law, with whom she seemed to have a war relationship.  The different forms of 
discrimination in Los Altenses were the primary theme of my Saturday afternoon 
conversation with Carlos.  He talked about the times before schooling, which he knew 
only as a memory: 
Before there were people who although they had not gone to school, but still more 
or less knew a little.  Plenty. But now education is a great advantage. A person 
without a juridical education, I see a lot of illiterate people.  If you give them a 
piece of paper in the hand, they can’t read it.  This means a cloth is blinding their 
eyes. 
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Carlos points to an appreciation of a form of intelligence and value not associated with 
capapcidad, people “still more or less knew a little.” Adopting a somber tone, Carlos 
then laments how his father was made fun of for being lesser developed than other 
villagers: 
But sometimes there are insults.  I realized because of my father.  Before, before, 
he was very poor.  He didn’t have any possibilities to buy something for the week 
or to dress us, his children.  Over time, [they would say] Don Rodrigo is ignorant, 
he’s an indio [an Indian].  That word already died. Yes, it was used between 
families. He [Don Rodrigo] gave this some thought.  “My children are not going 
to be like me.” Through the insult, my father began to analyze. [Rodrigo said] 
“Thank you for making fun of me.  This is going to be an idea for me, an 
experience.” 
This story, alongside the fear of committee participation expressed by Diego, 
demonstrates an internalization of the norm of capacidad among the less capacitated 
villagers.   It also exemplifies again how discourses of development recode individual 
economic differences and misfortune as an individual failure. When he told me that the 
word “indio” was used among the same people, I was taken aback.  Later, I asked 
Humberto to clarify what he meant that the word, as he put it, had “died.”  He said that 
the use had become prevalent in the 80s, but was no longer used, ever since the signing of 
the Peace Accords.  Apparently, the Accords, which included a substantial section on the 
rights of indigenous people, had provoked a rethinking of ethnic discrimination locally, 
as registered in the stoppage of the local usage of the term.  This refusal to assign a 
negative identity to “Indianness” points to a key moment in the process of transformation 
of Mayan identity, or Mayanización (Bastos and Camus 2003).  When I asked him what 
he thought about these criticisms, not surprisingly he told me he was not in agreement:  
Let’s go for the constitution of the republic.  One person cannot be less than 
another.  Many times there is ridicule or discrimination.  But if we go with the 
law, the person has value.  Some people always say, ‘You don’t have capacidad, 
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you have no schooling.’ But for me this is illogical.  It’s not good to say to a 
person that [they] don’t matter. It’s very illogical. 
But to what extent these types of racializing categories have disappeared remains 
uncertain.  It seems clear that these continue to operate, in a disguised way, through terms 
such as capacidad, which always seems to have had an “Indian” somewhere hidden 
inside it, as an opposite that it was always trying to escape, but could nonetheless never 
leave completely behind.  Capacidad creating the conditions under which Mayans could 
be equal to Ladinos.  This opens space for equality, supposedly, for a few people who 
most closely assimilate to these goals.  But at the same time it justifies discrimination 
against the majority of indigenous people on a “legitimate” basis.  People who have less 
training or studies have less value or importance.  Even if the word ‘indio’ is no longer 
acceptable, it is the fantasm conjured up by capacidad as its inferior opposite.   In order to 
be capacitated, some people have to play the role of non-capacitated.  Identities invested 
in notions of capacidad are invested in the naming of others. 
Importantly, in this re-telling of events, neither Don Rodrigo nor Carlos disputes 
the relative advantage of the superior level of capacidad of members of the Bravo family.  
The only stand that they took was to insight that making fun of people with less 
capacidad is wrong.  In fact in this story discrimination turned out to be an important 
impetus for the universalization of norms established by discourses on capacidad. It does 
not call into question the validity of the norm itself.  
One memory looms particularly large in local discussions of political divisions. 
About 20 years ago at a town meeting, José Antulio, who by this time had already started 
his entry into local politics by this time, after hearing that Rodrigo Ruíz had just had 
another son, quipped, “Don Rodrigo has another son?  Fantastic.  Now I will have 
another mozo (peon).”  This joke, obviously incredibly offensive, not just to Don 
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Rodrigo, but to the Ruíz family, was picked up on by members of the Bravo family. 
Without a doubt, Don Rodrigo emerges as the victim in this story, and a heroic victim 
who learns from a bad situation.  His sons still remember this moment as defining family 
divisions in Los Altenses.  
The discrimination against Rodrigo is only one example.  The entire family has 
been cast as “backwards.” Today, these forms of discrimination are the main reason why 
the leaders of the Ruíz family do not want to participate in any kind of alliance that 
involved the Bravo family, or José Antulio Morales.  According to other members of the 
Ruíz family, the Lopez participate equally in discrimination.  Rodrigo, the leader of the 
Ruíz family, had worked on Natanael’s campaign, united with the other villagers.  It is 
remarkable that the Ruíz and Lopez families were able to work together, given the bitter 
accusations of murder of Juan Lopez.  
 
THE RUÍZ FAMILY 
This new standard benefited the Bravo family and their allies in the Lopez family 
at the expense of the exclusion of the Ruíz family.  The Ruíz family, whose leaders were 
less educated and who had mostly withdrawn from the DIGESA program after Arturo 
Bravo wrested control of the village representative position from Rodrigo Ruíz, was 
marginalized from leadership positions.  Other non-capacitated men were similarly 
excluded. Despite their recognition of the relative experiences of other villagers in 
garnering projects, and even those who excluded themselves from participating in 
committees, many village men did not give up their aspirations for leadership, and the 
respect that came with it.  Certainly not all men with ‘lower level of capacidad’ were 
fearful of participation.  This generated political divisions. 
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The role of these forms of discrimination in generating political divisions in Los 
Altenses became apparent in my first meeting with the Ruíz family.  I had arranged an 
interview with Rodrigo, but when I arrived to their humble home, all of the male heads of 
family were there, including his nephew and his two eldest sons, both of whom are 
teachers.  Because I had already heard a little bit about the divisions between the two 
families when I arrived in the community, I began the questioning there.  The mood was 
quite indignant, very defensive, and immensely uncomfortable as the oldest member of 
the younger generation began to share his thoughts: 
They say that there is no one else can get projects like them.  No one.  Only they 
can do it.  They say they’re the smartest.  Only they can.  There is on one else.   
That is their pride.  In the end when they changed their ways.  When they began 
to take money from the community box.  That’s where the people separated, and 
they grabbed their roads, one for one side, the other for the other.  The Ruíz 
family, we met and talked about what we were going to do—all 120 of us—to 
stop them from dominating.  
But it was not simply their pride about their ability to bring development projects to the 
community that angered the Ruíz, but their general arrogance.  Rodrigo’s second oldest 
son, Eriberto, visibly upset as he spoke, continued:  
Eriberto: And bragging too!  Bragging that they have capacidad to do things!  
That’s how the people realized, with they [the Morales] getting drunk and saying 
that they know so much, that they are one way and that we’re different. 
NC: they say bad things about you?  
Eriberto: Insults.  More than anything they talked about a family.  Here there are 
three families.  They talked about how more than anyone else the Ruíz can’t, that 
they lack capacidad.  Because [the Ruíz] lack money and go to the finca or go 
with a patron to work.  That we don’t do our own work.  They seriously criticize 
our family.  With us the main leader of our family is my father [Rodrigo Ruíz].  
He organized the family.  He struggled […] for them to study.  It was to answer 
them, so that they wouldn’t go around criticizing.  And the Lopez are also proud.  
They still are.  When the [time of] politics comes every 4 years, because we have 
never been together helping a candidate with their families.   
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NC: But you were divided before, right, regarding the death of Juan Lopez?  
Eriberto: Yes.  But afterwards we were united to launch Pedro Ramírez.  Then the 
people were united again.  It was after that that they started to say things about 
them being the only ones who knew anything.  This year is the ninth year of 
division.  In 1996 there was division.  They get so proud! Even their own family 
was divided.   There have now passed two political periods that they do not go 
with them.  We are here, united.  We have three periods of working together.  We 
weren’t able to win that day.  Then we went with another candidate.  The first 
candidacy of Mariano Díaz, but he didn’t win.  Chepe won.  And us? They have 
this saying that they’re ‘political technicians’ and when we don’t win, they 
criticize us.  And we, well, afterwards, we’re never going with them.  In the next 
election we helped Mariano Díaz.  And Don Rodrigo’s friends were in the muni.  
Then they shut up.  That’s when we got rid of the ‘zero.’  We divided before the 
first candidacy of Chepe Antulio.  When they have their electoral campaign, only 
they want to participate.  Only they get to be part of the corporacion municipal. 
There’s nothing for us.  Only them.  But not only they can do it.   
Most evident here is the sense of wounded pride felt collectively by members of the Ruíz 
family.  It is clear that vindicating the family name played a determinative role in their 
decision to support the FRG’s candidate, Mariano Díaz.  What is surprising is how this 
frame of reference completely overwhelms any other political or ideological 
considerations.  It is as if the party itself—what it stands for at the national level—is 
irrelevant.  They only important thing is the parties willingness to give them space, to 
take them into account.  It is significant that the last line, ‘not only they can do it,’ is the 
same phrase Mayans use to criticize attempts by Sampedranos Ladinos have justified 
opposition to Mayan attempts to gain political power.  
Even, Diego, who admits to being afraid to participate in the developmetn 
committe because of lack of experience, includes these forms of disrespect in his 
explanation of why the Ruíz did not want to participate as much in committe meetings. 
Diego explains:   
Why are there only Bravo in the committees?  They only want other Bravo to 
speak.  They don’t want to listen to the word of another.  But all of us have to 
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listen to others words.  If you don’t like it, you still have to give space to speak.  
They don’t let us talk in reuniones.  Only they think that they know what to do.  
In his perspective, the Bravo are arrogant in meetings.  They discount other people’s 
opinions.  This suggests that the reason behind this fear, or whatever other elements in 
the “lack of desire” to participate, might have been was motivated by the aggressive 
manner of the Bravo during the meetings.  It is hard to know the extent to which such 
feelings of inadequacy influence individual desires to participate in community 
leadership positions. The fact that his grandfather and other male family members echoed 
these sentiments almost verbatim suggests their salience.   
 
FRG: THE PARTY OF THE LESS CAPACITADOS? 
Over the years, Rodrigo worked for various opposition parties, mostly progressive 
ones.  They gave him the leadership position he desired, but he never won elections.   
Having lost a great deal of face, his reputation as a village leader in serious jeopardy, 
Rodrigo Ruíz decided enough was enough.  Convinced that they could never win, and 
sick of being passed over, Rodrigo gave up on progressive parties, and finally joining the 
FRG in 1998.  Chepe Antulio won that election though; and the ridicule from the 
Morales-aligned Bravo and Lopez intensified.  When Rodrigo finally backed a winning 
party, one month before I arrived, he was ecstatic.  One day, I met Rodrigo while walking 
home, and he pulled me into a cantina operated by a family from behind their house, 
which was on the side of the road leading into the village.  Unfortunately, they were out 
of the warm beer they usually served, and so we bought aguardiente (liquor) and a soda.  
The wife of the owner gave us some sliced lime.  As my throat burned with the stiff, 
warm and sweet mixture, Rodrigo began to speak somewhat reflectively:  
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Rodrigo: You have a lot of experience.  A lot of studies.  You’re a gringo 
licenciado. You have more experience than me. I am illiterate.  I never studied.  
But now, where am I?  On top! 
He pulled out his FRG party affiliate card, which named his job in the party.   
The gringos say that Guatemalans are only good for having children. I only have 
one daughter, the rest are boys.  
One time, José Antulio in a reunion in front of everyone, heard that I had had 
another boy. He said, “good” now I will have another mozo.  But now you see, I 
have two children who are teachers, and another one who is going to be a teacher.  
All of them went out.  They’re not farmers.  
NC: But being a farmer is honorable work, right?  
Rodrigo: Yes, it is.  But now I am working for development.  
What stands out here is that community development is not necessarily an end unto itself; 
it is that the activity allowed him to be a leader that was so important to him.  It is 
apparent that Rodrigo sees his recent electoral victory as primarily a vindication of his 
lost status as a community leader.  It is a salve for his wounded pride.  
Rodrigo’s ability to be a leader has been restored by the fact that, ever since the 
Peace Accords, projects are much easier to get.  The ability to gestionar has become 
more democratic.  It is less necessary for committee members to have a high level of 
capacidad now than it was in the early 1980s.  Many institutinos offer them.  A smoother 
system has developed over the years.  Many of the bureaucratic details have been 
eliminated.  When I sat in on meetings between DECOPAZ, where Mateo had worked, 
and the representatives from the village organizations, there was little expected in the 
way of opar  Being a member of a committe is still hard work.  Villagers still have to 
dedicate time and make trips to different towns for the purposes of finding material and 
meeting with contractors to discuss and plan projects.  But in the current climate, where 
projects are most often awarded based on political affiliation, the process of “knocking on 
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doors” which is how the members of the Bravo family describe their work as committe 
heads. In Los Altenses, this allowed Rodrigo and some of his political allies from the 
FRG, many of who also illiterate and inexperienced, to find funding for several major 
projects, including a massive school improvement project.  Here, it did not hurt his 
chances that Mariano Díaz, the FRG party head in San Pedro, was on the board of 
DECOPAZ, the institution that approved the project, just after the FRG took over 
program administration from the United Nations. 
 
MARIO MARTÍNEZ 
Another man who, for similar reasons having to do with personal status, 
abandoned the fold of the Bravo family and the political alliance with José Antulio 
Morales and found what he was looking for in the FRG was Mario Martínez.  Mario is 
young, in his early 30s at the time of this research.  He was married and has three young 
children.  When he was 18, he left the village and joined the army, where he fought 
against guerrilla in Ixcan.  Mario seems to have no ideological preference for the military, 
however.  His ideological leanings appeared leftist-inflected, in line with the 
commonsense antipathy to the state I describe in chapter 3.  In one of our interviews, he 
registered deep dissatisfaction with most of what the army did during the war, especially 
during the massacres.  He is unique form his fellow villagers in that is knowledge of the 
specifics of the guerrilla movement is based on his experiences in the army, in particular 
direct fighting with the guerrilla in the Ixcan in the late 1980s, an experience that scared 
him to bits.  For him, being in the army was simply a job, and not a necessarily a 
controversial one.  None of the villagers who were his political rivals ever brought up his 
having participated in the military as one of the reasons that they diverged from his 
politics.  Mario was an active leader in the FRG’s recent political campaign, in charge of 
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recruiting villagers to vote, organizing rallies, and other duties.  He is also a close 
associate of Mariano Díaz, the FRG alcalde.  
Mario was deeply invested in being considered a community leader.  When I first 
met Mateo, he was working as a village representative to a state development institution 
that provided infrastructural projects.  When I decided to live in Los Altenses, I did not 
remember that Mario was from there.  Several others had advised me to speak with 
Arturo Bravo, who they said was the community leader.  As I was walking back into San 
Pedro the night I presented my research proposal to the village meeting in Los Altenses, I 
ran into Mario.  As he gripped my hand, not letting go, I could tell he had been drinking.  
When he began to speak, I realized he was angry.  He chastised me for not talking to him 
before about coming to do my research in his village.  “Why did you talk to Arturo, and 
not me?” He told me he was a leader, and he wanted me to “take him into account.” And 
that “Arturo never takes me into account.”  I was shocked—I had forgotten that Mario 
was from Los Altenses and my friend had never mentioned his name.  Apologizing 
profusely, I assured him that I had every intention of taking him into account in my 
research.  We arranged an interview for the next week. 
We discussed the issue of village leadership at length when I met him for an 
extended interview with him in his home, decorated inside and out with a huge plastic 
blue and white FRG banners, with their ubiquitous victory fingers logo.  Mario’s wife, 
Carolina, When I asked him why he participated in politics, he wove together discussions 
of development, individual respect, personal reward and memories of being denied that 
respect by José Antulio Morales: 
NC: Why do you participate in politics?  
MM: My goal, is the following: To participate in a political party…we think the 
first is that, we need development.  One, because we well know how we have 
spoken since the beginning. We can show ourselves demonstrarnos before the 
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pueblo how we decide things with our work.  What is our plan for work? The 
other. A person gets involved in politics because you have voice to speak with the 
people.  If the people know you, they give us their trust.  If they don’t know us—
don’t know our character—but now our respect, our saludo (greeting) or how we 
speak, if we obey so and so [a person], if we listen to the petitions of such and 
such, that is where the people come close to a person.  A person has to study in 
between them all [candidates] to see if it is right for them to get involved. Because 
it doesn’t help at all if we’re going to get involved and the people don’t want us! 
It’s in vain, the time that one loses.  
That’s what happened to me with Don Antulio.  I didn’t have much knowledge 
before.  I only got involved to help out so that he [Antulio] would arrive [win the 
election].  Thank God he did.  But he didn’t take my person into account.  Sure, 
[now] I’m not in the planilla (list of candidates for the FRG), but thank God I’m 
one of the councilors.  I’m earning my little salary. It’s not much, but it’s 
something, it’s something.  That is my decision when I got involved.  Because if 
you don’t enter into to any compromise and you don’t remember someone, well, 
that was my thinking when I entered. That was how it was.  
NC: It pained you that he didn’t take you into account?  
MM:  For a part, yes.  But when José Antulio Morales was starting out in politics 
I didn’t think much.  I wasn’t too angered [then] because as I was telling you I 
lacked understanding, I lacked ideas, for my age. When you get to older, you 
think for yourself.   
It is interesting the intensity and detail with which he focuses on the interpersonal 
recognition of leaderships status.  Whether or not someone says ‘buenas dias’ to him on 
the street as he passes by.  To gain this respect, he had to establish himself as someone 
who could increase the well-being of the fellow villagers, in a demonstrative way.  He 
had to prove it.  This is what public office will allow him to do.  These feelings of 
exclusion he mentions seem to be recent.  When he was young, he felt them less, because 
there was no reason to take him seriously.  But as he got older and started to have more 
“ideas” he aspired to be a leader.  It was then that being left out began to sting more 
acutely.        
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There was another interesting moment I witnessed that exemplified male 
competition for leadership roles and development.  There is a church that is being built, 
double size, right up the road.  Arturo Bravo is the head of the church building 
committee.  He spoke first about fundraising; and there was a raffle to raise money for 
transportation and cement costs.  Later, Arturo spoke at length, about 20 minutes, 
regarding the building process.  Although many of the details were lost on me, it was a 
very repetitive speech that provided numerous details about the steps that he had taken in 
finding funds, talking to different contractors, making deals with them, and outlining 
future steps he would take to “Knock on all the doors he could” to look for more money.  
“There is always the need for economic resources,” he explained. He was asking a 
contribution of Q2 from every person, young men, women and older.  He was interrupted 
by Juan Jiménez, who said that they should ask instead for Q5, because Q2 was not 
enough.  It took him five minutes of elaborate talking to make this point, in his serious, 
intelligent, almost condescending tone.  Arturo thanked him, and proceeded, seemingly 
taking his advice.  In a pause, Mario spoke, saying that people who have more should 
give more: “Instead of asking for Q2, it’s better to ask for Q5 and above, because some 
of us are going to be able to contribute more. It’s better that everyone gives what they 
can.” Arturo thanked him, agreed with him, and spoke for another ten minutes.  It was 
clear to me that this was a competitive performance of intelligence, authority and 
leadership.  In the church environment, all can be seen as advancing the well-being of the 
community.  Each alpha male wanted to give their contribution.  It indicated what I had 
perceived previously about competition between Arturo and Juan, and between Mario 
and both of them.   
I saw a great deal of evidence to suggest that this process was not limited to Los 
Altenses.  José Antulio worked with select leaders in each of the 50 villages of San 
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Pedro.  Uneven distribution of capaciadad and leadership manifested in different ways in 
a number of villages.  My investigations revealed that these individuals were part of José 
Antulio’s generation, middle-aged men, experienced hands in brining development to 
their villages, and education oriented in their outlook.  This was a mix of Catholics and 
Protestants.  If anything, there were more Catholics than Protestants, at least in the 
previous generation. Futhermore, residents from many villages reported disdainful 
treatment by José Antulio Morales.  One of the first things I heard about Chepe Antulio’s 
time as mayor, and something that was repeated numerous times, was that he treated his 
Mayan constituency with little respect, as if he were a Ladino.  He would not attend 
people when they arrived, despite the long way they might have walked to gain his 
audience, and tell them to come back tomorrow.  Indeed, Chepe stood me up several 
times before I was able to get him to sit for an interview.   Perhaps I shouldn’t read 
anything into this—I was stood up frequently, by dozens of people. But most of those 
were farmers, who don’t keep a daily planner for appointments, like Chepe, who, despite 
the fact that he was no longer in politics, had many business meetings in San Pedro and in 
Huehuetenango throughout the day.  He was blowing me off intentionally, another 
reminder of the ‘public nuisance’ aspect of ethnographic researcher.  Of course, part of 
this might have been concern about the purpose of my investigation.  I do remember him 
pulling aside another informant of mine, and a neighbor and long time close political 
associate of his who works for the municipio, after I left his office one day after making 
an early appointment.  Looking back over my shoulder, I saw that they were talking 
closely, and Chepe was pointing directly at me.  In any case, several people, even some 
of his family members and close friends, told me that he was “muy creida” (very 
arrogant).  A few told me that Chepe had become more arrogant the longer he was in 




Mariano Díaz, the FRG alcalde of San Pedro, seemed to come out of nowhere to 
dominate the politics in San Pedro.  Mariano is in his early 40s. Several years after his 
return, Díaz joined the Igesia Shamma—an evangelical Pentecostal church—around the 
same time that he joined the FRG.  After losing the 2000 election to José Antulio, 
Mariano, acting as the leader of the FRG party locally, was appointed to the board of 
directors of DECOPAZ. DECOPAZ was a World Bank funded organization in charge of 
implementing infrastructural projects and whose operation had been turned over to the 
state after the first round of projects was completed.   The second round of projects is 
widely known to have been politicized by the FRG, in control of the presidency and the 
congress after the 2000 elections.  Mariano is an enthusiastic and exciting public speaker.  
Most of his political speeches include a great deal of self-aggrandizement.  He goes on at 
length about his proficiency in attaining development projects and his closeness to God.  
He addresses large audiences in much the same tone as an evangelical preacher addresses 
a congregation.  Mariano fills his speeches with jokes and humorous stories.  
Mariano is reviled by the Ladinos, for whom he is a disgrace to the municipio.  
Several prominent Ladinos expressed embarrasment that he was the mayor of the city, 
and longed for José  Antulio, whose candidacy they had vehemently opposed at the time. 
Likewise, the capacitado and professional class Mayans dislike Mariano a great deal, as 
well as resent his political ascendance. Vicious rumors about Mariano, and open 
contempt for his authority are rampant.  Although he says that he is a teacher, dozens of 
people swore to me that he never finished high school, he never taught classes, and that 
he purchased his diploma to claim the credential.  Mariano is from San Pedro, but was 
gone for several years during which he lived and worked for several years in Cancún, 
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Mexico.  Another rumors about Mariano was that he left for Mexico because he was 
implicated in the robbery and murder of a local man who had just sold his land and was 
traveling with cash.   Immediately after Díaz’ term began, complaints began to arise 
about his joking mentality. At the several town functions I attended, almost no one in the 
primarily Ladino audience would clap after he finished speaking.  Jokes about his strange 
personal conduct and manner of being are commonplace.   He is frequently referred to as 
“Mariano Chiflado”—a word that means a mixture of crazy, funny and annoying—and 
also Mariano Payaso (Mariano the clown).  And more vulgar words are used, including 
one prominently scrawled with red marker on the wall of the blue and white tiled 
staircase at his front door.  
Mariano stands out from ordinary townspeople, indigenous and Ladino.  His 
facial hair is cut in goatee including what in Austin, TX we would call a ‘soul patch’.  He 
cuts a sharp image in new expensive clothes, often sporting a tie, which is rare in the 
area.  His new shoes always have the gleam of a fresh shine.  His large  silver wristwatch 
is visible from several yards away. Since he became mayor, he drives around town in a 
new red Toyota truck—the signature commodity of the superado.  These signs of wealth 
and power are similar to those displayed by José  Antulio, and will be discussed more in 
the next chapter on project centered development.  
Despite the fact that he seems too unexperienced to be mayor, the FRG party 
sought Mariano Díaz out. Why did the FRG select him their candidate?  This is 
impossible to answer without interviewing the people who made the decision, assuming, 
of course, that they reveal their motivations.  In any case, this was something I was 
unable to do.  I was worried about what might happen to me if I went poking around in 
the party headquarters in Huehuetenango.  Nevertheless, several facts stood out.  Mariano 
had wanted political power in the municipio for several years, but was not included in 
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José  Antulio’s team, which was mainly composed of professionals and highly 
capacitated leaders.  When Mariano joined the FRG, he still lost his first mayoral race to 
José  Antulio.  Most locals who are not members of the FRG attribute his desire to be 
alcalde to personal interest.  And indeed his personal wealth has grown immensly since 
entering office, far beyond, it would seem, his Q7,000 monthly salary.  Like most 
candidates, they say, Mariano wanted the money that came from corruption.  Dozens of 
people described him as an opportunistic, lying son of a bitch—a career criminal with a 
taste for power.   
My assessment after having seen him operate for his first year of power, and into 
his second and third, was that the decision by party leaders to select him was based in the 
fact that he has the perfect combination of characterstics.  Mariano is Mayan, so he can 
speak to the masses and identify with their needs, yet posesses no consciousness of the 
history of Mayan political opposition to the state (as made clear in chapter 2);  he is 
ambitious, but mostly for personal gain, and definitely eager to taste for himself the fruits 
of corruption; he is too inexperienced to come up with his own political strategies without 
being so unintelligent as to not be able to be directed by party leaders; and, last but not 
least, he is charismatic and energetic enough to hold the attention of a wide audience of 
people.  These are the same traits possessed, to different degrees, by the people who 
became village level leaders for the FRG. 
 
THE CAPACITADOS SPEAK BACK 
When I finally did interview Arturo Bravo about familial divisions in the villages, 
I had already been apprised of the criticisms around notions of capacidad.  I asked him if 
he felt that the Bravo family had excluded the Ruíz, and that that was why they chose a 
different political path.  Not surprisingly, he disagreed completely, claiming that the Ruíz 
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excluded themselves: “The Ruíz family were always thinking of gaining something, like 
personally.  It was not an idea of ours.  We wanted to make something for all the 
communities.  For that reason they separated to look for another party.” In this narrative, 
everyone was united due to the Bravo family’s efforts to look for development projects 
and support José Antulio. Later, I was able to ask the same question, to José Antulio 
about the exclusion of the “less capacitados” in his political movement.  Antulio also 
disagreed with the criticism, which he seemed to have heard before: 
NC: I have an idea that I want to hear what your opinion about.  I think that there 
were some groups of people who were excluded in the aldeas.  In Los Altenses, it 
was the Ruíz. They were not given spaces for leadership in committes because 
they were less capacitado.  Now, despite the fact tht they used to identify with the 
guerrilla movement, they support Ríos Montt.  My idea is that they see the FRG 
as a way to recuperate their respect and leadership in the village.   
Antulio: I don’t think so.  We invited them to join the group.  It was they who 
didn’t want to come to reuniones.  They also didn’t want cargos in the Church.  
They didn’t want to work, but they get made when something comes and they 
aren’t receiving it.  But it’s true.  It is the least capacitated people in all of the 
villages that are helping the FRG.  
Chepe steadfastly held his ground, refusing any responsibility. He blamed their lack of 
desire to work.  He says that they just had personal interests at heart. Perhaps he is 
correct; but even he has no explanation for what he observed as a large amount of people 
with low levels of capacidad supporting the FRG.  Perhaps what the Bravo family 
members said about not exlcuding Ruíz from participating is true in a way.  It could be 
that their monopoly on the ability to speak the truth, underwritten by their previous 
training, led them to exclude the Ruíz, on “objective grounds.” The Bravo  coud easily 
have constructed the Ruíz’ apprehension about participating in committees as evidence of 
their inferiority, on the ‘objective’ scale of modern narratives of progress. The Ruíz’s 
unwillingness, or inability, to assimilate at the same rate was seen in purely negative 
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terms, as lack; they became seen as lagging behind.   Unable or unwilling to articulate an 
alternative vision to capacidad, the Ruíz criticized the way that the Bravo treated them. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In Los Altenses, it appears that the hierarchical thinking present in notions of 
capacidad has altered social relations between Mayans.  People who were associated 
most with norms of capacidad became arrogant, exclusive and abusive with their 
neighbors who were not as developed.  At their worst, they bullied and silenced them.  
Making fun of their neighbors’ backwardness completes their self-identification as 
modern.  For years, Mayans suffered these same forms of discrimination from Ladinos. 
Now, in a sad turn of events, at the same time that public humiliation of indigenous 
people is becoming less acceptable, more the exception than the rule, indigenous people 
began to discriminate against one another.  It is possible that these divisions provide a 
support for Ladino racism towards indigenous.  I have heard several Ladinos justify their 
own discrimination against indigenous people on the basis of the fact that “Indians 
discriminate against themselves.”  There is no question that discourses of capacidad have 
created a heated division between families and individuals.  It has hurt their community 
bond and their ability to collectively participate in politics.   
Some community members who are on the receiving end of these new norms 
have voiced strong opposition to this discrimination. They felt disrespected and 
emasculated.  Members of the Ruíz family articulate a criticism of capacidad.  On the 
one hand, they accept that it is important to learn things, to train, and to gain new 
experiences.  The target of their critique is the public forms of humiliation and insults 
attached to the categir they have only reached the point of criticizing the excesses 
associated with these forms of reason. This reworking of the concept calls attention to the 
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existence of a form of human value that exists regardless of what kind of capacidad that 
people have.  This is a level on which all the people in the village are equal.  They 
internalized the terms of this discourse, and attempted to assimlate themselves to it.  
Their criticism is a call to treat those who have not yet mastered the norm with dignity.  It 
is not at all clear to me whether it is possible to have a norm that ranks people on a scale 
of ascending value and still be able to treat as equal people on different locations along 
that scale.   
These divisions and forms of exclusion do seem to have provided a foothold to 
the FRG, whose presence becomes productive in the context of these antagonisms.  The 
FRG does not emphasize capacidad.  In fact, they seem to look for people who have less 
capacidad to join their party.  I would not be surprised if there is an explicit strategy in 
the FRG to recruit people who fit the characteristics that I have described in this chapter. 
Without leaders who are respected by the community at large, the FRG would not be able 
to operate in the villages: they would have no credibility. By joining the FRG, these 
villagers can play the role of leader in their villages, just as well as any other villager, and 
they can also enjoy the fruits of corruption.  Respect and economic advantage are two 
powerful motivating forces.  In addition to the factors discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 5, 
this is one of the paths that lead some villagers, in this case, would be leaders, to unite 
with the FRG.  This has nothing to do with political ideology.   
I titled this chapter “revolt against capacidad” to evoke the famous ethnography of 
Aguacatan written by Brintnall and quoted in this chapter.  He describes the challenge to 
village hierarches in the 1960s as a “Revolt Against the Dead”, the Dead being the cult of 
ancestor worship at the basis of community hierarchy.   I do not know the extent to which 
a “revolt against capacidad” plays into FRG victories in other Mayan villages or other 
towns in the region.  In some towns, like Colotenango, political divisions are much more 
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deeply rooted in the war itself, positioning some with the military and others with the 
guerrilla.  This was a subtle process that I detected because of the time I spent living in 
one village and investing the roots of their divisions.  It was a complicated tangle to work 
through.   At the end, it seemed obvious to me that I had captured something that was 
happening there, but I did not have enough time to document these processes elsewhere.  
Besides Antulio’s observation that it was the less capacitated people in general that 
joined the FRG, the corroborating evidence is somewhat thin. There are many curious 
similarities between the party members of the FRG that does seem to suggest that the 
FRG purposefully selects a type of leaders.  Furthermore, there is a distinct advantage, 
especially for a political party with such strong ties to the anti-reformist military as the 
FRG, in having a weak alcalde.   A weak alcalde allows the party itself a freer reign in 
intervening in community relationships.  Party technicians, who are in constant direct 
contact with indigenous alcaldes, call the shots on campaign and government strategy, 
informing some very basic decisions.  As the next chapter illustrates, it seems very risky 
to place these types of authority in the hands of people for whom community well being 
is not of direct importance.  
                                                
NOTES 
1 In 2004 a change in this process was already underway due to the new laws on 
decentralization.   Decentralization consolidates all community development committees 
into one committee: the Consejo Municipal del Desarrollo (COMUDE), with the 
representative to be selected by vote from among the villagers, and changing, like all 
other cargoes, annually, unless for some reason a particular individual is deemed 
exceptionally capable in their task, or shows great enthusiasm, or if a task cannot be 
carried out adequately by any other willing villagers.  But in 2004, although the 
COMUDE representative was already in place, community members had still not 




Chapter Nine: Project-centered Development and Community 
Autonomy 
 
When I arrived at the meeting of the development council, three days after my 
first meeting with the new alcalde from the ultra-right FRG, I sat down in the back row, 
among the various community representatives (all of whom were male). This was the 
alcalde’s first meeting with the recently established Consejo Municipal del Desarrollo 
(Community Development Council, COCODE). The alcalde, who had just entered the 
salon with his entourage, noticed me, smiled broadly, and gestured that I should come up 
and sit with him and his advisors on the makeshift stage.  To my surprise, after brief 
introductory comments, I was handed the microphone and told to introduce myself and 
describe my work to the crowd. Startled, vastly under-prepared, and stuttering, I 
described as briefly and as vaguely as possible, the aim of my research as “to ensure that 
the government development programs respond to the needs of the people.”  This was 
met with polite applause.  The alcalde spoke next.  I was immediately struck by his tone: 
He spoke in the same cadence and pitch as the evangelical preacher.  He spoke loudly 
into the microphone, hanging on syllables, breathing in quickly in a way that make an 
emphatic sucking sound in the microphone, and filling his speech with poetic repetitions.  
He switched frequently between Mam and Spanish.  He spoke Mam very quickly, with 
the same fervor.  Without a doubt, the new alcalde was one hell of a public speaker.  His 
talk stuck to several central, memorable key points, all of which revolved around this 
one:  
San Pedro ne-ces-ita desarrollo. Si o No? (audience) Si!Desarrollo es necesario.  
No pelea con nadie.  Sin ello, nadie puede hacer nada.  Nosostros los 
Sampedranos, tenemos que mejorar. Tenemos que ser personas que….No 
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podemos ser personas que piensan solo en nosotros mismos. Tenemos que ser 
personas que piensan en las com-u-ni-da-des San Pedro necesita un cambio, pero 
solo nosotros lo podemos cambiar. Uds. son los lideres.  Uds. van a decidir.  Uds. 
saben que son las necesidades en tus com-u-ni-dad-es! El pueblo unido jamas sera 
vencido! 
San Pedro needs a change.  Yes or No? (audience) Yes! Development is 
necessary.  It does not fight with anyone. Without it, no-one can do anything. We 
San Pedranos have to get better. We have to be people who.We can’t be people 
who think only about ourselves. We have to be people who think about the com-
un-i-ty. San Pedro needs a change but only we can change it.  You are going to 
decide.  You know what are the necessities are in your com-u-ni-ties! The pueblo, 
united, will never be divided! 
He peppered this talk with lots of jokes, including one in which he compared a 
development project to an attractive young woman in a mini-skirt. This irreverent 
impersonation, and other humorous asides seemed to put him as well as his audience at 
ease.  Upon hearing this speech, similar to ones I would hear many more times while in 
San Pedro, I realized I had been temporarily co-opted into a local drama—the alcalde’s 
self-presentation as a charismatic and powerfully connected individual, completely 
dedicated and fully able to bring development to the communities, evidenced now by his 
relationship to an expert, a gringo no less, who was going to study development.    
I must admit I felt a bit dirty.  Spending time with the members of the Asociación 
CEIBA as they had their last meeting in November, days before the national elections of 
2003 I heard many criticisms of FRG ‘vote buying’ tactics.  These were featured in a 
dinamica (skit) in which a one of the men from the NGO, a Mayan ex-guerrilla trainer, 
pretended to fly down to a community in a helicopter and offer villagers small, valuable 
items, like machetes, ladles and various pots and pans.  Villagers, played by other CEIBA 
staff, humbly thanked the FRG party for their wonderful gifts, and promised to vote for 
them in the next week’s elections.  This elicited a great deal of laughter from the 
audience of returned refugees, ex-guerrilla combatants, and URNG party members.  
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Afterwards I spoke to one of my closer friends in the NGO, Carlos, a Mayan health 
promoter who had lived for15 years in exile in Chiapas and now was in a community of 
retornados in a municipio in Huehuetenango. I asked if he thought that this dramatization 
was fair, making fun of people who vote for the Right.  “Are they really stupid?” I asked. 
He said, “You’re right. It’s true. They could probably just as easily play making fun of us, 
a bunch of guerrillas, the same way we are making fun of them.”   
Contributing to bad populism was the least of my concerns.  After I had been in 
San Pedro for a couple of weeks, Guadalupe, a key informant who I had met initially 
through CEIBA, came to visit me in a hotel room I had converted into a kitchen. To fight 
off the cold, and take advantage of some of the fresh herbs readily available in the weekly 
market, I made a pot of ginger, mint and chamomile tea with plenty of sugar.  While we 
drank our tea, we talked about the political situation in the villages. Holding her cup in 
both hands for warmth as the cold night air drifted in the open window, Guadalupe said: 
The problem now is that we are all divided.” She said in a serious and concerned voice.  
“There are fifteen parties and we are divided into all of them.  It’s everyone for 
themselves.  This is the situation we have now.  We are divided by parties.” 
*** 
Over the past twenty years there has been a sea change in politics in Guatemala’s 
rural highlands. Rural Mayans, once completely excluded from municipal politics—with 
a brief exception in some areas during the democratic period of 1944-1954—now 
dominate the political scene in the rural highlands.  Regardless of party affiliation, 
Mayans now hold the top positions in most municipal governments.  Most elections pit 
indigenous candidates against other indigenous candidates. At the same time, desarrollo 
(development) is the name that rural Mayans give to their political demands.  Candidates 
for the presidency, or for high level legislative positions, use a populist, pro-Mayan 
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rhetoric when campaigning in the region.  Development, specifically infrastructural and 
individudal assistance “projects”, has replaced violence, military occupation, and the 
Civil Patrol system as the primary mechanism through which rural Mayans encounter the 
state. Examining this encounter is essential to understanding the meaning of democracy 
in post-revolutionary Guatemala.  
In official discourses, like the one of the FRG alcalde, development is the 
sanctioned and idealized route to full Mayan inclusion in national political and economic 
life.  This narrative promises that infrastructure and individual assistance programs will 
benefit impoverished and war-torn communities by bringing them the fruits of modernity.  
During the war, this military made this explicit commitment to obedient communities—
those who stayed away from the guerrilla, and, when they became legal, from social 
movements.1 Today conservative and neo-authoritarian political parties use infrastructure 
and individual assistance programs as proof of the state’s commitment to the role of 
benevolent provider of basic resources for Mayans communities.  In this narrative, the 
benevolent state is the foremost provider of development. Mayan candidates bend over 
backwards to demonstrate their commitment to provide development to poor Mayan 
communities.  
This chapter focuses on development politics in San Pedro.  Previous studies have 
been able to examine state development policy doing from the outside.  It has been very 
difficult to do intensive research, much less in-depth ethnography, on Mayan responses to 
these development politics, and few have examined the long-term implications of village 
development on Mayan communities (Stepputat 2001).2  It is a testimony to the changes 
in rural Guatemalan political life that such a study could be undertaken.  
I view development as a crucial site where rural Mayans imagine the state and 
their own political agency and formulate political demands.   It is also a mechanism 
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through which they imagine and reproduce community relationships with other villagers. 
I attempt to read Mayan political understandings through the way that they relate to 
development through their participation in these daily practices. 
This chapter presents ethnographic data to address the following deeply related 
questions, appropriate for programs that were specifically intended to control behavior 
through resources. How do Mayans make sense of and respond to these programs, and 
specifically how these forms of knowledge and practice have filtered into local discourses 
and practices of politics, development and community? How are these meanings shaped 
by the power relationships that subtend Mayan claims to community development?  What 
are the power relationships being articulated or rearticulated through development 
projects?  How do the power relations depend upon what these projects mean to the 
people, in this case Mayan villagers who desire them? What spaces for political thought 
and action have opened as a result of the ascendance of state delivery of projects in rural 
Mayan communities?  What spaces have been closed, or blocked? To what extent and 
under which existing development practices reproduce certain understandings of the 
political as normal, inevitable, or, in somehow desirable, while others become impossible 
unlikely or feared?  
To answer these questions, this chapter brings to the surface of the discourses, 
narratives, and understandings embedded in the discourses and practices of infrastructural 
and individual assistance development.  Speeches like the one at the beginning of this 
chapter, exemplify the official discourse on community development.  It is ubiquitous 
and saturates public discussions, but it hardly exhausts local understandings, many of 
which are built into the practice of development, and go often unquestioned and 
unspoken. While unspoken, without these shared understandings it would be impossible 
for development to function the way that it does in rural Mayan villages.  
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FROM ABANDONMENT TO REPRESSION TO INCLUSION THROUGH PROJECTS 
A short 40 years ago, as Mayans old enough to remember recount, the vast 
majority of rural Mayan villages were, as they had been for centuries, completely 
abandoned by the state.  Villages had no schools, and most residents were non-literate.  
Women carried water daily to their houses from small, hand excavated pozos (wells) that 
would dry up in the winter months. They were also far from individual homes and 
required many trips to gather water for daily needs.  Dirt paths, cut by foot and machete, 
not wide enough for a car to pass, connected villages to one another and to the town 
center.  Small, wooden bridges, or rocks, helped Mayans traverse the streams that ran out 
of the mountains on their trips into the casco urbano.  At night, houses were lit by 
candles, or by oil lamps. As village populations grew in the 1960s, these conditions 
became increasingly unsustainable.   
Between the late 1950s and the mid 1960s, communities, mostly with the 
assistance of the Catholic Church, began to form development committes, comites de 
pro-mejoramiento. The most common reason for the formation of these committes was to 
construct a school.  The first schools were ranchitos, small houses enclosed by sticks and 
with thatch rooves. I will use the story of one village in San Pedro, Los Altenses, as an 
example.   Their case is typical. As population rose, and water supplies dwindled, 
residents of los Altenses began to request potable water projects from the municipal 
government, tubes that ran, sometimes miles, from a known clean water source and 
different family chorros (spigots). They also organized on their own to cut a road wide 
enough for a car to pass.  
The first project for potable water began in 1983.  Members of the original 
committe for potable water in Los Altenses, which had organized nearly a decade 
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previously, recalls how representatives from UNIPAR, came to look for the communtiy 
committe, which had been organized since the early to mid 1970s.  UNIPAR 
representatives offered the PVC piping and material, and the community members 
divided the expenses between themselves.   They also had to go and get these items.  He 
also recalls how angry the town Ladinos became over the initiative, which would provide 
potable water to three communities.  One commented “they wanted all of the water for 
themselves.” Despite this new level of organization, the populist rhetoric of the dictator 
General Lucas Garcia, and some campaign promises from MLN candidates, all 
infrastructure projects in San Pedro were directed towards the primarily Ladino casco 
urbano. 
Many villages received projects under Ríos Montt’s regime. Ríos Montt had made 
this very clear with his “frijoles o fusiles” campaign in that same year. Those who 
abandoned the guerrilla were offered amnesty and development in “model communities” 
and those who refused the offer would be hunted down and killed. Several schools were 
constructed in the period directly after the violence, in 1983, in villages that had 
expressed enthusiastic support for the formation of the civil patrols and went about their 
task with apparent earnest.  Although these were small buildings, these were testimonies 
to the state’s approval and dedication to support allied-communities. There was an 
explicit understanding that communities were being rewarded for not participating in the 
guerrilla movement, and not being asked to prefer any particular political party.  At the 
same time, some communities with a stronger investment in the guerrilla movement 
refused to approve army led development projects in their village, in many cases because 
they did not want military presence in community affairs.3  Development at that time had 
dual meanings, either threat or reward, depending on one’s perspective. 
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Early committee members, and current, ones, attest that navigating the state 
bureaucracy was an sizeable obstacle.  In the early 1980s, still few elder community 
members could read and write and few had traveled out of their region, especially not to 
Quetzaltenango.  The first potable water project, once approved, was at first rejected 
because the paperwork was signed by huella (fingerprint), instead of with the signatures 
of the committee members.  A new committee, one that could sign, was formed for this 
reason.  As this description makes clear, the number of projects in these years was very 
few.  Any requests were to state institutions and not to the local government, which had 
no resources on their own for projects of any magnitude.   
This situation was drastically altered in 1985 with the advent of the 8% municipal 
tax.  This tax would give alcaldes control over the gestionamiento (planning, profiling 
and negotiating) of development projects as well as their distribution. As a result of the 
new opportunities for development projects, with some help from the Church, but 
increasingly by the work of DIGESA—the General Directory of Agricultural Sciences 
some community members had learned how to gestionar (plan and petition) projects with 
state institutions. This strengthened local development committees, which subsequently 
multiplied. The old comité pro-mejoramiento remained pre-ememinent, but was now 
supplemented by different comites focused on particular needs: pro-molino (mill); 
escuela (school); pro-carretera (road); luz electrica (electric light); and others. The most 
important motivation for Mayan political organizations in the mid 1980s for having an 
indigenous alcalde was to have influence over the flow of new municipal development 
funds. 
In the late 1980s, years after the military defeat of the left, representatives from 
some military-aligned, oligarchic political parties began to approach local Mayan leaders. 
They offered development projects and mayoral positions in exchange for political 
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allegiance and avoidance of leftist politics. The first indigenous candidate for alcalde 
after the violence was Pedro Ramírez. In 1986, representatives of the PAN party came 
and spoke to the group, announcing that they would finance their campaign, and provide 
development projects for the communities. In the very recent past, exclusion and 
exploitation of Mayan communties was enforced by violence. During the violence, the 
military served as an accomplice to Ladino desires to crush Mayan struggles for local 
power. Now, the state would attempt to accomodate indigenous desires to improve their 
lives and communities, and to resist local Ladino domination and exclusion. But if the 
new politics of inclusion aceded to Mayan hopes for local equality, it was part of a 
strategy to further undermined their participation in social movements with national 
aspirations for reform.  Mayan leaders were told that new political spaces and 
opportunties for rural development was conditioned on their non-participation in social 
movements.  There seemed to be an understanding among the party leaders  and the 
members of rural Mayan organizations that these organizations had been sympathetic to 
the revolutionary cause, but that that support would end.   Mayan leaders, convinced by 
the violence of the futility of the revolutionary movement, opted to accept the bargain in 
hopes of reaping the benefits of development while they waited for new political spaces 
to open. Today, conservative parties share the task of selectively managing a sanctioned 
form of Mayan politics, while competing for Mayan votes.  
When Mayan leaders in San Pedro won the alcaldia for the first time in 1993, the 
state delivered on their part of the bargain: projects began to flow to rural communities.  
Their work earned them a second term.  After the signing of the Peace Accords, a huge 
wave of projects targeted rural Mayan communities.   This dramatically increased  the 
power of being alcalde, who before did not administer so many funds nor wield so much 
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political power.  This also further cemented the promise of development as a viable 
means of social and political advancement. 
 
A DIRTY GAME: EMBEDDED UNDERSTANDINGS IN STATE-DEVELOPMENT  
More than by official narratives of development and community reconstruction, 
local meanings of development are produced through the daily practices of development: 
the way that they are actually implemented, distributed, narrated and debated by 
community members. The first understanding is that development means projects. 
‘Project’ is an umbrella term for any kind of assistance, from potable water, or roads, to a 
scholarship, a job or medicine—precious commodities most Mayans could not otherwise 
afford. New programs trained Mayans to think of development in terms of discrete 
projects. Communities created prioritized lists, which they presented to the mayor and 
development institutions. These lists expanded over time to include such items as mills, 
latrines, and stoves.  Talk of projects is incessant among villagers.  When anyone from 
the United States goes to a Mayan community, one of the first questions asked is if I have 
any projects, or if I can help them get them.  I always told them I was only a student and 
that I did not work for any granting institution.4  
Another characteristic of formal as well as informal discourse about development 
is that projects come from the “state.” Although there are other institutions, and 
international aid, the state is depicted as the preeminent agent of development. Most 
projects are narrated as proof of the “state’s” or el gobeirno commitment to the role of 
benevolent provider for Mayan communities. Development is presented as a departure 
from the violent state of the past. In addition, development discourses depict the state as 
surrounding the communities, looming above them and peering down into the intimate 
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contexts their lives to see and attend to their needs, achieving a sense of apparent 
“vertical encompassment” of the town and village (Gupta and Ferguson 2002).  
In addition, projects are insufficient for community needs and arrive irregularly.  
Institutions and politicians respond to community demands, or not, at their leisure.  It 
often takes years for a project to go through institutional channels. The bigger the project 
the longer it takes.  False promises of aid are the norm.  The most common excuse given 
is scarce resources. Furthermore, in project celebrations, populist discourses, and in 
everyday interactions with politicians and institutions, Mayans are symbolically depicted 
as dependent on state-provided resources.  All of these understandings were illustrated to 
me one day when I accompanied Mariano Díaz on what is a fairly routine trip to a village 
whose leaders had requested a personal audience.  They wanted to talk to him directly, 
and were unwilling to accept a councilor of his as a replacement.  They wanted to discuss 
with the alcalde why some of the projects he had promised during his campaign, now, 
over a year later, had not arrived.  They were also frustrated with other problems of 
necessities in the community going unmet, and in particular there were some health 
concerns. Mariano was very clear in response to these questions.  He first told them that 
“the municipal budget does is insufficient for everyone.  Imagine, there are 56 
communities in San Pedro.” He told them that they could make a request “but I can’t tell 
you that right away today but rather than perhaps we can help you in some part. I can’t 
give projects like this, continuously, because other communities are also getting them and 
it depends on the necessities more urgent in other communities.”  There is simply not 
enough for every community to have every project that they want to have: the budget is 
too small and Guatemala is poor.  
The alcalde went on to describe how a landslide had created a need in a 
community the previous year, forcing him to prioritize it above other projects in other 
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places.  He even said how he was a good guy and had given them warm cups of coffee in 
the early morning when they came to his house in the town center to ask for his help.  At 
one point, he even criticizes the community leaders, telling them that: 
We can help you depending on your necessities, but we don’t want you to be 
necios (silly/brats) like a child for example, that to fregar (screw around and ruin) 
you get wet or you give your shoe to a dog so that the dog eats it and then come 
running to daddy to ask for help.  That’s no good. 
He also reminded them that, “Projects are not the solution for poverty.”  For that, he 
counseled, everyone has to pray to God, work hard and give a good education for your 
children.  They community was also worried about crime, and children stealers—several 
cases had been reported in the area.  For this, the alcalde suggested—although he said 
ordering them would be illegal—to form again the patrols that had once existed in order 
to fight the delinquents who lived among them, much like, as one of his councilors 
emphasized, the guerrilla had twenty some years before.   
These more “realistic” admissions, which do a lot to undermine the official 
discourse, mark the fundamental ambivalence in development discourses.  They promise 
a lot, then tell people that these promises are “just promises,” something that the mayor 
would love to be able to provide, but simply cannot under the circumstances.  The 
alcalde, the strong provider of development, is depicted simultaneously as fundamentally 
limited by a state that is unwilling to provide more funds.  San Pedro is a large town full 
of poor people, each with their needs and wants.  San Pedro Necta is one example of a 
larger drama, the national fight against poverty. After the meeting, which, like everything 
else in San Pedro, started late and ended late, we bounced down the hill in the darkness, 
the slippery steep trail illuminated by my flashlight.  By the time we were far enough 
from the schoolhouse to be out of hearing distance, the alcalde let his emotion fly, “Did 
we convince them or did we convince them!”  Also elated, one of his counselors, a young, 
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high-school educated man employed in the planning and directing of projects, responded, 
“Yes, because we came with strategies!”  
Of course, any child knows that development projects are provided as quid pro 
quo for political support. To get projects from a political party, you have to go sign up 
with the party. Everyone knows this.  It is not news. When I lived in San Pedro, the hotel 
owner Edgar, a Ladino, was the local representative for a prominent party.  Mayan 
villagers would always come to his house, hats in hand, requesting audience with him and 
signing their names to lists.  One day when I ran into Edgar on one of his increasingly 
frequent trips to the department capital, he told me that his party had a plan of sending 
projects to five villages. As we sat down to a lunch of roasted chicken, a delicacy only 
available in the city, he informed me that he was going to start by extending roads to each 
village, and then give laminas (fiberglass roofing).  By the time the election rolled 
around, he could count on their votes.  With so many parties competing, it was only 
necessary to have solid support in several villages.  This creates a significant limitation of 
the compassion horizon for big political parties.  They need only concern themselves with 
one tenth of the villages in a town in order to legitimately claim legal authority.  
Individuals who support a losing candidate often get passed over for development 
projects by the winner, who must favor his followers, honoring as many promises as he 
can if he wants to avoid danger.  Stories about many alcaldes who have been lynched for 
false promises are common in the region.   
Edgar further elaborated that his election plan was to work with remote villages, 
“because the villagers who live close lie.  They promise you their vote, but then at the 
last minute, they take it back.  They take advantage.  The people who live in further away 
villages, where there is more poverty, are more honest.”  I wondered what about living 
farther from the town center would make them more honest.  Then I asked him if the 
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political parties weren’t taking advantage of the people and lying to them as well.  Edgar 
looked a bit deflated at first, but then became more serious, looked into my eye.  
Chuckling, he said that, yes, they were.  In admitting this, Edgar draws attention to the 
other part of development that is taken for granted: promises of development are 
common, and they are commonly false. The most common complaint about politics is 
that politicians will promise everything, but in the final moment do not deliver. The 
current alcalde promised twenty laminas to every man and woman who voted for him.   
This is an expensive gift, as each lamina costs about Q75, three days pay.  It was too 
expensive in fact.  Three years after his victory, villagers are still waiting for their 
laminas.  With so many political parties making so many promises to villagers, it is not 
necessary to win a majority of votes to win a municipal election.  The FRG won with a 
little over 2,200 out of nearly five times that many voters.  Therefore, party 
representatives can focus their efforts on three or four villages and perhaps still win a 
majority.  The rest of the villages do not matter. 
Although the alcaldes get most of the blame when projects do not materialize, it 
is unclear that false promises are their sole responsibility. When I was invited to observe 
a group of indigenous politicians (all men) discuss the formation of a political party after 
José Antulio Morales’ death, they began the discussion talking about projects promised to 
them from the party that they planned to unite with.  There were several projects, 
including a housing project that would benefit over 150 families, (of the candidate’s 
election of course) it seemed to me odd that there would be such a huge promise made.  
And, down the line, it turned out that the project would be much smaller; around 25 
houses were eventually approved.  This false promise just as often came from above, not 
from the candidates themselves.   
 368 
There are several ways to direct projects.  At the largest level, there are 
megaprojects, such as a new municipal building, a new market, or a road connecting the 
town to the outside world.  One of the first megaprojects undertaken by Mariano Díaz 
was a containing wall on the road leading to the Interamerican Highway.  It made a 
barrier on the side of the road where there was a steep drop into the Selegua River below.  
It also stopped erosion, which makes the road incredibly weak during the monsoon 
season.  Sometimes, alcaldes promise development projects to entire communities.  
Roads are an example.  Many projects are offered on an individual basis.  The most 
common example of this is a job, usually on a municipal infrastructural project, paying 
better than the going rate (Q20-25for a jornalero (day laborer), sometimes three times as 
much.   It is also a common strategy for candidates to focus on village subsectors, small 
geographical subregions within villages, which usually have distinct names.  Subsectors 
tend to be extended family units, but are not exclusively kin based.  Like individuals, 
entire subsectors receive items such as stoves and pilas (large cement sinks for washing 
clothes); but subsectors also have specific needs, like corn mills and potable water 
projects.  
There has been a tendency in recent years to direct development projects 
specifically towards Mayan women.  In the last decade, women’s position in Mayan 
communities has become a topic of special concern for a number of state institutions and 
NGO’s many of which have formulated plans for women. Projects aimed at women are 
stoves, mills, and home industry (such as chickens for laying eggs). It is now common for 
women to sit on development committees for the types of projects directed towards 
women.  The new law of COCODES requires that two women and two men sit on the 
village development councils.  In San Pedro, all acting presidents were still men, meaning 
that the monthly COCODE meeting in the town center was almost all male. The logic 
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accompanying many of these interventions holds that Mayan culture discriminates 
against women.  Women are abused and marginalized in their communities.  Therefore, 
these women need protection from outside institutions. Although such ‘feminist’ 
discourses accompany these projects, there are few state-run programs to support 
community women’s organizations with stong human rights components. 
Projects are not usually simply gifts.  Most often with large infrastructural 
projects, community members are expected to provide mano de obra.  This is their 
contribution, usually in labor hours.  If a community is going to get a school built, for 
example, community members themselves gather rocks to stretch the cement, and spend 
long hours digging out the foundation space, mixing cement, laying the cinder blocks, 
and other tasks.  Community members, mostly men, work together, usually on a 
Saturday, to maintain roads, using machetes to clearing the roadside of weeds and using 
hoes to fill in potholes with dirt. Women participate by preparing food, although they 
rarely engage in the work itself.  Mano de obra was another place where a sense of 
community is produced, where villagers work together for a common goal. When I asked 
why some men did not participate, I was told, “we don’t all think alike. Some of us want 
to work for the community, others don’t.”   
Because of rampant politicization of development, politics is a male competition 
between to see who can provide more development projects.  Most men start in their 
villages, working with committees, learning how to navigate institutions, developing 
relationships with politicians.  After they have built up a reputation as a person with 
powerful connections in the state and in development institutions, some develop political 
aspirations.  Parties also pick people who they think would be viable carriers of their 
banner.   Certain leaders become legendary.  A family member of José Antulio Morales 
was intent on impressing me with Antulio’s power, even though Chepe no longer held 
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elected office at the time.  He told me that, “Chepe is still powerful because he backed 
the GANA party in the second round of voting” In fact, he noted, “Chepe is discussing a 
water project with an engineer who has already approved it.  He is working on 
development projects in this village and in ten others.”  At Antulio’s burial later that 
year, a huge event attended by at least 1,000 people, one of the speakers said that, “Every 
community in San Pedro has a recuerdo (souvenir) from Chepe.”   
Mariano Díaz also had to establish himself as a development rainmaker before 
winning office.  He worked on the board of DECOPAZ, in its third cycle of projects.  
This was the cycle that happened after the institution, formerly run by the UN, was turned 
over to the state, meaning that it fell into the hands of the FRG, and was completely 
politicized.   In a speech before the COCODE, Mariano, speaking from a stage with a 
microphone, told the crowded room that he personally had spoken with Licenciado. 
Oscar Berger, the president, and that Oscar had promised to would lay asphalt on the 
dangerously switchbacked mountainous road into town.  This seemed to be a clear lie, but 
went uncommented at the meeting.  And there was some reason to believe.  After all, 
Mariano Díaz was able to give several major projects, including roads, potable water 
projects, and schools to several villages.  While the law strictly prohibits anyone who sits 
on the board of a development institution from running a campaign, this conflict of 
interest, more than anything else, is precisely what makes Mariano Díaz a viable 
candidate.5 Attacks on a candidate from political opponents focus on their weakness and 
inability to bring projects.   
The most obvious indication of this male competition is the practice in which all 
projects, with the exception of small individual projects, are announced with large signs, 
always painted in the colors of the institution or political party in charge of authorizing 
the project, and telling the amount of money the project cost and the amount of work that 
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the community gave in mano de obra, and, increasingly, writing the names of the alcalde 
and his team.  These signs are impossible to miss; and they give the feel of a constant 
state of campaigning.  Another sign of this male competition for dominance is by the 
consumption patterns of indigenous politicians.  Winning a town election catapults a 
person into ‘superado’ status, even if they were not there before. While unremarkable by 
North American standards, each floor of his home is larger and built more sturdily than 
the average home in the region, many of them, even in the town center, are made of 
adobe, which is covered by a small layer of concrete (repellado). Because it is across the 
street from a steep heavily treed mountainside, its outline is clearly visible from across 
the town, especially when entering or leaving on the main road from the town towards the 
Interamerican Highway. Resolving any doubts one might have about the centrality of 
gendered spectacle to claims of political power, Mariano’s house towers up like a huge 
erect penis above the rooftops of his neighbors’ houses. It was a literal tower, and more 
than enough space, as many reminded me, for his family of five.  No other house in the 
entire town, Ladino or Mayan, was even half the size.  Even the new house being built by 
José Antulio was only two stories.  Of course, the house did double duty as FRG 
headquarters.  It’s function as a meeting house was announced by the party logo, the little 
blue hand with victory-like “V” fingers against a white background.   
Town members, both Ladinos and indigenous, expressed a great deal of disgust at 
this show of personal wealth.  They see his house, along with his shiny red truck, as proof 
that he is dipping into the local till. It disgusts them.  Anger and suspicion about the 
origins of his house and truck turned to anger in both in the local boletín—a xeroxed page 
of very raw, stinging and often very sexist gossip about town members and town politics, 
published anonymously twice a year comes out once or twice a year. At the same time, 
Morales was finishing construction on his home in San Pedro, still large, but more 
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modest than Marianos.   Still, Chepe had homes in his home village, as well as a house in 
the city of Huehuetenango, where he resided before his untimely death in a car accident. 
In this way, Mayan leaders appropriate the official discourses on progress through 
projects as a way to aggrandize themselves in the pursuit of wealth and power. 
 
SUNK TO THE BOTTOM IN CORRUPTION 
Talk of male competition inevitably slides into another element of common 
knowledge: that funds for development are loosely controlled. People holding political 
power, or occupying a leadership role in a committee have access to these loose funds. 
Development funds are loosely controlled, making corruption a huge temptation for 
everyone, especially the mayor and his cronies, who deftly bypass new legal regulations. 
One person told me that part of the reason so many political parities exist is because of 
the number of men who want to get a crack at money from corruption, in addition to their 
Q7,000 monthly salary—far beyond the local average, almost six times a teachers’ pay.   
Some corruption is clearly inevitable, even for people who do not take office solely for 
personal greed.  A friend of mine, an indigenous activist who had worked in the alcaldia 
of the capital city in a different department told me that outside institutions often require 
bribes, or also routinely give them as a favor to an alcalde or village representative for 
awarding their company a contract—even if the contract was legitimately won!  Members 
of the national Controlaría (accounting office) had the temerity to request that the 
municipio buy them an expensive piece of lakefront property in order to give legal 
approval for rebuilding the municipal building.  Paying for the land required them to use 
off the books measures.  One day, while on a bus out of San Pedro, I happened to sit next 
to Mariano Díaz’s new municipal secretary from San Pedro Necta.  He was quite open, 
and we spoke at length about how corruption worked in the towns.  He said that there is 
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no control of funds.  In fact, he told me, the controlador for the entire department of 
Huehuetenango was shot and killed when I was doing fieldwork in 2004.  One can only 
imagine what for.  As if on cue, the secretary opened his wallet to hand me his card, I 
looked inside and saw dozens of cards emblazoned with the names of construction 
companies.   
Development money is the prize for much smaller forms of corruption.  Alcaldes, 
leaders of Community Development Councils, (COMUDES) or who sit on the board of 
other development institutions commonly make deals with contractors. A friend of mine, 
I will call him Alejandro, worked as a community representative to the development 
institution DECOPAZ (Community Development for Peace).  DECOPAZ that had 
provided numerous projects to the town and to his village.  DECOPAZ elects 
representatives for micro-regional units, which comprise several villages in the town.  
When I was talking to Alejandro about village politics, he began expressing his anger at a 
neighbor of his who also sits on the board:   
Alejandro: But he is not good in politics either.  He likes to get money from the 
diputados (congressmen) and the construction companies. To get his ‘tip’.  If one 
works, the people are going to see it.  It is possible but between everyone.  
NC: You have the power to take some of the money?  
Alejandro: That’s what I’m saying, but if it is between everyone, between all of 
the directors. He’s not the only one there, there are 5 people legally authorized. 
One dialogue between everyone.  But he does it alone.   
NC: How does he do it?  
Alejandro: If there is a project, he likes to look for the contractors himself, alone. 
But why?  So that in the very hour we make the decision to go with that 
contractor [to do the job].  But that is not right. It’s worth more, if he wants to do 
it that way, that he does it between everyone. A certain contractor can do the job, 
but between everyone, not just one. Not only one person is hungry.  Not only one 
person is thirsty.  And we sign together.   
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Alejandro is expressing a proper way of being corrupt.  It cannot be a single person; the 
entire group has to be involved for it to be legitimate.  Corruption is wrong, in a sense, 
but it is so common and so built into the development process that it is hardly worth 
criticizing someone for taking advantage.  What is wrong is to go it alone and take all of 
the benefits for oneself.  This is one element of what de Sardaan (1999) writing in the 
context of postcolonial Africa refers to as a “moral economy of corruption”.   
Another example of an illegitimate type of corruption involves someone stealing 
something that people need and would have otherwise receive.  After the first year, 
tempers flared when hundreds of bags of fertilizer from the state fertilizer program turned 
up in the private storage houses of his friends and political allies.  Confronted at a 
COCODE Mariano appealed to a local Ministero de Agricultura y Ganado MAGA 
representative, saying that he had told him to store the fertilizer in different houses.  The 
startled MAGA representative replied “Mr. Mayor, please do not involve me in your 
sinvergonzadas (shameless behavior).” Trapped, Mariano, quoting the Bible, called the 
angry crowd ‘devils’ and said that they were chasing him.6  
More regularly, the alcaldes seemed to ignore attempts to regulate on their power.  
In 2000, the UNOPS did a study of San Pedro, listing priorities and goals for 
development.  José Antulio ignored this document, preferring, for obvious reasons, to 
make his own decisions regarding project priorities. Both he and Marino Díaz seemed 
very capable of evading even the new COCODE system, founded by the law on the 
Consejos de Desarrollo, part of the new law of decentralization. Of course, the corrupt 
controlaria helped in this.  The Law on Consejos requires that each village elect their own 
representative committee, a COMUDE (Community council), who will then appoint one 
member, usually the president (always male in San Pedro), as the village representative to 
the COCODE.  The COCODE, and not the alcalde, decides the development priorities for 
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the town, which construction companies will do the work, and how the work will be 
audited.  This new law represents a substantial decrease in the power of the alcalde, both 
to win political support through favoritism and to enrich himself and his friends and 
family through illicit funds. José Antulio Morales simply ignored the COCODE.  It was 
new at the time and José took advantage of this to ignore it.  Mariano Díaz inherited the 
institution more squarely, so he devised an alternative approach: he simply appointed, 
where possible, the heads of the COMUDES from among his own group of followers.  
During the first three monthly sessions, when Mariano was facing criticism (which was 
every session) he would simply call for a show of hands or an ‘Aye’ or ‘Nay’ vote to 
close debate.  Since he had the majority, he controlled the entire show.  This angered 
members of the other political parties, including many Ladinos, who simply began to 
circumvent the COCODE as well, blaming Mariano Díaz for playing unfairly.   At least 
by the time I was there, the COCODE served as a space for debate that had previously 
not existed.  There was some additional level of oversight and accountability for the 
Mayor, and a growing awareness that there was a legal sanction against a “one man 
decides” framework for development.   
 
FORGING A NEW STATE-COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP 
As I foreshadowed in chapter 3, this development strategy has failed to foster a 
Mayan identification with the nation-state.  But it did help end Mayan support for radical 
politics, although not exactly in the way that state or AID planners imagined.  So how did 
it happen?  I argue that state development programs are shaped by the threat of state 
violence, and they also exacerbate and perpetuate the disfiguration of Mayan politics that 
violence initiates.  
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It appears that these new dynamics have enacted a shift in the way that Mayans 
imagine the state.  These programs have made it possible for Mayans to imagine the state 
as a protector of life. There is considerable evidence that the advent of project-centered 
development has established in community members’ minds a belief in a narrative of 
progress. Progress is visible.   The state is a different creature than it was before.  I have 
had numerous conversations with villagers who have pointed to specific projects to talk 
about how much better their lives were now from before.  If nothing else, the state makes 
the appearance that it is making a concerted effort to alleviate poverty and to raise the 
quality of life of Mayans.  The difference between the before and after is indeed 
remarkable, and not lost on villagers.  But understanding the political significance of 
projects requires digging deeper than this story, which, although pervasive, is a quick 
gloss that hides many of the nuanced in the state-community relationship that has been 
re-worked through the peculiar form of development politics that has taken shape over 
the last 25 years.    
One important element in the contemporary state-village dynamic is a 
transformation of community political demands. Another important effect of project-
centered development is to enshrine projects as the sole political objective.  Through the 
work of the development committee leaders, community desires are more transparent to 
state bureaucracies than they have ever been before.  These desires are also constituted in 
ways that create options for these bureaucracies in terms of their ability to exert a 
measure of control on their relationship to communities.  If a party knows that a 
community has several demands, they might elect to satisfy only one of them, the one 
listed by the community as “most important.”  Larger projects could be for people who 
are strong followers.  Smaller ones are often used as a guarantee of future projects, a 
promise.  State institutions keep statistics on individual villages in multiple municipios, 
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allowing them to track the progress of each.  This makes visible inequalities and 
concentrations, which makes a more systematic approach.  No community will be so 
completely behind that it feels left out.  No community should receive so many projects 
as to make other communities jealous.  It also helps to constitute new norms for village 
development, something fairly consistent between multiple villages.  This could, for 
instance, operate as a partial check to the potentially disruptive effects of a particular 
alcalde’s political distribution of development.7 Transparency made possible by the 
efforts of community development committee system make possible a forms of 
economical regulation of community desires by the state. An additional characteristic of 
this is that each village, as a discrete and bounded entity, is the base unit of all 
discussions of community well-being (Stepputat 2001).8  
In addition to public political discourse, development project procurement 
devours the political energies and overwhelms the organizational capacities of village 
hierarchies, now organized around the development committee system.  Village level 
political organizing is today almost completely dedicated to the pursuit of specific 
development projects.  This is a time consuming activity, obligating committee leaders to 
lose many days of work.  In my entire time in Los Altenses, I was witness to no 
community discussions that were attempts to analyze the national situation, such as the 
state of the Peace Accords, the objectives and strategies of social movements or the 
ideology of any particular political party.9  The one exception to this that I know about 
from recent years were the discussions prior to the 2003 elections about the Ríos Montt’s 
involvement in the violence.  The numerous meetings that I did witness were entirely 
dedicated to the discussion of development. Village meetings in which decisions to 
support particular candidates is the matter at hand focus specifically on comparisons of 
the projects offered to the villager by each candidate, and the likelihood of the candidate 
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to win and to make good on their promises.  Coming a close second was the issue of 
crime and insecurity, which has been a growing fear as property crimes have become 
more common and more violent.10  In addition, it is significant that, in fitting with the 
official discourses on development, Mayans overwhelmingly focus their desires for 
village well-being, and in many instance individual well-being, directly on the state.  
In addition to big projects, the spoils of politics are often basic grains, fertilizers, 
cooking oil, chickens, cereal and jobs—the basic ingredients of daily sustenance, life 
itself.  Although talk of assistance is endless, the projects that arrive are insufficient to 
meet the needs.  The simultaneous regularity and inadequacy of individual assistance 
programs have transformed widespread economic insecurity into widespread feelings of 
dependency on the state for survival. For example, when I asked rural farmers—and I 
must have asked dozens—what would happen if the state stopped subsidizing fertilizer, 
several said they would “just not eat.” Despite these concerns, there is little focus on 
what they can do for themselves to ensure their own well-being outside of development 
fortuitous relationships with external actors, people perceived to have access to the state 
chief among them.  Food aid, insufficient as it is, still does not bring most children in San 
Pedro up to standards for nutrition.     
Moreover, the state’s newly-minted identity as protector and provider of Mayan 
life did not displace its prior incarnation as destroyer of Mayan lives.  Conditioning 
assistance reinforces the sense of powerlessness established by state violence.  
Conditioning aid reminds villagers of the norms of political passivity as defined initially 
by state violence: non-participation in social movements.  By presenting the possibility 
for its removal, it serves as a new consequence of disobedience. This was explicit in the 
early years of projects, but is still a factor.  After the neighboring municipio Colotenango 
elected a URNG mayor in 2000, a Mayan named Arturo Mendez, many feared an end to 
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state assistance for the town.   This was in fact a threat made during the campaign by 
their opponents.  After the election, when Colotenango had indeed continued to receive 
state funds, from what was by then the 10% tax, rumors still circulated in the department 
that they no longer received any funds from the state because of their political affiliation.  
Although proof was difficult to produce, many still believe that Colotenango has been 
disadvantaged as a result.  My friends in retornado villages in other towns report not 
being taken into consideration for development projects because of their perceived, and 
real, association with guerrilla organizations.11   
The prevalence of this disempowered feeling became especially evident to me 
when I watched the encounters between villagers wanting projects and party 
representatives and alcaldes they hoped would help them get them.  When villagers came 
on Saturday and Sunday mornings to Edgar’s house, hoping to get his approval for a 
project, they came with their hats in their hands.  They spoke to Edgar with their eyes 
turned to the floor, in very respectful language.  Their petitions were elaborate pleas for 
support, with a somewhat desperate quality.  Many of these petitioners, leaders in their 
villages, used such uncommon deference because they felt it was necessary, given that 
they were literally at the mercy of someone else’s decision.  People who approached me 
looking for projects often used the same, impassioned tone, emphasizing the stark 
necessities they were confronting in their villages.  I think that the fear of abandonment is 
intimately linked to the overwhelming sense of disempowerment vis-à-vis the state 
produced originally by state violence that I describe in more detail in the MOSCAMED 
chapter.  
The URNG party, at least partially, concedes the risk of state abandonment.  In 
addition to refuting this as false threat made to manipulate the vote, they have elaborated 
a critique of project-oriented development itself, which they see as a diversion away from 
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the ‘more important’ matters of political organization and pursuit of the Peace Accords.   
This is not limited to members of the Asociación CEIBA.  One man, a URNG member 
from a village with strong past ties to the guerrilla, echoed these opinions based on his 
experience in his village: “I have it analyzed, about the projects.  On the one hand, 
they’re good; on the other they’re bad. Maybe I’m mistaken but I think the people sell 
themselves out for a gift. I accept [projects] but I’m not going to vote for their party.” 
This argument is voiced in less explicit terms by many villagers who are not aligned with 
the left.  My own analysis of the political effects of project-centered development 
coincide in many ways with this argument, although with some important revisions, as 
will be made evident throughout this chapter.   
State development is a reminder of sovereign power.  Rural Mayans measure the 
value or productivity of these programs not in relation to other political alternatives—
which are disqualified—but to the threat of violence.  Heightening this perception is the 
fact that the politics surrounding community development projects are predicated upon an 
image of the state as “vertically encompassing” Mayan communities, reinforcing its 
claims to dominate social force relations (Gupta and Ferguson 2002). These 
understandings were dramatized by the FRG’s promise to pay $500 to Mayans who had 
served in state-mandated civil patrols (anti guerrilla militias) if they joined the party.  
Names were collected on a laptop computer.  The FRG candidate assured them that the 
computer would “know” how they voted, adding that God would too.  This was a very 
effective vote getting strategy the basis of which is linking a promise for resources to a 
threat of punishment, the certainty of which is guaranteed by a high-tech fetish: a laptop, 
a mobile panopticon, especially for folks who know little about computers. The gift of 
resources is an unsubtle, if often un-remarked, reminder of the state’s capacity for 
violence, knowledge that dampens local feelings of political agency.  An FRG party 
 381 
affiliate denied the computer ever went to the villages, but admitted that  “manipulación 
hubo” (there was manipulation).  Conditioning development on political obedience and 
party affiliation reenacts the power of the state over Mayan life it in a slightly different 
context, and therefore is a way of reproducing the terms of this relationship, albeit in a 
less dramatic manner.  
 
WAR IN THE VILLAGES 
In addition to changing Mayan imaginaries of the state and development, 
community development has contributed to a breakdown of communal relations and 
political unity in the majority of villages in San Pedro.  Politicizing insufficient 
development gives rise to a reduced conception of politics as a zero-sum competition for 
scarce resources.  This sentiment was expressed from all sides.  A young Mayan man, 
Sergio, who was graduating high-school at the top of his class at the time of my 
fieldwork, told me he thought about it in this way: “They say that politicians lie.  Those 
than win, win for lies.  For that reason, maybe it’s better to just find a party for your own 
personal interests.  Joining a party is how a person can find a job.  If you don’t join a 
party, you are left out of work.” By the time I arrived in Los Altenses, villagers 
habitually looked upon many of their own neighbors as threats, people competing against 
them for access to basic resources that everyone needs to survive.   Even when the parties 
that they supported changed, this fundamental division remained.12   Several made an 
analogy between politics and sports.  One of the political leaders in Los Altenses told me 
that, “Politics is like fútbol.  There has to be a winner and a loser.”  “That is how 
politics is”, said a leader from a different party in the same village, “you help your 
friends and the people who helped you win when you come into power.  There is not one 
party that is any different, even if they say they are.”  In this conception, there is little 
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room for compromise.  The same friend told me that the political strategies adopted by 
the candidates are ones that they are instructed to use by the political parities!13  In this 
type of politics, one side will be happy, and the other people will be sad.  The foreclosure 
of the field of political possibilities is built into this knowledge of scarcity.  The fact that 
the insufficient amount of resources being offered, by the state, is equal to the amount of 
resources available imbues the existing social order with a sense of inevitability.  If 
contesting state definitions of scarcity was one of the central premises of the 
revolutionary discourse, such a critical angle is certainly not a current factor in the minds 
of the Mayan villagers I spoke with.    
Villagers do not simply join the same party; villages divide into different parties.  
This is driven by the parties themselves, which increasingly attempt to entice village 
subsectors, rather than entire villages, with promises of development.  The tentative 
political unity that emerged in Los Altenses after the war was broken when all of the 
followers of a certain party were not treated equally in the distribution of development 
projects.  Close friends, family members, and the most dedicated supporters received 
numerous valuable development projects.  When those who had been left out of the 
bounty formed their own parties, and lost, they were left out of development again, this 
time because they supported the political opposition.  This pattern has been elaborated for 
several electoral cycles over a relatively short time, but enough to produce a noticeable 
effect. This mentality led to conflict between villagers after the elections.  Younger 
members of competing families from different political parties got in fights on several 
occasions, still mad at one another over the previous election.  
This cycle of division was related to the decision of a large group of villagers to 
support the FRG.  Candelaria Velazquez is a woman in her mid 40s.  She is married and 
has two children.  She lives in a large house with a mill.   Her husband does carpentry 
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work.  She is a evangelical woman who makes a decent living by praying for people and 
acting as a faith healer.  She leaves regularly, making visits to people in different villages 
in San Pedro to pray or heal.  She holds prayer sessions in her own home almost daily 
when she is there.  Candelaria campaigned hard for Mariano Díaz.  She spoke on his 
behalf in villages all over San Pedro.  She would pray regularly for God to bless his 
campaign.   Her entire house is painted blue and white and proudly features the FRG 
insignia.  She told me that she “number one” for Mariano, and that he had offered her a 
position in the corporation, which she had refused to continue her ministry.  When I 
asked Candelaria if she voted for people on the basis of their religion, she assured me that 
she did not, “We don’t make an exception for anyone.  We treat everyone the same.  I will 
support anyone as long as they are really Christian.”  Mariano Díaz does not attend the 
same church as hers, but she assured me that “it is the same word of God.”  In her 
perspective, on I heard from numerous evangelicals, “The Catholics also preach the 
same word of God, the difference is that they don’t follow through.  They still drink 
alcohol.  They still have caseras (adulterous lovers).”  When I talked to Maria about Ríos 
Montt, Maria said that he was probably a murderer.  So what made her join the FRG?  
And what warranted her invocation of religious support for Mariano?  Her religious 
fervor for Mariano was generated by her anger over project favoritism in her own village 
during the regime of José Antulio Morales.  Exasperated that I didn’t already know, she 
explained in great detail:  
They say that we’re poor and don’t work, but they only give viviendas (houses) to 
their family members and good friends.  Only for them even though other people 
sign up for the projects.  I signed up, I handed in my form, and afterwards I was 
told that it was not valid. ‘Yours didn’t go through’ I was told.  Even though it 
had a signature.  They don’t advise about most projects. Look at his friends’ 
houses.  They all got new ones and they already had houses!  Some of us others 
are using plastic and ranchitos (houses made of bound sticks).  They signed up 
 384 
and didn’t get anything.  [Viviendas] should go to the most needy, everyone 
equally.  
There are auxiliares who are supposed to advise us.  One came today to tell us 
that we would be doing work to maintain the road.  But they don’t’ advise about 
food, medicine, or vaccines for animals.  When we don’t know anything, their 
chickens are already vaccinated!  
We call him Chepe chuch (Chepe the dog) because he grabs everything for 
himself.  His friends in our village are already accustomed.  Ask [person’s name] 
where he got 300 cinder blocks!  That is the villages’ money, it was what was left 
over on a village housing project!  They grabbed it. That is why there is division.  
There is a war between groups.  We don’t go to reunions anymore.  It’s better to 
work with your own sweat.  They don’t do anything for us.  It can be houses, it 
can be food assistance, all for them!  With Natanael, he would give a little bit to 
everyone.  But Chepe only gives to his supporters.  We helped Antulio in the 
beginning, but he didn’t give us any thanks.  Not one cent. There were 150-200 
houses [that were to be distributed] in the whole town.  But they didn’t give them 
to the poor people.  Poor people are pushed to the side.   Some people also don’t 
like Chepe because he had caseras.  But most were tired of the favoritism.  El 
hace excepcion de personas (He distinguishes between people, he discriminates). 
Candelaria was incensed at the intense favoritism shown to José Antulio’s supporters in 
the distribution of projects.  Here the idea that state bureaucrats exert some control on this 
process, trying to make development even and just between communities, suffers greatly.  
This discrimination gives almost no place to the existence of real need among certain, 
ignored sectors of the communities.  Members of the community hierarchy place their 
party allegiances above the duties associated with their cargo, keeping new resources a 
secret from those who were already assumed to be excluded from sharing the loot 
because they are not part of the group.  People who already have more continue to take 
more, furthering existing disparities.   She even questions their devotion to God. “They 
only say that they’re Christians.”  She suggests a more ethical solution would be to give 
the projects to people who are in the most need of them.  Because of her prominent role 
in the Pentecostal Church, her message was especially persuasive among her co-
religioners. But this theme resonated with many who were not Pentecostal, including a 
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sizable number of Catholics in her own village, some of whom actively disliked her on a 
personally.14 If the promise of development coupled with the threat of violence helps 
explain Mayans alignment with neo-conservative parties in San Pedro in 1993 and after, 
that plus local opposition to the negative outcomes I have just described led to an FRG 
victory in 2003.  Villagers responded enthusiastically to the FRG candidate’s vehemently 
critique of corruption in prior administrations and promises of aid to groups excluded 
from past rounds of projects. 
In addition, village headmen (almost always men) compete for access to the fruits 
of corruption from development projects implemented under their stewardship.   I looked 
into a huge mess of a fight that emerged between rival village headmen over a school 
project in Los Altenses.  The current development committee head, let’s call him 
Artemio, had been in control for less than one year.  It was his first time to run the 
committee.   Before, the spot had been held by Miguel, who was seen as much more 
capacitado and experienced.  Miguel told me that he “let Artemio have the job,” because 
felt excluded before.  Artemio had told me as much on several occasions.  Now, with 
Artemio in control of the committee, and while his political ally Mariano Díaz was in 
control in DECOPAZ, DECOPAZ approved a school renovation project for the village. 
What ensued is still a matter of whose story you believe.  The following summaries I 
pieced together out of several discussions with all of the major parties to the conflict. 
Artemio’s Story 
Artemio plays the victim.  He says that he had the school approved, and it was 
going out in his name.  He was very happy.  Then, Chepe got jealous, because he 
wanted to have the project go out in his name, and not in the name of Mariano 
Díaz.  Miguel also was jealous of the money that Artemio stood to make off the 
deal. (On such a large project, a ten percent kickback was standard.)  He says 
Miguel broke into his house and stole the escritura to the committee. Then 
Miguel and Chepe called a reunion of the villagers and criticized the plan for the 
school approved by Artemio.  They said it was only a one-story school.   They 
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presented their own plan for a school that had two stories.  The upstairs could be 
used as a meeting space for village reunions.  The villagers in attendance voted 
for Miguel to take over the committee and for the school that had two floors.15  
However, the school plan that they approved was already for two levels.  The only 
difference between the plans was who got the money.  Chepe and Miguel lied to 
the villagers for their own personal interest.  Miguel broke the law because 
committee leadership positions are elected by the community for a two year 
period.   
Miguel’s Story 
Miguel says that the school that was approved was only for one level.  The 
community did not like how the other committee was working.  Artemio was 
planning to steal money from the school project, almost Q75,000 to divide 
between the committee members. They voted for the new committee and the new 
school instead.  
The two men, uncle and nephew, wound up wrestling in the schoolyard and were still 
estranged seven months later, both accusing each other of corruption and personal 
interest.  This is just one more characteristic of a political environment in which personal 
interest is pursued at the expense of the neighbors.    
José Antulio Morales had certainly leaped in economic stature, buying trucks, 
properties in the department capital, and land.  These all fueled the rumors of 
malfeasance.  In addition, indigenous from the communities began to complain that 
Morales had begun to think of himself as better than other people, and began to treat 
people callously the way that Ladinos used to treat indigenous petitioners.   In addition to 
admitting to project favoritism, one person who had worked with Morales compalined 
that, “Chepe was only interested in working on big projects, with contractors, to be able 
to take out his percentage.  If there was an administrative project, a necessity, he didn’t 
want it.” 
Corruption has another worrisome consequence. Widespread corruption has 
discredited most indigenous politicians. They are almost universally seen and talked 
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about as personally interested.  Disrepute has spread to village development leaders, who 
are increasingly cut in on the action.  Politicians, and politics in general, is seen as a 
domain controlled by the basest of human motivations. It is disheartening that, just as 
Mayans enter into spaces of political authority, those spaces themselves are becoming 
seen as increasingly compromised and illegitimate.  It is as if these issues were irrelevant 
when Ladinos were in control.  It is true, that the possibilities for corruption have 
multiplied alongside the processes of Mayan inclusion in township politics.  This is 
incidental, and in some ways fortuitous.  Delivering on development was what allowed 
Mayan politicians to be taken seriously as political actors and leaders in the first place.  
Now this access to development is the means by which they have caused many to fall into 
pessimism regarding the future of Mayan politics.   These concerns were expressed by an 
older man, and one of the first catequistas in the town and a former sympathizer with the 
guerrilla movement. He commented grimly on the state of the local Mayan movement in 
the wake of the reign of Antulio Morales:  
The struggle now is that a Mayan should govern.  For years only Ladinos were in 
the government.  Now there are indigenous, but perhaps it is the same as before, 
or even worse.  We have an example with the alcaldes here in San Pedro. The 
problem now is embezzlement of money.  They just come to steal.  Before there 
were only three candidates and one would win.  Now there are 14 because 
everyone wants to get some money.  That is why Guatemala is fucked. We don’t 
know what to do to resolve this.  
 
DANGEROUS NEW SPACES FOR EMPOWERMENT 
At the same time, the state’s shift to inclusive political strategies opens new 
avenues for Mayan agency. As violence wanes, Mayan leaders across the political 
spectrum invoke the state’s responsibility for development and its failure to deliver. 
Concerned citizens have formed Civic Committees or joined leftist parties for the express 
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purpose of addressing these concerns. Neo-authoritarian resurgence in San Pedro was one 
example.  A young college-educated Mayan man and FRG advisor in San Pedro put it 
this way, “We are re-fun-didos (sunk to the bottom) in corruption.  There are no good 
guys.  Yes, Ríos Montt is bad, but this is a double-edged sword.  We are doing something 
good here while the country gets worse.” Díaz and his followers campaigned on the 
promise that development projects should go to those in the communites who need them 
the most. Despite such noble claims, the FRG’s own tactics further enshrine the project-
centric notion of politics, dependency relations and political divisions.  
I spoke with several Mayans in San Pedro, most of them on the left, who 
articulated a criticism of state development programs as a divide and rule strategy, used 
to destroy Mayan political power.  This study, which aims to describe how these 
strategies work, is in response to the concerns expressed to me by several friends of mine 
in the Mayan movement and on the left.  It seems that Antulio Morales was begining to 
worry about the consequences of divisionist politics, after years of benefitting from it.  
According to Petrona Lazaro, after his second term had ended, Morales seemed perplexed 
by what he saw as the inevitable side effects of divisions wrought by party politics.  
Before the 2003 election, Morales had expressed to one of his political team members his 
desire to run a new kind of campaign, one without any false promises, favoritism and 
divisionism—all of which now seemed insperable from local politics.  Morales too had 
seen the damage wrought by the favoritism tactics in the campaigns.  Even though he was 
clearly in charge of the alcalde campaign for the ANN—the candidates were far less 
experienced.  In this version, Morales disapproved when the new candidate, hungry for a 
victory, resorted to the same tactics of false promises, favoritism, machismo.  But this 
change of heart and of strategy was too little too late.  Morales lost control of the 
campaign, as he was in Hueuhuetenango working on his own campaign.  It was by all 
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counts probably far too late to undo the effects of several electoral periods of  power 
politics, and questionable decisionmaking.   
 What before was a competition between Ladinos and Mayans for development 
and power has become a contest between Mayans and their neighbors.  But the struggle 
between Ladinos and indigenous over development seems to have grown steadily in 
intensity, not lessened.   Many Ladinos to me expressed concern about indigenous control 
of the alcaldia.  They are especially worried about Mariano Díaz.  One elderly man, a 
former schoolteacher, told me that, “this new person, Díaz, hates Ladinos.  When he is 
talking in Mam, he says he wants to get rid of us.  He says that there won’t be any more 
projects for Ladinos.  Antulio Morales was a crook, but at least he gave some projects to 
the Ladinos.  This new one says he won’t give any.”  I heard from indigenous and Ladino 
alike claim that Mariano’s campaign discourses were hostile towards Ladinos, pitting 
Ladinos against indigenous for projects.  With the implications of FRG populism coming 
into clearer view undoubtedly explains a good deal of Ladino opposition to Díaz. 
 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND ‘PROYECTITUS’ AND DIVISION 
If the aim of genocidal violence was to destroy an autonomous subaltern identity 
deemed a threat to the nation, it backfired, as evidenced by the resurgence of Mayan 
identity and politics after the violence.  Opening a limited space for the inclusion of a 
sanctioned form of Mayan politics through development, however, has been much more 
insidious. Ferguson (1991) argues that development is a powerful transfer point for state 
power that reframes poverty as a technical problem while spreading networks of 
bureaucratic control.  In this chapter, I have shown how development works 
synergistically with state violence.  In this case, the combination was essential to re-
organize the conceptual, affective, and material basis of revolutionary politics.  Instead of 
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being united in a struggle against the state, Mayans compete with each other for access to 
state resources, while their marginal status in apartheid-like Guatemalan society remains 
unchanged, or gets worse. More than any ideology, Mayan support for the FRG, even 
among evangelicals, was one effect of a form of development politics that has divided 
community members. Mayans find it increasingly difficult to speak with one political 
voice and to collaborate with one another in collective political struggle. Many Mayans 
have contested the negative consequences of this strategy on Mayan communities.  
Several criticize it as an intentional strategy for rule, another means for the corrupt state 
and the rich to thwart Mayan political power.  There was definitely a great deal of 
forethought, and continued attempts at strategic manipulation; but certainly not all of 
these effects described above were by design.  Whatever one’s opinion on this matter, it 
is clear that the decision by the prior generation of Mayan leaders to make a pact with big 
political parties has backfired, in ways that were probably not apparent to them when 
they made the agreement.   
It should be obvious by now that I do not agree with the leftist critic of 
proyectitus, the idea that communities are accustomed to receiving projects and therefore 
become dazzled and distracted away from real political concerns.  But I want to be very 
clear about the differences between my interpretation and this one.  The proyectitus 
rendering has too many similarities with false consciousness, knowing that ideal or 
rational Mayan politics means uniting with leftist organizations.  It also paints villagers as 
lazy, and unaware of the real costs of their political behavior.  However, most of the 
villagers I spoke with, on the left and right, were quite aware of and concerned with most 
of the consequences described in this chapter.  But they also had very real needs, which 
they felt were pressing enough to justify participating in the political process, as ugly as it 
was.  Most of the Mayans I met talked about an obvious alternative to the current 
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development arrangement: giving projects to the neediest people in the communities.  
But, for personal interest or party policy, that does not happen.   
Beyond these reasons, my central critique of proyectitus entails a difference of 
perspective, one informed by an appreciation of the historical dynamics of struggle 
between Mayan communities and the state.  Rather than see development as a state 
imposition, we must see it as a response to Mayan political desires.  Mayans asked for 
development.  Now state legitimacy depends on their ability to deliver projects to rural 
communities. Communities now demand projects.  People who cannot or will not deliver 
on these will not receive votes.  It will be interesting to note how long the state can go on 
not fulfilling the demands that it stokes every three years with elections before the Mayan 
population decides that enough is enough. In fact, many Mayans point to criticisms 
between state promises to deliver the basic necessities and the inadequacy of projects to 
meet even their most basic needs.  The more they see evidence of corruption, the more 
they are certain that the government that exists is incorrigible.  In fact, discourses of 
corruption, like the MOSCAMED conspiracy, in addition to being one of the spaces 
through which the state is imagined (Gupta 1995), also provides the moral justification 
for its own elimination and replacement through electoral power.  Mayans are thirsty for 
a political alternative, but pessimistic that one will emerge.  To the extent that these 
discourses help to generate the widespread lack of confidence among rural Mayans 
regarding their political agency, these discourses of corruption and moral outrage 
reinforce power.  However, they also contain an incontrovertible ethical justification for 
its replacement with another form of governance. 
It is not enough, however, to declare the pact, which was made under conditions 
of extreme coercion in any case, illegitimate.  It is necessary to find strategies to undo the 
forms of divisionism that have taken such deep root in such short time in the villages 
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throughout San Pedro, and, indeed, throughout the western highlands.  Several strategies 
have already been identified.  The COCODES is one of these strategies.  It would also 
help for communities to devise their own ‘rules of engagement’ with political parties, or 
regulations specifying criteria for the distribution of development projects.  Community 
unity behind a Civic Committee, espousing the same goals and endorsing a strict 
agreement to transparency—perhaps along the lines of what was imagined by Antulio 
Morales before his demise—would also produce interesting results.  One option would be 
for community members to support the regional movement for an independent office of 
Accounting.  There are other strategies, many of which might have already been in 
action, but passed underneath my radar.  But the first step towards any of these solutions, 
I think, is not the adoption of a high-tech legal strategies, although I do not want to 
downplay the importance of these new regulatory frameworks; rather, the central problem 
is getting community members to trust each other enough to agree to a particular 
framework that will bring resources to communities in a way that does not privilege one 
group over the other. This chapter has been an attempt to draw attention to, and therefore 
defamiliarize, current practices that form the day-to-day reality of community 
development politics.  I want this chapter to serve as a form of inquiry that invites 
community activists to think about and discuss the ways in which their own agency and 
identity has become bound up with, really fuel for, the current cycle of community 
divisions.  This shows a direct link between Mayan agency, and contemporary forms of 
colonial political domination of Mayan communities. Examining these processes have 
evolved in San Pedro can hopefully clarify these processes in other communities, 
providing a valuable point of reflection for Mayans searching for a path to development 





                                                
NOTES 
1 It is well-documented that Mayan communities became targeted for development 
assistance as part of a larger state strategy to eliminate Mayan support for the guerrilla 
movement. Several authors have focused their research on the most extreme case of 
military development projects: the model community system which was established by 
the army after the worst of the violence to “round up” and re-educate Mayan villagers 
displaced by the army’s genocidal rampage through the highlands (Smith 1990, Schirmer 
1998).  Along with projects, villagers were fed a stream of ‘propaganda’, not dissimilar to 
the narratives about the violence, the guerrilla and Mayan politics that were discussed in 
the chapter about local memory. Stoll (1988) provides evidence that in some cases 
evangelical religion was pushed alongside pro-army, nationalist ideology. Nelson (1999) 
shows how postwar state development programs attempt to create a vision of the state as 
the provider of basic resources, as the source and defender of life itself.  Stepputat (2000) 
argues that development is one of the key agents of village governance in the postwar era.  
2 Stepputat (2000) makes several important observations about the effects of state 
development programs on community.  However, he does not investigate differences 
between types of development politics and their relation to community political 
orientation.  Also, his work is not focused on the collective understandings around 
development; rather the general relationship to the state that these programs establish.  In 
this chapter, I am investigating the long-term effects of development and politics in a 
particular community, focusing on political imaginaries, community relations and affects.  
3 I heard reports of this in at least one community in San Pedro.  
4 In 2002, I worked as a grantwriter for a small Mayans women’s collective in San 
Sebastian, a nearby town.  But my grantwriting efforts there, and to finance a subsequent 
research project with CEIBA, were failures. Sometimes, the people who make such 
requests represent particular political parties; and helping them would mean taking their 
side in a local political battle, not a good role for an anthropologist trying to learn as 
much as possible from members of all different political parties. It is simply impossible 
to honor requests from all communities in San Pedro. 
5 When I pointed this illegality out to one of Mariano’s close advisors, he said that 
another candidate who runs a local development institution had also run.  In this logic, 
two wrongs may not make a right, but they are more fair than one wrong.  
6 Midway through his term however, Diaz seemed to be recuperating.  Many projects 
have arrived and his base seems intact.  There is no clear party with the strength to 
contest him.  A year later, when he had still not delivered the laminas, people were quite 
angry and some have discussed killing him for projects.  The community who was angry 
at him threatened to lynch the alcalde if he did not make good on his promise to buy them 
land on which to make a village cemetery.   
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7 For obvious reasons, ethnographic details of the strategic planning that takes place in 
state development institutions, especially politicized ones, is lacking.  It is not therefore 
unreasonable to speculate. 
8 One of the only exceptions to this is DECOPAZ.  DECOPAZ that worked in micro-
regions composed of several villages.  But even in DECOPAZ’s microregions, each 
community appointed one representative whose job was to look out for their own 
villages’ best interest. 
9 I am referring here to the types of dialogue present in community meetings.  These 
discussions are not completely absent, but they are dominated by external institutions, 
such as CEIBA, and many others.  
10 Several people in San Pedro have been murdered during thefts in the last two years.  
11 This is complicated by the popular, stigmatizing perception that retornados are 
pampered by international organizations and have come to expect things be given to 
them.  This is a sentiment echoed by even left-leaning residents in the town of Nenton, in 
reference to their returned neighbors.  
12 Although in Los Altenses, these divisions also mapped onto familial divisions over 
notions of capacidad, noted in the last chapter, this dynamic of division over project 
favoritism remain constant in other villages where such a clear line between families was 
not in place. 
13 It would be interesting to know the rationale behind the decision to require these 
divisive political tactics.  It is possible that this is yet another intentional military-
development relay. 
14 People regularly criticize Candelaria because she dresses, as they say, ladina.  She does 
not wear traje.  People also call her a witch because before she became a Pentecostal and 
started healing with olive oil, she used to cure people with teas made of various grasses.  
There was also an implication that she was active in the guerrilla and responsible for 
assassinating a man in the village.  Now her reputation as a strange woman was being 
somewhat revised, at least among some villagers, given that she was a respected member 
of a powerful political party.  People who opposed her politically however, hated her 
even more than ever.   
15 Villagers seem to be in general agreement with the idea that decisions made by 
whoever shows up to a reunion, are binding for the entire community.  Although no one 
mentioned it to me, and I forgot to ask, I am fairly certain that the villagers in attendance 





CONCLUSION: BENEATH DEMOCRACY AND POPULISM 
THE NARRATIVE OF GUATEMALAN DEMOCRACY 
Since the Peace Accords, a powerful narrative has emerged that constructs 
Guatemala as a non-problematic democratic polity, just as good as any other.  This 
classification of Guatemala as democratic has slowly calcified and become hegemonic 
among conservatives in the Guatemalan and US governments, and saturates national and 
international media.1 The post-Accords decade is now seen as an arc of progressive 
departure from the violence of the past. Discourses of democracy criticize the excesses of 
past violence, but assert that it was at some level necessary to defeat “communist 
subversives” and to prevent Guatemala from becoming “another Cuba.”  Furthermore, 
the narrative of Guatemala as a democracy completely denies any operation of power in 
the constitution of the social.  It asserts that violence has no bearing on current politics. 
Violence is part of the past, not the present, and is only of anecdotal importance today. 
This construction grossly, and in many cases cynically and purposefully, underestimates 
the impact of decades of extreme violence and intense militarization on Mayan political 
consciousness and behavior. It also normalizes the effects of centuries of colonialism and 
exploitation on shaping the contemporary economic, social and cultural marginalization 
of rural Mayans. This soothing and depoliticizing discourse protects Guatemala from 
international sanction and pressure, even despite the non-implementation of the Peace 
Accords, the survival nearly intact of colonial social hierarchies and the authoritarian 
structure of the state. 
Conservatives in Guatemala and the US celebrate contemporary Mayan right, 
which is a huge material prop for this narrative of freedom.2  In this story, Mayan support 
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for neo-authoritarian regimes must be seen as their “democratic free will.” This 
triumphant discourse defines democracy as narrowly as possible, focusing exclusively on 
the existence of free, or relatively free, elections and disregarding historical and political 
context. This narrative does not exist peacefully beside other dissenting ones; it is 
literally backed up by a still-ruthless army and an elite controlled media apparatus. 
Groups and individuals who espouse different viewpoints are routinely harassed, killed 
and silenced by quasi-official groups with impunity. Even non-violent public protests are 
often brutally repressed. Indeed, this narrative of Guatemalan politics is also central to 
the way that violence persists during ‘peace’. This depoliticized framing of social reality 
as democratic allows selective violence against social movements to be narrated as vital 
to protect democracy and economic stability, whose only hope, supposedly, lies in the 
fickle attentions of foreign investment capital.3  State development programs provide 
another source of material support for this narrative, demonstrating a commitment to 
include Mayans in a pluri-ethnic nation. 
The most common and most compelling alternative to this power-free discourse is 
the contention that thirty-six years of war, genocide and social militarization created a 
“culture of terror” in the Mayan highlands, and that is now maintained by continued 
selective state violence and impunity. This narrative is reinforced by the findings of the 
two truth commissions and various human rights and international solidarity 
organizations.  In this vision, fear still forecloses the space for democratic choice.  This 
narrative offers a vital corrective to conservative discourses on democracy that must deny 
any continued effects of decades of extreme state violence and Orwellian social control 
on Mayan political behavior.  However, the “culture of terror” argument is dated; it is 
unable to account for the substantial, albeit limited, changes in Guatemalan political 
culture, including: the Peace Accords; democratization; legalization of leftist parties and 
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social movements; Truth Commissions; the Pan Mayan movement; and demilitarization.  
Certainly these changes are not lost on rural Mayans, who must have formulated new 
understandings of the possibilities inherent in new political spaces.  This disconnect 
disqualifies counter-discourses on violence and lends credence to conservative attempts 
to ignore its continued effects.  
The analysis in this dissertation is motivated by the conviction that democracy is 
never non-problematic, but that the effects of violence are never fixed. Standards for 
measuring and evaluating democracy must take into account the way that current 
approaches to governance operate in relation to a countries’ or region’s history. Without 
such contextualization, democracy itself becomes a meaningless phrase. Each country is 
only held to their own standard, no matter how deplorable.  Current dynamics must be 
able to be represented as an improvement over past conditions, but there is no expectation 
that authoritarian practices stop entirely.  We need to consider its corrosive effects on the 
meaning of democracy at a particular historical moment.  Without this, neoliberalism or 
“globalization” becomes the era of low standards and low expectations. However, 
contemporary understandings of the continued political relevance of state violence must 
be revised in light of emerging realities lest they lose more ground against conservative 
attempts to locate counterinsurgency violence squarely in the past.   By refusing to reify 
the effects of violence on its victims this perspective emphasizes the ability for human 
agents to resist and change the meanings of violence.  I am not the first to write from this 
perspective. 
 
FROM DISCIPLINARY ASSIMILATION TO NEOLIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM  
Hale (2006) describes two qualitative shifts in the way that rural Mayans have 
been governed in the second half of the twentieth century.  Before the 1960s, indigenous 
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were treated as both “separate and unequal.”  As it sounds, indigenous were seen as 
clearly inferior “Indians” who were relegated to their subordinate status.  There was no 
hope for social advancement.  Basic education was not made available, and collective 
attempts at empowerment, almost nonexistent since the Democratic Revolution, were not 
tolerated.  After the early stage of genocidal violence, “the army sought not to eliminate 
but to control the indigenous population, not even to eliminate the material bases of 
Mayan culture, but rather to reshape them, with the utmost violence if necessary, cutting 
out the cancer of subversion and dissent, affirming a space to be Indian within constraints 
imposed by a fiercely militarized disciplinary state” (67).  After this point, the state 
embarked on a strategy of “disciplinary assimilation,” which offered “equality, cultural 
respect, and long term assimilation toward a dominant, (Ladino defined) norm of national 
unity” (72).  Meanwhile, the army worked in community development to “consolidate its 
image” as promoters of peace and reconstruction, while furthering the “two armies” 
discourse (68). The Catholic Church, by this time largely evacuated of more radical 
priests, echoed a similar version of this assimilationist message, which Hale qualifies as 
“universalist.”  
A second shift in state ideology came in the early 1990s due to pressure, funds 
and initiatives from Mayan organizations, international organizations ranging from small 
NGOs to the World Bank, and donor countries: “By the mid 1990s, state initiatives, 
programs and declarations in favor of multiculturalism had accumulated to the point 
where the basic principles stood beyond question: contemporary Mayan identity merits 
recognition and respect; Mayans have collective rights grounded in cultural difference 
(74).  The most compelling example of this shift is the Accord on Identity and Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which called for a deep and abiding change in the not only the 
official legal stance towards indigenous rights claims of all sorts, and also in the national 
 399 
character and self-conception.  This new state ideology came alongside a renewed 
commitment to neoliberal policies, evident as well in the limitations of the Accords and 
in the policies of the Arzú regime.  In the countryside, political parties began to seek 
Mayan candidates, who were able to redirect development funds towards the villages.  
Government institutions, as well as international donors, began to work directly on 
Mayan issues and target Mayan populations. Neoliberal multiculturalism, in this view, 
can recognize collectivities as subjects of special rights because the “key defining feature 
of neoliberalism is not strict, market oriented individualism, as many contend, but rather 
that restructuring society such that people come to govern themselves according to the 
tenets of global capitalism”(75). Simply put, the state valorizes and indeed promotes a 
neutralized version of Mayan politics, one incapable or not disposed towards massive 
collective political action, especially not of the kind that would threaten the existing 
social order. They also create new ambiguities, mainly the specific rights claims that can 
be attached to Mayan cultural difference.  Contemporary cultural politics contest these 
very spaces. 
Hale suggests that this message was reinforced by a wave of Mayan centered 
development initiatives, which strongly preferred to work directly with Mayans.  This 
new logic was also complemented, at least in Chimaltenango, by a shift to maquila 
production, which allowed indigenous to bypass Ladinos to enter the labor market.  
Moreover, Hale provides statistics that seem to indicate, again in Chimaltenango, a 
process whereby Mayan-majority towns to further “Mayanize” and for Ladino population 
centers to similarly concentrate amounting to a slow but noticeable “bifurcation of the 
racial demography,” that corresponds to “political ascendancy” of Mayans in Mayan 
towns, and Ladinos in Ladino strongholds (78).  This space was occupied by Mayan 
organizations, some of which made radical claims for collective rights, and a wave of 
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indigenous alcaldes, few of whom endorsed anything beyond the “indigenous 
universalist” position (80).4 However, by the end of the 1990s, doctrines of assimilation 
had been deeply critiqued by Mayan activists with support from international donors.  
As with the transition from “separate and unequal” to “disciplinary assimilation” 
the shift to neoliberal multiculturalism came in “jumps and starts,” and remains uneven 
and incomplete. Ultimately, Hale sees the apparent contradiction between residual and 
emergent forms is mutually productive “multiculturalism opens space for cultural 
recognition while disciplinary assimilation helps keep that space strictly limited” (82).  
The separation between leftist and Mayan politics is further cemented by a memory 
politics heavily influenced by state repression.  This mix of authoritarian assimilationism 
and neoliberal multiculturalism follows a continental trend in hybrid governance.   
Hale draws several conclusions regarding contemporary Mayan politics. Hale 
points to a layering of “disciplinary assimilation” and “neoliberal multiculturalism” 
which together “saturate Chimaltenango with mixed messages: repudiation of racism but 
continuation of the same ideas in a more gentle guise; respect for indigenous culture, yet 
subtle ongoing disdain for things Indian; encouragement of respectful intercultural 
relations, yet deep skepticism about people’s claims to be Mayan” (80).   This leaves 
people with, in general, two paths: 
With moderate access to resources, a supportive educational setting, positive role 
models, and organizational opportunities, indigenous Chimaltecos can 
successfully negotiate these contradictory messages and follow the path of Mayan 
empowerment.  However, many others find a path of least resistance in practices 
of assimilation, made more attractive by the power of universal rights (80). 
In such uncertain terrain, the clear tendency is for indigenous to affirm universalist 
ideologies and avoid strident cultural politics.  In this argument, this peculiar space 
created by this hybrid regime of governance also creates the conditions for FRG politics 
in the highlands.  He poses the question that the populist rhetoric of the FRG, with its 
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stronger identification with cultural rights than other parties, attracts Mayans who are 
disenchanted with or cynical regarding leftist politics.  The FRG is the party for Mayan-
centric indigenous.   
This reading of Guatemalan politics digests and makes analytical sense of an 
extraordinarily large body of data about a complicated set of interrelated processes.  By 
drawing our attention towards shifts in state ideology, it allows us to see the limitations 
and ambiguities in each, as well as points of transformation.  It shows Mayan agency on a 
shifting political terrain reorganized by power.  This analysis encourages an 
understanding of Mayan support for center-right and neoconservative regimes outside of 
the frames of state repression or false consciousness.  
The ethnographic data and analysis in this dissertation provide support for many 
aspects of this description.  They also add dimension to this picture, and complicates it on 
some key points.  It achieves this by focusing directly on Mayan responses to shifting 
state strategies, which themselves aim to produce spatial, affective and ideological 
effects.  This focus fleshes out how Mayans have experienced and responded to shifts in 
governing strategies, and provides key insights that further our understanding of current 
support for both conservative and neo-authoritarian regimes. In particular, my research 
suggests that Mayan support for neoauthoritarian regimes is not primarily ideological.  
The success of these parties only makes sense in relationship to the transformation of the 
Mayan political imaginaries and of the political field by counterinsurgency strategies. 
The success of the FRG has to be understood in relationship to the continued effects of 
counterinsurgency measures on local Mayan imaginaries of the state, development and 
community.  I provide a genealogy of how governance has effected transformations of 
the conceptual and affective structures through which rural Mayans understand politics 
and form their political identities and community relationships. I show how these 
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transformations result in a new Mayan-state relationship, characterized by a new 
imagination of the state and development that create new community divisions.   Seeing 
no viable political alternative, Mayans who share investments in both Mayan nationalism 
and revolutionary narratives engage in relationships to the state for short-term gains.  The 
pursuit of well-being through state sanctioned forms of development perpetuates the 
sense of powerlessness while undermining community relations.  The rise of the FRG is 
due to the fact that it is the party the most adept at identifying and exploiting these 
divisions.     
 
THE DISFIGURATION OF MAYAN POLITICS 
My investigation of the history of indigenous political organizing in San Pedro 
Necta shows how a distinctive political imaginary and field of possibility emerged when 
grassroots activism for ethnic equality and empowerment encountered the revolutionary 
movement in the mid-1970s.  Struggles for national level reforms inspired by 
revolutionary organizing and narratives were always constituted in a dialogic relationship 
to local struggles for ethnic equality.   Many rural Mayans in San Pedro Necta had either 
sympathized deeply with or had themselves participated enthusiastically in the 
revolution, despite deeply felt criticisms of their strategies and their cultural politics.  
Many Mayans that had participated fully had never fully trusted the guerrilla. The 
violence either killed, or drove into exile, the most active and charismatic members of 
that generation of Mayan political activists. The pattern of state violence in San Pedro 
indicates a concerted attempt to break the link between indigenous identity and radical 
politics of any kind.   
Starting with these initial kidnappings and assassinations, counterinsurgency 
strategies progressively undermined the conceptual, narrative, and affective conditions of 
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leftist and progressive politics, creating new spaces for political agency. In a testimony to 
Mayan political agency, new political organizations formed in Mayan communities after 
extreme violence and during intense militarization.  Their goals were development and 
Mayan inclusion in town politics.  State strategies also opened new spaces for these 
political movements, which occupied them cautiously.  Past and continued 
counterinsurgency governing strategies altered the conceptions and narratives that 
animated these Mayan activists, and forced them to seek their goals on a completely 
different political terrain.  
My research revealed that most Mayans in San Pedro, regardless of class, 
religion, or political party, identify with what Hale would call “Mayan-centric” 
ideologies.  In addition, they tend to embrace most of the ideological positions of the 
revolutionary left, if not their specific strategies, and even though they tend not to 
participate in these groups.  They continue to be enthralled with leftist narratives of 
capital and the state. Even many of those who do not outwardly espouse leftist politics or 
political strategies, find themselves in agreement with most of the core tenets of the 
revolutionary worldview. There are strong counter-state identifications, anti-capitalist 
sentiments, all meshed and seen as continuous with a strong current of opposition to 
Ladino domination.  It is obvious when talking to Mayans that even though revolutionary 
thinking, even when the specific relationship to leftist politics in the past is denied and to 
the extent that it is inconsistent with other forms of politics or ideologies, still remains a 
solid foothold in common sense.  The long-term effects of these counter-insurgency 
strategies on the directions and strategies of this movement, twenty years later, gave 
traction to FRG politics, a party that was anathema to the Mayan activists who started the 
local movement. They have, temporarily at least, lost control of the movement that they 
helped to found.   
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My chapter on memory provides additional insight into Hale’s discussion of how 
official memory came to dominate among rural Mayans. During the war, Mayans were 
invested in the two armies narrative strategy for their lives.  In addition it shows that, 
rather than persuasion, post-violence identities formed around, and became invested in, 
state-sanctioned truths about the Mayan political past. In the decade and a half after the 
decisive military defeat of the guerrilla, the ability for certain people to think of 
themselves, and be thought of as intelligent according to discourses of capacidad, as 
ethical subjects according to discourses of human rights, and as a legitimate victims 
according to discourses of state definitions of criminality, performs a similar function.  
These investments in specific contours of an emerging sanctioned identity created the 
conditions for the perpetuation of what first arose as a strategic denial, dovetailing with 
an new state legitimation strategy that allowed limited criticism of state violence, within a 
larger discursive frame that also condemned the guerrilla.  Alongside the reshaping of 
identities, opportunistic Mayans espouse ahistorical discourses that sanitize the army’s 
role in past violence and obscure past Mayan politics.   
These processes have stifled local memorial processes, and have resulted in the 
contemporary conceptual separation between Mayan and revolutionary struggles and 
profoundly shapes the way that Mayan advancement is imagined and practiced by the 
new generation of Mayan political leaders.  One of the most devastating consequences is 
a historical amnesia and a corresponding political disorientation among an emerging 
generation of Mayan professionals and among political leaders who know little of the 
origins of the Mayan movement locally or nationally, and have little understanding of the 
stakes of the revolutionary movement. This disorientation is especially pronounced 
among FRG candidates, selected, it seems, for their opportunism and their ignorance of 
the stakes of past political struggles as much as their charisma and Mayan identity.  
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Nevertheless, despite these investments, the new discourses taking hold in the political 
spaces opened by the Peace Accords have begun a process of rethinking and re-narrating 
official history, as well as the narrative frames that have dominated for the last decade 
and a half.  
In addition to these effects on local memorial processes, state violence affects 
Mayan sense of the politically possible and of their own political agency.  State violence 
continues to target groups whose actions challenge state authority, aim to influence state 
policy, or challenge the prerogatives of capital.  The spectacle of violence dramatizes the 
power of the state to dominate autonomous social movements. Violence actively 
constrains conceptions of the politically possible, gutting their understanding of the 
viability of the new “democratic” political spaces. Violence has rewritten revolutionary 
narratives of empowerment and national level reform, replacing them with a palpable 
cynicism, which is linked to political inaction.  The only sphere where substantial, and 
seemingly lasting gains have been achieved is in the field of local race relations.  Mayans 
have taken over local politics in a majority of highland towns, seemingly for good.  As 
far as this goes, there is no indication that Mayans see these victories as creating any 
openings for their national level political aspirations.  The state is still a specter, a 
vampire that watches and waits. The level of selective violence characteristic of 
Guatemala today may not seem out of the range of the normal, and it obviously meets the 
feeble international expectations for democratic states, but it is more devastating due to 
the recent history of extreme violence that each attack.  Each attack on autonomous social 
movement reminds the Mayan and poor population of past violence, assuring them that 
democracy has its limits. This might be why when it happens it is exaggerated, why it 
makes a point of crossing the line into the realm of illegality.  To the extent that violence 
is necessary to assure Mayan submission to the Guatemalan social order, it is also 
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undermines the claims to legitimacy of the social order, which, ever since the Peace 
Accords, increasingly bases its claims to legitimacy in the protection of Mayans as full 
citizens.  Continued acts of violence contradict these messages, and generate widespread 
unrest.  The question to be answered in the post-revolutionary era is whether violence 
will generate more protests against the state, or more submission.  
Now that Mayan politics, at least in some form, is sanctioned, and the movement 
is growing, and as the threat of violence wanes, it will be especially difficult for the state 
to manage the forms of historical imagination and politics that emerge in these groups. 
Near the end of his life, José Antulio Morales spearheaded a move to the left and towards 
a cultural rights focus among his political organization. The reason this move failed, and 
why the FRG won instead, was due to the fact that counterinsurgency strategy has 
steadily eroded the political ground these movements occupied.  
Regularized selective violence is not the only modality through which 
disempowering state imaginaries are reproduced.  More important than violence in this 
regard, while never independent of it, is project-centered state development.   More than 
through acts of violence, the ritualized provision of “development” is the primary 
medium through which rural Mayans encounter “the state.” Conservative parties 
responded to post-violence Mayan organizing, a few years after these groups congealed, 
with offers of development and key mayoral positions, provided that communities stay 
out of leftist politics and affiliate with their parties. Mayans, for whom development 
represented increased quality of life and equality with Ladinos, accepted this arrangement 
and waited for new political openings. The army, political parties and state officials 
narrate this form of “apolitical” development as a sanctioned and idealized route to full 
Mayan inclusion in national political and economic life.  This narrative promises that 
infrastructure and assistance programs will rebuild war-torn communities.  They also 
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demonstrate the state’s commitment to promoting and protecting Mayan culture and 
autonomy.   
The Mayan-state relationship constituted through development that predominates 
today could never have come into existence without the prior effects of extreme state 
violence on the population.  Prior to its conditioning on party affiliation, promises of aid 
are predicated on political obedience. In these spaces and activities, Mayans perform a 
supplicatory act, consistent with the disciplinary assimilation, in which they make 
appeals to the all-powerful state, appeals that affect the very quantity of life itself.  Life is 
not defined by the desire of Mayans for a transformed society, but in the terms dictated 
by the state itself: discrete, selectively provided development projects.  Through a 
combination of politicization and scarcity, project-centered state development acts 
directly on the affects generated by state violence. Not only do Mayans humble 
themselves in front of the state in ritualized development practice, they also submit to 
new forms of surveillance. They also make themselves and their desires visible to 
bureaucrats in parties and institutions, to whom they make promises of support, giving 
groups with no ethical commitment to the community great influence over community 
dynamics.  Through development, the threat of state power to withhold life is a 
background detail in Mayan imaginaries, always present and acknowledged in state 
efforts to preserve life.  This is experienced in everyday life as the threat of scarcity and 
of being “left out.”  In this imaginary, the threat of exclusion from resources is 
represented by the desires for survival of ones’ own neighbors.  Community conflicts 
over development projects—material instantiations of life itself—have become brutal and 
calcified, and they have driven the idea of a collective political project further from the 
realm of the thinkable. In this context, almost any project that does not benefit every 
community member is experienced as a loss to others, and becomes an impediment to 
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community cohesion.  Unity is a scarce quantity as every family and individual fends for 
their self.  
Violence and development, although distinct mechanisms of power, work 
synergistically to make new forms of governance possible.  Development programs do 
not only affect Mayan politics due to the way that they reshape Mayan imaginaries of the 
state, they exert a powerful form of spatial control, investing Mayans in community level 
conflicts that define lines between families, village sub-sectors, and party affiliates all the 
more rigidly with each electoral cycle. As Mayans are included through development, 
they are neutralized politically, their capacity for collective action and collective 
empowerment are deeply impaired.  Pursuit of individual and subgroup well-being and 
interests undermine group interests and community cohesion. This dominant trend is, 
indeed, how the strategy seems designed to work, a sort of arrangement whereby political 
parties share the responsibility of governing Mayan communities as they compete for 
Mayan votes.  
At the same time, the state’s shift to development has opened new possibilities for 
Mayan political agency, most crucially by redefining the terms of the Mayan-state 
relationship.  Now state legitimacy is increasingly contingent on its commitment and 
ability to respond to local desires for resources, economic security, and ethnic equality 
through development. Parties compete with one another to incite and satisfy these desires 
to gain a political following.  Yet, contradictions inherent in the state’s move to ground 
its legitimacy on its commitment and ability to respond to Mayan desires for resources 
and empowerment through development, on the one hand, and the dismal outcome of 
state programs, on the other, produce new forms of political opposition.  
Development definitely works with and reprograms the same types of affects and 
understandings that are the target of state violence. But we can also look at both violence 
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and development reactive, as signs of insecurity emitted by a state that is unsure about its 
own claims legitimacy and its ability to dominate the “democratic” political field.  State 
activities involve a desperate desire to “look” or appear in control, in order, it seems, to 
stay in control.  The potential for collective Mayan agency, if it coalesced into a united 
political bloc, is larger than the power of the state to repress it.  It would transform the 
country.  The promise of full citizenship for Mayans, Xincas and Garifunas holds this 
possibility, even if these are undermined by other parts of those agreements, as well as 
the subsequent reneging upon these agreements by the elite, who, internal divisions aside, 
is in complete agreement on the basic tenets of democratic governance: limited selective 
violence and divide and conquer pacification-style development politics.   
The vast majority of rural Mayans view the state as an illegitimate source of 
authority.  For many of them, these acts of self-conjuring are transparent. But the state is 
remystified in these demysticifations of the agent of mystification, a real intentional 
agent.  This remystified state is widely viewed as nearly omnipotent and everpresent, 
with the knowledge and the capability to destroy. As Nelson says that Mayans see the 
state as a piñata, a source of treats (1999). The question is not whether or not Mayans 
think the state is legitimate, but whether or not legitimacy is what matters when what one 
is doing is imagining the likely result of collective political agency. 
Signs of unrest in this outrageous and shameful approach to governance are 
everywhere.  Mayans across the political spectrum, from different parties and different 
economic classes voice resistance to violence, corruption, favoritism, divisions, false 
promises of aid, the failure of projects to combat poverty, and resource extraction–all 
framed in local moral idioms. The state’s responsibility to provide development and its 
failure to deliver are constantly invoked. These protests have proliferated and become 
more urgent.  Mayan activists from different generations increasingly invoke the state’s 
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new role as defender of life to criticize political strategies that prolong the apartheid-like 
exclusion and exploitation of Mayans by destroying their hope and their communities.  
Ironically, FRG-aligned Mayans tapped into widespread anger over these issues to win 
San Pedro’s local elections in 2003.  FRG development strategies involve targeting 
communities and community sub-sectors towards groups excluded from past rounds of 
development.  Despite their moralizing rhetoric about project distribution, the FRG’s own 
party strategies furthered these processes on their own watch, entrenching the project-
centric notion of politics, dependency relations and political divisions.  
Complicating the effects of violence, and violent, project-centered development, 
state agrarian modernization programs have a complicated and shifting relationship to 
Mayan politics in the last thirty years, including an unexpected role in Mayan 
authoritarianism.  Years before project-centered development became a commonplace 
fact of life in Mayan villages, agrarian modernization and education were offered as a 
sanctioned path out of poverty.   Mayan leaders responded enthusiastically to promises of 
economic prosperity framing state initiatives like DIGESA, reading their civilizing 
discourse and disciplinary pedagogy as an antidote for colonial marginalization.  My 
research fills in a central piece of the puzzle described by Hale, outlining the conditions 
under which “universalist” conceptions of politics (what I refer to as depoliticizing 
elements) came to saturate the political field and capture the imagination of post-violence 
Mayan political organizations.  Although grassroots conceptions of betterment and 
advancement certainly existed, and definitely informed the autonomous cooperative 
movement, state programs like DIGESA redefined these notions in particular ways.  I 
argue that a central element of this redefinition was the notion of the self as a life project, 
as an enterprise—something to be calculated, planned, and invested.  This was conceived 
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of as an individual process, a succession of responsible, “modern” choices. These notions 
were selectively appropriated by Mayans.    
Discourses of capacidad have had a significant impact on Mayan communities 
and Mayan politics.  Capacidad provided the moral basis for Mayan political ascendance, 
by providing a neutral standard on which Mayan political movements in the mid-1980s 
and early 1990s could be compared to Ladinos and challenge their authority. While 
universalist, capacidad was not totally “assimilationist”: the term capacidad was revoiced 
to fit Mayans needs for political empowerment. In the same process, capacidad altered 
local conceptions of inequality and political alternatives.  The uneven spread of practices 
of capacidad have advanced alongside, and probably intensified, processes of 
stratification within Mayan communities that had begun with cash cropping.  Capacidad 
and superacion, was only a reality only for a small percentage of rural Mayans, due to the 
fact that most people could not afford to send their children to school, and that capacidad 
did not always, or even most often, lead to superacion. Nevertheless, its notions of 
responsible intelligent economic choices as a recipe for individual economic 
advancement inform local thinking about social inequality.  A substantial number of 
young professional and highly educated or capacitated Mayans to believe in rhetoric of 
the economic policies associated with new Free Trade Amendments.  Many more 
economically comfortable Mayans perceive of poverty as less of a political problem, and 
primarily as an individual shortcoming or choice. People who had already made it or 
from well off families had personal reasons to espouse this narrative, despite its ill fit 
with the precariousness of the local economic situation.  These discourses allow certain 
individuals to experience their own success as evidence of personal achievement or 
possession of a unique quality.  These depoliticizing, universalist notions had become so 
powerful that they it had almost completely eclipsed revolutionary narratives about the 
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causes and solutions to poverty. Discourses of individual blame crowd out critiques of 
structural inequality.  This was evident in wave of Mayan political organizing in San 
Pedro in the 1990s.  
Divisions based on notions of capacidad also helped create the conditions for a 
neo-authoritarian resurgence in the highlands. Alongside and through these processes, 
capacidad became a neutral or objective standard for assessing the relative value of 
persons.  People with more capacidad were more important, more credible and more 
worth of respect.  Jokes and insults about less capacitated people and families became 
common. Discourses of capacidad fostered a form of discrimination among Mayans.  
This is exacerbated by the fact that a few men seen as most embodying these norms of 
capacidad monopolized community leadership positions, and often became abusive and 
arrogant.  The resulting division was politically exploitable.  The FRG fields politically 
inexperienced, cynical, opportunistic and corrupt or corruptible candidates.  Often these 
politicians are only minimally literate, were excluded from leadership positions in 
previous postwar Mayan political organizations, and many have little conception of the 
stakes of past political movements. 
 
CODA 
Sampedranos would not support the FRG if they thought they could vote for a 
more progressive party and that that vote would be efficacious act of political agency, in 
other words, that it could change the national racial political hierarchy.  Even given the 
unnatural foreclosure on the field of possible political options, Mayans would not support 
the FRG unless some Mayans saw it as the only way to access scarce and badly needed 
resources.  And it is also unlikely that this party would have found local leaders willing to 
represent it, given the ridicule of their neighbors and their own unwholesome feelings and 
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misgiving about supporting a pro-military party, if they were not so angry about being 
excluded and disrespected—not to mention left out of corruption money—in their own 
villages by their own neighbors.  Few FRG supporters believe that the populist rhetoric is 
anything more than rhetoric.  They still distrust, loathe, and fear the state.  But they do 
know that politics brings “treats,” and they are also aware of the very limited nature of 
these treats.  
These findings have relevance for political actors on the ground. They clarify the 
limits of neoliberal multiculturalism, particularly its complicity with colonial governance. 
It also shows how authoritarian governance continues to produce effects on Mayan 
politics, and also how these effects operate through, not just alongside, the very 
mechanisms of neoliberal multiculturalism.  Furthermore, this work provides a map of 
governance and state effects that can assist in local political actors reflections on the 
pitfalls and spaces of opportunity in state strategies.  By drawing attention to the micro-
practices through which political common sense, investments, and habits of being and 
feeling are reproduced, this work hopes to open a space for reflection on alternatives. 
 
                                                
NOTES 
1 Following the Peace Accords and a string of internationally approved elections, 
Guatemala is widely understood to be “in transition” towards democracy.  The departure 
of the UN’s Mission to Guatemala (MINUGUA) in 2005 gave the feel that a substantial 
part of this transition has already occurred. NGO’s are withdrawing from Guatemala as 
international funding looks for other areas, recently affected by the ongoing wars. Public 
declarations by the Bush administration, coupled with the restoration of military aid cut 
off by Carter, further confirm Guatemala’s passage. 
2 The Guatemalan media repeatedly draws attention to the ironic chasm between claims 
by the left to represent the rural Mayan population, on the one hand, and the small 
number of those same people who actually get on their feet to support leftist politics, on 
the other.  Conservatives herald this as evidence of staunch grassroots opposition to 
reformist political goals and methods. In the same way that the army described 
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counterinsurgency measures like the PAC as “voluntary,” they want to naturalize Mayan 
neo-authoritarianism. 
3 In the current climate, “defending democracy” has become the new mantra for efforts 
by the Guatemalan right to de-legitimate leftist organizations.  In lockstep with the Bush 
administration’s rhetoric, the Guatemalan government and media depict social movement 
tactics as threats to private property, free movement, national development—all of which 
are seen as essential to democracy and freedom.  The war on terror began with the idea 
that the world is divisible between those that support democracy and freedom defined as 
the advance of the neoliberal world order—us—and those who do not: terrorists or 
terrorist supporters.3  Commitment to supporting the US is far more important than 
upholding international norms for human rights.  Minimal reform and lip service to 
democratic ideals is sufficient in this cynical discourse, which poses as and passes for 
realism. 
4 Hale identifies two major ideological groupings in Mayan communities, the “Mayan 
centered” and the “universalists,” which he associates with a distinction between Mayan 
empowerment and “practices of assimilation.” Universalists, including most new Mayan 
alcaldes who support center-right parties, are in the majority. Mayan-centrists refuse the 
universalist politics that affirms equality with no changes to account for historical 
exclusion.  Universalists ignore cultural rights activism, out of “fear, resignation, or 
political philosophy.”  Hale sees this division as fluid, and also hard to quantify given 
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